Adversus Manichaeos (homilia 2)

OF THE SAME JOHN THE PRESBYTER, SECOND HOMILY 1. What we discussed previously would have been sufficient for the refutation of the godless error of the Manichaeans. But lest anyone, being entangled by other thorns of impiety, be wounded in mind, I will not hesitate to also mention other questions, showing what evil is and from where it is; for by using such questions they attempt to lead astray the more simple-minded. First, therefore, we must distinguish concerning the good and the beautiful, what each of these signifies; for the beautiful signifies one thing, and the good another. And the beautiful is that which is well-proportioned in the symmetry of its parts and has, without deficiency, that for which it has been made by its creator. Wherefore it is written: "Behold, very beautiful," concerning the substance of created things; for God has made all things beautiful, both sensible and intelligible. For concerning all things he adds, saying: "And God saw all that he had made, and behold, it was very beautiful," including with the sensible things the creation of the incorporeal things. For after the creation of man, which is composed of a rational soul and body, Moses says this. 2. But the good is twofold in meaning. And in the case of God, the good happens to be substance; for being uncreated, God possesses substantially all that He possesses, and nothing is added to him later which was not always in him. For this reason, since God was without form, he will always be without form; and since he was without quality, he will always be without quality; and since he is all-powerful, he was always all-powerful; and since he is creator, he is always creator, even if the things created and ruled by him did not exist. For God possesses substantially all the things by which He is named and does not possess relatively what He is. For relations are about [substance], not being substances themselves. Therefore God is without relation; for it is not possible for him to have any relation to any of the created things. For the divine is self-sufficient and self-completing, having its being in no relation to external things, lest we be compelled to say that any of the things accomplished by Him are complementary to his power. 3. And in the case of all things, not only in the case of God, the same reasoning applies. For the powers that complete substances do not have their being in relation to external things, but exist in things without relation, being considered in themselves. But consider the argument thus: the power of seeing in the eye or the light in the sun are complementary to the substance of the eye and the sun. And if one were to suppose that none of the things seen by it exist, or that no external things partake of the luminous power of the sun, not even so would the sun or the eye be considered incomplete in its substance by those who judge correctly. Thus, therefore, even if the example is faint, before the world was created God was creator by nature and without relation, not becoming a maker by relation to external things. For this is nothing other than to insult God and to give God an acquired relation, such as those things have to one another that advance from ignorance to knowledge, and to equate things that have come to be later with things that exist substantially. 4. And so matter, as I was saying—for we must return to the point from which the argument diverged—if it were uncreated, being without form and without quality, how then will it be fashioned, being uncreated and not able to receive what was not always in it? But if they say that matter has form and quality and quantity, it is not uncreated, as has been demonstrated, but rather created from non-being with its forms and qualities, brought forth by God. For quality and quantity are properties of created things.

Adversus Manichaeos (homilia 2)

ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΙΩΑΝΝΟΥ ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΟΥ ΟΜΙΛΙΑ ∆ΕΥΤΕΡΑ 1. Ἤρκει μὲν οὖν ὅσα πρὸς ἔλεγχον τῆς ἀθέου πλάνης τῶν Μανιχαίων ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διελέχθημεν. Ἀλλ' ἵνα μή τις ἑτέραις ἀκάνθαις ἀσεβείας περιπειρόμενος πληγείη τὸν νοῦν, οὐκ ὀκνήσω καὶ ζητημάτων ἑτέρων ἐπιμνησθῆναι, δεικνὺς τί τέ ἐστι τὸ κακὸν καὶ πόθεν ἐστίν· τοῖς τοιούτοις γὰρ ζητήμασι κεχρημένοι παρατρέπειν ἐγχειροῦσι τοὺς ἁπλουστέρους. Πρότε- ρον οὖν διαληπτέον περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, τί δηλοῖ τούτων ἑκάτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ καλόν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ καλὸν μέν ἐστι τὸ συμμετρίᾳ μελῶν εὐηρμοσμένον καὶ ἀνελλιπῶς ἔχον πρὸς ὃ γεγένηται ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος. ∆ιὸ γέγραπται· Ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν περὶ τῆς τῶν κτισμάτων οὐσίας· πάντα γὰρ καλὰ πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός, αἰσθητά τε καὶ νοητά. Περὶ πάντων γὰρ ἐπιφέρει λέγων· Καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησε καὶ ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν, συμπεριλαβὼν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τῶν ἀσωμάτων τὴν ποίησιν. Μετὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίαν, τὴν ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος συνεστῶσαν, τοῦτό φησι Μωϋσῆς. 2. Τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν διττόν ἐστι τῇ σημασίᾳ. Καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσία τυγχάνει· ἀγένητος γὰρ ὢν ὁ θεὸς πάντα ὅσα κέκτηται οὐσιωδῶς ἔχει καὶ οὐδὲν ὕστερον αὐτῷ ἐπιγίνεται ὃ μὴ ἀεὶ ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ. ∆ιὰ τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἦν ὁ θεός, ἀεὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἔσται· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἄποιος ἦν, ἀεὶ ἄποιος ἔσται· καὶ ἐπειδὴ παντοκράτωρ ἐστίν, ἀεὶ παντοκράτωρ ἦν· καὶ ἐπειδὴ δημιουργός ἐστιν, ἀεὶ δημιουργὸς ὑπάρχει, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἴη τὰ δημιουργηθέντα καὶ κρατούμενα παρ' αὐτοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐσιωδῶς ἔχει πάντα ὅσα καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ οὐ σχετικῶς ἔχει ἅπερ ἐστίν. Αἱ γὰρ σχέσεις περὶ [οὐσίαν] εἰσί, μὴ οὖσαι οὐσίαι. Ἄσχετος οὖν ἐστιν ὁ θεός· οὐ γὰρ πρός τινα τῶν γενητῶν ἔχειν τινὰ δυνατὸν αὐτὸν σχέσιν. Αὔταρκες γὰρ τὸ θεῖον καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ συμπληρωτικόν, ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν τὸ εἶναι ἔχον, ἵνα μή τι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τελουμένων συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τῆς δυνάμεως. 3. Καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων δέ, οὐκ ἐπὶ θεοῦ μόνον, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Αἱ γὰρ συμπληρωτικαὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν δυνάμεις οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν σχέσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀσχέτως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐνυπάρ-χουσι καθ' ἑαυτὰς θεωρούμεναι. Σκόπει δὲ τὸν λόγον οὑτωσί· τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ βλεπτικὸν ἢ τὸ ἐν ἡλίῳ φῶς συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ τε καὶ ἡλίου ἐστὶν οὐσίας. Καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ὑπόθοιτό τις εἶναι τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ θεωρουμένων ἢ τῶν ἔξωθεν μετ-εχόντων τῆς φωτοειδοῦς τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμεως, οὐδ' ὄντως ἀτελὴς ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῖς ὀρθῶς κρίνουσιν ὑποληφθήσεται. Οὕτως οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἀμυδρὸν ὑπάρχει τὸ παράδειγμα, πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργηθῆναι τὸν κόσμον φύσει καὶ ἀσχέτως δημιουργὸς ὁ θεός, οὐ τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν σχέσει γινόμενος ποιητής. Τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἐξυβρίζειν καὶ σχέσιν ἐπίκτητον διδόναι θεῷ, οἷον ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐξ ἀπιστίας εἰς ἐπιστήμην προκόπτοντα, καὶ ἐξισάζειν τοῖς οὐσιωδῶς | ἐνυπάρχουσι τὰ ὕστερον ἐπιγεγονότα. 4. Καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὖν, ὡς ἔφην-ἐπαναληπτέον γὰρ ὅθεν ἐξέβη ὁ λόγος-εἰ ἀγένητος ἦν, ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἄποιος οὖσα, πῶς οὖν δη- μιουργηθήσεται ἀγένητος οὖσα καὶ μὴ δυναμένη προσλαβεῖν ὃ μὴ ἀεὶ ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ; Εἰ δὲ σχῆμα καὶ ποιότητα καὶ ποσότητα τὴν ὕλην ἔχειν φασίν, οὐκ ἀγένητος ὑπάρχει, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον γενητὴ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων σὺν τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ποιότησι παρὰ θεοῦ παραχθεῖσα. Ποιότης γὰρ καὶ ποσότης ἴδια τῶν γενητῶν.