and it is properly its own characteristic; for substance alone, while remaining incorruptible, changes, for example, a man, altering nothing of his humanity, becomes just from being unjust and unjust from being just, and water hot and again cold. But none of the others, while remaining unchangeable, is receptive of contraries. And these things, then, concerning substance. Concerning quantity Quantity is a category according to which each of the beings has been quantified. Its species are two, continuous and discrete. And continuous is a quantity whose parts are joined to some common boundary, while discrete is one whose parts are not joined to any common boundary. The discrete is divided into number and speech {whose parts are not joined to any common boundary}, while the continuous is divided into five: into a line, into a surface, into a mathematical body, into time, and into place. A mathematical body is that which has length and breadth and depth, not, however, falling under touch and sight, but comprehended by the mind alone; for each of these has a common boundary to which its parts are joined; for the line has the point, the surface the line, the body the surface, and time the 'now'; for the 'now' joins both the past and the future; and place, also being continuous, has the line as a common boundary; for place and surface are almost the same thing. Quantity has four properties, first, being measured, second, having no contrary, third, not admitting of the more and the less—for three is not said to be more three than five, nor is time more or less time—, fourth, the equal and the unequal; and this property belongs to every quantity and to quantity alone. And concerning quantity let these things have been said. Concerning quality Quality is a category according to which certain things are said to be of a certain kind. It has four species that are put forth, first, state and disposition, second, capacity and incapacity, third, affective quality and affection, fourth, shape and form. And a state is a quality that is difficult to lose, either corrupting or perfecting that in which it exists, while a disposition is a quality that is easy to lose, that is, one that comes to be and ceases to be for a time, and it clearly differs from a state in that a state is both more long-lasting and more stable; for we say that one has a state who possesses it for a longer time, that is, one who has acquired grammar, and similarly also in the case of justice and the others. But we say that one has a disposition who has acquired something, but quickly casts it off, as for example one who has blushed through anger or grown pale through fear. And it is clear that one who has the state previously had the disposition. And so much, then, concerning the first species of quality. Its second species was said to be capacity and incapacity. These are not in actuality, but are brought forth only according to aptitude. Capacity, then, is a progress of aptitude, while incapacity is a difficulty or a cutting off of aptitude, for example, we say that a gifted child has the capacity to become a grammarian, but the ungifted child has an incapacity, and in the same way also in similar cases. And these things, then, concerning capacity and incapacity. The third species of quality is affective quality and affection. And an affective quality is that which is conjoined with some lasting affection, such as paleness or sickness, while an affection is the short-lived path to the affective quality. The affective quality is spoken of in three ways: for either it came from an affection and produces an affection, as the unnatural heat of a fever that has occurred in a man; or it did not come from an affection, but produces an affection, as the heat of fire; or it came from an affection, but does not produce an affection, as the qualities existing in the soul, such as manic ecstasy and anger; for these came from an affection, but they do not produce an affection in one who sees or touches. And the affective quality differs from the affection in the same way that the state differs from the disposition, namely, in being more long-lasting and more stable. the fourth species of

καὶ κυρίως αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἴδιον· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία μόνη μένουσα ἀδιάφθορος μεταβάλλεται, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος μηδέν τι τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἐναλλάσσων γίνεται ἐξ ἀδίκου δίκαιος καὶ ἐκ δικαίου ἄδικος, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ θερμὸν καὶ πάλιν ψυχρόν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἀμετάβλητον μένον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτικόν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. Περὶ ποσοῦ Ποσόν ἐστι κατηγορία καθ' ἣν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων πεπόσωται. εἴδη δὲ τούτου δύο, συνεχὲς καὶ διωρισμένον. καὶ συνεχὲς μέν ἐστι ποσὸν οὗ τὰ μόρια πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει, διωρισμένον δὲ οὗ τὰ μόρια πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει. διαιρεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν διωρισμένον εἰς ἀριθμὸν καὶ λόγον {ὧν τὰ μόρια πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει}, τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς εἰς πέντε, εἰς γραμμήν, εἰς ἐπιφάνειαν, εἰς σῶμα μαθηματικόν, εἰς χρόνον καὶ εἰς τόπον. μαθηματικὸν δὲ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἔχον μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, μὴ μέντοι γε ἁφῇ καὶ θέᾳ ὑποπῖπτον, ἀλλὰ νῷ μόνῳ περιληπτόν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων κοινὸν ὅρον ἔχει πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ συνάπτει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραμμὴ τὸ σημεῖον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια τὴν γραμμήν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, ὁ δὲ χρόνος τὸ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ νῦν συνάπτει πρός τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα· ὁ δὲ τόπος καὶ αὐτὸς συνεχὴς ὢν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχει κοινὸν ὅρον· σχεδὸν γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὅ τε τόπος καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια. ἔχει δὲ ἴδια τὸ ποσὸν τέσσαρα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μετρεῖσθαι, δεύτερον τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἐναντίον, τρίτον τὸ μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον- οὔτε γὰρ τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε μᾶλλον τρία λέγεται οὔτε ὁ χρόνος τοῦ χρόνου μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον-, τέταρτον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἴδιον παντὶ καὶ μόνῳ τῷ ποσῷ ἁρμόττει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ποσοῦ τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω. Περὶ ποιότητοσ Ποιότης ἐστὶ κατηγορία καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες εἶναι λέγονται. ἔχει δὲ εἴδη προφερόμενα τέσσαρα, πρῶτον μὲν ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν, δεύτερον δὲ δύναμιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, τρίτον παθητικὴν ποιότητα καὶ πάθος, τέταρτον σχῆμα καὶ μορφήν. καὶ ἔστιν ἕξις μὲν ποιότης δυσαπόβλητος ἢ κακωτικὴ ἢ τελειωτικὴ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει, διάθεσις δέ ἐστι ποιότης εὐαπόβλητος, τουτέστιν εἰς καιρὸν γινομένη καὶ ἀπογινομένη, διαφέρει δὲ δηλονότι τῆς ἕξεως ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις πολυχρονιωτέρα τέ ἐστι καὶ μονιμωτέρα· ἕξιν γὰρ ἔχειν λέγομεν τὸν κατέχοντα ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ, ἤγουν τὸν δεξάμενον τὴν γραμματικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. διάθεσιν δὲ λέγομεν ἔχειν τὸν δεξάμενον μέν τι, ταχὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἀποβαλλόμενον, οἷον ὡς τὸν διὰ θυμὸν ἐρυθριάσαντα ἢ διὰ φόβον ὠχριάσαντα. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἕξιν πρότερον τὴν διάθεσιν ἔσχε. καὶ οὕτως μὲν περὶ τοῦ πρώτου εἴδους τῆς ποιότητος. δεύτερον δὲ αὐτῆς εἶδος ἐλέχθη δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία. ταῦτα δὲ οὔκ εἰσι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιτηδειότητα μόνον προάγονται. ἔστι μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἐπιτηδειότητος προκοπή, ἀδυναμία δὲ δυσκολία ἢ ἐκκοπὴ ἐπιτηδειότητος, οἷον τὸν εὐφυᾶ παῖδα δύναμιν ἔχειν φαμὲν τοῦ γενέσθαι γραμματικόν, τὸν δὲ ἀφυᾶ ἀδυναμίαν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀδυναμίας. τρίτον δὲ εἶδος ποιότητος παθητικὴ ποιότης καὶ πάθος. καὶ παθητικὴ μὲν ποιότης ἐστὶν ἡ πάθει χρονίῳ τινὶ συνεζευγμένη, οἷον ὠχρότης ἢ νόσος, πάθος δὲ ἡ εἰς τὴν παθητικὴν ποιότητα ὁδὸς ἡ ὀλιγοχρόνιος. τριχῶς δὲ λέγεται ἡ παθητικὴ ποιότης· ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ πάθους ἐγένετο καὶ πάθος ἐμποιεῖ, ὡς ἡ περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γενομένη παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ πυρετοῦ θερμασία· ἢ ἀπὸ πάθους μὲν οὐκ ἐγένετο, πάθος δὲ ἐμποιεῖ, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμότης· ἢ ἀπὸ πάθους μὲν ἐγένετο, πάθος δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ, ὡς αἱ περὶ ψυχὴν ὑφιστάμεναι ποιότητες, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργή· αὗται γὰρ ἀπὸ πάθους μὲν ἐγένοντο, πάθος δὲ οὐ ποιοῦσιν εἰς τὸν ὁρῶντα ἢ ἁπτόμενον. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ παθητικὴ ποιότης τοῦ πάθους καθ' ὃν τρόπον ἡ ἕξις τῆς διαθέσεως, κατὰ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον δηλονότι καὶ μονιμώτερον. τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς