OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

CHRISTIAN QUESTIONS TO THE GREEKS.

First Christian question to the Greeks. If the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good among men, and the greatest good among men is to know the truly existing God, then the greatest evil is to be ignorant of Him. But since this evil exists in some men, what is more fitting for God the creator of the world: to change the condition of the present life and to free men from the greatest evil, as the Christian doctrine wills, or to allow the world to remain in the same condition and men to be ever held by the greatest evil? Greek response to the Christians. First, in response to the first problem, it must be said that there is no greatest evil. For if God is the greatest of goods, it is clear that if one were to suppose a greatest evil, another principle would be found opposite to God, which the Manichaeans, speaking wrongly, say. For it is absurd for God not to comprehend all things, not to shine His own goodness upon all. Therefore, there is no greatest evil. For indeed ignorance is often given to men for their good; for we see in many cases that it often happens that known things are despised more than unknown things. And besides, the soul suffers ignorance of the truly existing God not from anything else but from its own forgetfulness. But knowledge of God also comes to the souls here; just as we see even here men knowing God. But if one wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance of God at all; for all confess by common notion that God exists. And that men, being here, are able to know God, the faith of the orthodox also clearly shows, saying that God Himself came down and was made known to men. If, therefore, it is possible for men, being here, to know God, no greatest evil befalls them from being here. For to those who are ignorant, as has been said, ignorance of God happens from their unfaithful nature. But if one should concede, which is absurd, that the things here are the greatest evil, and that it is better for the things here not to exist than to exist, if he says that the creator has made the things here evil through weakness, he is foolish, asserting that the power of God does not comprehend all things. But if, being able to make the things here good, He allowed others to make them evil, this too will be an accusation against God; for he who is able to stop it, but overlooks it, more truly does it himself. But if it is God Himself who made the things here, it is clear that as the same God remains both hereafter and always, the same things will be. For what He was able to do long ago, He is also able to do now. But if He is now able to do something more than before, such of His will be subject to time

ΤOΥ AΓIOΥ IOΥΣΤIΝOΥ ΦIΛOΣOΦOΥ ΚAI ΜAΡΤΥΡOΣ

EΡΩΤHΣEIΣ ΧΡIΣΤIAΝIΚAI ΠΡOΣ ΤOΥΣ EΛΛHΝAΣ.

Πρώτη ἐρώτησις χριστιανικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Eἰ τῷ μεγίστῳ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῷ μέγιστον ἀντίκειται κακόν, μέγιστον δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν τὸ γνῶναι τὸν ὄν τως ὄντα θεόν, μέγιστον ἄρα κακὸν τὸ τοῦτον ἀγνοεῖν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδή ἐστι τοῦτο κακὸν ἔν τισι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ποῖόν ἐστι τῷ δημιουργῷ τοῦ κόσμου θεῷ πρεπωδέστερον τὸ ἐναλλάξαι τὴν τοῦ παρόντος βίου κατάστασιν καὶ ἀπαλλάξαι τοὺς ἀν θρώπους τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καθὼς ὁ τῶν Χριστιανῶν βού λεται λόγος, ἢ τὸ ἐᾶσαι μένειν τὸν κόσμον ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κατα στάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ἀεὶ κατε χομένους; Ἀπόκρισις ἑλληνικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς. Πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἄπορον ·ητέον, ὡς μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν. Eἰ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ μέγιστον ὁ θεός ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι, εἴ τις ὑπόθοιτο μέγιστον κακόν, εὑρεθήσεται ἑτέρα ἀρχὴ ἐναντία τῷ θεῷ, ὅπερ οἱ Μανιχαῖοι κακῶς λέγοντες λέγουσι. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸν θεὸν μὴ πάντα καταλαμβάνειν, μὴ πᾶσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθότητα ἐπιλάμπειν. Μέγιστον τοίνυν κακὸν οὐδέν. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια πολλάκις ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ δίδοται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ὁρῶμεν οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὡς πολλάκις συμ βαίνει μᾶλλον καταφρονεῖν τῶν γινωσκομένων ἢ τῶν ἀγνοουμέ νων. Ἄλλως τε καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν οὐκ ἔκ τινος ἄλλου ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας λήθης ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχει. Παρα γίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐνταῦθα ψυχαῖς γνῶσις θεοῦ· ὥσπερ οὖν ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀνθρώπους γινώσκοντας τὸν θεόν. Eἰ δέ τις ἐθέλοι τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, οὐδέ ἐστιν ὅλως ἄγνοια περὶ θεοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ὁμολογοῦσι κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὄντες δύνανται οἱ ἄνθρωποι γινώσκειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀρθοδόξων πίστις σαφῶς δηλοῖ, λέγουσα τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν κατεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐγνῶσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Eἰ τοίνυν δυνατὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας γινώσκειν τὸν θεόν, οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς μέγιστον κακὸν συμβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ταῦθα εἶναι. Τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι γάρ, καθὼς εἴρηται, ἐκ τῆς ἀπί στου φύσεως τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεὸν συμβαίνει. Eἰ δέ τις καὶ συγχωρήσει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον, μέγιστον εἶναι κακὸν τὰ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ κάλλιον ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰ τῇδε τοῦ εἶναι, εἰ μὲν λέγει κακὰ πεποιηκέναι τὰ τῇδε τὸν δημιουργὸν δι' ἀσθένειαν, ἀνοηταίνει, τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν φάσκων μὴ καταλαμβάνειν πάντα. Eἰ δέ, δυνάμενος καλὰ ποιῆσαι τὰ τῇδε, συνεχώρησεν ἑτέροις κακὰ ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἔσται κατηγόρημα θεοῦ· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δέ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸς δρᾷ. Eἰ δὲ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὰ τῇδε, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ μένοντος καὶ εἰς ὕστερον καὶ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔσται. Ἂ γὰρ πάλαι ἠδύνατο καὶ νῦν δύναται. Eἰ δὲ νῦν τι πλεῖον δύναται παρὰ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ, ἔγχρονος αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἡ τοιαύτη