ARTICLE XI

In the Eleventh Article We Ask: IS THERE UNCHANGEABLE TRUTH IN PROPHECY?

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. Since unchangeable truth is put in the definition of prophecy, if it belongs to prophecy at all, it must belong to it for some intrinsic reason. But future contingent things, about which we have prophecy, are not unchangeable for any intrinsic reason, but only in so far as they are referred to the divine foreknowledge, as Boethius says. Therefore, unchangeable truth should not be attributed to prophecy as part of its definition.

2. That which is fulfilled only if some changeable condition exists does not have unchangeable truth. But there is a prophecy, that containing a threat, which is fulfilled only if there exists a changeable condition, namely, persistence in justice or wickedness, as we see this in Jeremias (18:8). Therefore, not all prophecy possesses unchangeable truth.

3. The Gloss on Isaias (38:1) reads: "God reveals His sentence (sententia) but not His chosen plan (consilium) to the prophets." But His sentence is changeable, as is said in the same place. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable truth.

4. If prophecy contains unchangeable truth, this happens because of the prophet who sees it, or because of the thing which is seen, or because of the eternal mirror by reason of which it is seen. But its source is none of these. Not the seer, for human knowledge is changeable. Not the thing which is seen, for that is contingent. Finally, not the divine foreknowledge or mirror, for this does not impose necessity on things. Therefore, prophecy in no way contains unchangeable truth.

5. It was said that divine foreknowledge does not impose a necessity which makes it impossible for the outcome to be different, but nevertheless the outcome which was foreknown will not be different, and that in this way prophecy contains unchangeable truth. For, according to the Philosopher, that is called unchangeable which cannot be changed, or is changed with difficulty, or simply does not change.--On the contrary, granted the occurrence of what is possible, nothing impossible follows. If, therefore, that which is foreknown and prophesied can vary, then, if we assume that it does vary, nothing impossible follows. But it does follow that prophecy possesses changeable truth. Therefore, prophecy does not necessarily contain unchangeable truth.

6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing, for: "A statement is true or false as the thing is or is not," as the Philosopher says. But the things about which there is prophecy are contingent and changeable. Therefore, the prophetic statement contains changeable truth.

7. An effect is called necessary or contingent from the proximate cause, not from the first cause. But the proximate causes of the things of which we have prophecy are changeable causes, although the first cause is unchangeable. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable, but changeable, truth.

8. If prophecy possesses unchangeable truth, it is impossible for something to be prophesied and not happen. But it is impossible for what has been prophesied not to have been prophesied. Therefore, if prophecy has unchangeable truth, that which has been prophesied must necessarily happen. Thus, prophecy will not concern future contingent things.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Gloss says: "Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth."

2'. "Prophecy is a sign of divine foreknowledge," as Jerome says. But things which are foreknown are necessary in so far as they are subjects of foreknowledge. Therefore, the things prophesied are also necessary in so far as there is prophecy about them. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth.

3'. God's knowledge about changeable things can be unchangeable, for He does not obtain it from things. But in the same way prophetic knowledge is not received from the things themselves. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth about changeable things.

REPLY:

In prophecy there are two things to consider, the things prophesied and the knowledge which is had of those things. And the order of the causes in these two is different. For the things prophesied come immediately from changeable causes as from their proximate cause, but from the unchangeable causes as from their remote cause. Prophetic knowledge, on the other hand, comes from the divine foreknowledge as its proximate cause and depends on the things prophesied not as a proximate cause, but only as a sign of these things.

Moreover, the necessity and contingency of every effect depends on the proximate cause and not on the first cause. Hence, the things prophesied are changeable, but the prophetic knowledge is unchangeable, just as is the divine foreknowledge from which it is derived as a copy from the pattern. For, just as the necessity of the truth of the understanding causes necessary truth in the statement which is a sign of understanding, so also the immutable divine foreknowledge causes unchangeable truth in the prophecy which is its sign.

But the way in which God's foreknowledge can be unchangeably true about changeable things is explained in another question, on God's knowledge. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat it here, since the whole immutability of prophecy depends on the immutability of the divine foreknowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Nothing prevents something from being in another thing for an extrinsic reason, if that thing is taken in itself, and yet being in the thing for an intrinsic reason, if it is taken together with something else. Thus, to be moved belongs to man for an extrinsic reason, but, in so far as he is running, it belongs intrinsically to a man. So also, to be unchangeable does not belong intrinsically to the thing which is prophesied, but belongs to it only inasmuch as it is prophesied. Therefore, it is fittingly included in the definition of prophecy.

2. The prophecy containing a threat fully possesses unchangeable truth, for it does not deal with the outcomes of things, but with the order of the causes to the outcomes, as has been said. And this order, predicted by the prophet, must necessarily be, although sometimes the events do not follow.

3. That eternal disposition of God which never changes we call the chosen plan of God. For this reason Gregory says: "God never changes His chosen plan." Sentence, however, is that to which some causes are ordained. Moreover, sentences are handed down in trials according to the merits of the cases (causae). However, sometimes that to which the causes (causae) are ordained is arranged by God from eternity. And, then, God's chosen plan and sentence are the same. But, sometimes, causes are ordained to something which is not arranged by God from eternity. Then, God's chosen plan and sentence are directed to different things. Therefore, there is mutability in the sentence which looks to lower causes, but there is always immutability in the chosen plan.

Sometimes, then, a sentence which is in conformity with the chosen plan is revealed to the prophet. In this case, the prophecy possesses unchangeable truth even with reference to the outcome. Sometimes, however, there is revealed a sentence which is not in conformity with the chosen plan. In this case, there is unchangeable truth with reference to the order, but not with reference to the outcome, as we have said.*

4. The eternal mirror gives immutability to prophecy, not because it imposes necessity on the things prophesied, but because it makes the prophecy about contingent things necessary just as it itself is necessary.

5. Given that something has been prophesied according to foreknowledge, although in itself it is possible for it to fail to exist, still, granted that it is said to be foreknown, it is then impossible for it not to exist. For, from the fact that it is established as foreknown, it is established that it will be so, since foreknowledge looks to the outcome.

6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing when the knowledge of the one proposing the truth has its origin from things. However, this is not so in our case.

7. Although the proximate cause of the thing prophesied is changeable, the proximate cause of the prophecy itself is unchangeable, as has been said.* Therefore, the argument does not follow.

8. We should pass like judgment on the failure of what is prophesied to come to pass and on the failure of what is foreknown to come to pass. To what extent this should be conceded and to what extent it should be denied is treated in the question on God's knowledge.