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divine Maximus, of being, nor is "there was not" older than them, but they always are from the always existing God, being always inseparably around Him and co-eternally subsisting in Him. For we will not be afraid of your sophisms of vain artifice and the ditheisms and polytheisms and the composite gods, which you, like some bogeymen, put forward against us and the saints, frightening not those of age, be well assured, but the infants, and through which (p. 682) you falsely accuse us of what you yourself suffer, being overturned by your own words, as has often been shown, and attempting, alas, to drag others down with you, so that you might deceitfully lead them away from the right dogmas, enveloping them in the devices of your arguments.

"For," he says, "inasmuch as you say that many things are eternal and uncreated, both the subordinate and that which is above them, you speak of many gods; and inasmuch as [you speak of things] subsisting not dividedly from God, and of the same God possessing eternally both a visible glory and an invisible essence, you bring two Gods together into one composite God." Against whom are such words and this unrestrained denunciation and these forbidden accusations, or rather, this nonsense? Or is it clear to all, even if we do not say it? For you have heard the saints who have said that the participated things are many and all without beginning, and that God is infinitely and innumerably transcendent to them, and those who said that the contemplative glory of God is eternal and co-eternal with Him. But let us nevertheless give a brief account of how these things are said; for we too are in harmony with them.

We, O best one, say that God has all these things, or rather, to speak according to the great Dionysius, that He pre-contains and transcends them incomparably and comprehensively and unitively, just as the soul has in a simple mode within itself all the providential powers of the body. As, therefore, the soul, even when the eyes have been cut out or the ears have been deafened, has in itself no less the providential powers of the body, so also God, when the world was not yet, had the providential powers of the world; and as the soul is not simply the providential powers, but has powers, so indeed is God; and as the soul is one and simple and uncompounded, in no way being multiplied (p. 684) or compounded on account of the powers in it and from it, so also God, being not only of many powers but also all-powerful, does not depart from unity and simplicity on account of the powers in Him. You might learn many works of the soul by examining yourself, which it has even when separated from the body, and which it imparts to the body when joined with it. But indeed, the great Dionysius, speaking of life-itself and deification-itself and suchlike principles and paradigms of beings, says that God does not pre-contain them. How then are the things which God pre-contains originated? But if they are also put forward as gifts, how does the same one say He bestows these very things, how are the predeterminations and the divine wills not without beginning and uncreated? How then is it confessed that "there is only one thing without beginning, the essence of God, and the things besides this are of a created nature and had a beginning in time"? Which of the saints ever said this? And if none, how is it confessed?

And he attaches to this another of the likewise confessed things, "that there is no other reality between the essence of God and created things." If, then, here he calls essence the participated and essence-creating power of God, which the great Dionysius also names self-essentiation, it was not necessary to say that there is nothing between the essence of God and all created things simply, but only of created essences, since for living things insofar as they are living, whether sensitively or rationally or intellectually, not the essence-creating power of God is creative but the life-creating, and for those being made wise, the wisdom-creating, and for those being deified, the deifying, from which also God and wisdom and life, but not essence

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θεῖον Μάξιμον, τοῦ εἶναι, οὐδ᾿ ἔστι «πρεσβύτερον αὐτῶν τό "οὐκ ἦν"», ἀλλ᾿ ἀεί εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀεί ὄντος Θεοῦ, περί αὐτόν ἀχωρίστως ἀεί ὄντα καί ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνυπάρχοντα συναϊδίως. Οὐ γάρ δή φοβηθησόμεθά σου τά τῆς ματαιοτεχνίας σοφίσματα καί τάς διθεΐας καί πολυθεΐας καί τούς συνθέτους θεούς, ἅ σύ καθάπερ τινά μορμολύκια καθ᾿ ἡμῶν καί τῶν ἁγίων προβάλλῃ, δεδιττόμενος μή τούς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, εὖ ἴσθι, ἀλλά τά νήπια, καί δι᾿ ὧν (σελ. 682) ἅ σύ πάσχεις ἡμῶν καταψεύδῃ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ λόγοις ὡς πολλάκις δείκνυται περιτρεπόμενος καί σαυτῷ συγκατασπάσαι τούς ἄλλους, φεῦ, ἐπιχειρῶν, ὡς τῶν ὀρθῶν δογμάτων συναπαγάγοις δολίως, περιβάλλων τοῖς ἐκ τῶν λόγων τεχνάσμασιν.

«Ἧ μέν γάρ», φησίν, «ἀΐδια καί ἄκτιστα πολλά φατε, ὑφειμένα τε καί τό τούτων ὑπερκείμενον, πολλούς λέγετε θεούς, ἧ δέ μή διῃρημένως ὑπό τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑφεστηκότα καί τοῦ αὐτοῦ Θεοῦ τό μέν δόξαν ὁρατήν, τό δέ οὐσίαν ἀόρατον, ὡς ἔχοντος ἀϊδίως καί ἀμφότερα, τούς δύο Θεούς εἰς ἕνα συνάγετε σύνθετον Θεόν». Πρός τίνα οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι καί ἡ ἄσχετος καταφορά καί τά ἀπηγορευμένα ταῦτα ἐκγλήματα, μᾶλλον δέ ληρήματα; Ἤ πᾶσι δῆλον, κἄν ἡμεῖς μή λέγωμεν; Ἀκηκόατε γάρ τῶν εἰρηκότων ἁγίων τά μεθεκτά πολλά τε καί πάντα ἄναρχα καί τόν Θεόν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ὑπεξῃρημένον τούτων καί τούς εἰπόντας τήν θεωρητικήν δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀΐδιον καί συναΐδιον αὐτῷ. ∆ῶμεν δ᾿ ὅμως ἡμεῖς διά βραχέων λόγον ὅπως ταῦτα λέγεται˙ καί γάρ καί ἡμεῖς συνάδομεν ἐκείνοις.

Ἡμεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν τόν Θεόν φαμεν, μᾶλλον δέ, ἵνα κατά τόν μέγαν ∆ιονύσιον εἴπωμεν, προέχειν καί ὑπερέχειν ἀσχέτως καί συνειλημμένως καί ἑνιαίως, ὡς ἡ ψχή ἔχει μονοειδῶς ἐν ἑαυτῇ πάσας τάς προνοητικάς τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεις. Ὡς οὖν ἡ ψυχή καί τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐκκεκομμένων ἤ τῶν ὤτων ἐκκεκωφημένων ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει κατ᾿ οὐδέν ἧττον τάς προνοητικάς τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεις, οὕτω καί τοῦ κόσμου μήπω ὄντος τάς προνοητικάς τοῦ κόσμου δυνάμεις εἶχεν ὁ Θεός˙ καί ὡς ἡ ψυχή οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς αἱ προνοητικαί δυνάμεις, ἀλλά δυνάμεις ἔχει, οὕτω δή καί ὁ Θεός˙ καί ὡς ἡ ψυχή μία καί ἁπλῆ καί ἀνύνθετός ἐστι, μηδαμῶς διά τάς ἐν αὐτῇ καί ἐξ αὐτῆς δυνάμεις πολλαπλασιαζομένη (σελ. 684) ἤ συντιθεμένη, οὕτω καί ὁ Θεός, οὐ πολυδύναμος μόνον ἀλλά καί παντοδύναμος ὑπάρχων, διά τάς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις τοῦ ἑνιαίου καί τῆς ἁπλότητος οὐκ ἐκχωρεῖ. Πολλά δ᾿ ἄν τῆς ψυχῆς καί ἔργα καί σεαυτόν ἐξετάζων καταμάθοις, ἅ καί σώματος διεζευγμένη ἔχει καί τῷ σώματι τούτων μεταδίδωσι συνεζευγμένη. Οὐ μήν ἀλλά τήν αὐτοζωήν καί αὐτοθέωσιν καί τά τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς καί παραδείγματα λέγων ὁ μέγας ∆ιονύσιος, οὐ προέχειν τόν Θεόν αὐτά φησι. Πῶς οὖν ἅ προέχει ὁ Θεός ἀρκτά; Εἰ δέ καί ὡς δωρεάς προβάλλεται, πῶς δωρεῖται τά αὐτά ταῦτα ὁ αὐτός φησι, πῶς οἱ προορισμοί καί τά θεῖα θελήματα οὐκ ἄναρχα καί ἄκτιστά ἐστι; Πῶς οὖν ὁμολογουμένως «ἕν μόνον ἄναρχον, ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, τά δέ παρά ταύτην γενητῆς ἐστι φύσεως καί ἀρχήν ἔσχε χρονικήν»; Τίς ποτε τοῦτο τῶν ἁγίων εἶπεν; εἰ δέ μηδείς, πῶς ὁμολογεῖται;

Συνείρει δέ τούτῳ καί ἕτερον τῶν ὡσαύτως ὁμολογουμένων, «μηδεμίαν ἄλλην εἶναι ὀντότητα μεταξύ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῶν γενητῶν». Εἰ μέν οὖν οὐσίαν κανταῦθα λέγει τήν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ τήν μεθεκτήν καί οὐσιοποιόν, ἥν καί αὐτοουσίωσιν ὁ μέγας ὀνομάζει ∆ιονύσιος, οὐκ ἔδει φάναι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῶν γενητῶν ἁπλῶς πάντων μηδέν εἶναι μεταξύ, ἀλλά τῶν γενητῶν μόνον οὐσιῶν, ἐπεί τῶν ζώντων ᾗ ζώντων , αἰσθητικῶς ἤ λογικῶς ἤ νοερῶς, οὐχ ἡ οὐσιοποιός τοῦ Θεοῦ δύναμις ποιητική ἀλλ᾿ ἡ ζωοποιός, καί τῶν σοφιζομένων ἡ σοφοποιός, καί τῶν θεουμένων ἡ θεοποιός, ἀφ᾿ ὧν καί Θεόν καί σοφίαν καί ζωήν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ οὐσίαν