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of the one who has made and of the one who has been born from him knowing him. Let us give by way of an example: those who are knowledgeable, what they know, not insofar as they are such, but insofar as they strive to be such, and how they know the same things, whenever they ascend to the very limit and end of knowledge. Therefore, that progress in all things might be called knowledge and truth of the knowledgeable one, not because it is not of God and introductory; for on account of the former, the latter is received. The prototype and every idea of truth is the Savior. And it is possible to partake of this truth. The one who partook received a state called truth, about which the holy one said: "There is truth in me," and, "I have not hidden your truth in my heart." This truth has come to be through the truth, through the prototypical sealer, just as the seal made in wax or some other thing comes to be. In any case, a certain difference is still found concerning another quality, the more human one, so to speak. Quality itself in itself does not admit of more and less. But that which is in the qualified thing does admit of it. And that which admits of it and that which does not are not the same thing. It is in a way other and not other. But if it has come to be in a state and disposition, it admits of more and less. But it can be contemplated in itself; for neither does one wishing to see quality precisely take it from the qualified thing itself, but from it he knows the qualified thing to be so qualified. 7 Your judgments are a great abyss. Among men a great difference is found both of things that befall them from without and of those from their own disposition. It is possible to find a difference from external things. Some are rich, others poor, some rulers, others subjects, healthy, sickly. Finally, the same is true also concerning practices; as if in terms of soul they are by nature quick and slow, and some are disposed toward virtue and others toward vice. And of these there is a great difference; for no one of men is in perfect virtue, even if one strives for it, even if one makes progress in it. But where there is more and less, there is great infinity. Likewise also vice. And it is well to say, virtue, admitting of more and less, will at some point come to the end, when a good man is not more good than another good man, nor a wise man more wise than another wise man. But vice is always in infinity. It has no end at all; for how is it possible for there to be one end of vice itself, being discordant and different? In excess and deficiency there is infinity, but in the mean a certain defined end is received. Since, therefore, we men are unable to say—even if—for they do not seem to have knowledge—why this one is poor 236 and another is rich; for whatever you might say, it has a certain incomprehensibility. We often say that God, seeing that this man, having obtained wealth or rank, is arrogant and tramples on all, does not give to them, and we find such tramplers rising up who have wealth in all respects. Likewise also in the case of health and in the case of the soul's movements, we say that the difference among these things happens by a judgment of God. And that it happens by a judgment of God, let us take the saying from the Gospel and clarify it, if it is possible, having been led by the hand to this account: In the Gospel the Savior says: "Woe to you, Chorazin; woe to you, Bethsaida; for if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes." If the wondrous mighty works had been done for the Sidonians and Tyrians, they would have been called to repentance. But since these things were tested by the aforesaid cities, Bethsaida and Chorazin—why were the wondrous mighty works done there, where they did not repent? It is a saying like an abyss. "Unsearchable," the Apostle said, are the judgments of God. No one searches them out, no one is able to comprehend their depth. And only with difficulty, by paying attention to the things that are done and are, as it were, judged, do we receive an impression that it is God who judges and arranges each thing. But as to the individual case, we are not able to say why this one, for instance, is strong, and another is weak.

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πεποιηκότος καὶ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεναμένου ἐγνωκότος αὐτόν. δῶμεν διὰ παραδείγματος· οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ὄντες, ἃ γιγνώσκουσιν, οὐχ ᾗ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ σπεύδουσιν εἶναι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ὡς ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκουσιν, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ τέρμα καὶ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναβῶσιν. ἐκείνη οὖν ἡ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν προκοπὴ γνῶσις καὶ ἀλήθεια τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ῥηθείη, οὐχ ὅτι οὔκ ἐστιν θεοῦ καὶ εἰσαγωγική· αὐτῆς γὰρ ἕνεκα αὕτη παραλαμβάνεται. ἡ πρωτότυπος καὶ πᾶσα ἰδέα τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ σωτήρ ἐστ̣ι̣ν. μετέχειν δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας ταύτης δυνατόν. ὁ μετασχὼν ἕξιν ἔλαβεν καλουμένην ἀλήθειαν, περὶ ἧς ὁ ἅγιος εἶπεν· "ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν ἐμοί", καί· "οὐκ ἔκρυψα ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου τὴν ἀλήθειάν σου". αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια γέγονεν διὰ τοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου σφραγιστῆρος γενέσθαι τὴν ἐν κηρῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ σφραγῖδα γενομένην. ἀμέλει γοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλης ποιότητος τῆς, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, ἀνθρωπικωτέρας διαφ̣ορά τις ἔτι εὑρίσκεται. ἡ ποιότης αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐ δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ δέχεται. οὐ ταὐτὸν δὲ τὸ ε᾿̣πιδεχόμενον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπιδεχόμενον. ἄλλη πως καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἕξει καὶ διαθέσει γέγονεν, δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. αὐ τὴ δὲ δύναται καθ' ἑαυτὴν θεωρεῖσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῶς θέλων ἰδεῖν ποιότη̣τα ἐκ τοῦ ποιοῦ λαμβάνει αὐτὴν ταύτην, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸ ποιὸν γιγνώσκει οὕτω πεποιωμένον. 7 τὰ κρίματά σου ἄβυσσος πολλή. ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πολλὴ εὑρίσκεται ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ τῶν ἔξω̣θεν προσπιπτόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ διαθέσεως τῆς αὐτῶν. ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν διαφοράν. οἱ μέν εἰσιν πλούσιοι, οἱ δ̣ὲ πένητες, ἕτεροι ἄρχοντες, ἄλλοι ὑπήκοοι, ὑγιαίνοντες, νοσώδεις. λοιπὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ταὐτά· ὡσανεὶ ψυχικῶς εἰσιν ὀξεῖς καὶ βραδεῖς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἕτεροι ἐπιτρεπῶς ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἄλλοι πρὸς κακίαν. καὶ τούτων πολλή ἐστιν διαφορά· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἐν τελείᾳ ἀρετῇ ἐστιν, κἄν τις ἐπὶ ταύτην σπεύδῃ, κἂν προκόπτῃ κατ' αὐτήν. ἔνθα δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ἀπειρία πολλή. ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ κακία. καὶ καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἀρετὴ δεχομένη τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐλεύσεταί ποτε εἰς τὸ τέλος, ὅτε οὔκ ἐστιν σπουδαῖος σπουδαίου μᾶλλον, σοφὸς σοφοῦ μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ κακία ἀεὶ ἐν ἀπειρίᾳ ἐστίν. οὐκ ἔχει τέλος ὅλως· πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε ἑ`̣ν̣ τέλος εἶναι τῆς κακίας αὐτῆς ἀσυμφώνου καὶ διαφόρου οὔσης; ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐνλείψει ἀπειρία ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ μεσότητι λαμβάνεταί τι τέλος ὡρισμένον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, κἂν -μὴ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν γνῶσιν-, ἱνατί ὅσδε πένης ἐστὶν 236 καὶ ἄλλος πλουτεῖ· οἷον γὰρ ἐὰν εἴπῃς· ἔχει ἀκαταλημψίαν τινά. πολλάκις λέγομεν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς θεωρῶν ὅτι ὅσδε πλούτου τυχὼν ἢ ἀξιώματος ὑπεραίρεται καὶ καταπατεῖ πάντας, οὐ δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ εὑρίσκομεν τοιούτους πατοῦντας ἐξανισταμένους κατὰ πάντα ἔχοντας πλοῦτον. ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ ὑγιείας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κινημάτων τὴν τούτων διαφορὰν λέγομεν ὅτι κρίσει θεοῦ γίνεται. καὶ ὅτι κρίσει θεοῦ γίνεται, ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου λάβωμεν τὴν λέξιν καὶ σαφηνίσωμεν, εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν χειραγωγηθέντα ἐπὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν ταύτην· ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ σωτήρ φησιν· "οὐαί σοι, Χοραζίν· οὐαί σοι, Βησσαιδά· ὅτι εἰ ἐν Τύρῳ καὶ Σιδῶνι ἐγένοντο αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ γενόμεναι ἐν ὑμῖν, πάλαι ἂν ἐν σάκκῳ καὶ σποδῷ καθήμενοι μετενόησαν". εἰ αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ τεράστιοι Σιδωνίοις καὶ Τυρίοις γενόμεναι ἦσαν, ἐξεκαλοῦντο εἰς μετάνοιαν̣. τούτων δὲ πειραθεῖσαι αἱ εἰρημέναι πόλεις ἡ Βησσαιδὰ καὶ ἡ Χοραζίν-διὰ τί ἐκεῖ γέγοναν αἱ τεράςτιοι δυνάμεις, ἔνθα οὐ μετενόησαν; ῥῆμά ἐστιν ἀβύσσῳ ἐοικός. "ἀνεξερεύνητα" εἶπεν ὁ ἀπόστολος τὰ κρίματα τοῦ θεοῦ. οὐδεὶς ἐξερευνᾷ αὐτά, οὐδεὶς τὸ βάθος αὐτῶν καταλαβεῖν δύναται. μόλις δὲ ἐπιστάνοντες τοῖς πραττομένοις καὶ ὡσανεὶ κρινομένοις λαμβάνομεν φαντασίαν ὅτι θεός ἐστιν ὁ κρίνων καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστα. τὸ καθ' ἓν δὲ οὐ δυνάμεθα εἰπεῖν, διὰ τί ὅσδε, φέρε, ἰσχυρός ἐστιν, ἄλλος δὲ ἀσθενής.