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What am I saying? Does it have the cognitive, the prognostic, the creative, the cohesive, the providential, the deifying, and simply all such things, or does it not? For if it does not have them, then this one unoriginate substance is no longer God. But if it does have them, if it acquired these powers at some later time, then there was a time when it was imperfect, which is to say, not even God; but if it had these powers from eternity, then not only one thing is unoriginate, the substance of God, but also each of these powers. But there is one unoriginate substance, the substance of God; for none of such powers in it is a substance; but all necessarily are always present in the substance of God, to speak through a dim image, just as the powers of the senses are in what is called the common sense according to the soul. And this is the manifest and secure and acknowledged dogma of the Church, but not that one, away with it. For just as there is one unoriginate substance, the substance of God, and the substances apart from it are of a created nature, having come to be from the only unoriginate and only substance-creating substance, in the same way there is also one unoriginate providential power, that of God, and those apart from it are of a created nature, and (p. 658) likewise for all the other natural powers of God. Therefore it is not the case that only one thing is unoriginate, the substance of God, and that which is apart from it is of a created nature.

And my argument, guided by the self-perfect and from infinity all-preconceiving nature, wishes to clarify not only powers, which you will find in many places called natural energies by the holy fathers, but also unoriginate works of God, and to show briefly to the disobedient that the fathers also said this most excellently. What then? Was there not need of the work of providence even before creation, so that at the proper time each of the created beings might come forth from non-being? Was there not need of God-befitting knowledge, so that having first known, He might then choose, even if not chronologically? And what beginning could one conceive for that self-seeing contemplation, and was there a time when God began to be moved by His own contemplation? Certainly not. Therefore, there is one unoriginate providence, that of God, being a work of God, while the providences apart from this are of a created nature; and providence is not the substance of God; therefore, not only one thing is unoriginate, the substance of God. And one foreknowledge is unoriginate and uncreated, that of God; but the foreknowledges apart from this that exist in us by nature all had a beginning and are created. And one will is unoriginate, that of God, while the wills apart from this all had a beginning; but not even those who called the Logos of God the Son of will dared to say that the will is the substance of God. And the predeterminations even from their very name show their existence before created things; and if anyone should wish not to call these pre-eternal as well, he will be refuted by Paul who says, as "God predetermined before the ages".

But these are clearly unoriginate and pre-eternal works of God, such as foreknowledge, will, providence, (p. 660) self-contemplation and anything similar; and if contemplation and providence and foreknowledge, and predeterminations and will are unoriginate works of God, then virtue is also, for each of these is a virtue, but also beingness, since beingness precedes not only substance, but also every being, for it is first; then it is virtue or will or predetermination. Well then does Maximus, that great expert in divine things, say that "beingness and life and holiness and virtue are works of God not wrought in time" and lest anyone think these exist in an age, even if not in time, he added, "for there was never a time when virtue and goodness and holiness and immortality were not"; and again, lest anyone should suppose he is saying that the things in us are unoriginate, he adds that "the things wrought by participation in the unwrought both are and are called so; for of all life and immortality, and of holiness and virtue", that is, of that which exists in us by nature, "[God is] creator

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τί λέγω˙ ἔχει τό γνωστικόν, τό προγνωστικόν, τό δημιουργικόν, τό συνεκτικόν, τό προνοητικόν, τό θεουργικόν καί ἁπλῶς πάντα τά τοιαῦτα, ἤ οὔκ ἔχει; Εἰ μέν γάρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδέ Θεός ἐστι λοιπόν ἡ μόνη αὕτη ἄναρχος οὐσία. Εἰ δέ ἔχει, εἰ μέν ὕστερόν ποτε ταύτας τάς δυνάμεις προσεκτήσατο, λοιπόν ἦν ὅτε ἀτελής ἦν, ταὐτόν δ᾿ εἶπεῖν οὐδέ Θεός˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἐξ ἀϊδίου εἶχε ταύτας τάς δυνάμεις, οὐχ ἕν μόνον ἄναρχον, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλά καί τῶν ταύτης δυνάμεων ἑκάστη τούτων. Μία δέ ἄναρχος οὐσία, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ τῶν γάρ ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτων δυνάμεων οὐδεμία ἐστίν οὐσία˙ πᾶσαι δ᾿ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔνεισιν ἀεί τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς δι᾿ ἀμυδρᾶς εἰπεῖν, εἰκόνος καθάπερ αἱ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δυνάμεις ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ κοινῇ κατά ψυχήν αἰσθήσει. Καί τοῦτό ἐστι τό φανερόν καί ἀσφαλές καί ἀνωμολογημένον δόγμα τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἄπαγε. Καί γάρ ὡς μία ἄναρχος οὐσία, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην οὐσίαι γενητῆς εἰσι φύσεως, παρά τῆς μόνης ἀνάρχου καί μόνης οὐσιοποιοῦ οὐσίας γεγονυῖαι, τόν ἴσον τρόπον καί μία προνοητική δύναμις ἄναρχος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην γενητῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχουσι, κἀπί (σελ. 658) τῶν ἄλλων ἁπασῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων ὡσαύτως. Οὐχ ἕν ἄρα μόνον ἄναρχον, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, τά δέ παρά ταύτην γενητῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχει.

Βούλεται δέ μοι ὁ λόγος, ὑπό τῆς αὐτοτελοῦς καί πάντα προειληφυίας ἐξ ἀπείρου φύσεως ὁδηγούμενος, οὐ δυνάμεις μόνον, ἅς καί φυσικάς ἐνεργείας εὑρήσεις πολλαχοῦ τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσι καλουμένας, ἀλλά καί ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄναρχα διασαφῆσαι καί τούς πατέρας ἄριστα καί τοῦτ᾿ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐν βραχεῖ τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι δεῖξαι. Τί οὖν; Οὐκ ἔδει τοῦ ἔργου τῆς προνοίας καί πρό κτίσεως, ὥστ᾿ εἰς καιρόν ἕκαστον τῶν κτιστῶς ὄντων ἐκ τοῦ μή ὄντος προελθεῖν; Οὐκ ἔδει δέ γνώσεως θεοπρεποῦς, ὥστε γνόντα πρότερον, ἔπειτα ἑλέσθαι, κἄν μή χρονικῶς; Τί δέ αὐτοπτικῆς ἐκείνης θεωρίας ἐννοήσειέ τις ἄν ἀρχήν καί ἦν ὅτε ἤρξατο ὁ Θεός κινεῖσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρία; Οὐμενοῦν. Μία τοιγαροῦν πρόνοια ἄναρχος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔργον οὖσα τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην πρόνοιαι, γενητῆς εἰσι φύσεως˙ οὐκ ἔστι δέ ἡ πρόνοια οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ οὐχ ἕν ἄρα μόνον τό ἄναρχον, ἠ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ. Καί μία πρόγνωσις ἄναρχός τε καί ἄκτιστος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην κατά φύσιν ἡμῖν ἐνυπάρχουσαι προγνώσεις ἀρχήν ἔσχον πᾶσαι καί κτισταί εἰσι. Καί μία θέλησις ἄναρχος, ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ, αἱ δέ παρά ταύτην θελήσεις ἀρχήν ἔσχον ἅπασαι˙ θέλησιν δέ τήν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδ᾿ οἱ θελήσεως Υἱόν εἰπόντες τόν Λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν. Οἱ δέ προορισμοί καί ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμφαίνουσι τήν πρό τῶν κτισμάτων ὕπαρξιν αὐτῶν˙ εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσει μή καί προαιωνίους τούτους λέγειν ἐξελεγχθήσεται παρά τοῦ Παύλου λέγοντος, καθώς «προώρισε πρό τῶν αἰώνων ὁ Θεός».

Ἀλλά ταῦτα μέν σαφῶς ἄναρχα ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ καί προαιώνια, οἷον ἡ πρόγνωσις, ἡ θέλησις, ἡ πρόνοια, (σελ. 660) ἡ αὐτοψία καί εἴ τι παραπλήσιον˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἡ θεωρία καί πρόνοια καί πρόγνωσις, προορισμοί τε καί θέλησις ἄναρχα ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστι, καί ἡ ἀρετή ἄρα, καί γάρ ἀρετή τούτων ἕκαστον ἐστιν, ἀλλά καί ἡ ὀντότης, ἐπεί μή τῆς οὐσίας μόνης, ἀλλά καί παντός ὄντος προηγεῖται ἡ ὀντότης, πρῶτον γάρ ἐστιν˙ εἶτα ἀρετή ἐστιν ἤ θέλησις ἤ προορισμός. Καλῶς ἄρ᾿ ὁ πολύς τά θεῖα Μάξιμός φησιν ὅτι «ἡ ὀντότης καί ἡ ζωή καί ἡ ἁγιότης καί ἡ ἀρετή ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσιν οὐκ ἠργμένα χρονικῶς» καί ἵνα μή τις ἐν αἰῶνι ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι νομίσῃ, κἄν μή χρονικῶς, ἐπήγαγεν, «οὐκ ἦν γάρ ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ἀρετή καί ἀγαθότης καί ἁγιότης καί ἀθανασία»˙ πάλιν δέ ἵνα μή τις οἰηθείη τά ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦτον λέγειν ἄναρχα, ἐπάγει ὅτι «τά ἠργμένα τῇ μετοχῇ τῶν οὐκ ἠργμένων καί εἰσί καί λέγονται˙ πάσης γάρ ζωῆς καί ἀθανασίας, ἁγιότητός τε καί ἀρετῆς», δηλαδή τῆς φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἐνυπαρχούσης, «δημιουργός