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similar to this in all respects is: “Therefore he who falls on it will be broken, and on whomever it falls, it will scatter him.”

(p. 500) But let us consider from what source the philosopher constructs his argument that there is no vision beyond all intellectual activities, having first said this, that we know that to be nameless and above-name, about which our discourse is concerned. For if we call it vision, yet we know it to be beyond vision, and if anyone wishes to call it intellection, believing or knowing through experience that it is also beyond intellection, in this he agrees with us. Therefore let all thoughts and visions that are systematically affirmed and denied be set aside by him as futile and of no account to us and to the present discussion. But that there is a vision beyond all intellection, he has neither understood nor believed. We would have pardoned him for not understanding, since to understand what is beyond understanding is not in our nature or in the practices related to it; and we would have accepted him for not believing completely, knowing that according to the apostle it is necessary “to receive the one who is weak in faith.” But to attempt to pervert believers and to use contentious writings against them and against the truth and to hasten in every way to cause to stumble not only the little ones, but also those advanced in virtue and piety—who, choosing to be a servant of the truth, could bear this in silence? He, therefore, has neither understood nor believed that there is a vision and intellection beyond all vision and intellection, being both above-name and possessing names that fall short of it; and as for what he thinks the theologians call beyond intellect, namely, theology by way of negation, even this he himself agrees is not beyond intellect. “For they deny,” he says, “things that are known, not things that are not known;” and we know that in this theology the intellect thinks about what is unfit for God, so that not even this theology has surpassed the intellectual activities.

And concerning the vision beyond intellect, we would say this, that if our intellect did not have the power to ascend above itself, (p. 502) there would be no vision and intellection beyond the intellectual activities; but since it does have this power and through it alone is properly united with God, a power which proceeds into activity through Him at the time of prayer, there is therefore a vision beyond all intellectual activities, which we call vision beyond intellection. How then, since this is no more non-intellection than intellection, will it be a part of universal knowledge? And how will it be counter-divided into its species? For none of the wise has ever divided substance into corporeal, incorporeal, and super-substantial, nor sensation into the five senses and that which is beyond sensation. For how could that which is above substance be under substance, and that which is above sensation be under sensation? Thus, therefore, that which is above knowledge is not a species of knowledge. And that the intellect has the power to transcend itself and through this power to be united with what is superior to itself, the great Dionysius says most clearly; and he does not say this simply, but also indicates that such knowledge is among the most necessary things for Christians: “For it is necessary,” he says, “to know that our intellect has, on the one hand, a power for intellection, through which it sees intelligible things, and, on the other hand, a union which transcends the nature of the intellect, through which it is joined to the things beyond itself.” Inasmuch, then, as it transcends the nature of the intellect, it is beyond all intellectual activities and is not knowledge, by way of eminence; and inasmuch as it is a link between intellect and God, it is incomparably better than the power which binds the intellect to created things, that is, knowledge.

But how does our opponent construct his argument that there is no vision beyond all intellectual activities? “Because,” he says, “nothing is higher than theology by way of abstraction.” But the contemplation of theology is one thing, O best of men, since it is not the same to say something about

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ταύτῃ παραπλήσιός ἐστιν ἐν πᾶσιν˙ «ὁ πεσών οὖν ἐπ᾿ αὐτόν συντριβήσεται, καί ἐφ᾿ ὅν ἄν πέσῃ, λικμήσει αὐτόν».

(σελ. 500) Ἡμεῖς δέ σκεψώμεθα πόθεν ὁ φιλόσοφος κατασκευάζει ὡς ὑπέρ πάσας τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας ὅρασις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο πρότερον εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνώνυμόν τε καί ὑπερώνυμον ἐκεῖνο ἴσμεν, περί οὗ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος. Εἰ γοῦν καί ὅρασιν αὐτό φαμεν, ἀλλά καί ὑπέρ ὅρασιν αὐτό ὑπάρχον ἐπιστάμεθα, κἄν τις ἐθέλῃ νόησιν αὐτό καλεῖν, ὅτι καί ὑπέρ νόησίν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο πιστεύων ἤ διά τῆς πείρας ἐπιστάμενος, κατά τοῦθ᾿ ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖ. Τά γοῦν συντεταγμένως καταφασκόμενά τε καί ἀποφασκόμενα νοήματά τε καί ὁράματα αὐτῷ παρείσθω πάνθ᾿ ὡς μάταια καί μηδέν ὄντα πρός ἡμᾶς καί τόν προκείμενον λόγον. Ὅτι δέ ἐστιν ὅρασις ὑπέρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, ἐκεῖνος μέν οὐκ ἐνόησεν οὐδέ ἐπίστευσεν, ἡμεῖς δέ καί μή νοοῦντι συνέγνωμεν ἄν, ἐπειδή τό ὑπέρ νοῦν νοεῖν οὐκ ἔνι φύσει τῇ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς καί ταῖς κατ᾿ αὐτήν μελέταις, καί μή πάντῃ πιστεύοντα παρεδεξάμεθ᾿ ἄν, χρῆν εἰδότες κατά τόν ἀπόστολον «τόν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει προσλαμβάνεσθαι». Τό δέ καί τούς πιστεύοντας περιτρέπειν ἐγχειρεῖν καί συγγράμμασιν ἐναγωνίοις χρῆσθαι κατ᾿ αὐτῶν τε καί τῆς ἀληθείας καί παντί τρόπῳ σκανδαλίζειν σπεύδειν οὐ τούς μικρούς μόνον, ἀλλά καί τούς προήκοντας ἀρετῇ καί εὐσεβείᾳ, τοῦτο δέ τίς ἄν ἐνέγκοι σιωπῇ τῆς ἀληθείας θεραπευτής εἶναι προαιρούμενος; Ἐκεῖνος μέν οὖν ὡς ἔστιν ὅρασις καί νόησις ὑπέρ πᾶσαν ὅρασιν καί νόησιν, ὑπερώμενός τε οὖσα καί ἀποδεούσας ἑαυτῆς κεκτημένη τάς ἐπωνυμίας οὐκ ἐνόησεν, οὐδέ ἐπίστευσε, καί ὅ δέ ὑπέρ νοῦν λέγειν τούς θεολόγους οἴεται, τήν κατά ἀπόφασιν θεολογίαν, οὐδέ τοῦτ᾿ εἶναι ὑπέρ νοῦν καί αὐτός ὁμολογεῖ. «Τά γάρ ἐγνωσμένα», φησίν, «ἀποφάσκουσιν, οὐ τά μή ἐγνωσμένα»˙ καί ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ὡς ἐν τῇ θεολογίᾳ ταύτῃ τά ἀπεφαίνοντα τῷ Θεῷ διανοεῖται ὁ νοῦς, ὥστ᾿ οὐδ᾿ αὕτη ἡ θεολογία τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας ὑπερβέβηκε.

Περί δέ τῆς ὑπέρ νοῦν ὁράσεως τοῦτ᾿ ἄν εἴποιμεν, ὡς, εἰ μέν οὐκ εἶχεν ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ὑπεραναβαίνειν ἑαυτόν, (σελ. 502) οὐδ᾿ ἄν ἦν ὑπέρ τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας ὅρασις καί νόησις˙ ἐπεί δέ καί ταύτην ἔχει τήν δύναμιν καί κατά ταύτην μόνην κυρίως ἑνοῦται τῷ Θεῷ, δι᾿ αὐτοῦ κατά τόν καιρόν τῆς προσευχῆς προϊοῦσαν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ἔστιν ἄρα ὑπέρ τάς νοεράς πάσας ἐνεργείας ὅρασις, ἥν ὅρασιν ὑπέρ νόησίν φαμεν˙ ὅ τοίνυν οὐ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἀνοησία ἤ νόησις, πῶς μόριον ἔσται τῆς καθόλου γνώσεως; Πῶς δ᾿ ἀντιδιαιρεθήσεται τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτῆς; Οὐδέ γάρ τήν οὐσίαν διεῖλέ ποτέ τις τῶν σοφῶν εἰς σῶμα καί ἀσώματον καί ὑπερούσιον, οὐδέ τήν αἴσθησιν εἴς τε τάς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καί τό ὑπέρ αἴσθησιν˙ τό γάρ ὑπέρ τήν οὐσίαν, πῶς ἄν εἴη ὑπό τήν οὐσίαν καί ὑπ᾿ αἴσθησιν τό ὑπέρ αἴσθησιν; Οὕτως ἄρα οὐδέ τό ὑπέρ τήν γνῶσιν, γνώσεως εἶδος. Ὅτι δέ ἔχει δύναμιν ὑπερβαίνειν ἑαυτόν ὁ νοῦς καί δι᾿ αὐτῆς τοῖς ἑαυτόῦ κρείττοσιν ἑνοῦσθαι καί ὁ μέγας ∆ιονύσιος ἀριδηλότατά φησι, καί οὐχ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο λέγει, ἀλλά καί τήν τοιαύτην εἴδησιν χριστιανοῖς τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων εἶναι προσημαίνειν˙ «δέον» γάρ, φησίν, «εἰδέναι τόν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς νοῦν, τήν μέν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τό νοεῖν, δι᾿ ἧς τά νοητά βλέπει, τήν δέ ἕνωσιν ὑπεραίρουσαν τήν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, δι᾿ ἧς συνάπτεται πρός τά ἐπέκεινα ἑαυτοῦ». Ἧ μέν οὖν ὑπεραίρει τήν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, ὑπέρ πάσας ἐστί τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας καί γνῶσις οὐκ ἔστι καθ᾿ ὑπεροχήν˙ᾗ δέ σύνδεσμός ἐστι νοῦ τε καί Θεοῦ, κρεῖττον ἀσυγκρίτως τῆς συνδούσης τόν νοῦν πρός τά κτιστά δυνάμεως, δηλαδή τῆς γνώσεως.

Ἀλλά πῶς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἡμῖν κατασκευάζει ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπέρ πάσας τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας ὅρασις; «Ἐπειδή», φησί, «τῆς κατά ἀφαίρεσιν θεολογίας ὑψηλότερον οὐδέν». Ἀλλ᾿ ἕτερον, ὦ βέλτιστε, θεωρία θεολογίας, ἐπεί μηδέ ταὐτόν λέγειν τι περί