Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

Elements of Theology

PROCLUS THE SUCCESSOR, ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY. 1 Every multitude partakes in some way of the one. For if it were in no way to partake of it, neither would the whole be one, nor each of the many things from which the multitude is constituted; but each of those things will also be a multitude, and this to infinity; and each of these infinites will in turn be an infinite multitude. For partaking in no way of any one, neither as a whole itself nor in respect of each of the things within it, it will be in every way and in every respect infinite. For each of the many things, whatever you take, will be either one or not one; and if not one, then either many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that which is composed of them is also nothing; and if many, each is composed of things infinitely infinite. But these things are impossible. For none of the things that are is composed of things infinitely infinite (for there is nothing greater than the infinite, but that which is composed of all its parts is greater than each part), nor is it possible for anything to be composed out of nothing. Therefore, every multitude partakes in some way of the one. 2 Everything that partakes of the one is both one and not one. For if it is not the one-itself (for it is something other than the one that partakes of the one), it has been affected by the one through participation and has submitted to becoming one. If, then, it is nothing besides the one, it is only one; and it will not partake of the one, but will be the one-itself. But if it is something besides that, which is not one, [that which partakes of the one is both not one and one, not the one-itself but a thing that is one, as partaking of the one] it is therefore in this respect not one, nor the one-itself; but being at once one and partaking of the one, and for this reason not being one in virtue of itself, it is both one and not one, being something other than the one; in respect of what it has in addition, it is not one; in respect of what it has been affected by, it is one. Therefore, everything that partakes of the one is both one and not one. 3 Everything that becomes one becomes one by participation in the one. For in itself it is not one, but in so far as it has been affected by participation in the one, it is one. For if things that are not one in themselves were to become one, they surely become one by coming together and having communion with each other, and they submit to the presence of the one, not being the one-itself. Therefore, it partakes of the one in that respect in which it undergoes becoming one. For if it already is one, it does not become one; for that which is does not become what it already is. But if it becomes one from having previously been not-one, it will possess the one through some one having come to be in them. 4 Everything that is unified is other than the one-itself. For if it is unified, it would partake in some way of the one in that respect in which it is called unified; but that which partakes of the one is both one and not one. But the one-itself is not both one and not one. For if this also were both one and not one, the one in it would in turn have the composite character, and this to infinity, there being no one-itself at which it is possible to stop, but everything being one and not one. Therefore, the unified is something other than the one. For if it were the same as the unified, the one would be an infinite multitude, and likewise each of those things out of which the unified is composed. 5 Every multitude is secondary to the one. For if there is a multitude before the one, the one will partake of the multitude, but the multitude that is before the one will not partake of the one, if indeed, before the one comes to be, that thing is a multitude; for it does not partake of that which is not; and because that which partakes of the one is at once both one and not one, but the one has not yet subsisted, since the primary thing is multitude. But it is impossible for any multitude to exist that in no way partakes of the one. Therefore, the multitude is not before the one. But if it is simultaneous with the one, and they are coordinate by nature (for in time nothing prevents it), then neither is the one in itself many, nor the multitude one, since they are oppositely divided while being simultaneous by nature, if indeed neither is prior or posterior to the other. The multitude, therefore, in itself will not be one, and each of the things in it will not be one, and this to infinity; which is impossible. It partakes, therefore, of the one according to its own nature, and it will be impossible to take any part of it which is not one; for being not one, it would be an infinite composed of infinites, as has been shown. In every way, therefore, it partakes of the one. If, then, the one, which is one in itself, in no way partakes of multitude, the multitude will be in every way posterior to the one, partaking of the one, but not being partaken of by the one. But if the one also partakes of multitude, then in respect of its existence

Institutio theologica

ΠΡΟΚΛΟΥ ∆ΙΑ∆ΟΧΟΥ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ. 1 Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ γὰρ μηδαμῇ μετέχοι, οὔτε τὸ ὅλον ἓν ἔσται οὔθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ἔσται καὶ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πλῆθος, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων τούτων ἕκαστον ἔσται πάλιν πλῆθος ἄπειρον. μηδενὸς γὰρ ἑνὸς μηδαμῇ μετέχον μήτε καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸ μήτε καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, πάντῃ ἄπειρον ἔσται καὶ κατὰ πᾶν. τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν ἕκαστον, ὅπερ ἂν λάβῃς, ἤτοι ἓν ἔσται ἢ οὐχ ἕν· καὶ εἰ οὐχ ἕν, ἤτοι πολλὰ ἢ οὐδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἕκαστον οὐδέν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ πολλά, ἐξ ἀπειράκις ἀπείρων ἕκαστον. ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀπειράκις ἀπείρων ἐστί τι τῶν ὄντων (τοῦ γὰρ ἀπείρου πλέον οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἐκ πάντων ἑκάστου πλέον) οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς συντίθεσθαί τι δυνατόν. πᾶν ἄρα πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἑνός. 2 Πᾶν τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἕν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοέν (μετέχει γὰρ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο τι ὂν παρὰ τὸ ἕν), πέπονθε τὸ ἓν κατὰ τὴν μέθεξιν καὶ ὑπέμεινεν ἓν γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὸ ἕν, μόνον ἐστὶν ἕν· καὶ οὐ μεθέξει τοῦ ἑνός, ἀλλ' αὐτοὲν ἔσται. εἰ δ' ἐστί τι παρ' ἐκεῖνο, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν, [τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ οὐχ ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἕν, οὐχ ὅπερ ἓν ἀλλ' ἓν ὄν, ὡς μετέχον τοῦ ἑνός] τούτῳ ἄρα οὐχ ἕν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ὅπερ ἕν· ἓν δὲ ὂν ἅμα καὶ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἓν καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπάρχον, ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἕν, παρὰ τὸ ἓν ἄλλο τι ὄν· ᾧ μὲν ἐπλεόνασεν, οὐχ ἕν· ᾧ δὲ πέπονθεν, ἕν. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἕν. 3 Πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἓν μεθέξει τοῦ ἑνὸς γίνεται ἕν. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕν ἐστι, καθὸ δὲ πέπονθε τὴν μετοχὴν τοῦ ἑνός, ἕν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ γίνοιτο ἓν ἃ μὴ ἔστιν ἓν καθ' αὑτά, συν ιόντα δήπου καὶ κοινωνοῦντα ἀλλήλοις γίνεται ἕν, καὶ ὑπομένει τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς παρουσίαν οὐκ ὄντα ὅπερ ἕν. μετέχει ἄρα τοῦ ἑνὸς ταύτῃ, ᾗ πάσχει τὸ ἓν γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἕν, οὐ γίνεται ἕν· τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐ γίνεται ὃ ἤδη ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἑνὸς πρότερον, ἕξει τὸ ἓν ἐγγενομένου τινὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἑνός. 4 Πᾶν τὸ ἡνωμένον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοενός. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡνωμένον, μετέχοι ἄν πῃ τοῦ ἑνὸς ταύτῃ, ᾗ καὶ ἡνωμένον λέγεται· τὸ δὲ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἕν. τὸ δ' αὐτοὲν οὐχὶ καὶ ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἕν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἕν τε καὶ οὐχ ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πάλιν ἓν τὸ συναμφότερον ἕξει, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον, μηδενὸς ὄντος αὐτοενὸς εἰς ὃ στῆναι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ οὐχ ἑνὸς ὄντος. ἔστιν ἄρα τι τὸ ἡνωμένον τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερον. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ὂν τῷ ἡνωμένῳ, τὸ ἓν πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἔσται, καὶ ἕκαστον ὡσαύτως ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν ἐστι τὸ ἡνωμένον. 5 Πᾶν πλῆθος δεύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι πλῆθος πρὸ τοῦ ἑνός, τὸ μὲν ἓν μεθέξει τοῦ πλήθους, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τὸ πρὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐ μεθέξει τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ, πρὶν γένηται ἕν, ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο πλῆθος· τοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐ μετέχει· καὶ διότι τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἕν ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ οὐχ ἕν, οὔπω δ' ὑπέστη ἕν, τοῦ πρώτου πλήθους ὄντος. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον εἶναί τι πλῆθος μηδαμῇ ἑνὸς μετέχον. οὐκ ἄρα πρὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ πλῆθος. εἰ δὲ δὴ ἅμα τῷ ἑνί, καὶ σύστοιχα ἀλλήλοις τῇ φύσει (χρόνῳ γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει), οὔτε τὸ ἓν καθ' αὑτὸ πολλά ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ πλῆθος ἕν, ὡς ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἅμα ὄντα τῇ φύσει εἴπερ μηδέτερον θατέρου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον. τὸ οὖν πλῆθος καθ' αὑτὸ οὐχ ἓν ἔσται, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ἕν, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. μετέχει ἄρα τοῦ ἑνὸς κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν· μὴ ἓν γὰρ ὄν, ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρον ἔσται, ὡς δέδεικται. πάντῃ ἄρα μετέχει τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἕν, τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὄν, μηδαμῇ μετέχει πλήθους, ἔσται τὸ πλῆθος πάντῃ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὕστερον, μετέχον μὲν τοῦ ἑνός, οὐ μετεχόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἓν μετέχει πλήθους, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὕπαρξιν