146

We, O best one, say that God has all these things, or rather, to speak according to the great Dionysius, that He pre-contains and transcends them unrelatedly and comprehensively and unitively, just as the soul has in itself in a simple manner all the providential powers of the body. Therefore, just as the soul, even when the eyes have been cut out or the ears have been deafened, has in itself no less the providential powers of the body, so also when the world was not yet, God had the providential powers of the world; and just as the soul is not simply the providential powers, but has powers, so indeed is God; and just as the soul is one and simple and uncompounded, in no way being multiplied (p. 684) or compounded on account of the powers in it and from it, so also God, being not only of many powers but also all-powerful, does not depart from unity and simplicity on account of the powers in Him. You would learn many works of the soul and of yourself by examining them, which it has even when separated from the body and which it imparts to the body when united with it. Yet the great Dionysius, speaking of life-itself and deification-itself and such things as the principles and paradigms of beings, does not say that God pre-contains them. How then are the things which God pre-contains created? But if He also puts them forth as gifts, how does the same one say He bestows these same things, how are the predeterminations and the divine wills not unoriginate and uncreated? How then is it confessed that “there is only one unoriginate thing, the essence of God, and things besides this are of a created nature and have a temporal beginning”? Which of the saints ever said this? And if none did, how is it confessed?

And he connects to this another of the likewise confessed things, “that there is no other reality between the essence of God and created things.” If, then, he here calls essence the participable and essence-creating power of God, which the great Dionysius also names essentiality-itself, he ought not to have said that there is nothing between the essence of God and all created things simply, but only of created essences, since for living things insofar as they are living, whether perceptively or rationally or intellectually, the creative power is not the essence-creating power of God but the life-creating, and for those being made wise, the wisdom-creating, and for those being deified, the deifying, from which we both conceive and name that superessential and unitive hiddenness as God and wisdom and life, and not only as essence. But if he means that very superessential, and here also imparticipable, hiddenness, which is established beyond in secrets; (which he also claimed above to be the only unoriginate thing, wrongly removing from it its co-eternal (p. 686) powers and energies, or rather those most God-befitting works, which are never inactive), if, therefore, he means this, and says that between this and created things there is no other reality, then he says that the superessential essence of God itself exists as the participable reality of created things; and he has made this very thing manifest by saying “no other”; for if there is no other, it must be itself. Therefore all created things will participate in the imparticipable essence of God. For how will each of the created things not participate in reality? And how will either aeon or time or place and the things in them exist, if it does not partake of being, which is the same as to say, of reality? Therefore, if each of these things is to exist, both those that are essences and those that are not, it will partake of the essence of God; for according to you, there is no other, but this alone is the reality of created things; and the most absurd thing of all is that things partaking of an essence, and a divine one at that, will not even be essences.

But if reality is also the principle of things that exist in any way, how is He who is beyond principle not also beyond it? And if a principle of necessity transcends the things from it, how is reality not beyond beings? And if this is beyond the participants, and He who is beyond principle is beyond it, how is the participable reality not between the participants and the imparticipable superessentiality? And indeed, all such principles are nothing other than the logoi of beings and the paradigms, participable by beings, but separate from beings, as by the

146

Ἡμεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν τόν Θεόν φαμεν, μᾶλλον δέ, ἵνα κατά τόν μέγαν ∆ιονύσιον εἴπωμεν, προέχειν καί ὑπερέχειν ἀσχέτως καί συνειλημμένως καί ἑνιαίως, ὡς ἡ ψχή ἔχει μονοειδῶς ἐν ἑαυτῇ πάσας τάς προνοητικάς τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεις. Ὡς οὖν ἡ ψυχή καί τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐκκεκομμένων ἤ τῶν ὤτων ἐκκεκωφημένων ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει κατ᾿ οὐδέν ἧττον τάς προνοητικάς τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεις, οὕτω καί τοῦ κόσμου μήπω ὄντος τάς προνοητικάς τοῦ κόσμου δυνάμεις εἶχεν ὁ Θεός˙ καί ὡς ἡ ψυχή οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς αἱ προνοητικαί δυνάμεις, ἀλλά δυνάμεις ἔχει, οὕτω δή καί ὁ Θεός˙ καί ὡς ἡ ψυχή μία καί ἁπλῆ καί ἀνύνθετός ἐστι, μηδαμῶς διά τάς ἐν αὐτῇ καί ἐξ αὐτῆς δυνάμεις πολλαπλασιαζομένη (σελ. 684) ἤ συντιθεμένη, οὕτω καί ὁ Θεός, οὐ πολυδύναμος μόνον ἀλλά καί παντοδύναμος ὑπάρχων, διά τάς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις τοῦ ἑνιαίου καί τῆς ἁπλότητος οὐκ ἐκχωρεῖ. Πολλά δ᾿ ἄν τῆς ψυχῆς καί ἔργα καί σεαυτόν ἐξετάζων καταμάθοις, ἅ καί σώματος διεζευγμένη ἔχει καί τῷ σώματι τούτων μεταδίδωσι συνεζευγμένη. Οὐ μήν ἀλλά τήν αὐτοζωήν καί αὐτοθέωσιν καί τά τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς καί παραδείγματα λέγων ὁ μέγας ∆ιονύσιος, οὐ προέχειν τόν Θεόν αὐτά φησι. Πῶς οὖν ἅ προέχει ὁ Θεός ἀρκτά; Εἰ δέ καί ὡς δωρεάς προβάλλεται, πῶς δωρεῖται τά αὐτά ταῦτα ὁ αὐτός φησι, πῶς οἱ προορισμοί καί τά θεῖα θελήματα οὐκ ἄναρχα καί ἄκτιστά ἐστι; Πῶς οὖν ὁμολογουμένως «ἕν μόνον ἄναρχον, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, τά δέ παρά ταύτην γενητῆς ἐστι φύσεως καί ἀρχήν ἔσχε χρονικήν»; Τίς ποτε τοῦτο τῶν ἁγίων εἶπεν; εἰ δέ μηδείς, πῶς ὁμολογεῖται;

Συνείρει δέ τούτῳ καί ἕτερον τῶν ὡσαύτως ὁμολογουμένων, «μηδεμίαν ἄλλην εἶναι ὀντότητα μεταξύ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῶν γενητῶν». Εἰ μέν οὖν οὐσίαν κανταῦθα λέγει τήν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ τήν μεθεκτήν καί οὐσιοποιόν, ἥν καί αὐτοουσίωσιν ὁ μέγας ὀνομάζει ∆ιονύσιος, οὐκ ἔδει φάναι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῶν γενητῶν ἁπλῶς πάντων μηδέν εἶναι μεταξύ, ἀλλά τῶν γενητῶν μόνον οὐσιῶν, ἐπεί τῶν ζώντων ᾗ ζώντων , αἰσθητικῶς ἤ λογικῶς ἤ νοερῶς, οὐχ ἡ οὐσιοποιός τοῦ Θεοῦ δύναμις ποιητική ἀλλ᾿ ἡ ζωοποιός, καί τῶν σοφιζομένων ἡ σοφοποιός, καί τῶν θεουμένων ἡ θεοποιός, ἀφ᾿ ὧν καί Θεόν καί σοφίαν καί ζωήν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ οὐσίαν μόνον νοοῦμέν τε κάι ὀνομάζομεν τήν ὑπερούσιον καί ἑνιαίαν κρυφιότητα ἐκείνην. Εἰ δ᾿ ἐκείνην αὐτήν τήν ὑπερούσιον, κἀνταῦθα καί ἀμέθεκτον, κρυφιότητά φησι, τήν ἐν ἀποκρύφοις ὑπερανιδρυμένην˙ (ἥν καί ἀνωτέρω μόνην ἄναρχον εἶναι ἰσχυρίζετο, περιελών αὐτῆς κακῶς τάς συναϊδίους (σελ. 686) αὐτῆς δυνάμεις τε καί ἐνεργείας, μᾶλλον δέ τά θεοπρεπέστατα ἐκεῖνα ἔργα, τά μηδέποτε ἠργμένα), εἰ τοίνυν ταύτην λέγει, καί ταύτης καί τῶν γενητῶν μηδεμίαν ἄλλην εἶναι μεταξύ ὀντότητα φησιν, αὐτήν λοιπόν φησι τήν ὑπερούσιον οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὀντότητα τῶν γενητῶν ὡς μεθεκτήν ὑπάρχειν˙ τοῦτο δέ αὐτό καταφανές καί διά τοῦ μηδεμίαν ἄλλην φάναι πεποίηκεν˙ εἰ γάρ μή ἄλλη, αὐτή ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Μεθέξουσιν ἄρα τά γενητά πάντα τῆς ἀμεθέκτου οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ μεθέξει τῆς ὀντότητος ἕκαστον τῶν γενητῶν; Πῶς δέ ἔσται ἤ αἰών ἤ χρόνος ἤ τόπος καί τά ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰ μή τοῦ εἶναι, ταὐτόν δέ εἰπεῖν ὀντότητος, μετέχει; Μεθέξει τοίνυν εἴπερ ἔσται τούτων ἕκαστον, ὅσα τε οὐσίαι εἰσί καί ὅσα μή, τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ οὐκ ἄλλη γάρ, ἀλλ᾿ αὕτη μόνη κατά σέ τῶν γενητῶν ἐστιν ὀντότης˙ καί τό πάντων ἀτοπώτατον, ὅτι οὐδέ οὐσίαι ἔσονται τά οὐσίας μετέχοντα, καί ταῦτα θείας.

Εἰ δέ καί ἀρχή ἐστι τῶν ὁπωσδήποτε ὄντων ἡ ὀντότης, πῶς οὐχί καί ὑπερ αὐτήν ἐστιν ὁ ὑπεράρχιος; Εἰ δ᾿ ἀρχή τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπερέχει, πῶς οὐχ ὑπέρ τά ὄντα ἡ ὀντότης; Εἰ δ᾿ αὕτη μέν ὑπέρ τά μετέχοντα, ὁ δ᾿ ὑπεράρχιος ὑπέρ αὐτήν, πῶς οὐ μεταξύ τῶν μετεχόντων καί τῆς ἀμεθέκτου ὑπερουσιότητος ἡ μεθεκτή ὀντότης; Καί μήν αἱ τοιαῦται ἅπασαι ἀρχαί οὐδέν ἕτερόν εἰσιν ἤ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων καί τά παραδείγματα, μεθεκτοί μέν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐξῃρημένοι δέ τῶν ὄντων, ὡς τῷ