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is of them, but He has not subsisted from them; for the things concerning God are not the essence of God, but He is the essence of the things concerning Him. Inasmuch as He is a superessential essence, both ineffable and inconceivable, both unrelated and (p. 690) unparticipated, but inasmuch as He is the essence of beings and the life of the living and the wisdom of the wise and simply of all things that in any way are, the reality and beautifying power, He is both conceived and spoken of and participated in by created beings. For if, according to the great Dionysius, "God is known not only through unknowing, but also through knowing, and there is of Him both intellection and reason and knowledge and touch and perception and opinion and imagination and name and all other things," therefore there is also participation in Him, on the one hand because there exists intellection and perception and touch of Him, and on the other because of the most comprehensive reason subsequently adduced. The same God, therefore, exists as both unparticipated and participated, the former as superessential, the latter as possessing an essence-creating power and energy, both exemplary and final, of all things.

But indeed, Pythagoras and Plato and Socrates, in a lowly manner and unworthily of God, held such paradigms to be self-subsistent principles, co-causes with God. These men, therefore, must be accused as polytheists, who between that superessentiality and created beings, having extemporaneously devised from themselves other divine essences as principles of beings, established them, "which neither they knew," according to the scripture, "nor their fathers." But we and our fathers hold none of these things to be self-subsistent, nor uncaused, nor a co-cause with God, for which reason we call these things predestinations and foreknowledge and wills of God, existing indeed before created things in Him—for how could they not?—but with created things later proceeding according to them. For "He spoke," it says, "did it not come to be? And the thought was a deed, and all that He willed, He made." If, then, we do not say there are many superessential, originating, and creative essences of things that have come to be, but one which rejects all duplicity and according to a single, uniform, and super-unified simplicity brings forth the multiform and the particular, yet we know this one to be all-powerful and comprehensive of all things, as having (p. 692) all things in itself even before creation.” For if the sun," to quote the great Dionysius, "has pre-conceived in itself in a uniform manner the causes of many participations, much more must it be granted that in the cause of both it and all things, the paradigms of all beings pre-exist according to a single superessential union."

There is, therefore, and there always is, and there is in the proper sense, predestination and foreknowledge and providence and such things, and they are indivisibly united to God and are other than that superessentiality, and it is beyond them; for how could it not be? What then? Since these things always exist according to some subsistence, and God also always exists, will there be two or many gods? Because these things are indivisibly united to Him, will God be composite for us? Or because we have come to be according to them, are we the creations not of God, but of other things? Surely you will not make the emperor on earth, who is set over us by God, two emperors, and prove his empire composite from two empires, and say that someone else and not he is the master of dignities, because by his own decree and will he creates the positions, and his decree becomes a venerable name and dignity for each of those in authority? For here too, between the one commanding and those who obey, there is of necessity the command. But nor would anyone say that the emperor does not possess for us the power to rule, and in some way also foresight, even if not in all things and at all times. Will we then also place the decree itself with the senate, because the decree is not the empire, just as you there place the participated things among created beings, because these are not the essence of God? From such principles, and thus confessed, you have shown the orthodox to be dytheists and polytheists.

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ἐστιν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὑπό τούτων ὑφέστηκεν αὐτός˙ οὐ γάρ τά περί Θεόν ἐστιν οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτός ἐστιν οὐσία τῶν περί αὐτόν. Ἧ μέν ἔστιν αὐτός ὑπερούσιος οὐσία, ἄρρητός τε καί ἀπερινόητος, ἄσχετός τε καί (σελ. 690) ἀμέθεκτος, ᾗ δέ ἐστιν οὐσία τῶν ὄντων καί ζωή τῶν ζώντων καί σοφία τῶν σοφιζομένων καί ἁπλῶς πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων ὀντότης καί δύναμις καλλοποιός, καί νοεῖται καί λέγεται καί μετέχεται παρά τῶν γενητῶν. Εἰ γάρ κατά τόν μέγαν ∆ιονύσιον «οὐ δι᾿ ἀγνωσίας μόνον, ἀλλά καί διά γνώσεως ὁ Θεός γινώσκεται καί ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καί νόησις καί λόγος καί ἐπιστήμη καί ἐπαφή καί αἴσθησις καί δόξα καί φαντασία καί ὄνομα καί τἄλλα πάντα», τοιγαροῦν καί μέθεξίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο μέν διά τό νόησιν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν καί αἴσθησιν καί ἐπαφήν, τοῦτο δέ διά τόν ὕστερον ἐπενηνεγμένον συμπεριληπτικώτατον λόγον. Ἀμέθεκτος ἄρα καί μεθεκτός ὑπάρχει ὁ αὐτός Θεός, ἐκεῖνο μέν ὡς ὑπερούσιος, τοῦτο δέ ὡς οὐσιοποιόν ἔχων δύναμίν τε καί ἐνέργειαν παραδειγματικήν καί τελικήν τῶν πάντων.

Ἀλλά γάρ τά τοιαῦτα παραδείγματα Πυθαγόρας μέν καί Πλάτων καί Σωκράτης ταπεινῶς καί ἀναξίως τοῦ Θεοῦ αὐθυπάρκτους ἐδόξασαν ἀρχάς συναιτίους τῷ Θεῷ. Τούτους οὖν αἰτιατέον ὡς πολυθέους, οἵτινες μεταξύ τῆς ὑπερουσιότητος ἐκείνης καί τῶν γενητῶν θείας οὐσίας ἑτέρας ἀρχικάς τῶν ὄντων αὐτοσχεδιάσαντες παρ᾿ ἑαυτῶν ὑπέστησαν, «ἅς οὔτε αὐτοί ᾔδεισαν» κατά τό λόγιον «οὔτε οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν». Ἡμεῖς δέ καί οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν οὐδέν τούτων αὐθύπαρκτον δοξάζομεν, οὐδ᾿ ἀναίτιον οὐδέ συναίτιον Θεῷ, διό καί προορισμούς καί προγνώσεις ταῦτά φαμεν καί θελήματα Θεοῦ, ὄντα μέν πρό τῶν κτισμάτων ἐν αὐτῷ πῶς γάρ οὔ; προηγμένων δ᾿ ὕστερον τῶν κτισμάτων κατ᾿ αὐτά. «Εἶπε» γάρ, φησί, «οὐκ ἐγένετο καί τό ἐννόημα ἔργον ἦν καί πάντα ὅσα ἠθέλησεν ἐποίησεν». Εἰ γοῦν καί μή πολλάς φαμεν ὑπερουσίως ἀρχικάς τε καί ποιητικάς τῶν γεγονότων οὐσίας, ἀλλ᾿ ἕν πᾶσαν διπλόην ἀπαναινόμενον καί κατά μίαν ἑνοειδῆ καί ὑπερηνωμένην ἁπλότητα τά πολυειδῆ καί μερικά προάγον, ἀλλά παντοδύναμον τοῦτ᾿ ἴσμεν καί συνεκτικόν ἁπάντων, ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ (σελ. 692) τά πάντα ἔχον καί πρό κτίσεως.» Εἰ γάρ ὁ ἥλιος», κατά τόν μέγα ∆ιονύσιον φάναι, «τάς τῶν πολλῶν μετοχῶν αἰτίας ἐν ἑαυτῷ μονοειδῶς προείληφε, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπί τῆς αὐτοῦ καί πάντων αἰτίας προϋφεστάναι τά πάντων τῶν ὄντων παραδείγματα κατά μίαν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν συγχωρητέον».

Ἔστι οὖν καί ἀεί ἐστι καί κυρίως ἐστί προορισμός καί πρόγνωσις καί πρόνοια καί τά τοιαῦτα, καί ἀδιαιρέτως ἥνωνται τῷ Θεῷ καί τῆς ὑπερουσιότητος ἐκείνης ἕτερά ἐστι, καί ὑπέρ αὐτά ἐστιν ἐκείνη˙ πῶς γάρ οὔ; Τί οὖν; ἐπεί ταῦτα κατά τινα ὕπαρξίν ἐστιν ἀεί, ἔστι δέ καί ὁ Θεός ἀεί, δύο ἤ πολλοί ἔσονται θεοί; ∆ιότι δ᾿ αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἥνωνται ἀδιαιρέτως, σύνθετος ἔσται ὁ Θεός ἡμῖν; Ὅτι δ᾿ αὖ κατ᾿ αὐτά γεγόναμεν, οὐ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾿ ἑτέρων ποιήματά ἐσμεν; Ἦ που σύ καί τόν ἐπί γῆς ἐκ Θεοῦ ἡμῖν ἐπηργμένον βασιλέα δύο ποιήσεις βασιλέας καί ἐκ δύο βασιλειῶν σύνθετον ἀποδείξεις τό βασίλειον αὐτῷ καί ἄλλον δή τινα καί οὐκ αὐτόν ἐρεῖς τῶν ἀξιωμάτων πρύτανιν, ὅτι ὁρισμῷ καί θελήματι οἰκείῳ τά σχήματα ποιεῖται καί ὁ ὁρισμός αὐτῷ γίνεται σεπτόν ὄνομά τε καί ἀξίωμα ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐν τέλει; Κἀνταῦθα γάρ μεταξύ τοῦ ἐπιτάττοντος καί τῶν ὑπακουόντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοὐπίταγμά ἐστιν. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ τό δύνασθαί τις ἄν εἴποι μή προέχειν ἡμῖν τόν βασιλέα, ἔστι δ᾿ ὅπη καί τό προειδέναι, εἰ καί μή ἐπί πᾶσι καί διά παντός. Ἆρα δέ καί τόν ὁρισμόν αὐτόν μετά τῆς συγκλήτου θήσομεν, ὅτι μή βασιλεία ἐστίν ὁ ὁρισμός, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ σύ τά μεθεκτά κτιστά, ὅτι μή ταῦτ᾿ ἐστίν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ; Ἐκ τοιούτων ἀρχῶν καί οὕτως ὁμολογουμένων διθεΐτας καί πολυθεΐτας ἔδειξας τούς ὀρθοδόξους.