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wishing to do the things of time before time. But if evil is altogether unchangeable, it would never cease warring and being warred against, and there will never be any settlement at all of the two natures, with evil remaining unchangeable and, though crushed, showing malice to the good and raising war against goodness. And if, on the whole, evil will always be crushed by the desire for the good, then it will no longer be evil, since, longing for the good, it wishes to draw the good to itself, so that by drawing power to itself through the nature of the good and its panoply, it might seem in this to honor and glorify itself, and to embolden and empower itself. For to everyone who wishes for the good, it is entirely because the thought proceeds from a good † intention, and the wicked will no longer be entirely wicked, whenever it is found longing for the good. For everything wicked has an aversion to the good, just as the good does not wish for the wicked. But if the power of both exists intermingled, and the good knows how to despoil its own, to war and to flay the principalities and the powers, sometimes to destroy 3.96 and annihilate the matter brought into being by the wicked one, sometimes to fashion from it, and sometimes to annihilate it, * the narrative of the idle talk introduced to us by this sinner will be found to be wickedness and inconsistent. 59. Come now, let us take up the argument again and speak about the nature of evil; tell us, you sir, having come from the time of the emperor Aurelian and hither, and narrating the things before all ages, though no prophet has declared this, nor the Savior himself has taught this, nor any of the apostles, unless you should babble some fabrications, setting up for yourself and putting forward certain books under the name of the saints—from where then do you come, you sir, bringing the ancient principle of evil? But being asked by us whether he says this is something changeable or unchangeable, * it has already been dinned into our ears that he introduces it as unchangeable, and sometimes as changeable, sometimes as unchangeable; unchangeable towards evil, but changing towards the good, so that from the two definitions he might incur shame for his life. For if for many and boundless ages wickedness was unchangeable, having only this name and nothing else besides evil, what turned the unchangeable nature of wickedness after many ages to turn to things not belonging to it? For if it had not yet seized power and waged war, nor taken a panoply for its own power and for food, but remained for many ages unfed and not needing food, who turned the one that once did not need food to come to food and to seek what it once did not seek, and to need what it once did not need? But if, then, its nature was turned, how will your doctrine of the unchangeableness of evil be established? And if it should come again to its own state, no longer having abundance of what it might eat, how can the one who has once become accustomed to being bad or wicked in devouring and using food endure to continue for the coming time without food? For if, not having been in the habit of foods, it was not able to endure, but turned to come to food and, having despoiled the soul, procured food for itself, how much more, having been in the habit of food, will its nature be unrestrainable, and nothing would persuade it, having become gluttonous and experienced in food, to continue without these things, as your inconsistent argument wishes this to be. 3.97 60. But I will pass over this topic, and I extend the narrative again to other points of his nonsense. For again he says that the rulers will then be in their own parts and the father will take back his own parts. Who then is this reasonable one, that he should measure out the boundary of each part from both sides? And how will he who from the beginning does not obey the truth and the good be persuaded? But if the good one should persuade the lawless one by necessity to keep to his own and not to trespass on the portion of the good, why was he not able to do this from the beginning, before

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βουληθεὶς πρὸ χρόνου τὰ τοῦ χρόνου ποιῆσαι. εἰ δὲ ἄτρεπτον παντάπασι τὸ κακόν, οὐδέποτε διαλείψειε πολεμοῦν καὶ πολεμούμενον, καὶ οὐδ' ὅλως ποτὲ ἔσται κατάστασις τῶν δύο φύσεων, ἀτρέπτου μένοντος τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ ἐπιτριβομένου τοῦ κακοῦ ἐνδείκνυσθαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ κακίαν καὶ πόλεμον ἐγείρειν κατὰ τῆς ἀγαθότητος. καὶ εἰ ὅλως ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἀεὶ ἐπεντριβήσεται, ἄρα οὐκέτι κακὸν ἔσται, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γλιχόμενος βούλεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπισπᾶσθαι, ἵνα διὰ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ πανοπλίας ἐπισπάσας ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν, ἐν ταύτῃ δοκῇ ἑαυτὸν τιμᾶν μὲν καὶ λαμπρύνειν, παραθαρσύνειν τε καὶ ἐνδυναμοῦν. παντὶ γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντως ὅτι ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ † ὑπονοίας ἔγκειται διάνοια, καὶ οὐκέτι παντάπασι πονηρὸν ἔσται τὸ πονηρόν, ὁπότε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γλιχόμενον εὑρίσκεται. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πονηρὸν ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐ βούλεται τὸ πονηρόν. εἰ δὲ ἀναμὶξ ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἡ δύναμις, καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν οἶδε συλᾶν τὸ ἴδιον πολεμεῖν τε καὶ ἐκδέρειν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας, ποτὲ δὲ ἀναιρεῖν 3.96 καὶ ἀφανίζειν τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ γεγενημένην ὕλην, ποτὲ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς πλάσσειν, ποτὲ δὲ ἀφανίζειν, * πονηρία καὶ ἀσύστατος εὑρεθήσεται ἡ διήγησις τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλιτηρίου τούτου ἡμῖν ἐπεισενεχθείσης ἀδολεσχίας. 59. Φέρε δὴ εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ φύσεως πάλιν ἀναλαβόντες τὸν λόγον, λέγε ἡμῖν, ὦ οὗτος, ἀπὸ χρόνου Αὐρηλιανοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν καὶ τὰ πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων διηγούμενος, οὔτε που τοῦτο προφητῶν θεσπισάντων οὔτε αὐτοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος τοῦτο δεδιδαχότος οὔτε ἀποστόλων τινός, εἰ μή τι ἂν φλυαρήσῃς ἐπίπλαστά τινα ἐξ ὀνόματος ἁγίων βιβλία ἑαυτῷ τιθέμενος καὶ προβαλλόμενος, πόθεν οὖν ἥκεις, ὦ οὗτος, τὴν κακοῦ ἀρχαΐζουσαν ἀρχὴν φέρων; ἐρωτώμενος δὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἰ ταύτην τρεπτήν τινα φάσκει ἢ ἄτρεπτον, * ἤδη δὲ ἐνηχήθη ἡμῖν ὡς ἄτρεπτον αὐτὴν εἰσηγεῖται καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τρεπτήν, ποτὲ δὲ ἄτρεπτον, εἰς μὲν τὸ πονηρὸν ἄτρεπτον, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τρεπομένην, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν δύο ὅρων αἰσχύνην τῷ βίῳ ὀφλήσῃ. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀπλέτοις αἰῶσιν ἄτρεπτος ἦν ἡ κακία, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον ἔχουσα τὸ ὄνομα καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον πλὴν τοῦ κακοῦ, τίς ἔστρεψε μετὰ πολλοὺς αἰῶνας τὴν ἄτρεπτον φύσιν κακίας τραπῆναι ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα; εἰ γὰρ οὔπω ἦν ἁρπάξασα δύναμιν καὶ καταπολεμήσασα μηδὲ λαβοῦσα πανοπλίαν εἰς αὐτῆς δύναμιν καὶ εἰς ἐδωδήν, ἔμενε δὲ ἐν πολλοῖς αἰῶσιν ἄτροφος μηδὲ τροφῆς ἐπιδεομένη, τίς ἔστρεψε τὴν ποτὲ μὴ ἐπιδεομένην τροφῆς εἰς τροφὴν ἥκειν καὶ ἐπιζητεῖν ὅπερ ποτὲ οὐκ ἐπεζήτει καὶ ἐπιδέεσθαι οὗπερ ποτὲ οὐκ ἐπεδέετο; ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα ἐτράπη τὴν φύσιν, καὶ πῶς ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἀτρεψία περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ συσταθήσεται; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάλιν εἰς ἰδίαν κατάστασιν ἔλθοι, μηκέτι εὐπορῶν ὃ φάγοι, πῶς ὁ ἅπαξ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γεγονὼς κακὸς ἢ πονηρὸς τοῦ βιβρώσκειν καὶ ἐδωδῇ χρῆσθαι δύναται ὑπομένειν εἰς τὸν ἐπιόντα χρόνον ἄνευ ἐδωδῆς διατελῶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν συνηθείᾳ βρωμάτων μὴ γεγονὼς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ ἐτράπη εἰς ἐδωδὴν ἔρχεσθαι καὶ συλήσας τὴν ψυχὴν βρῶμα ἑαυτῷ περιεποιήσατο μᾶλλον ἐν συνηθείᾳ βρώματος γεγονὼς ἄσχετος ἔσται τὴν φύσιν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν τοῦτον παραπείσειε, λίχνον γεγονότα καὶ ἐν πείρᾳ ἐδωδῆς, ἄνευ τούτων διατελεῖν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος ἀσύστατος ὑπάρχων τοῦτο βούλεται. 3.97 60. Ἀλλὰ παρελεύσομαι τοῦτον τὸν τόπον, ἐφ' ἕτερα δὲ πάλιν τῆς αὐτοῦ ληρῳδίας ἐπεκτείνομαι τὴν διήγησιν. πάλιν γὰρ φάσκει ὅτι οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μέρεσι τότε ἔσονται καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τὰ ἴδια ἀπολήψεται μέρη. τίς ἄρα ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὗτος, ἵνα τὸν ὅρον διχόθεν ἑκάστου μέρους γεωμετρήσῃ; πῶς δὲ πεισθήσεται ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ μὴ πειθόμενος; εἰ δὲ μετ' ἀνάγκης παραπείσειεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς τὸν παράνομον ἰδίοις στοιχεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπεμβαίνειν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μερίδι, διὰ τί μὴ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦτο ἠδυνήθη ποιῆσαι, πρὶν ἢ