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an eternal source would co-exist, being from him a source from a source and God from God and light from light, not having begun to be, not having fallen under time, but at the same time truly having a Father and at the same time the Father truly having a Son, not unbecoming to the Father, not obscuring the incomparable. For there is not some corporeal distinction, but a hypostatic Word, being a Son from a Father, spirit from spirit and God from God, shutting out every syllogistic suspicion, being life for the faithful and for all who have come into being by the Father through him and from him, for those who believe and know and do not consider the power of God and the wisdom of God foolishness, which surpasses all examination and all reasoning, especially of mortal men, as Aetius himself unwillingly confessed. 36. 19. If the unbegotten, with respect to God, is indicative of privation, and the unbegotten were nothing, what reason would take away nothing from that which is not? But if it signifies something that is, who would separate God from being, which is to separate him from himself? 3.386 Refutation. Aetius brings to us the things said according to privation among the pagan dialecticians, as if considering this for the sake of knowledge and benefit regarding God, having first been ignorant of in what cases among the pagans the privative is used. For the arguments of the dialecticians hold that it is not possible for something to be said according to privation in all cases, but only in the case of those possessing something by nature. For in the case of those things which can exist in a state contrary to what they possess by nature, the term according to privation is used, but no longer in the case of things where this is not possible. For example, one would not say 'blind' of a stone; for he who is by nature able to see, and then has lost sight, is called blind, but if a bird or a man or any beast by nature able to see, when it is deprived, is said to be blind in a privative sense; so also we would not say 'without anger' of a stone, or 'without malice' or 'without envy; for it is not its nature; but in the case of a man and a beast whose nature is to be angry, when it is not angry, one might speak according to privation, but no longer in the case of things where this is not possible. So also must it be understood in the case of God, as the argument is directed toward Aetius and examines him with questions. Tell us, O Aetius, do you know God as incomparable to all those who are not of the same substance, or would you dare to number him also with all things? And if you should number him with all things, which are not of his substance, but have come into being from non-being by him through the one who is from him according to substance—except for himself alone and the Holy Spirit, who is of the substance of the incomparable Father and of his only-begotten Son—your confession would be most absurd. For how is he still one of all things, from whom all things have come into being from non-being? For this is impossible, and not even you yourself would say this. And since it is not possible for him to be like or equal to those who have come into being from him out of non-being, it is impossible for him to suffer the same things as those who are unlike him, in whom, by the fact that they are from him out of non-being, it also happens that all the things in them exist by privation of their opposites. For some things see not from themselves—for neither do they have being from themselves, but according to the giving grace of the one who has bestowed it—in whom it happens that the affection comes to be by privation of those things that belonged to them according to the gift of the bestower, who is impassible and does not have being from another, nor is 3.387 able to be deprived in the same way as those who came into existence from non-being. If therefore the Son or the Father or the Holy Spirit is not equal to those things, to these, but the Son is other than these, not being called by the same designation, but having a special and incomparable name, being good-in-itself from the one who is good-in-itself, what would be the connection with the privative * having an opposite? For superfluous is the argument of Aetius who introduced the privative to us, since the unbegotten God and the begotten Son does not possess the preeminent dignity according to the privation of creatures, but according to that which is automatically and uniquely and in itself fitting to his own

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οὔσης ἀΐδιος πηγὴ συνυπάρχοι, ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὖσα πηγὴ ἐκ πηγῆς καὶ θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτός, οὐκ ἀρξάμενος τοῦ εἶναι, οὐ χρόνῳ ὑποπεσών, ἀλλ' ἅμα πατέρα ἔχων ἀληθινῶς καὶ ἅμα τὸν πατέρα υἱὸν ἔχειν ἀληθινῶς, οὐκ ἀποπρεποῦντα πατρί, οὐ τὸ ἀσύγκριτον ἀφανίζοντα. οὐ γάρ ἐστι σωματική τις διαστολή, ἀλλὰ λόγος ἐνυπόστατος, υἱὸς ἐκ πατρὸς ὤν, πνεῦμα ἐκ πνεύματος καὶ θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ, ἀποκλείων πᾶσαν συλλογιστικὴν ὑπόνοιαν, εἰς ζωὴν ὢν πιστοῖς καὶ ὅλοις τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονόσι, τοῖς πιστεύουσι καὶ γινώσκουσι καὶ μὴ μωρίαν ἡγουμένοις θεοῦ τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ θεοῦ τὴν σοφίαν, τὴν ὑπερβαίνουσαν πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν καὶ πάντα λογισμόν, μάλιστα φθαρτῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀέτιος ἄκων ὡμολόγησεν. 36. ˉιˉθ. Εἰ στερήσεώς ἐστι δηλωτικὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, μηδὲν δὲ εἴη τὸ ἀγέννητον, ποῖος λόγος ἂν ἀφαιρήσειε τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τὸ μηδέν; εἰ δὲ ὂν σημαίνει, τίς ἂν χωρίσειεν ὄντος θεόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ; 3.386 Ἀνατροπή. Τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω διαλεκτικοῖς φέρει ἡμῖν Ἀέτιος, ὡς ἐπὶ θεοῦ εἰδήσεως καὶ ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τοῦτο διαλαμβάνων, πρότερον ἀγνοήσας ἐπὶ τίσι παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω τὸ στερητικὸν λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεσθαι βούλονται οἱ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν λόγοι, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τι κεκτημένοις. ἐπὶ τούτοις γὰρ ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἐνδεχομένοις ἵστασθαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχόντων τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων οὐκέτι. οἷον τὸ τυφλὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις· ὁ γὰρ πεφυκὼς ὁρᾶν, εἶτα ἀποβαλὼν τὸ ὁρᾶν, τυφλὸς ἀκούει, εἰ μέντοι γε πετεινὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ κτῆνος ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς ὁρᾶν, ὅτε ἐστέρηται, τυφλὸν στερητικῶς λέγεται· οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀόργητος οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου ἢ τὸ ἄκακος ἢ τὸ ἄφθονος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκεν· ἐπὶ μέντοι ἀνθρώπου καὶ κτήνους τοῦ πεφυκότος ὀργίζεσθαι, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο, εἴποι ἄν τις κατὰ στέρησιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι. Οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ληπτέον, ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἀέτιον ἀποτεινομένου τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐρωτητικῶς ἐξετάζοντος. λέγε ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἀέτιε, οἶδας θεὸν ἀσύγκριτον πρὸς τοὺς πάντας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἢ καὶ αὐτὸν σὺν τοῖς ἅπασιν ἀριθμεῖν τολμήσειας; καὶ εἰ μὲν σὺν τοῖς πᾶσι τοῦτον ἀριθμήσειας, τοῖς μὴ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ οὖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν γεγενημένοις πάρεξ μόνου αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, τοῦ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀσυγκρίτου πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος, ἀτοπωτάτη ἂν εἴη σου ἡ ὁμολογία. πῶς γὰρ ἔτι εἷς ἐκ τῶν πάντων, ἐξ οὗ πάντα ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γεγένηται; ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτο, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτὸς τοῦτο λέξειας. μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δὲ τοῦ αὐτὸν εἶναι ὅμοιον ἢ ἴσον τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γεγονόσιν, ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι τὰ ὅμοια αὐτὸν πάσχειν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις αὐτῷ, οἷς τῷ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς συμβαίνει κατὰ στέρησιν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁρῶντα οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν οὔτε γὰρ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐσχήκασιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ δοτικὴν χάριν τοῦ δεδωρημένου, ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει τὸ πάθος γενέσθαι κατὰ στέρησιν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπαρξάντων κατὰ τὴν δόσιν τοῦ δεδωρημένου, τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἔκ τινος ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι οὐδὲ δυνα3.387 μένου στερίσκεσθαι ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑπάρξασιν. εἰ οὖν οὐκ ἴσος ἐκείνοις ὁ υἱὸς ἢ ὁ πατὴρ ἢ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τούτοις, ἄλλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς παρὰ τούτους, οὐ τῇ ἴσῃ ὀνομασίᾳ κικλησκόμενος, ἐξαίρετον δὲ καὶ ἀσύγκριτον ὄνομα ἔχων, αὐτοάγαθος ὢν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοαγάθου ὄντος τίς ἂν ἡ συμπλοκὴ πρὸς τὸ στερητικὸν * ἐχούσης ἀντίθετον; περιττὸς γὰρ ὁ τοῦ τὸ στερητικὸν εἰσενέγκαντος ἡμῖν Ἀετίου λόγος, τοῦ ἀγεννήτου θεοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ υἱοῦ οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν τὴν τῶν κτισμάτων ἔχοντος τὸ ὑπερέχον ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτομάτως καὶ ἰδιαζόντως καθ' ἑαυτὸ συμπρέπον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ