De principiis

Concerning free will and the solution and interpretation of scriptural sayings that seem to abolish it

3.1.1 Since the ecclesiastical proclamation contains the teaching about the just judgment of God, which, being believed to be true, summons its hearers to live well and to flee sin in every way, who evidently assent that things worthy of praise and blame are in our power, come, let us also discuss a few things separately about free will, a most necessary problem. But in order that we may understand what free will is, we must unfold its meaning, so that when this has been made clear, the subject of our inquiry may be accurately set forth. 3.1.2 Of things that are moved, some have the cause of their motion within themselves, while others are moved only from without. Therefore, things that are carried, such as wood and stones and all matter held together by state alone, are moved only from without. But for now let the statement that the flow of bodies is motion be excluded from the discussion, since this is not needed for the present purpose. But animals and plants and, in general, all things that are held together by nature and soul have the cause of their motion within themselves; among which they say are also metals, and besides these, fire is also self-moved, and perhaps also springs. But of those things having the cause of their motion within themselves, some, they say, are moved out of themselves, and others from themselves; inanimate things out of themselves, but animate things from themselves. And animate things are moved from themselves when an impression arises, which calls forth an impulse. And again, in some animals impressions arise that call forth an impulse, the imaginative nature moving the impulse in an ordered way, as in the spider an impression of weaving arises and an impulse follows to weave, its imaginative nature calling it forth to this in an ordered way and nothing else being entrusted to the animal after its imaginative nature, and in the bee to fashion wax. 3.1.3 The rational animal, however, in addition to its imaginative nature, also has reason, which judges the impressions and rejects some while accepting others, so that the animal may be led according to them. Whence, since in the nature of reason there are starting-points for contemplating the noble and the base, following which, after contemplating the noble and the base, we choose the noble and turn away from the base, we are praiseworthy when we give ourselves to the practice of the noble, but blameworthy for the opposite. It must not be ignored, however, that the greater part of the nature which is ordered for all things is in some measure in animals, to a greater or lesser degree; so that the work in tracking dogs and in war horses is, so to speak, somewhere near to the rational. That a certain external thing should befall us, moving in us an impression of this kind or that, is admittedly not in our power; but to judge to use the event in this way or that is the work of nothing else than the reason within us, which, acting in accordance with its principles, prompts us toward the impulses that call us to the noble and our duty, or turns us to the contrary. 3.1.4 But if someone should say that the external thing itself is of such a kind that it is impossible to resist it when it has become such, let him attend to his own feelings and movements, whether there is not an approval and an assent and an inclination of the ruling faculty to this or that because of these probabilities. For, let us say, the woman who appears to one who has decided to be continent and to keep himself from intercourse, and who invites him to do something contrary to his resolution, does not become the complete cause of his setting aside his resolution; for in every case, having approved of the tickling and the smoothness of the pleasure, not wishing to resist it nor to confirm his decision, he commits the licentious act. But someone, on the contrary, when the same things have happened to the more

De principiis

Περὶ αὐτεξουσίου καὶ τῶν δοκούντων τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖν ῥητῶν γραφικῶν λύσις καὶ ἑρμηνεία

3.1.1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ κηρύγματι τῷ ἐκκλησιαστικῷ περιέχεται ὁ περὶ κρίσεως δικαίας θεοῦ λόγος, ὅστις καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας, πιστευθεὶς εἶναι ἀληθής, προκαλεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ καλῶς βιοῦν καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ φεύγειν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, δηλονότι συγκατατιθεμένους τῷ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὰ ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου ἄξια, φέρε καὶ [τὰ] περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ἰδίᾳ ὀλίγα διαλάβωμεν, ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα προβλήματος. ἵνα δὲ νοήσωμεν τί τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ ἀναπτύξαι δεῖ, ἵνα ταύτης σαφηνισθείσης ἀκριβῶς παρασταθῇ τὸ ζητούμενον. 3.1.2 Τῶν κινουμένων τὰ μέν τινα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχει τὴν τῆς κινή σεως αἰτίαν, ἕτερα δὲ ἔξωθεν μόνον κινεῖται. ἔξωθεν μὲν οὖν μόνον κινεῖται τὰ φορητά, οἷον ξύλα καὶ λίθοι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ὑπὸ ἕξεως μόνης συνεχομένη ὕλη. ὑπεξῃρήσθω δὲ νῦν τοῦ λόγου τὸ κίνησιν λέγειν τὴν ῥύσιν τῶν σωμάτων, ἐπεὶ μὴ χρεία τούτου πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δὲ ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς ὅσα ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς συνέχεται· ἐξ ὧν φασιν εἶναι καὶ τὰ μέταλλα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι, τάχα δὲ καὶ αἱ πηγαί. τῶν δὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐχόν των τὰ μέν φασιν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν· ἐξ ἑαυ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἄψυχα, ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν δὲ τὰ ἔμψυχα. καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν κι νεῖται τὰ ἔμψυχα φαντασίας ἐγγινομένης ὁρμὴν προκαλουμένης. καὶ πάλιν ἔν τισι τῶν ζῴων φαντασίαι γίνονται ὁρμὴν προκαλούμεναι φύσεως φανταστικῆς τεταγμένως κινούσης τὴν ὁρμήν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀράχνῃ φαντασία τοῦ ὑφαίνειν γίνεται καὶ ὁρμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν, τῆς φανταστικῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως τεταγμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸν προκαλουμένης καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου μετὰ τὴν φανταστικὴν αὐ τοῦ φύσιν πεπιστευμένου τοῦ ζῴου, καὶ ἐν τῇ μελίσσῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κηρο πλαστεῖν. 3.1.3 Τὸ μέντοι λογικὸν ζῷον καὶ λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τῇ φαντα στικῇ φύσει, τὸν κρίνοντα τὰς φαντασίας καί τινας μὲν ἀποδοκιμά ζοντα, τινὰς δὲ παραδεχόμενον, ἵνα ἄγηται τὸ ζῷον κατ' αὐτάς. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ λόγου εἰσὶν ἀφορμαὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, αἷς ἑπόμενοι θεωρήσαντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἱρούμεθα μὲν τὸ καλόν, ἐκκλίνομεν δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, ἐπαινετοὶ μέν ἐσμεν ἐπιδόντες ἑαυτοὺς τῇ πράξει τοῦ καλοῦ, ψεκτοὶ δὲ κατὰ ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἀγνοητέον μέντοι γε ὅτι τὸ πλέον τῆς εἰς πάντα τεταγμένης φύσεως ποσῶς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον δὲ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον· ὥστε ἐγγύς που εἶναι, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἰχνευταῖς κυσὶν ἔργον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἵπποις. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑποπεσεῖν τόδε τι τῶν ἔξωθεν, φαντασίαν ἡμῖν κινοῦν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ὁμολογουμένως οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὸ δὲ κρῖναι οὑτωσὶ χρήσασθαι τῷ γενομένῳ ἢ ἑτέρως, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔργον ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν λόγου ἐστίν, ἤτοι παρὰ τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἐνεργοῦν τος ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν προκαλουμένας καὶ τὸ καθῆκον ὁρμάς, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐκτρέποντος. 3.1.4 Εἰ δέ τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἔξωθεν λέγοι εἶναι τοιόνδε, ὥστε ἀδυ νάτως ἔχειν ἀντιβλέψαι αὐτῷ τοιῷδε γενομένῳ, οὗτος ἐπιστησάτω τοῖς ἰδίοις πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασιν, εἰ μὴ εὐδόκησις γίνεται καὶ συγ κατάθεσις καὶ ῥοπὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τόδε τι διὰ τάσδε τὰς πιθα νότητας. οὐ γάρ, φέρ' εἰπεῖν, ἡ γυνὴ τῷ κρίναντι ἐγκρατεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνέχειν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ μίξεων, ἐπιφανεῖσα καὶ προκαλεσαμένη ἐπὶ τὸ ποιῆσαί τι παρὰ πρόθεσιν, αὐτοτελὴς αἰτία γίνεται τοῦ τὴν πρό θεσιν ἀθετῆσαι· πάντως γὰρ εὐδοκήσας τῷ γαργαλισμῷ καὶ τῷ λείῳ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀντιβλέψαι αὐτῷ μὴ βεβουλημένος μηδὲ τὸ κεκριμένον κυρῶσαι, πράττει τὸ ἀκόλαστον. ὁ δέ τις ἔμπαλιν, τῶν αὐτῶν συμ βεβηκότων τῷ πλείονα