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substance of God. For of such powers in it, none is substance; but all are necessarily always present in the substance of God, so to speak through a faint image, just as the powers of the senses are in the so-called common sense in the soul. And this is the manifest and safe and acknowledged dogma of the Church, but not that, God forbid. For just as there is one unoriginate substance, the substance of God, and the substances apart from this one are of a created nature, having come into being from the only unoriginate and only substance-creating substance, in the same way also there is one unoriginate providential power, that of God, and those apart from this one are of a created nature, and (p. 658) likewise with all the other natural powers of God. Therefore, not one thing alone is unoriginate, the substance of God, while the things apart from it are of a created nature.

But my discourse, guided by the self-sufficient and from infinity all-preconceiving nature, desires to clarify not only powers, which you will find in many places called natural energies by the holy fathers, but also to clarify unoriginate works of God, and to show briefly to the disobedient that the fathers also said this excellently. What then? Was not the work of providence necessary even before creation, so that at the proper time each of the created beings might come forth from non-being? And was not a God-befitting knowledge necessary, so as to know first, then to choose, even if not chronologically? And of that direct vision, could anyone conceive a beginning, and was there a time when God began to be moved by his own vision? By no means. Therefore, one unoriginate providence, that of God, being a work of God, but the providences apart from this one are of a created nature; and providence is not the substance of God; therefore, not one thing alone is unoriginate, the substance of God. And one foreknowledge, unoriginate and uncreated, that of God; but the foreknowledges apart from this one, which exist in us by nature, all had a beginning and are created. And one unoriginate will, that of God, but the wills apart from this one all had a beginning; but not even those who called the Logos of God the Son of will dared to call the will the substance of God. And the predestinations, even from the name itself, show their existence before created things; and if anyone should wish not to call these pre-eternal also, he will be refuted by Paul who says, just as "God predestined before the ages."

But these are clearly unoriginate and pre-eternal works of God, such as foreknowledge, will, providence, (p. 660) direct vision and anything similar; but if contemplation and providence and foreknowledge, predestinations and will are unoriginate works of God, so then is virtue, for each of these is a virtue, but also being-ness, since being-ness precedes not only substance, but also every being, for it is first; then it is virtue or will or predestination. Well then does Maximus, great in divine things, say that "being-ness and life and holiness and virtue are works of God not wrought in time" and lest anyone should think these exist in an age, even if not chronologically, he added, "for there never was when virtue and goodness and holiness and immortality were not"; again, lest anyone should suppose he means that the things in us are unoriginate, he adds that "the things wrought are both and are called so by participation in the things not wrought; for of all life and immortality, and of holiness and virtue," that is, of that which naturally exists in us, "God is the creator." These things, then, he has said in the fiftieth chapter of the first Century, and in the forty-eighth of the same, he says that these are essentially contemplated around God and are themselves the things participated in, in which the participating beings and works wrought in time share, those being unoriginate works, "for never," he says, "was 'was not' older than virtue, nor any of the other things mentioned," as having God as the sole eternal begetter of their being. And lest it should seem to anyone that he is speaking of that super-essentiality, which we mentally apprehend through the abstraction of all things, writing immediately thereafter in the forty-ninth, he said that also "of the

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οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ τῶν γάρ ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτων δυνάμεων οὐδεμία ἐστίν οὐσία˙ πᾶσαι δ᾿ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔνεισιν ἀεί τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς δι᾿ ἀμυδρᾶς εἰπεῖν, εἰκόνος καθάπερ αἱ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δυνάμεις ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ κοινῇ κατά ψυχήν αἰσθήσει. Καί τοῦτό ἐστι τό φανερόν καί ἀσφαλές καί ἀνωμολογημένον δόγμα τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἄπαγε. Καί γάρ ὡς μία ἄναρχος οὐσία, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην οὐσίαι γενητῆς εἰσι φύσεως, παρά τῆς μόνης ἀνάρχου καί μόνης οὐσιοποιοῦ οὐσίας γεγονυῖαι, τόν ἴσον τρόπον καί μία προνοητική δύναμις ἄναρχος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην γενητῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχουσι, κἀπί (σελ. 658) τῶν ἄλλων ἁπασῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων ὡσαύτως. Οὐχ ἕν ἄρα μόνον ἄναρχον, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, τά δέ παρά ταύτην γενητῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχει.

Βούλεται δέ μοι ὁ λόγος, ὑπό τῆς αὐτοτελοῦς καί πάντα προειληφυίας ἐξ ἀπείρου φύσεως ὁδηγούμενος, οὐ δυνάμεις μόνον, ἅς καί φυσικάς ἐνεργείας εὑρήσεις πολλαχοῦ τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσι καλουμένας, ἀλλά καί ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄναρχα διασαφῆσαι καί τούς πατέρας ἄριστα καί τοῦτ᾿ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐν βραχεῖ τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι δεῖξαι. Τί οὖν; Οὐκ ἔδει τοῦ ἔργου τῆς προνοίας καί πρό κτίσεως, ὥστ᾿ εἰς καιρόν ἕκαστον τῶν κτιστῶς ὄντων ἐκ τοῦ μή ὄντος προελθεῖν; Οὐκ ἔδει δέ γνώσεως θεοπρεποῦς, ὥστε γνόντα πρότερον, ἔπειτα ἑλέσθαι, κἄν μή χρονικῶς; Τί δέ αὐτοπτικῆς ἐκείνης θεωρίας ἐννοήσειέ τις ἄν ἀρχήν καί ἦν ὅτε ἤρξατο ὁ Θεός κινεῖσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρία; Οὐμενοῦν. Μία τοιγαροῦν πρόνοια ἄναρχος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔργον οὖσα τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην πρόνοιαι, γενητῆς εἰσι φύσεως˙ οὐκ ἔστι δέ ἡ πρόνοια οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ οὐχ ἕν ἄρα μόνον τό ἄναρχον, ἠ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ. Καί μία πρόγνωσις ἄναρχός τε καί ἄκτιστος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην κατά φύσιν ἡμῖν ἐνυπάρχουσαι προγνώσεις ἀρχήν ἔσχον πᾶσαι καί κτισταί εἰσι. Καί μία θέλησις ἄναρχος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην θελήσεις ἀρχήν ἔσχον ἅπασαι˙ θέλησιν δέ τήν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδ᾿ οἱ θελήσεως Υἱόν εἰπόντες τόν Λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν. Οἱ δέ προορισμοί καί ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμφαίνουσι τήν πρό τῶν κτισμάτων ὕπαρξιν αὐτῶν˙ εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσει μή καί προαιωνίους τούτους λέγειν ἐξελεγχθήσεται παρά τοῦ Παύλου λέγοντος, καθώς «προώρισε πρό τῶν αἰώνων ὁ Θεός».

Ἀλλά ταῦτα μέν σαφῶς ἄναρχα ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ καί προαιώνια, οἷον ἡ πρόγνωσις, ἡ θέλησις, ἡ πρόνοια, (σελ. 660) ἡ αὐτοψία καί εἴ τι παραπλήσιον˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἡ θεωρία καί πρόνοια καί πρόγνωσις, προορισμοί τε καί θέλησις ἄναρχα ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστι, καί ἡ ἀρετή ἄρα, καί γάρ ἀρετή τούτων ἕκαστον ἐστιν, ἀλλά καί ἡ ὀντότης, ἐπεί μή τῆς οὐσίας μόνης, ἀλλά καί παντός ὄντος προηγεῖται ἡ ὀντότης, πρῶτον γάρ ἐστιν˙ εἶτα ἀρετή ἐστιν ἤ θέλησις ἤ προορισμός. Καλῶς ἄρ᾿ ὁ πολύς τά θεῖα Μάξιμός φησιν ὅτι «ἡ ὀντότης καί ἡ ζωή καί ἡ ἁγιότης καί ἡ ἀρετή ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσιν οὐκ ἠργμένα χρονικῶς» καί ἵνα μή τις ἐν αἰῶνι ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι νομίσῃ, κἄν μή χρονικῶς, ἐπήγαγεν, «οὐκ ἦν γάρ ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ἀρετή καί ἀγαθότης καί ἁγιότης καί ἀθανασία»˙ πάλιν δέ ἵνα μή τις οἰηθείη τά ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦτον λέγειν ἄναρχα, ἐπάγει ὅτι «τά ἠργμένα τῇ μετοχῇ τῶν οὐκ ἠργμένων καί εἰσί καί λέγονται˙ πάσης γάρ ζωῆς καί ἀθανασίας, ἁγιότητός τε καί ἀρετῆς», δηλαδή τῆς φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἐνυπαρχούσης, «δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ Θεός». Ταῦτα μέν οὖν ἐν πεντηκοστῷ κεφαλαίῳ τῆς πρώτης Ἑκατοντάδος εἴρηκεν, ἐν δέ τῷ τεσσαρακοστῷ ὀγδόῳ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσιωδῶς περί τόν Θεόν αὐτά φησι θεωρεῖσθαι καί αὐτά εἶναι τά μεθεκτά, ὧν μετέχουσι τά ὄντα μετέχοντα καί ἠργμένα ἔργα χρονικῶς, ἀνάρχων ἔργων ἐκείνων ὄντων, «οὐ γάρ ποτε», φησί, «πρεσβύτερον ἀρετῆς τό "οὐκ ἦν", οὐδέ τινος ἄλλου τῶν εἰρημένων», οἷα τόν Θεόν ἔχοντα τοῦ εἶναι μονώτατον ἀϊδίως γεννήτορα. Καί ἵνα μή τινι δόξῃ τήν ὑπερουσιότητα ἐκείνην λέγειν, ᾗ κατά τήν ἀπόλυσιν πάντων τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐπιβάλλομεν, ἐν τῷ τεσσαρακοστῷ ἐνάτῳ ἐφεξῆς εὐθύς γράφων εἶπεν ὅτι καί «τῶν