Chapter 1.—The Love of the Studious Mind, that Is, of One Desirous to Know, is Not the Love of a Thing Which It Does Not Know.

1. Let us now proceed, then, in due order, with a more exact purpose, to explain this same point more thoroughly. And first, since no one can love at all a thing of which he is wholly ignorant, we must carefully consider of what sort is the love of those who are studious, that is, of those who do not already know, but are still desiring to know any branch of learning. Now certainly, in those things whereof the word study is not commonly used, love often arises from hearsay, when the reputation of anything for beauty inflames the mind to the seeing and enjoying it; since the mind knows generically wherein consist the beauties of corporeal things, from having seen them very frequently, and since there exists within a faculty of approving that which outwardly is longed for. And when this happens, the love that is called forth is not of a thing wholly unknown, since its genus is thus known. But when we love a good man whose face we never saw, we love him from the knowledge of his virtues, which virtues we know [abstractly] in the truth itself. But in the case of learning, it is for the most part the authority of others who praise and commend it that kindles our love of it; although nevertheless we could not burn with any zeal at all for the study of it, unless we had already in our mind at least a slight impression of the knowledge of each kind of learning. For who, for instance, would devote any care and labor to the learning of rhetoric, unless he knew before that it was the science of speaking? Sometimes, again, we marvel at the results of learning itself, which we have heard of or experienced; and hence burn to obtain, by learning, the power of attaining these results. Just as if it were said to one who did not know his letters, that there is a kind of learning which enables a man to send words, wrought with the hand in silence, to one who is ever so far absent, for him in turn to whom they are sent to gather these words, not with his ears, but with his eyes; and if the man were to see the thing actually done, is not that man, since he desires to know how he can do this thing, altogether moved to study with a view to the result which he already knows and holds? So it is that the studious zeal of those who learn is kindled: for that of which any one is utterly ignorant, he can in no way love.

2. So also, if any one hear an unknown sign, as, for instance, the sound of some word of which he does not know the signification, he desires to know what it is; that is, he desires to know what thing it is which it is agreed shall be brought to mind by that sound: as if he heard the word temetum715    Read si for sicut, if for as. Bened. ed.    [Augustin here begins his discussion of some ternaries that are found in the Finite, that illustrate the trinality of the Infinite. Like all finite analogies, they fail at certain points. In the case chosen—namely, the lover, the loved, and love—the first two are substances, the last is not. The mind is a substance, but its activity in loving is not. In chapter iv. 5, Augustin asserts that “love and knowledge exist substantially, as the mind itself does.” But no psychology, ancient or modern, has ever maintained that the agencies of a spiritual entity or substance are themselves spiritual entity or substances. The activities of the human mind in cognizing, loving, etc., are only its energizing, not its substance.   The ambiguity of the Latin contributes to this error. The mind and its loving, and also the mind and its cognizing, are denominated “duo quædam” the mind, love, and knowledge, are denominated “tria quædem.” By bringing the mind and its love and knowledge under the one term “quædam,” and then giving the meaning of “substance” to “thing,” in “something,” the result follows that all three are alike and equally “substantial.”   This analogy taken from the mind and its activities illustrates the trinality of the Divine essence, but fails to illustrate the substantiality of the three persons. The three Divine persons are not the Divine essence together with two of its activities (such, e.g., as creation and redemption), but the essence in three modes, or “forms,” as St. Paul denominates them in Phil. iii. 6   If Augustin could prove his assertion that the activities of the human spirit in knowing and loving are strictly “substantial,” then this ternary would illustrate not only the trinality of the essence, but the essentiality and objectivity of the persons. The fact which he mentions, that knowledge and love are inseparable from the knowing and loving mind, does not prove their equal substantiality with the mind.—W.G.T.S.]    Wine. uttered, and not knowing, should ask what it is. He must then know already that it is a sign, i.e. that the word is not an empty sound, but that something is signified by it; for in other respects this trisyllabic word is known to him already, and has already impressed its articulate form upon his mind through the sense of hearing. And then what more is to be required in him, that he may go on to a greater knowledge of that of which all the letters and all the spaces of its several sounds are already known, unless that it shall at the same time have become known to him that it is a sign, and shall have also moved him with the desire of knowing of what it is the sign? The more, then, the thing is known, yet not fully known, the more the mind desires to know concerning it what remains to be known. For if he knew it to be only such and such a spoken word, and did not know that it was the sign of something, he would seek nothing further, since the sensible thing is already perceived as far as it can be by the sense. But because he knows it to be not only a spoken word, but also a sign, he wishes to know it perfectly; and no sign is known perfectly, except it be known of what it is the sign. He then who with ardent carefulness seeks to know this, and inflamed by studious zeal perseveres in the search; can such an one be said to be without love? What then does he love? For certainly nothing can be loved unless it is known. For that man does not love those three syllables which he knows already. But if he loves this in them, that he knows them to signify something, this is not the point now in question, for it is not this which he seeks to know. But we are now asking what it is he loves, in that which he is desirous to know, but which certainly he does not yet know; and we are therefore wondering why he loves, since we know most assuredly that nothing can be loved unless it be known. What then does he love, except that he knows and perceives in the reason of things what excellence there is in learning, in which the knowledge of all signs is contained; and what benefit there is in the being skilled in these, since by them human fellowship mutually communicates its own perceptions, lest the assemblies of men should be actually worse than utter solitude, if they were not to mingle their thoughts by conversing together? The soul, then, discerns this fitting and serviceable species, and knows it, and loves it; and he who seeks the meaning of any words of which he is ignorant, studies to render that species perfect in himself as much as he can: for it is one thing to behold it in the light of truth, another to desire it as within his own capacity. For he beholds in the light of truth how great and how good a thing it is to understand and to speak all tongues of all nations, and so to hear no tongue and to be heard by none as from a foreigner. The beauty, then, of this knowledge is already discerned by thought, and the thing being known is loved; and that thing is so regarded, and so stimulates the studious zeal of learners, that they are moved with respect to it, and desire it eagerly in all the labor which they spend upon the attainment of such a capacity, in order that they may also embrace in practice that which they know beforehand by reason. And so every one, the nearer he approaches that capacity in hope, the more fervently desires it with love; for those branches of learning are studied the more eagerly, which men do not despair of being able to attain; for when any one entertains no hope of attaining his end, then he either loves lukewarmly or does not love at all, howsoever he may see the excellence of it. Accordingly, because the knowledge of all languages is almost universally felt to be hopeless, every one studies most to know that of his own nation; but if he feels that he is not sufficient even to comprehend this perfectly, yet no one is so indolent in this knowledge as not to wish to know, when he hears an unknown word, what it is, and to seek and learn it if he can. And while he is seeking it, certainly he has a studious zeal of learning, and seems to love a thing he does not know; but the case is really otherwise. For that species touches the mind, which the mind knows and thinks, wherein the fitness is clearly visible which accrues from the associating of minds with one another, in the hearing and returning of known and spoken words. And this species kindles studious zeal in him who seeks what indeed he knows not, but gazes upon and loves the unknown form to which that pertains. If then, for example, any one were to ask, What is temetum (for I had instanced this word already), and it were said to him, What does this matter to you? he will answer, Lest perhaps I hear some one speaking, and understand him not; or perhaps read the word somewhere, and know not what the writer meant. Who, pray, would say to such an inquirer, Do not care about understanding what you hear; do not care about knowing what you read? For almost every rational soul quickly discerns the beauty of that knowledge, through which the thoughts of men are mutually made known by the enunciation of significant words; and it is on account of this fitness thus known, and because known therefore loved, that such an unknown word is studiously sought out. When then he hears and learns that wine was called “temetum” by our forefathers, but that the word is already quite obsolete in our present usage of language, he will think perhaps that he has still need of the word on account of this or that book of those forefathers. But if he holds these also to be superfluous, perhaps he does now come to think the word not worth remembering, since he sees it has nothing to do with that species of learning which he knows with the mind, and gazes upon, and so loves.

3. Wherefore in all cases the love of a studious mind, that is, of one that wishes to know what it does not know, is not the love of that thing which it does not know, but of that which it knows; on account of which it wishes to know what it does not know. Or if it is so inquisitive as to be carried away, not for any other cause known to it, but by the mere love of knowing things unknown; then such an inquisitive person is, doubtless distinguishable from an ordinary student, yet does not, any more than he, love things he does not know; nay, on the contrary, he is more fitly said to hate things he knows not, of which he wishes that there should be none, in wishing to know everything. But lest any one should lay before us a more difficult question, by declaring that it is just as impossible for any one to hate what he does not know, as to love what he does not know, we will not withstand what is true; but it must be understood that it is not the same thing to say he loves to know things unknown, as to say he loves things unknown. For it is possible that a man may love to know things unknown; but it is not possible that he should love things unknown. For the word to know is not placed there without meaning; since he who loves to know things unknown, does not love the unknown things themselves, but the knowing of them. And unless he knew what knowing means, no one could say confidently, either that he knew or that he did not know. For not only he who says I know, and says so truly, must needs know what knowing is; but he also who says, I do not know, and says so confidently and truly, and knows that he says so truly, certainly knows what knowing is; for he both distinguishes him who does not know from him who knows, when he looks into himself and says truly I do not know; and whereas he knows that he says this truly, whence should he know it, if he did not know what knowing is?

CAPUT PRIMUM.

0971

1. Amorem studentis animi, id est, scire cupientis, non esse amorem ejus rei quam nescit. Nunc ad ea ipsa consequenter enodatius explicanda limatior accedat intentio. Ac primum, quia rem prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest, diligenter intuendum est cujusmodi sit amor studentium, id est, non jam scientium, sed adhuc scire cupientium quamque doctrinam. Et in his quippe rebus in quibus non usitate dicitur studium, solent existere amores ex auditu, dum cujusque pulchritudinis fama ad videndum ac fruendum animus accenditur, quia generaliter novit corporum pulchritudines, ex eo quod plurimas vidit, et inest intrinsecus unde approbetur, cui forinsecus inhiatur. Quod cum fit, non rei penitus incognitae amor excitatur, cujus genus ita notum est. Cum autem virum bonum amamus, cujus faciem non vidimus, ex notitia virtutum amamus, quas novimus in ipsa veritate. Ad doctrinas autem cognoscendas, plerumque nos laudantium atque praedicantium accendit auctoritas: et tamen nisi breviter impressam cujusque doctrinae haberemus in animo notionem, nullo ad eam discendam studio flagraremus. Quis enim sciendae, verbi gratia, rhetoricae ullam curam et operam impenderet, nisi ante sciret eam dicendi esse scientiam? Aliquando etiam ipsarum doctrinarum fines auditos expertosve miramur, et ex hoc inardescimus facultatem comparare discendo, qua ad eos pervenire 0972 possimus. Tanquam si litteras nescienti dicatur quamdam esse doctrinam, qua quisque valeat, quamvis longe absenti, verba mittere manu facta in silentio, quae rursus ille cui mittuntur, non auribus, sed oculis colligat, idque fieri videat; nonne, dum concupiscit nosse quo id possit, omni studio circa illum finem movetur, quem jam notum tenet? Sic accenduntur studia discentium: nam quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto potest.

2. Ita etiam signum si quis audiat incognitum, veluti verbi alicujus sonum, quo quid significetur ignorat, cupit scire quidnam sit, id est, sonus ille cui rei commemorandae institutus sit: veluti si audiat cum dicitur temetum, et ignorans quid sit requirat. Jam itaque oportet ut noverit signum esse, id est, non esse inanem illam vocem, sed aliquid ea significari: alioquin jam notum est hoc trisyllabum, et articulatam speciem suam impressit animo per sensum aurium: quid amplius in eo requiratur, quo magis innotescat, cujus omnes litterae omniaque soni spatia nota sunt; nisi quia simul innotuit signum esse, movitque sciendi cupiditatem, cujus rei signum sit? Quo igitur amplius notum est, sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod reliquum est. Si enim tantummodo esse istam vocem nosset, eamque 0973 alicujus rei signum esse non nosset, nihil jam quaereret, sensibili re, quantum poterat, sentiendo percepta. Quia vero non solum esse vocem, sed et signum esse jam novit, perfecte id nosse vult. Neque ullum perfecte signum noscitur, nisi cujus rei signum sit cognoscatur. Hoc ergo qui ardenti cura quaerit ut noverit, studioque accensus insistit, num potest dici esse sine amore? Quid igitur amat? Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. Neque enim ille istas tres syllabas amat, quas jam notas habet. Quod si hoc in eis amat, quia scit eas significare aliquid; non inde nunc agitur, non enim hoc nosse quaerit: sed in eo quod scire studet, quid amet inquirimus, quod profecto nondum novit: et propterea miramur cur amet, quoniam firmissime novimus amari nisi nota non posse. Quid ergo amat, nisi quia novit atque intuetur in rationibus rerum quae sit pulchritudo doctrinae, qua continentur notitiae signorum omnium; et quae sit utilitas in ea peritia, qua inter se humana societas sensa communicat, ne sibi hominum coetus deteriores sint quavis solitudine, si cogitationes suas colloquendo non misceant. Hanc ergo speciem decoram et utilem cernit anima, et novit, et amat; eamque in se perfici studet, quantum potest, quisquis vocum significantium quaecumque ignorat , inquirit. Aliud est enim quod eam in veritatis luce conspicit, aliud quod in sua facultate concupiscit. Conspicit namque in luce veritatis quam magnum et quam bonum sit omnes omnium gentium linguas intelligere ac loqui, nullamque ut alienigena audire, et a nullo ita audiri. Cujus notitiae decus cogitatione jam cernitur, amaturque res nota; quae ita conspicitur, atque inflammat studia discentium, ut circa eam moveantur, eique inhient in omni opera quam impendunt consequendae tali facultati, ut etiam usu amplectantur quod ratione praenoscunt: atque ita quisque, cui facultati spe propinquat, ei ferventius amore inardescit. Eis doctrinis quippe studetur vehementius, quae capi posse non desperantur. Nam cujus rei adipiscendae spem quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis quam pulchra sit videat. Quocirca, quia omnium linguarum scientia fere ab omnibus desperatur, suae gentis quisque maxime studet, ut noverit. Quod si et illi ad perfectum percipiendae se non sufficere sentit, nemo tamen tam desidiosus est hujus notitiae, qui non, cum audierit incognitum verbum, velit nosse quid illud sit, et si potest, quaerat ac discat. Quod dum quaerit, utique in studio discendi est, et videtur amare rem incognitam; quod non ita est. Species namque illa tangit animum, quam novit et cogitat, in qua elucet decus consociandorum animorum in vocibus notis audiendis atque reddendis: eaque accendit studio quaerentem quidem quod ignorat, sed notam formam, quo id pertineat, intuentem et amantem. Itaque si quaerenti, verbi gratia, quid sit temetum (hoc enim exempli causa posueram), dicatur, Quid 0974 ad te pertinet? respondebit, Ne forte audiam loquentem, et non intelligam, aut uspiam forte id legam, et quid scriptor senserit, nesciam. Quis tandem huic dicat, Noli intelligere quod audis, noli nosse quod legis? Omnibus enim fere animis rationalibus in promptu est ad videndum hujus peritiae pulchritudo, qua hominum inter se cogitata, significantium vocum enuntiatione noscuntur: propter hoc notum decus, et ob hoc amatum quia notum, studiose quaeritur verbum illud ignotum. Itaque cum audierit atque cognoverit temetum a veteribus vinum appellatum, sed jam ex usu loquendi quem nunc habemus, hoc vocabulum emortuum, propter nonnullos fortasse veterum libros sibi necessarium deputabit. Si autem et illos supervacaneos habet, forte jam nec dignum quod memoriae commendet existimat, quia videt ad illam speciem doctrinae quam notam mente intuetur atque amat, minime pertinere.

3. Quamobrem omnis amor studentis animi, hoc est volentis scire quod nescit, non est amor ejus rei quam nescit, sed ejus quam scit, propter quam vult scire quod nescit. Aut si tam curiosus est, ut non propter causam aliam notam, sed solo amore rapiatur incognita sciendi; discernendus quidem est ab studiosi nomine iste curiosus, sed nec ipse amat incognita, imo congruentius dicitur, Odit incognita, quae nulla esse vult, dum vult omnia cognita. Sed ne quisquam nobis difficiliorem referat quaestionem, asserens tam non posse quemquam odisse quod nescit, quam non potest amare quod nescit, non resistimus veris : sed intelligendum est, non hoc idem dici cum dicitur, Amat scire incognita, ac si diceretur, Amat incognita. Illud enim fieri potest, ut amet quisque scire incognita: ut autem amet incognita, non potest. Non enim frustra ibi est positum scire: quoniam qui scire amat incognita, non ipsa incognita, sed ipsum scire amat. Quod nisi haberet cognitum, neque scire se quisquam posset fidenter dicere, neque nescire. Non solum enim qui dicit, Scio et verum dicit, necesse est ut quid sit scire sciat: sed etiam qui dicit, Nescio, idque fidenter et verum dicit, et scit verum se dicere, scit utique quid sit scire: quia et discernit ab sciente nescientem, cum veraciter se intuens dicit, Nescio; et cum id se scit verum dicere, unde sciret, si quid sit scire nesciret?