with the hypocrisy of the heterodox, you proceed against the orthodox and the patristic sayings put forward by us, I know not how, you attempt to do away with, and you would give many cause to fear that by feigning things toward the Latins you are also proposing us. But let us take up the matter more clearly and set it forth, what it was of the unlikely things we said that the philosopher was to bear mildly.

Of divine things, some are known, some are sought, and there are some which are also demonstrated, but others are entirely unsearchable and untraceable, with no trace at all appearing of those who have passed over to that hidden thing. The philosopher took these things hard, and collecting himself as much as possible, he uses the power of his arguments against us, declaring nothing of divine things to be knowable or demonstrable; but that the things said by us are also agreeable to the fathers, the things said before are sufficient to show, and that some of their theologies bear demonstration as an inscription, this I do not think anyone who loves them is ignorant of, so that he who says there is no demonstration for any of the divine things attempts to contradict the fathers rather than us. For this thing of demonstration, lying in between, can signify another kind of showing; but how could it be inscribed, if what was written below were not properly a demonstration?

But if demonstration also signifies a perfect and firm showing, after which there is no more perfect discovery of truth, just as the verdict in courts of law, what is more perfect and more firm for us than the patristic demonstrations, so that this for us is properly a demonstration, wherefore also the sacred and divine Hierotheus, who bears his name, is testified to be above the many sacred (p. 538) teachers not "by purity of mind alone and the other sacred discourses, but also by the precision of his demonstrations"; and he himself who testifies such things about him and who loftily unfolded the condensed and lofty character of his theology clearly teaches that theology is twofold: "the one mystical, initiatory, secret, ineffable, which acts and establishes one in God by unteachable initiations, the other manifest and philosophical and demonstrative, which persuades and binds fast the truth of what is said." How then did he not name this dialectical, but demonstrative, O philosopher, although it is not directed simply to the faithful, for they do not need persuasion?

Nevertheless, even if it were not so clearly inscribed and written by them, the points of contradiction are thus clearly referred to them. For just as if someone should attempt to contradict the one who composes the divine names from opposites, for those who have said God is the same and other, and great and small, and on behalf of similar pious men, saying "He who becomes all things in all for the salvation of each, and who gives himself in many ways and suitably to those who turn to him, and who is likened in many forms in the hands of the prophets, how could he be the same, and again, how could the ageless one, who is contained in all things, who has gone forth from all mass, be great?"; just as therefore the one who says these things does not simply contend with the one who said God is the same or great, but sets up the sacred Scripture itself against itself (for 'other' concerning God and 'small' spoken by it will again be overturned in the same manner; for that which surpasses all things and extends beyond all things— to the one who says that some divine things are demonstrable but others are not, he who says that nothing (p. 540) of the divine things is demonstrable, for there is no contact with him nor knowledge, uses the divine Scripture against itself, having shown the things in it warring against one another by means of one another; for if it is because there is no contact with God and no knowledge that there is no demonstration, then because these things do exist, there will be a demonstration also.

What then is the conclusion from these things and what is incontrovertible and in agreement with Scripture

ὑποκρίσει τῶν ἑτεροφρόνων, χωρεῖς κατά τῶν ὁμοφρόνων καί τάς πατρικάς φωνάς παρ᾿ ἡμῶν προτεινομένας, οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως, ἀναιρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖς καί πολλοῖς ἄν δοίης δεδιέναι μή καί τά πρός Λατίνους ὑποκρινόμενος ἡμᾶς προτείνεις. Ἀλλ᾿ ἀναλαβόντες σαφέστερον προεκθώμεθα, τί λεγόντων ἡμῶν τόν φιλόσοφον πράως ἐνεγκεῖν τῶν ἀπεικότων ἦν.

Τῶν θείων τά μέν γινώσκεται, τά δέ ζητεῖται, ἔστι δ᾿ ἅ καί ἀποδείκνυται, ἕτερα δέ ἐστιν ἀνεξερεύνητα πάντῃ καί ἀνεξιχνίαστα, μηδαμῶς ἐμφαινομένου τινός ἴχνους τῶν ἐπί τό κρύφιον ἐκεῖνο διαβεβηκότων. Ταῦτα βαρέως ἤνεγκεν ὁ φιλόσοφος, καί συναγαγών ἑαυτόν ὡς οἷόν τε καθ᾿ ἡμῶν χρῆται τῇ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, οὐδέν γνωστόν οὐδέ ἀποδεικτόν τῶν θείων ἀποφαινόμενος˙ ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μέν καί τοῖς πατρᾶσιν συνδοκεῖ τά παρ᾿ ἡμῶν εἰρημένα καί τά προειρημένα ἱκανά δηλῶσαι, τό δέ καί τῶν ἐκείνων θεολογιῶν ἔστιν ἅς ἐπίγραμμα φέρειν τήν ἀπόδειξιν, τοῦτ᾿ οὐκ οἶμαί τινα τῶν ταύτας στεργόντων ἀγνοεῖν, ὥσθ᾿ ὁ λέγων μή εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων τοῖς πατρᾶσι μᾶλλον ἤ ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν ἐγχειρεῖν. Μεταξύ γάρ τό τῆς ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο κείμενον ἔνι δηλοῦν ἑτέραν δεῖξιν˙ ἐπιγεγραμμένον δέ πῶς ἄν εἴη, εἰ μή κυρίως ἀπόδειξις εἴη τό ὑπογεγραμμένον;

Εἰ δέ καί τήν τελείαν καί βεβαίαν δεῖξιν ἀπόδειξις δηλοῖ, μεθ᾿ ἥν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθείας εὕρεσις τελεωτέρα, καθάπερ ἐπί τῶν δικαστηρίων ἡ ἀπόφασις, τί τελεώτερον καί βεβαιότερον τῶν πατρικῶν ἀποδείξεων ἡμῖν, ὥστε τοῦθ᾿ ἡμῖν κυρίως ἀπόδειξις, διό καί ὁ ἱερός καί θεῖος φερώνυμος Ἱερόθεος ὑπέρ τούς πολλούς μαρτυρεῖται τῶν ἱερῶν (σελ. 538) διδασκάλων οὐ «καθαρότητι νοῦ μόνον καί ταῖς ἄλλαις ἱερολογίαις, ἀλλά καί τῇ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἀκριβείᾳ»˙ καί αὐτός δέ ὁ τά τοιαῦτα τούτῳ μαρτυρῶν καί τό συνεπτυγμένον καί ὑψηλόν τῆς ἐκείνου θεολογίας ὑψηλῶς ἀναπτύξας διττήν σαφῶς εἶναι διδάσκει τήν θεολογίαν˙ «τήν μέν μυστικήν, τελεστικήν, ἀπόρρητον, ἄρρητον, ἥ δρᾷ καί ἐνιδρύει τῷ Θεῷ ταῖς ἀδιδάκτοις μυσταγωγίαις, τήν δέ ἐμφανῆ καί φιλόσοφον καί ἀποδεικτικήν, ἥ πείθει καί καταδεῖται τῶν λεγομένων τήν ἀλήθειαν». Πῶς οὖν οὐ διαλετικήν ταύτην, ἀλλ᾿ ἀποδεικτικήν ὠνόμασεν, ὦ φιλόσοφε, καίτοι μή πρός τούς πιστούς ἁπλῶς οὖσαν, οὐδέ γάρ πειθοῦς οὗτοι δέονται;

Οὐ μήν ἀλλ᾿ εἰ καί μή σαφῶς οὕτω παρ᾿ αὐτῶν ἐγγεγραμμένον τε καί ἐπιγεγραμμένον ἦν, τά γοῦν τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως καί οὕτω πρός ἐκείνους ἀναφέρεται σαφῶς. Ὡς γάρ εἴ τις τῷ ταὐτόν καί ἕτερον καί μέγα καί μικρόν εἰπόντων τόν Θεόν κἀπί τῶν παραπλησίων εὐσεβῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συντιθέντι τάς θεωνυμίας ἀντιλέγειν ἐγχειροίη, λέγων «ὁ ἐν πᾶσι πάντα διά τήν σωτηρίαν ἑκάστου γινόμενος, καί τοῖς πρός αὐτόν ἐπιστρέφουσι πολυτρόπως τε καί καταλλήλως ἐπιδιδούς ἑαυτόν καί πολυειδῶς ἐν χερσί τῶν προφητῶν ὁμοιούμενος, πῶς ὁ αὐτός ἄν εἴη, καί αὖθις ὁ ἀπήλικος, ὁ ἐν πᾶσι χωρῶν, ὁ παντός ἐκβεβηκώς ὄγκου πῶς μέγας;»˙ ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐρίζει πρός τόν ταὐτόν ἤ μέγαν τόν Θεόν εἰπόντα ἀλλά τήν ἱεράν ἀνίστησι Γραφήν αὐτήν καθ᾿ ἑαυτῆς (καί τό ἕτερον γάρ ἐπί Θεοῦ καί τό μικρόν παρ᾿ αὐτῆς λεγόμενον πάλιν τόν αὐτόν ἀνατραπήσεται τρόπον˙ τό γάρ πάντα ὑπερβάλλον καί πάντων ὑπερεκτεινόμενον τῷ λέγοντι ὡς τά μέν τῶν θείων ἀποδεικτά ἐστι, τά δ᾿ οὔ, καί λέγων ὡς οὐδέν ἀποδεικτόν (σελ. 540) τῶν θείων, ἐπαφή γάρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἐπιστήμη, τῇ θείᾳ Γραφῇ καθ᾿ ἑαυτῆς χρῆται, τά ἐν αὐτῇ κατ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἐκπεπολεμωμένα δι᾿ ἀλλήλων δείξας˙ εἰ γάρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαφή Θεοῦ καί ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ ἀπόδειξις, καί ὅτι ἔστι ταῦτα, καί ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.

Τί δή τό ἐκ τούτων συναγόμενον καί τό ἄμαχόν τε καί ὁμόλογον τῇ Γραφῇ