it has a body running under it while it is perpendicular. For when the sky is clear, it is never walled off by another body. They will say these things about the moon as well, with slight modification. "But from where do you know this 'always' and this 'universal'?" We will say to them. "From induction," he says, "this knowledge, stored up in souls, becomes the principle of demonstrations." "How from induction, speak more clearly." "I saw," he says, "the eclipse of the sun happening at a conjunction, and the one after that, and indeed another and another, and through the power in me, which is by nature always apt to connect like things, I grasped the universal knowledge; again, from the continuous daily motion of the heaven, from many sensations the universal has been synthesized for me."

What then, O philosopher? Did you perceive the days and periods and eclipses that happened before you were born, and all those that will happen after you? Certainly not. But are there more that you have perceived or that you have not yet? By all means, it is not even possible to comprehend in number the excess of what has not been perceived. How then did you connect the universal from induction, not having included all the particulars? For this argument is yours and true, that if one is to receive accurate knowledge through induction, it is necessary to have contact with all the particulars through the appropriate criterion within us for each, and to hear each of the audible things, and to see the visible things. But you, not having seen most of the days and periods and eclipses, yet making declarations about all of them, think you know better than by demonstration, and coming to demonstration through this knowledge, you hold a supposition to be true and certain which is exceedingly false and fallacious?

For the continuous motion of the sun was interrupted in the time of Joshua son of Nun, and in the time of Hezekiah it went backward (p. 584) and carried away the stored-up universal knowledge from your soul. And what of the darkness that punished Egypt, and that for many days? Is it possible for the moon to be in conjunction with the sun for three successive days? And the eclipse that happened at the saving passion of the Lord, did it not happen when the moon was fourteen days old, at which time it was in every way impossible for the moon to be perpendicular to the sun? And so that we may also speak to you about future things, how will the stars of heaven fall, if the circular motion is uninterrupted? How will the heaven be rolled up like a scroll? How, when the sun is turned to blood, will the moon not give its light? Did you see an eclipse of the moon without the interposition of the earth?

If, therefore, the universal synthesized from things in the realm of coming-to-be becomes the principle of an art, and the principle of demonstration and demonstrative science from it comes from things that are always the same, but none of the existing things is always the same, for it is not uninterrupted, then the principle of demonstration does not exist. And with the principle not existing, the end is also gone. Since, then, the Aristotelian demonstration has been shown to be non-existent, how can we, speaking beyond it, unite the divine? But does Aristotle not believe what has been written about the heavenly bodies, both what has happened and what is to come? But you say you believe. Yet what faith could even he provide concerning things that happened when he had not yet been born? We, therefore, believing those who have seen, abolish his teachings. And what truth Aristotle discovered through the instrument of demonstration, and how he arrives at the mean and cause, that is, in no way, it was possible to say, but I think I will pass over it for now. And when the philosopher attempts to help his teacher, we will add this: but having said one more thing, we will stop the argument that has set out for many points.

(p. 586) "Demonstration," he says, "is not contradicted, and what is contradicted is not a demonstration." Since, therefore, the heterodox contradict our positions, it is among the impossible things for our positions to be a demonstration. What then? Does not "every argument wrestle with an argument," that is, also

ὑποτρέχον ἔχει σῶμα κατά κάθετον οὔσης˙ καί γάρ ὑπ᾿ ἄλλου σώματος αἰθρίας οὔσης οὐδέ ποτε διατειχίζεται. Ταῦτα καί περί σελήνης μικρόν ὑπαλλάξαντες ἐροῦσιν. "Ἀλλά πόθεν τοῦτο τό ἀεί ἐπίστασθε καί τό καθόλου;" Πρός αὐτούς ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν. "Ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς" φησιν "ἡ γνῶσις αὕτη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντεθησαυρισμένη, τῶν ἀποδείξεων γίνεται ἀρχή". "Πῶς ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, σαφέστερον εἰπέ". "Εἶδον" φησι "τήν τοῦ ἡλίου ἔκλειψιν ἐν συνόδῳ γενομένην καί τήν μετ᾿ ἐκείνην καί μάλα ἄλλην καί ἄλλην, καί διά τῆς ἐν ἐμοί δυνάμεως, ἥτις ἀεί πέφυκε τά ὅμοια ἐπισυνάπτειν, τήν καθόλου γνῶσιν ἔλαβον˙ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς ὁσημέραι συνεχοῦς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κινήσεως, ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν αἰσθημάτων τό καθόλου μοι συνῆκται".

Τί οὖν, ὦ φιλόσοφε; καί τῶν πρό τοῦ γεννηθῆναί σε ἡμερῶν καί περιόδων καί ἐκλείψεων γεγενημένων ᾔσθου καί τῶν μετά σέ γενησομένων ἁπασῶν; Πάντως οὐ˙ πλείους δέ τίνες, ὧν ᾔσθου ἤ ὧν οὔπω; Πάντως οὐδ᾿ ἀριθμῷ περιλαβεῖν ἐστι τό πλεονάζον τῆς ἀναισθησίας. Πῶς οὖν ἐπισυνῆψας τό καθόλου ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, μή πάντα συμπεριλαβών τά μερικά; Λόγος γάρ οὗτος ὑμέτερος καί ἀληθής ὡς, εἰ μέλλει τις τήν δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς γνῶσιν ἀκριβῆ λαβεῖν, πάντων ἐπαφήν σχεῖν τῶν μερικῶν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν πρός ἕκαστον καταλλήλῳ κριτηρίῳ, καί τῶν μέν ἀκουστῶν ἀκοῦσαι ἕκαστον, τά δέ ὁρατά ἰδεῖν. Σύ δέ τάς πλείστας μή ἑωρακώς ἡμέρας καί περιόδους καί ἐκλείψεις, περί πασῶν ἀποφαινόμενος, οἴει κρεῖττον ἤ κατά ἀπόδειξιν ἐπίστασθαι καί, διά τῆς ἐπιστήμης ταύτης ἐπί τήν ἀπόδειξιν ἐρχόμενος, ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ τε καί βεβαίαν ἔχειν τήν λίαν οὖσαν ψευδῆ καί σφαλεράν;

∆ιεκόπη μέν γάρ ἐπί Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Ναυῆ ἡ συνεχής ἡλίου κίνησις, ἐπί τοῦ Ἐζεκίου δέ εἰς τοὔμπαλιν ἐχώρησε (σελ. 584) καί τήν ἐντεθησαυρισμένην τοῦ καθόλου γνῶσιν ἐξεφόρησέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς. Τό δέ τήν Αἴγυπτον κολάσαν σκότος τί, καί ταῦτα πολυήμερον; Ἆρ᾿ ἔστι τρεῖς ἐφεξῆς ἡμέρας συνελθεῖν ἡλίῳ τήν σελήνην; Ἡ δ᾿ ἐπί τοῦ σωτηρίου πάθους τοῦ Κυρίου ἔκλειψις γεγενημένη, οὐ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκαταίας οὔσης τῆς σελήνης γέγονεν, ἡνίκα τῷ ἡλίῳ τήν σελήνην καί κάθετον εἶναι τῶν πάντῃ ἀδυνάτων ἦν; Ἵνα δέ σοι καί περί μελλόντων εἴπωμεν, πῶς πεσοῦνται τά ἄστρα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἰ ἀδιάκοπος ἡ κύκλῳ κίνησις; Πῶς ὁ οὐρανός ὡς βίβλος εἱλιθήσεται; Πῶς εἰς αἷμα τοῦ ἡλίου μεταστρεφομένου ἡ σελήνη οὐ δώσει τό φέγγος αὐτῆς; Εἶδες ἔκλειψιν σελήνην ἄνευ διαφράξεως τῆς γῆς;

Εἰ γοῦν ἐπισυνηγμένον μέν τό καθόλου ἀπό τῶν περί γένεσιν ἀρχή τέχνης γίνεται, τῶν δ᾿ ἀεί ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἀρχή τῆς ἀποδείξεως καί ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική ἐκ ταύτης, ἀεί δ᾿ ὡσαύτως ἔχον τῶν ὄντων οὐδέν, οὐ γάρ ἀδιάκοπον, καί ἡ ἀρχή ἄρα τῆς ἀποδείξεως οὐκ ἔστι˙ τῆς ἀρχῆς δέ μή οὔσης καί τό τέλος οἴχεται. Τῆς οὖν ἀριστοτελικῆς ἀποδείξεως μή ὄν φανείσης, πῶς ὑπέρ αὐτήν λέγοντες τό θεῖον συμνυνοῦμεν; Ἀλλ᾿ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ πιστεύει τοῖς περί τῶν οὐρανίων γεγραμμένοις, γεγενημένοις τε καί μέλλουσιν; Ἀλλά σύ πιστεύειν φῄς˙ πίστιν δ᾿ ὅμως κἀκεῖνος τίνα ἄν παράσχοι, ἐφ᾿ ὧν γεγενημένων οὔπω ἦν γεγεννημένος; Ἡμεῖς οὖν τοῖς ἑωρακόσι πιστεύοντες τά ἐκείνου καταργοῦμεν. Τίνα δέ τήν ἀλήθειαν Ἀριστοτέλης δι᾿ ὀργάνου τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐξεῦρε καί πῶς τοῦ μέσου καί αἰτίου κατατυγχάνει, τουτέστιν οὐδαμῶς, ἐνῆν μέν εἰπεῖν, παρεῖναι δέ μοι νῦν δοκῶ. Τοῦ δέ φιλοσόφου βοηθεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαντος τῷ διδασκάλῳ καί ταῦτα προσεροῦμεν˙ ἕν δέ προσειπόντες ἐπί πολλά τόν λόγον ὡρμημένον στήσομεν.

(σελ. 586) «Ἡ ἀπόδειξις», φησίν, «οὐκ ἀντιλέγεται, καί τό ἀντιλεγόμενον ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἔστιν». Ἐπεί τοίνυν ἀντιλέγουσι τοῖς ἡμετέροις οἱ κακόδοξοι, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι τά ἡμέτερα. Τί οὖν; οὐ «λόγῳ παλαίει πᾶς λόγος», δηλαδή καί