Proclus, On the Subsistence of Evils

On the subsistence of evils

Letting out a cry--- it is surely necessary to say one of two things: either that virtue is not contrary to vice, the whole to the whole and the parts

We speak of more or less intemperance, or are all intemperate and unjust in the same way? we shall say, by no means. and what then? is it not that, in

Evil, being a falling away and as it were a departure from the first of goods, is reasonably also deprived of being for what, being unable to share i

Evil but this is impossible for there cannot be two first principles for whence could they come at all, if the monad does not exist? for if each of

That evil is not of matter nor in bodies is clear from these things for matter and that which moves discordantly are not the same. and that matter is

Is unmixed nor is it primary evil. for if evil were contrary to every good, it would be necessary, since the good exists in itself and primarily befor

--- 41 therefore, against those who say there is one source of evils, what has been said is sufficient. for the gods <all and> are sources and causes

We call wretched ... therefore the evil man, insofar as he is evil, is not likened to the intellect ... nor could there be paradigms of evils in the

Generation for what is according to nature for one, is contrary to nature for another. and let an example of these, if you wish, be for you the very

For where the one is, there is also the good <but the evil> --- for there is asymmetry and disharmony and opposition in multitude, and from these co

Using its power for fighting and rather when greater power is present, the activities and works of evil are greater, and when less, lesser. if indeed

In particulars and in individuals, in which indeed there is also a lack of power because of the subsidence of being and an increase of division, as un

Things that are by nature are not diseases for even monsters are deformities of nature <and the deformity of these> is according to nature as a whol

On the Subsistence of Evils

A SINGLE BOOK ON THE SUBSTANCE OF EVILS 1 Some of our predecessors have also investigated the nature of evil, what it is and whence it has its origin, ---considering evil itself in itself, whether it is or not, and if it is, how it is and from where it comes into being and substance; ... but we ... having written down what ... was contemplated by the divine Plato concerning the nature of evil; ---and we shall certainly be closer to the comprehension of the things sought, having found Plato's thought, and from there having kindled as it were a light for our inquiries. Therefore, we must first consider whether evil is or is not; and if it is, whether it is among the intelligibles or not; and if among the sensibles, whether it subsists according to a primary cause or not; and if not, whether some substance should be given to it, or its being should be posited as completely non-substantial; and if this is so, how did it subsist, since the principle is other, and from where does it begin and how far does it proceed; and further how and from where is evil, since providence exists? ---but in all things---or we think to have treated of nothing, if we should miss his theory. 2 Let the beginning, then, of the theory concerning these things be, according to nature, whether evil is one of the things that are or not; for how is it possible for this to be, which is in every way devoid of the principle of things that are? For neither is it possible for darkness to partake of light, nor vice of virtue, nor evil of the good. --- thus ---evil must be nowhere among the things that are; for if it too is from the good, how is that still the cause of all things beautiful and good, which produced the nature of evil? if it is not from there ; the good was not then the cause of all things that are, nor the principle, if evil being ordered among things that are escapes its procession from that. But in general, if everything that subsists in any way subsisted by partaking of being, and it is necessary for that which partakes of being also to partake of the one---, and it was not nor will be right to make the secondary things which they make otherwise than with the things that are superior—intellect with life, life with being, and all things with the one—then it is necessary, of course, that evil in turn has suffered one of two things; either to have not partaken of being at all, or having partaken of being in any way, at the same time to partake of the cause beyond---. or that the principle does not exist, or that evil has neither come to be nor exists. ---but from both sides it is necessary to say that evil is nowhere. If ... the good is beyond being and the source of things that are---. how is evil one of the things that are, if it will be deprived of such a desire? --- 3 --- (evil) ... is even more distant from the good than non-being itself; ---that which is further from this is more non-substantial than that which is near. Therefore, that which in no way is, is more than what is called evil. --- and if also, as Plato's argument goes , the father of this cosmos not only substantiates the nature of goods, but also wills that there be no evil anywhere, what device is there for evil to stand toward subsistence, being unwanted by the demiurge? For it is not right for him to will one thing and do another, but will and creation were at the same time for the divine substances ; so that evil is not only unwanted by him, but also without substance, not as if he were not making it—for it is not right even to think this—, but as if he were making it not to be; for his will was not that evil not be made by him, but that it not be at all; what then will still make it be, when he who brings it towards non-being is the substance and father of all things? For what is contrary to him and from where? For the evil-doing is not from him—for that is not right for him; and if from elsewhere, it is absurd; for all things in the cosmos are from the father, some directly, as has been said, others as if from the workings of others. 4 The argument, then, that banishes evil from being might be something like this, and might plausibly say such things to us. But the one contrary to this

De malorum subsistentia

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΚΩΝ ὙΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ ΜΟΝΟΒΙΒΛΟΣ 1 Τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν, ἥτις τέ ἐστι καὶ ὅθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν, ἐζήτησαν μὲν καὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν τινες, ---αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ κακὸν σκοπήσαντες, εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε καὶ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, πῶς ἐστὶ καὶ πόθεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἥκει· ... ἡμεῖς δὲ ... ἀναγράψαντες, ἃ ... τῷ θείῳ Πλάτωνι περὶ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ φύσεως τεθεώρηται· --- καὶ τῆς τῶν ζητουμένων καταλήψεως ἐγγυτέρω πάντως ἐσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος εὑρόντες ἔννοιαν, κἀκεῖθεν οἷον φῶς ταῖς ἡμῶν ζητήσεσιν ἀνάψαντες. Εἴτε οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν, εἴτε μή, πρῶτον σκοπητέον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι, πότερον ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐστὶ ἢ οὔ· καὶ εἰ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, πότερον κατ' αἰτίαν προηγουμένην ὑφέστηκεν ἢ οὔ· καὶ εἰ μή, πότερον οὐσίαν αὐτῷ τινὰ δοτέον, ἢ παντάπασιν ἀνούσιον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι θετέον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο, πῶς ὑπέστη, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑτέρας οὔσης, καὶ πόθεν ἄρχεται καὶ μέχρι τίνος πρόεισι· καὶ ἔτι πῶς καὶ πόθεν, προνοίας οὔσης, ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν; ---ἐφ' ἅπασι δὲ---ἢ μηδὲν πεπραγματεῦσθαι οἰόμεθα, εἰ διαπέσοιμεν τῆς θεωρίας ἐκείνου. 2 Ἀρχὴ οὖν τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν θεωρίας κατὰ φύσιν <ἔστω>, πότερον τὸ κακὸν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ· καὶ πῶς γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχῆς πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἄμοιρον; οὐδὲ γὰρ φωτὸς σκότος, οὔτε ἀρετῆς κακίαν μετασχεῖν δυνατόν, οὔτε τἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακόν. --- <οὕτως> ---οὐδαμοῦ τῶν ὄντων εἶναι δεῖ τὸ κακόν· εἴτε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς ἔτι καλῶν ἁπάντων ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον, ὃ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ παρήγαγεν φύσιν; <εἴτε οὐκ ἐκεῖθεν>· οὐκ <ἄρα ἦν> πάντων τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἴτιον, οὐδ' ἀρχή, εἴπερ <τὸ κακὸν> ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τεταγμένον διαφεύγει τὴν ἐξ ἐκείνου πάροδον. ὅλως δέ, εἰ πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ὑφιστάμενον τοῦ εἶναι μετασχὸν ὑπέστη, τὸ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μετασχὸν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς μετέχειν---, οὔτε δὲ ἦν οὔτε ἔσται θέμις ἄλλως ποιεῖν τὰ δεύτερα ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἢ μετὰ τῶν ὑπερ- κειμένων-τὸν μὲν νοῦν μετὰ τῆς ζωῆς, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι, πάντα δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἑνός-δεῖ δήπου καὶ τὸ κακὸν αὖ δυοῖν πεπονθέναι θάτερον· ἢ μηδὲ τοῦ εἶναι μετειληχέναι τὸ παράπαν, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν τοῦ εἶναι μετασχὸν ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἐπέκεινα μετέχειν αἰτίας---. ἢ μηδὲ εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν, <ἢ> μηδὲ γεγονέναι μηδὲ εἶναι τὸ κακόν. ---ἀμ- φοτέρωθεν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον φάναι οὐδαμοῦ τὸ κακόν. εἰ δὲ ... τἀγαθὸν ἐπέκεινα <τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πηγὴν> τῶν ὄντων---. πῶς <ἐστι> τὸ κακὸν <ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων, εἰ> ἔσται τῆς τοιαύτης ὀρέξεως παρῃρημένον; --- 3 --- (τὸ κακόν) ... μᾶλλον καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπέχον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ---τὸ τούτου δὲ πορρώτερον τοῦ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον ἀνουσιώτερον. τὸ μηδαμῶς ἄρα ὂν μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἤπερ τὸ λεγόμενον κακόν. --- εἰ δὲ καὶ, <ὡς ὁ Πλάτωνος λόγος>, οὐ μόνον ὑφίστησι τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσιν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου πατήρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ βούλεται μηδὲν εἶναι μηδα- μοῦ κακόν, τίς ἔστι μηχανὴ ὑφεστάναι πρὸς ὑπόστασιν τὸ κακὸν ἀβούλη- τον τῷ δημιουργῷ; οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι, ἄλλα δὲ ποιεῖν θεμιτόν, ἀλλ' ἡ βούλησις ἅμα καὶ ποίησις <ἦν> ἐπὶ τῶν θείων <οὐσιῶν>· ὥστε οὐ μόνον ἀβούλητον αὐτῷ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνυπόστατον, οὐχ ὡς ἐκείνου μὴ ποιοῦντος-τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ νοεῖν θέμις-, ἀλλ' ὡς μηδ' εἶναι ποιοῦντος· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἡ βούλησις οὐ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὅλως μὴ εἶναι· τί οὖν ἔτι τὸ ποιῆσον εἶναι, τοῦ προσάγοντος αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὑποστάτου πάντων ὄντος καὶ πατρός; τί γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ καὶ πόθεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ κακοποιόν-οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ εἰ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἄτοπον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐκ τοῦ πατρός, τὰ μὲν αὐτόθεν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰ δ' οἷον ἐνεργούντων ἄλλων. 4 Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸ κακὸν ἐξορίζων τοῦ εἶναι λόγος τοιοῦτος ἄν τις εἴη, καὶ τοιαῦτα ἂν ἡμῖν προφέροιτο πιθανῶς λέγων. ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτῳ