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providential powers given forth from God who is unparticipable.” These are, then, essential powers, but what is super-essential, or rather, even in-itself-super-essentially super-essential, is that which holds these powers collectively and unitively; thus, therefore, that deifying light is also essential, but it is not itself the essence of God.

But this philosopher, proceeding further, declares not only this, but also that every power and energy of God is created, although the saints say clearly that of the uncreated nature both all its natural attributes and every power and energy is uncreated, just as the attributes of a created nature are created. “But how,” he says, “is it not the super-essential essence of God, if indeed it bears the marks of lordship, if it is beyond all creation both seen and conceived, that which is beyond sense, beyond thought, that which truly is, that which ever is, the immaterial, the unchangeable, and this being called by you enhypostatic? And how do you say that the essence of God is beyond such a light?” And he says these things not in a questioning manner, desiring from someone a clarification of obscurities or a solution to difficulties, but he refutes us, as he supposes, or rather, setting out to refute us, then, being unable, he rages and insults us, now claiming that the soul's faculty of judgment has been wretchedly corrupted, now saying we are equal to and worse than those heretics, the Messalians, at other times impious and polytheists; but indeed he did not even refrain from calling us ungodly and atheists and altogether wicked. But 'ditheists' is, as he himself both in writing and by word of mouth asserts and proclaims to all, the name most fitting for us above others, although by the very things he says, he unwillingly exempts us from all blame; for since he says that we say that which is beyond all things is one, this bears witness that we say that that super-essential being is one God, and that that light is not (p. 612) the essence, but the energy of that essence, which essence we said is one and beyond all things as energizing all things. But neither, if we should say that this energy is inseparable from that one essence, will that super-essentiality be composite because of this; for there would be no simple essence at all, if this were the case; for you would not see any essence whatsoever without its natural energy. And how would the deifying light not bear the marks of lordship, which even you yourself, constrained by the truth of the matter, have called a symbol of divinity? And since the saints here say 'enhypostatic' not 'self-subsistent', how could it be some other essence in itself, or how could that which does not have its own existence be another, second God? But if, because this energy is also unoriginate, uncreated, and beyond conception, you fashion another God in your clever suspicions, you will also fashion for us the will of God as another God, since the venerable Maximus says, “just as the divine, tri-hypostatic nature is unoriginate, uncreated, beyond conception, simple and uncomposite in its totality, so also is its will”; and you might say the same also of all its natural energies.

“But the deifying gift,” he says, “is the imitation of God, being a state of the intelligible and rational nature, beginning from the first ordering and ending with the last of rational beings, since also the great Dionysius, explaining how God is beyond the Godhead, 'if,' he says, 'you should understand divinity as the matter of the deifying gift and the inimitable imitation of the super-divine and super-good.' But, my good sir, first the saint added 'inimitable' to 'imitation'; it is therefore no more imitation than inimitability; how then will you yourself be acceptable, siding with one part only? Then he said two things, both the deifying gift and the inimitable imitation, seeming to me (p. 614) to teach us this, that although it is impossible for a man to be deified by himself, assimilated to the inimitable God through imitation, still one must imitate the inimitable; for thus one might obtain the deifying gift and be named God by position. Since, therefore, the great one says that two things are productive of deification, you yourself have cut out the one, having falsified it, but not

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ἐκδιδομένας ἐκ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου προνοητικάς δυνάμεις». ∆υνάμεις μέν οὖν αὗται οὐσιώδεις, ὑπερούσιον δέ, μᾶλλον δέ καί αὐθυπερουσίως ὑπερούσιον, τό ταύτας τάς δυνάμεις συνειλημμένως τε καί ἑνιαίως ἔχον˙ οὕτω τοίνυν καί τό θεουργόν ἐκεῖνο φῶς οὐσιῶδές ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὐτό οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ.

Ὁ δέ φιλόσοφος οὗτος προϊών, οὐ τοῦτο μόνον ἀλλά καί πᾶσαν δύναμιν καί ἐνέργειαν Θεοῦ κτιστήν εἶναι ἀποφαίνεται, καίτοι τῶν ἁγίων λεγόντων φανερῶς ὅτι τῆς ἀκτίστου φύσεως καί τά φυσικά πάντα καί πᾶσα δύναμίς τε καί ἐνέργεια ἄκτιστός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καί τά τῆς κτιστῆς φύσεως κτιστά. «Ἀλλά πῶς», φησίν, «οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπερούσιος οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἴπερ δεσποτικούς φέρει χαρακτῆρας, εἰ πάσης ὁρωμένης τε καί νοουμένης κτίσεως ἐπέκεινα, τό ὑπέρ αἴσθησιν, τό ὑπέρ νόησιν, τό κυρίως ὄν, τό ἀεί ὄν, τό ἄϋλον, τό ἀναλλοίωτον, καί ταῦτα παρ᾿ ὑμῶν ἐνυπόστατον λεγόμενον; Πῶς δέ τοῦ τοιούτου φωτός τήν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπέκεινά φατε;». Ταῦτα δέ οὐ διαπορητικῶς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, ποθῶν παρά του τῶν ἁπάντων εὐκρίνειαν τῶν ἀσαφῶν ἤ λύσιν τῶν ἀπόρων, ἀλλ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐξελέγχει, ὡς νομίζει, μᾶλλον δέ προθέμενος ἐλέγχειν, εἶθ᾿ ὡς μή δυνάμενος, μανείς ἐξυβρίζει καθ᾿ ἡμῶν, νῦν μέν ἀθλίως διεφθάρθαι τό κριτικόν τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχυριζόμενος, νῦν δέ τῶν πώποτε αἱρετικῶν ἐκείνων Μασσαλιανῶν ἴσους τε καί χείρους λέγων, ἄλλοτε δυσσεβεῖς καί πολυθέους˙ ἀλλά γάρ οὐδ᾿ἀσεβεῖς καί ἀθέους καί παντάπασιν ἀλιτηρίως καλεῖν παρῃτήσατο. ∆ιθεΐται δέ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτός καί διά γραμμάτων καί διά στόματος ἰσχυρίζεται καί περιαγγέλλει πᾶσιν, ἡ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡμῖν ἐπωνυμία προσήκουσα, καίτοι παρ᾿ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων πάσης ἡμᾶς ἄκων ἐξαιρεῖται μέμψεως˙ ἐπεί γάρ φησιν ἕν ἡμᾶς λέγειν τό ἐπέκεινα πάντων, καί τοῦτο τήν ὑπερούσιον ἐκείνην ἕνα Θεόν ἡμᾶς λέγειν μαρτυρεῖ, τό δέ φῶς ἐκεῖνο οὐκ (σελ. 612) οὐσίαν, ἀλλά τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης ἐνέργειαν, ἥν οὐσίαν μίαν τε οὖσαν εἴπομεν καί ἐπέκεινα πάντων ὡς πάντα ἐνεργοῦσαν. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ᾿, εἰς τήν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην τῆς μιᾶς ἐκείνης οὐσίας φαίημεν ἀχώριστον, σύνθετος ἡ ὑπερουσιότης ἐκείνη παρά τοῦτο ἔσται˙ ἦ γάρ ἄν οὐδεμία ἦν ἁπλῆ οὐσία, εἴγε τοῦτο ἦν˙ οὐσίαν γάρ φυσικῆς ἄνευ ἐνεργείας οὐδ᾿ ἠντινοῦν ἄν ἴδοις. ∆εσποτικούς δέ πῶς οὐκ ἄν φέροι χαρακτῆρας τό θεοποιόν φῶς, ὅ καί αὐτός ὑπό τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας συνωσθείς θεότητος προσεῖπες σύμβολον; Ἐνυπόστατον δέ οὐ τό αὐθυπόστατον ἐνταῦθα λεγόντων τῶν ἁγίων, πῶς ἄλλη τις οὐσία καθ᾿ αὑτήν, ἤ πῶς ἕτερος δεύτερος Θεός ὁ μή ὕπαρξιν ἰδίαν ἔχων; Εἰ δέ διά τό ἄναρχον εἶναι καί ταύτην τήν ἐνέργειαν, ἄκτιστόν τε καί ἀπερινόητον, Θεόν ἄλλον ἀπαρτίζεις ἐν ταῖς συνεταῖς σου ὑπονοίαις καί τό τοῦ Θεοῦ θέλημα Θεόν ἡμῖν ἄλλον ἀπαρτίσεις, τοῦ σεπτοῦ Μαξίμου λέγοντος, «ὥσπερ ἡ θεία φύσις ἡ τρισυπόστατος, ἄναρχος, ἄκτιστος, ἀπερινόητος, ἁπλῆ καί ἀσύνθετος ὁλότητι ὑπάρχει, οὕτω καί τό ταύτης θέλημα»˙ τό αὐτό δ᾿ ἄν εἴποις καί ἐπί πασῶν τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτῆς.

«Ἀλλά θεοποιόν», φησί, «δῶρόν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μίμησις, ἕξις οὖσα τῆς νοερᾶς καί λογικῆς φύσεως, ἀπό τῆς πρώτης διακοσμήσεως ἀρχομένη καί τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τῶν λογικῶν περατουμένη, ἐπεί καί ὁ μέγας ∆ιονύσιος, ἑρμηνεύων πῶς ὑπέρ θεαρχίαν ὁ Θεός ἐστιν, "εἰ θεότητα", φησί, "νοήσαις τό χρῆμα τοῦ θεοποιοῦ δώρου καί τά ἀμίμητον μίμημα τοῦ ὑπερθέου καί ὑπεραγάθου". Ἀλλ᾿ ὦγαθέ, πρῶτον μέν ὁ ἅγιος τῷ μιμήματι τό ἀμίμητον προσέθηκεν˙ οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν μίμησις ἤ ἀμιμησία˙ πῶς οὖν εὐπαράδεκτος αὐτός ἔσῃ θατέρᾳ μερίδι μόνῃ προσθέμενος; Ἔπειτ᾿ ἐκεῖνος δύο εἶπε, τό τε θεοποιόν δῶρον καί τό ἀμίμητον μίμημα, ἐμοί δοκῶν (σελ. 614) τοῦθ᾿ ἡμᾶς διδάσκων, ὡς εἰ καί παρ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ θεωθῆναι ἄνθρωπον ἀδύνατον, ἀφωμοιωμένον τῷ ἀμιμήτῳ Θεῷ διά μιμήσεως, ἀλλά δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τόν ἀμίμητον˙ οὕτω γάρ ἀν τύχοι τοῦ δώρου τοῦ θεοποιοῦ καί Θεός θέσει χρηματίσειε. ∆ύο τοίνυν τοῦ μεγάλου τά παρεκτικά φαμένου τῆς θεώσεως, αὐτός θάτερον ἐξέκοψας, παραχαράξας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ