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on the one hand, the rebellion of its natural pleasures, manfully striking it back through self-control; and on the other hand, against the introduction of unnatural and involuntary pains, remaining completely relentless through patience, and not departing from the god-befitting worth and glory of virtue for the sake of insubstantial pleasure, and not falling from the height of virtues out of pity for the flesh in the face of the perception of pains, because of the afflicting sensation. The cause of pain according to sense has become the complete neglect by the soul of what is according to its nature. But the unnatural activity of the soul clearly brings into being pleasure according to sense, which can have no other principle of its constitution than the soul's abandonment of what is according to its nature.

FOURTH CENTURY. 1. He knows the conceptual power of the soul to be its intellectual power; which, being separated from the relation according to

sense, leaves the flesh destitute of providence toward pleasure, according to the disposition in the will, not even tolerating to soothe the pain of the flesh, on account of the will's complete leisure in its relation to divine things.

2. Intellect and sense have their natural activity in opposition to one another, on account of the extreme difference and otherness of their respective objects. For the one has as its objects intelligible and incorporeal substances, which it is its nature to apprehend incorporeally [gg ad Thalass. g. 58, which it apprehends according to substance]; while the other has sensible and corporeal natures, which it too apprehends naturally.

3. The soul's abandonment of things according to nature is constituted to become the principle of pleasure according to sense. For when the soul is toiling over goods that are according to nature, the power that invents the mode of pleasure according to sense does not exist.

4. Where reason leads sense in the contemplation of visible things, the flesh is deprived of all pleasure according to nature, not having sense let loose and freed from the bonds of reason, for the service of its own pleasures. Whence also, when the reason in us prevails by necessity, the flesh, enslaved to it for virtue, is tormented.

5. (1305) When the intellect considers sense its own natural power, becoming entangled with the surfaces of sensible things, it contrives carnal pleasures, being unable to pass through the nature of visible things, being held fast by its passionate relation to sense.

6. If it is not possible for the intellect to pass over to kindred intelligible realities, without the contemplation of the sensible realities set before it as intermediaries; and for this contemplation to occur is completely impossible without sense, which is composite with it, but by nature kindred to sensible things; it is reasonable that if, upon encountering them, it is held fast by the surfaces of visible things, believing the composite sense to be a natural activity, it falls away from intelligible realities according to nature; and it lays hold, with both hands as they say, of bodies that are contrary to nature; by which, acting contrary to reason, on account of the sense that has conquered it, on the one hand, it becomes the generator of pain in the soul, being tormented by frequent scourges of conscience; and on the other hand, it becomes a manifest maker of pleasure according to sense, being fattened by the contrivances of modes that procure things for the flesh. But if, upon encountering visible things, cutting through the surface toward sense, it will contemplate the spiritual principles of beings, pure of their outward forms, it has produced the pleasure of the soul, with none of the contemplated sensible things

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μέν τῶν αὐτῆς φυσικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπανάστασιν, δι᾿ ἐγκρατείας ἀνδρικῶς ἀποῤῥαπίζουσαν· πρός δέ τήν τῶν παρά φύσιν και ἀκουσίων πόνων ἐπαγωγήν, διά τῆς ὑπομονῆς, ἀμείλικτον παντελῶς διαμένουσαν, καί τῆς κατ᾿ ἀρετήν θεοπρεποῦς ἀξίας τε καί δόξης διά τήν ἀνυπόστατον ἡδονήν οὐκ ἐξισταμένην, καί πρός τήν τῶν πόνων ἀντίληψιν φειδοῖ τῆς σαρκός διά τήν ὀδυνῶσαν αἴσθησιν, τοῦ ὕψους τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀποπίπτουσαν. Τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν λύπης αἰτία καθέστηκεν, ἡ πρός τά κατά φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς παντελής ἀσχολία. Τήν δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονήν, ἡ παρά φύσιν ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς προδήλως ὑφίστησιν, ἄλλην ἀρχήν ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένην συστάσεως, ἤ τήν ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσιν.

ΕΚΑΤΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΗ. α΄. Ἐπινοητικήν οἶδε τήν νοεράν τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν· ἥτις χωριζομένη τῆς κατ᾿

αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, ἔρημον τῆς πρός ἡδονήν τήν σάρκα καταλιμπάνει προνοίας, κατά τήν ἐν γνώμῃ σχέσιν, οὐδέ τήν ὀδύνην τῆς σαρκός ἀνεχομένη παραμυθεῖσθαι, διά τήν ἐν σχέσει τῆς γνώμης πρός τά θεῖα ὁλικήν σχολήν.

β΄. Νοῦς καί αἴσθησις ἀντικειμένην ἔχουσι πρός ἄλλήλα τήν κατά φύσιν ἐνέργειαν, διά τήν τῶν αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένων ἀκροτάτην διαφοράν καί ἑτερότητα. Ὁ μέν γάρ, ὑποκειμένας ἔχει τάς νοητάς καί ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ὧν ἀσωμάτως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι [gg ad Thalass. g. 58, ὧν κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἀντιλαμ.] πέφυκεν· ἡ δέ, τάς αἰσθητάς καί σωματικάς φύσεις, ὧν καί αὐτή φυσικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

γ΄. Ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσις, τῆς κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονῆς ἀρχή γίνεσθαι πέφυκε. Τῆς γάρ ψυχῆς περί τά κτά φύσιν ἀγαθά πονουμένης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τόν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τῆς ἡδονῆς τρόπον ἐφευρίσκουσα δύναμις.

δ΄. Ἔνθα λόγος προκαθηγεῖται τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατά τήν τῶν ὁρατῶν θεωρίαν, πάσης ἐστέρηται τῆς κατα φύσιν ἡ σάρξ ἡδονῆς, οὐκ ἔχουσα τήν αἴσθησιν ἄφετον καί τῶν λογικῶν ἀπολελυμένην δεσμῶν, εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτήν ἡδονῶν. Ὅθεν καί ἐξανάγκης κρατοῦντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῶν λόγου, ἡ πρός ἀρετήν αὐτῷ δουλωθεῖσα βασανίζεται σάρξ.

ε΄. (1305) Ὁ νοῦς ἅμα τήν αἴσθησιν οἰκείαν κατά φύσιν ἡγήσεται δύναμιν, ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιπλεκόμενος ἐπιφανείας, ἐπινοεῖται τάς σαρκικάς ἡδονάς, οὐ δυνάμενος τῶν ὁρατῶν διαβῆναι τήν φύσιν, τῇ πρός τήν αἴσθησιν ἐμπαθεῖ σχέσει κατασχεθείς.

στ΄. Εἰ οὐκ ἔστι δυνατόν πρός τά συγγενῆ νοητά τόν νοῦν διαβῆναι, δίχα τῆς τῶν διά μέσου προβεβλημένων αἰσθητῶν θεωρίας· ταύτην δέ γενέσθαι, παντελῶς ἀμήχανον χωρίς τῆς αὐτῷ μέν συγκειμένης, τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς δέ κατά φύσιν συγγενοῦς αἰσθήσεως· εἰκότως εἰ μέν προβαλών ἐνσχεθῇ ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις τῶν ὁρατῶν, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φυσικήν τήν συγκειμένην οἰόμενος αἴσθησιν, τῶν μέν κατα φύσιν ἐκπέπτωκε νοητῶν· τῶν δέ παρά φύσιν ἀμφοῖν ταῖν χεροῖν, ὅ δή λέγεται, ἐπελάβετο σωμάτων· οἷς παρά τόν λόγον ἐνεργούμενος, διά τήν αὐτόν ἐκνικήσασαν αἴσθησιν, τῆς μέν κατά ψυχήν λύπης γεννήτωρ καθίσταται, συχναῖς ταῖς κατά συνείδησιν μάστιξιν αἰκιζόμενος· τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἡδονῆς ἀρίδηλος γίνεται ποιητής, ταῖς ἐπινοίαις τῶν περιποιητικῶν τρόπων τῆς σαρκός λιπαινόμενος. Εἰ δέ τήν πρός αἴσθησιν, ἅμα τῇ προσβολῇ τῶν ὁρωμένων διατεμών ἐπιφάνειαν, τούς πνευματικούς τῶν ὄντων καθαρούς τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς σχημάτων θεάσεται λόγους, τήν μέν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονήν κατειργάσατο, μηδενί τῶν αἰσθητῶν θεωρουμένων