On The Virtues (In General)

Translated

with

Introduction and Notes

JOHN PATRICK REID, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies

Washington, D. C.

THE PROVIDENCE COLLEGE PRESS

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

1951

Nihil Obstat:

CHARLES I. LITZINGER, O.P., S.T.Lr., S.T.Bacc.

JOHN D. MCMAHON, O.P., S.T.Lr., Ph.D.

Imprimi Potest:

TERENCE STEPHEN MCDERMOTT, O.P., S.T.Lr., LL.D.

Prior Provincial, St. Joseph's Province

Imprimatur:

RUSSELL J. MCVINNEY, D.D.

Bishop of Providence

July 24, 1951

THE PROVIDENCE COLLEGE PRESS

PROVIDENCE, R.I.

Affectionately

Dedicated

My Mother and Father

He composed a substantial moral theology, capable of directing all human acts in accordance with the supernatural last end of man. And so he is the perfect theologian, so he gives infallible rules and precepts of life not only for individuals, but also for civil and domestic society which is also the object of moral science, both economic and politic . . .

His eminence in the learning of asceticism is no less remarkable; for he brought the whole science of morals back to the theory of the virtues and gifts, and marvellously defined both the science and the theory in relation to the various conditions of man, both those who desire to live the ordinary life and those who desire to attain to Christian perfection and fullness of spirit, in the active no less than in the contemplative life. If anyone, therefore, desires to understand fully all the implications of the commandment to love God, the growth of charity and the conjoined gifts of the Holy Ghost, the difference between the various states of life . . . and the nature and value of each, all these and other questions of ascetical and mystical theology, he must have recourse in the first place to the Angelic Doctor.

--Pius XI, Encyclical Studiorum

Ducem, June, 29, 1923.

Table of Contents

Translator's Introduction

1. The Disputed Questions

2. On the Virtues in General

a. General Plan, nature of the work, date of composition

b. Significance of a treatise on the virtues

3. The Translation

Outline of the entire Question

St. Thomas' The Virtues in General

Art. 1. Whether virtues are habits

2. Whether St. Augustine's definition of virtue is a good one

3. Whether a power of the soul can be the subject of virtue

4. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue

5. Whether the will is the subject of virtue

6. Whether there is virtue in the practical intellect

7. Whether there is virtue in the speculative intellect

8. Whether virtues are in us by nature

9. Whether virtues are acquired by acts

10. Whether there are any infused virtues in man

11. Whether infused virtue may be increased

12. Whether the virtues are correctly distinguished

13. Whether virtue is in the mean

Appendices

I. Outline Synopsis of the Articles

II. Detached Notes

III. Bibliography of Works Cited by St. Thomas

IV. Bibliography of Works Cited by the Translator

Translator's Introduction

1. THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS

Text-books, learned monographs, articles, treatises, and commentaries--even the best of these--fail in one way or another to provide a complete and perfect understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. Before all else, the works themselves of the Angelic Doctor must be zealously sought out. Massoulié voiced this incontrovertible truth when he advised: "If you wish to understand St. Thomas, read him; he is his own best interpreter." This is not to belittle secondary sources; it is but to acclaim the Primary.

Which works of Thomas should be read? The ultimate answer is, of course: read everything he has written. To narrow the field, the Summa Theologiae must certainly be read; it is the very best of Thomas. No other single work of his will prove so rewarding of the amount of time and effort expended on it as this, his masterpiece. But note carefully: the Summa Theologiae is a profound and genuinely concise synthesis, the rich, ripe fruit of Aquinas' intellectual and spiritual maturity. That it may be taken up and studied with supreme joy and profit, it is eminently wise, not to say imperative, to become acquainted with St. Thomas' other, more particularized works. The mind of Thomas will reveal itself all the more clearly and forcefully in the vast ocean of the great Summa after a judicious and extended examination has been undertaken of the several streams which flowed up to it. In writing the Summa, St. Thomas himself presupposed on the part of the reader or student a knowledge of philosophy and some acquaintance with the principle truths of faith or Sacred Scripture. This presupposition is often laid aside in his other writings; so that in these very works the doctrines which receive but brief notice in various places in the Summa may be traced out, in ordered, complete fashion, sometimes with an astounding wealth of historical and scientific detail. The same arguments masterfully arrayed in the Summa Theologiae will be presented in these less known works, often in much greater elaboration.

Among these other works of St. Thomas, the most outstanding are the Disputed Questions (Quaestiones Disputatae). As Master in Sacred Theology, St. Thomas conducted 'ordinary' disputations once every week from 1256 to 1259, and twice weekly from 1265 to 1272. The number of these exercises thus runs into the hundreds, whereas most of Thomas' contemporaries can be credited with no more than a few dozen. An eminent contemporary theologian, Matthias von Scheeben, has remarked concerning these Questions of Aquinas': "They are in a certain sense the golden key to an intelligent grasp of the Holy Doctor's other works."

The Disputed Questions in their present form are the outcome of three stages in the academic exercises previously mentioned. At the first session the Master proposed a general or specific topic of his own choice, which was to be the subject of the disputation, e.g.: truth, evil, the power of God, the Angels, etc. A Bachelor or other qualified subordinate appointed by the Master would then state the question, clearly and succinctly, pointing up such controversy as surrounded it, either currently or in the past. Those present, both students and masters (especially, it would seem, the latter) raised objections to the thesis thus briefly stated, or brought forth difficulties which demanded solution. The Bachelor or the Master himself replied to these objections immediately, at the same time fully exposing the true, positive doctrine. Thus went the first and most solemn session. The discussions lasted over as long a period of time--days, weeks, or even months -as the subject warranted. All objections were solved, difficulties removed as far as possible, and the complete doctrine presented.

At the next session, the Master summed up all that had preceded in the course of the dispute, and personally and definitively resolved the question at hand. Only one who enjoyed the rank of Magister had the power and the right to pronounce finally or "determine" a question.

Lastly, the proceedings were written up, either by the Master himself or through others. If it seemed opportune, these were published, in the form of articles and questions. This final, published version is what we know today as the Disputed Questions.

The method followed by St. Thomas in the Disputed Questions may be conveniently described by a comparison of it with that employed in his Summa Theologiae. The latter work is professedly aimed at instructing beginners. Hence the concise, direct style and, as far as possible, avoidance of abstruse and involved questions. The number of questions and articles is reduced to a minimum, and these are arranged according to the order of discipline, or pedagogy, for the benefit of students not far advanced.

On the other hand, the Disputed Questions, being the finished product of intense and elevated academic discussion, will be more readily appreciated by the more proficient student and by the professor. The articles are arranged, not according to the order of discipline, necessarily, but as those present at the disputation required, or as the occasion arose. In these truly magisterial works, St. Thomas at times refers explicitly to and solves the most pressing doctrinal problems of his day. There is a decidedly professional tone to this treatment, always lucid and rigorous and often quite extensive. The holy Doctor writes manifestly from a marvelous abundance of the most exquisite erudition and profound contemplation.

The format of the articles in all the Disputed Questions will be recognized immediately by one familiar with the Summa Theologiae. Each article has four component parts, prefaced by a statement in which the subject matter of the article is indicated, thus: "In this article the question is . . ." A contradictory (rarely a contrary) proposition then introduces the objections, thus: "It would seem that . . ." The number of objections or difficulties (dubitabilia: doubts or problems) in a single article is frequently large, much greater, usually, than in a parallel article of the Summa. These objections represent genuine difficulties; they are not mere straw figures, but push every possible angle of attack, striking at the very heart of the question at hand. Some of the objections raise difficulties of logic--something rarely seen in the Summa--and many reach to the utmost metaphysical foundations of reality, natural and supernatural. An occasional contrary argument may be inserted among the objections; this is answered at once, before proceeding with the next objection. In the formal statements On the contrary, one or more authorities are generally cited in favor of the thesis which St. Thomas himself will defend. Should the reasons adduced by any of these authorities require correction or further distinction, these are made either at the beginning of the Solutio or Body of the Article, or in the replies to the objections. The solution begins with the stock phrase "I reply." One or more distinctions are drawn at the outset, upon which the resolution of the question is to be based. Lastly, the objections are answered, one by one, directly and conclusively.

Before setting forth his own mind on the truth of things, in the Body of the article, St. Thomas not infrequently constructs a very gratifying historical apparatus, something seldom done in the Summa Theologiae. The actual solution is skillfully reduced to its proper, proximate principles, when this is called for. Nothing is ever gratuitously affirmed or denied. Guided and moved always by the sole desire to defend and expose the truth, St. Thomas meets difficulties squarely, never lightly dismissing or sidestepping the opinions of his adversaries.

It cannot be denied, certainly, that for conciseness and orderly, progressive arrangement, the Summa, excells the Disputed Questions. However, the latter are uniformly superior in historical syntheses of opinions, breadth and inclusiveness of doctrine, and refutation of errors current in St. Thomas' day. It would not be an exaggeration to characterize many of the articles of the Summa Theologiae as more or less compressed transcriptions of corresponding questions treated in Thomas' magisterial works, the Disputed Questions. At the same time, as Pere Coconnier observes: "The Disputed Questions in many instances would seem to be nothing other than a most illuminating and faithful commentary on the Summa Theologiae."

Ever mindful of ancient and contemporary controversies, St. Thomas has in fact given us a set of disputed Questions. Yet a question argued by the Angelic Doctor is practically a defined, in the sense of ultimately resolved, question. He exposes doctrine as a master, with sure, forceful expression, passing over personal prejudice in his burning love for truth, and truth alone. The venerable Dominican theologian, Fr. Xantes Marialis (+1660), who has edited many of St. Thomas' works, declared, in the preface to his Commentaries on the Disputed Questions: "I am eighty years old and have been engaged in studies from my youth. I declare in all sincerity that I have profited far more in these three or four years I have spent in editing these Questions than in the entire preceding course of my life."

2. ON THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL

A. General Plan, nature of the work, date of composition.

The Virtues in General is one of five Disputed Questions on the virtues composed by St. Thomas during his second sojourn in Paris. The five Questions are commonly listed in the following order: 1. The Virtues in General (De Virtutibus in Communi), 2. On Charity (De Caritate), c. On Fraternal Correction (De Correctione Fraterna), 4. On Hope (De Spe), 5. The Cardinal Virtues (De Virtutibus Cardinalibus). The titles plainly indicate that these Questions do not form an integral, organically coherent tract on the virtues, nor did the author intend that they should. Like the other Disputed Questions, these five were argued and subsequently written during different years, as the occasion required, with no conscious or resulting connection between them other than the similarity of their subject matter.

The Virtues in General is rightly placed before the other four Questions, in keeping with the Aristotelian principle of proceeding from the universal to the particular, from general principles to specific applications. Moreover, the present Question is easily seen to be the most sweeping and penetrating of the series. In this work, St. Thomas lays the solid, indispensable foundations for the Questions which are to follow, by an analysis of the very nature of virtue, its increase, its kinds, whether it is in the mean, and other basic issues.

That the Question on The Virtues in General was conducted by St. Thomas for his more advanced students, we may infer from the close preciseness of its methods and the exhaustive treatment of its matter. The work comprises thirteen articles and may be divided into four parts: 1) The definition or nature of virtue (Articles 1 and 2); 2) The subject of virtue (Articles 3 to 7); 3) The efficient cause of virtue (Articles 8 to 10); 4) Properties and kinds of virtue (Articles 11 to 13). It will be recognized that the first three sections correspond to what may be considered, respectively, as the formal, material, and efficient causes of virtue. The final cause of virtue, which is to make its subject good, is delineated by St. Thomas throughout the entire treatise, but particularly in the first two Articles. This division contains all the pertinent elements included in the tract on the virtues in the Summa, I-II, qq. 55-67, with the exception of certain properties of virtue, such as their connection and duration (q. 65 and q. 67), and certain detailed distinctions and comparisons among the virtues (qq. 59 and 60). The other locus for Aquinas' doctrines on the virtues in general is his commentary on the second Book of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Here, of course, it is a question of acquired or natural virtues only, not at all of those which exceed our natural power of attainment and are infused by God. Nevertheless, the universal, essential notes attached to virtue as such, not considering its efficient or formal cause, are taken over by St. Thomas from the Ethics, and adapted and applied to the virtues as these are understood in the present Disputed Question.

This Question is not formally a purely philosophical inquiry or disquisition; it is supernatural Ethics, moral, sacred Theology in the fullest sense. The holy Doctor follows Aristotle as far as the Philosopher can lead him but throughout the entire work it is clearly a question of Christian virtue, and not properly of the acquired habits known to the pagan Greeks. Virtue is not an end in itself (and this is true for Aristotle, as well as for the Christian moralist): it is primarily a means, ordered to the attainment of supreme happiness, the Beatific Vision, which is man's true end. Thus in the Compendium of Theology, St. Thomas observes: "There is such a definite way of arriving at happiness, namely, the practice of virtue. Nothing will reach its end unless it performs well the operations proper to it. A plant will not bear fruit if the procedure natural to it is not followed. A runner will not win a trophy or a soldier a citation, unless each of them carries out his proper functions. To say that a man discharges his proper office is equivalent to saying that he acts virtuously; for the virtue of any being is that which makes its possessor good and also makes his work good, as is stated in the second book of the Ethics (II, 6; 1106 a 15). Accordingly, since the ultimate end of man is eternal life, of which we spoke previously (chap. 150), not all attain it, but only those who act as virtue requires." As God is the efficient Cause of infused virtue, so He is its ultimate End, or rather the End which man attains through virtue. "Besides, as we have said above, not natural things alone but also human affairs, are contained under divine providence, and this not only in general but in particular (cf. chaps. 123, 133, 143). But He who has care of individual men has disposal of the rewards to be assigned for virtues and of the punishments to be inflicted for sin. For punishment has a medicinal value with regard to sin and restores right order when violated by sin, as we stated above (chap. 121); and the reward of virtue is happiness, to be granted by God's goodness. Therefore God will not grant happiness to those who act against virtue, but will assign as punishment the opposite of happiness, namely, extreme wretchedness." The two orders, of nature and of grace, are unequivocally and repeatedly distinguished, although never set at odds against each other. Thus the sources drawn upon by St. Thomas include Sacred Scripture, the Greek and Latin Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and a few early scholastic theologians, as well as Aristotle and one or two other Greek and Latin philosophers.

St. Thomas delivered his Disputed Questions on the virtues while he held the Chair of Sacred Theology for the second time at the University of Paris. In 1269, Louis IX, the Saint-King of France, invited him back to the world-renowned seat of learning where Thomas had shone with unrivaled splendor a decade earlier. The next year Thomas defended certain of the theological theses he had proposed against the redoubtable Franciscan, Master John Peckham. In 1272 he left Paris once again, nor was he ever to return. During these three years, from 1269 to 1272, Aquinas' literary output was truly amazing. Among the fruits of his labors at this period were his magnificent Commentaries on Job and on the Gospel according to St. John, commentaries on five or six works of Aristotle, seven of his twelve Quodlibeta, over a dozen Opuscula, and, most important, the entire Pars Secunda of the Summa Theologiae. Lastly, besides the five on the virtues, there were other Disputed Questions, on a variety of subjects.

Critical authorities disagree to some extent as regards the date of composition of these five Questions on the virtues. They are, at best, unanimous in assigning all five to St. Thomas' second stay in Paris, between the years 1269-1272. Synave and Grabmann indicate this three year period as the time of composition. Père Mandonnet narrows the span to the years 1270-1272. Finally, Van Steenberghen and others would date these Questions some time after De Malo, which they hold was written during the years 1271-1272. We are content, for present purposes, to accept the date more commonly agreed on, 1269-1272, when St. Thomas taught at Paris for the second time.

B. Significance of a Treatise on the Virtues.

In those fruitful years of the age of faith the importance of the study of virtue was universally recognized; the number of Questions devoted to the penetration of the truths involved and the thoroughness of the discussion vouch for the intense and appreciative interest of the participants. Indeed, as has been remarked, all the Disputed Questions are indicative of the topics of contemporary concern. Yet, the golden era of Catholic thought was quite aware that the principles sought and the truths unfolded were timeless as well as timely; that in very fact it was the ultimacy and fundamental character of the considerations which were the source of their vitality and gave solidity to their application.

Today, while the need of scientific and accurate understanding of virtue is, if anything, far more urgent, the importance of such a study is either belittled or, more widely, ignored. The context of truth, in which virtue takes an outstanding role, has been swept from the modern mind. The magnificent affirmations of the nature of man, his world, and his God, articulated with growing clarity by pagan Greeks and Christian scholastics, have been replaced solely by denials. Ironically, those denials, proffered as necessary steps to what was to be, in Bacon's phrase, "the enlargement of man unto all things possible," have succeeded only in negating man himself. Never has man been so powerless, his world so small, his goals so empty, their achievement so frustrating. In making himself--a distorted, warped, and partial self--the measure of all things, man has seen his project of creating a new world hasten to the world's destruction. The "heaven on earth" envisioned as proximate to the grasp of human science and the inevitable term of a beneficent evolution has revealed qualities more symptomatic of the conditions of hell.

The characterization of the modern mind and the modern world as hellish is no mere rhetorical exaggeration; doctrinal substantiation can be indicated. Nor is this to be sought solely in rampant pride and greed, constant strife, increasing selfishness, bestiality, hate and brutality. A defining trait of hell is the presence of wills, whether angelic or human, stubborn in maintaining their own absolute ultimacy. Such a will bows to no rule, acknowledges no measure beyond itself. For such a will intelligence performs no directive function; it can but be that will's most cunning and most useful slave. The limitations imposed by its nature occasion not restraint but constant straining; external violence issues at most in rebellious subjection.

The seed of the modern mind and world was sown in the subjectivism revived in the Renaissance, called sacred in the religious revolt of the sixteenth century, brought to fruit in the materialism, naturalism, atheism of recent generations. The autonomy and ultimacy of the human will is proposed doctrinally, defended practically, made the justification and explanation of the present and the promise, good and bad, of the future. The denial of the human soul and its eternal destiny, the exclusion of God, the sensualism, relativism, and anti-dogmatism of contemporary theorizing are but facets of the will's refusal to admit any rule outside itself. The function of intelligence to grasp reality is negated even to the denial of reality itself, lest the will be forced to acknowledge itself in any way not measuring but measured. On such a basis moral science as normative of human living, directive of human aspirations, cannot but tend to vanish and be replaced by arts, whether called creative or healing. The intelligence is employed increasingly as a mere technological and therapeutic instrument. The result is, and cannot be otherwise than, an individual and international anarchy, a continuity of violence interrupted only by latent rebellion.

The Christian insistence on the good life is more than timely; for an age which has all but lost sight of the true end of human life and of the indispensable means of attaining that end, emphasis on morals is imperative. It would not be presumptuous to assert that the most glaring deficiencies in private and social life today may be traced, in one significant area, to chaotic ignorance of orthodox moral standards. The special importance, now, of the study of virtue derives from this state of man and his world. The widespread misery and dissatisfaction consequent upon man's attempt to be an arbitrary, arrogant god affords springboard for a new focussing upon the true conditions of human happiness. Where the efforts to restore to truth its rightful place in terms of restatement of the doctrines of metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, and psychology have met with rebuff, the expansion and enrichment of man inherent in Christian living gives hope of attracting men to Christian moral teaching. The goals proposed by and to the will of man revolted from God have of necessity been distortions of the true ends divinely given to human nature. Experiment has given each personal experience of those distortions; the time is ripe to reveal the truths they hide. The words by which the human spirit has been enticed to revolt from God have proved themselves to be rendered meaningless by that very revolt; only the return to God can give them fruitfulness.

The intrinsically theo-centric slant of Christian moral science must be insisted on and properly emphasized. In an excellent chapter on Morality and Happiness, Father Vann voices this emphasis with striking simplicity: "Morality is the means whereby the self is brought gradually into conformity with the divine life, and therefore is the means whereby the desire for God is both expressed and fulfilled . . . if you will the end you necessarily will also the means to the end--and the means to God is morality in its fullness as a life of love and worship." And speaking of the ineluctable orientation of Thomistic moral ensemble, the same author notes that: "For St. Thomas, the moral life is simply the motus in Deum, the movement of the personality to fullness of life in God. A great deal of harm has been done by simply lifting the second part of the Summa Theologica out of its place in the whole work, and treating it as though it thus in isolation gave a complete picture of St. Thomas' view of the moral life. The second part is precisely a part of a whole. It is determined by what precedes and what follows ["by what follows": Christ, the uniquely perfect Exemplar of virtuous living!] In isolation therefore it is like a severed human hand. The Summa as a whole describes a circular movement, from God and back to God; man shares, and in a special way, in this cosmic process; and it is the whole man who thus shares, it is the whole psycho-physical personality, made in the image of the Creator."

In the work of restoring man to God, the world, and himself, by way of Christian moral teaching, the understanding of the virtues is of incalculable force. Thomas himself strongly affirms that practical science or Ethics is not sufficient to direct one's moral actions; for without the directive and regulative influence of the virtues a man may possess science and yet sin against virtue. Yet the fundamental principles, the broad, governing outlines of successful moral living are to be found in the several considerations of the science of morals--de facto, of moral Theology. Without an understanding of virtue it is impossible fully to understand man, what he is and what is his destiny. Virtue is, after all, human happiness as it is lived out, attained in this life and in this world, as well as the road to the eternal happiness of heaven. Virtue further affords the key to the understanding of law, of the mission of the state, of the man we each might be (and must be, under pain of misery).

Apart from the consideration of virtue, law is without mooring. As such, law is ordered to the promotion of virtue. If virtue remains hidden, or the concept of virtue is distorted, then law becomes tyranny or the monstrosity of being a man-made self-destruction. Because law has been divorced from virtue, it has been rendered unintelligible in itself, a thing of blind authority, exercised without reason and at the whim of the powerful; it has become a prime weapon in restricting human rights, instead of protecting and expanding them; it has become hateful, something to be circumvented, often despised. This attitude has been extended even to the laws of God. Emphasis upon law apart from virtue is a natural consequence of a doctrine (Protestantism) which reserves happiness to the few chosen (the self-righteous) and condemns the multitude. Because the privilege of virtue is for the few, the curb and check of law is for the many. Religion becomes a list of Thou shalt nots. The commandments are not gratefully reverenced as gifts lovingly given by a beneficent God to guide His people to happiness; they are regarded as the anathemas of a wrathful deity imposing punishment and breathing threats upon a wayward human race. They are rejected as thwarting natural impulses whereas they were given to unfold the powers of men to the influence and sharing of the divine life. Thus the Puritans turned from the concept of virtue as happiness and so made supreme virtues of intolerance and the hoarding of money and material wealth, and vices of joy and laughter and good fellowship. Oddly enough, their descendants have reversed, and find in the latter the only worthwhile virtues--see any issue of Reader's Digest. The fundamental distortion was the preference of pride to humility; and so Van Wyck Brooks tells of a New England woman who haughtily refused to kneel before God, Who was to her at best an equal.

So also the dignity of civil society is to be found in its aptitude to achieve and stabilize the conditions of human happiness. That happiness, in its realization of man's capacities and possibilities, consists particularly in the virtue of each member of society. How frighteningly true is this in a democratic state, where all, and not merely the heads of government, must be wise and good, since all retain by real participation the powers which they have freely delegated! A godless regime must lose sight of individual, personal happiness, and make the only virtue to be subservience to its almighty power. Man is emptied of his right to happiness--and so, of his right to be. The obedience owed to God, which unfolds the rich possibilities of man, gives way to slavery to the state unto the destruction of man. Such an oppressive regime well illustrates the relations maintaining between the intellectual and moral virtues: the truth must be hidden, lest men discover how to be men.

At the opposite extreme, for long certain Western nations exaggerated the development of the individual at the expense of the common good. These very powers are gradually leaning (where they have not already fallen) to a position wherein the greatest virtue will be personal security. The drive of personal selfishness whereby so many peoples have grown great and strong is now backfiring. Little of nature remains to be exploited (except by modern science, which carries on its exploitation under the guise of intellectual or humanitarian progress), so men are turning to the exploitation of government. Specifically, illustration is afforded of the relation between the natural and supernatural virtues. Were there no original sin, natural virtue might develop in "our way of life." Because of original sin, supernatural help is needed, and supernatural light to indicate criteria in the (healing and) perfecting of human nature. A multiplication of laws and statutes cannot substitute for the inner understanding of man as God's image and the fortified urge to maintain and develop this tremendous privilege and gift.

The modern world cast loose the traditions of Christianity. It became ignorant of man as he is, his nobility of destiny, his immortal soul, his relation to his fellow-men and to God. In very fact, the truth and good of virtue is at the root of man's well-being, personally and socially, naturally and supernaturally. Man can be led by ideals. He may be led to know what he is by a clear picture of what he can become. That picture is to be seen in the delineation of virtue. Therein is the outline--more, the concrete flesh and blood and sinews--of man fully developed as man. He may learn to know his powers by learning of the greatness of those powers in their virtuous perfection. He can be brought to a realization of the tremendous strength of his intellect in that intellect's expansion by true science and especially by wisdom. He may discover the emptiness and futility of selfish, rootless living in the richness of a peace rising out of Charity, of a meal made satisfactory by temperance, of work promoted by and promoting justice, etc. If he once sees virtue, not as an ogre of frustration, but as the vital element in each happy day of a happy man's living--then will the pride and greed and lust that dominates so much of human existence be overthrown.

Most importantly will the understanding of virtue lead to the understanding of God. He is reflected in the depths of the sea, in the beauty of the sky, in the vibrant fertility of the earth. But nowhere is He reflected, in His very being and inner life, as in the perfection of man by virtue. There alone can we learn of the love, the justice, the goodness, the wisdom of God--of the meaning of Father, Son, and Spirit. We shall find God most excellently here on earth in the living of men, in the individual and in society; and, pre-eminently, in the God Man, the divine Model of virtue, and in His universal Church, the nursery and garden of virtue. In an extraordinarily beautiful passage, St. Thomas portrays Our Lord as the unique and supreme Model of all the virtues. This Divine exemplarism shines forth with particular force and brilliance in the blessed Passion and Death of Christ: "Christ also wished to die that His death might be an example of perfect virtue for us. He gave an example of charity, for 'greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends' (John 15:13) . . . By His death Christ also gave an example of fortitude, which does not abandon justice in the face of adversity; refusal to give up the practice of virtue even under fear of death seems to pertain most emphatically to fortitude . . . In not refusing to die for truth, Christ overcame the fear of dying, which is the reason men for the most part are subject to the slavery of sin. Further, He gave an example of patience, a virtue that prevents sorrow from overwhelming man in time of adversity; the greater the trials, the more splendidly does the virtue of patience shine forth in them . . . Lastly, Our Lord gave an example of obedience; for the more difficult are the precepts one obeys, the more praiseworthy is the obedience. But the most difficult of all the objects of obedience is death. Hence, to commend the perfect obedience of Christ, the Apostle says, in Philippians 2:8, that He was obedient to the Father even unto death."

It is in Jesus Christ that the Christian will find the sole divinely efficacious, and concrete personification of true virtue. Christ could indeed have said: "Learn of Me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and possess all the other virtues which you need to learn." But because simple things are to be grasped before composed, the Second Part of the Summa, wherein the elements of the moral life are studied in their essential simplicity and organic hierarchy, comes before the Third Part, wherein these life-giving elements are shown in their Divine concretization, in the Incarnate Son of God.

Father Vincent McNabb, O.P. went so far as to predict that the Church may well be entering on an era when definitions about morals will be imperative. The evidence of popular ignorance and misconceptions concerning the moral nature of man is appalling. Man is the image of God: virtue is that imaging dynamically realized. The greatness of virtue and its import to human living is to be grasped most perfectly in the greatest of the virtues, Charity. Therein is revealed the potentiality of man in its ultimate realization (Virtus est ultimum de potentia). Therein does man regain paradise, the complete development of all his powers in God. The moralist must face this glorious challenge. He can thank God that in these times, when so much is confused and uncertain, he has the sane and solid teaching of the Church's Common Doctor. "If anyone, therefore, desires to understand fully . . . all these and other questions of ascetical and mystical theology, he must have recourse in the first place to the Angelic Doctor."

3. THE TRANSLATION

It is chiefly hoped that this translation of St. Thomas's De Virtutibus in Communi will render available the eminent doctrine in which the work abounds to the reader who cannot easily or conveniently consult the Latin text. In one of his Opuscula, the Angelic Doctor distinguishes two elements which should be required of every creditable translation. The first, and more necessary quality is a faithful reproduction of the thought of the original--as Thomas expresses it: "Hence it is the business of a good translator . . . to preserve the sense." The second desideratum is a smooth presentation of this thought-content in easy, idiomatic style. Thus, St. Thomas adds: "let him, however, adapt his manner of speaking according to the peculiarities of the language into which he is translating." Unfortunately, the simple, unadorned, properly technical language employed by St. Thomas in the Latin text does not submit readily to an equally smooth, idiomatic rendering into English. Hence the inevitable obscurity or thinness resulting here and there in the course of translation. Thomas himself warns against too literal a translation: "When things which sound perfectly all right in one language are translated word for word into another tongue, it is no wonder if any difficulties arise." For this reason, certain words and phrases, such as per se, ratio, differentia, have in some instances been left untranslated. At times the particular signification of a word is explained in a footnote. Where the precise meaning of a phrase or clause has seemed obscured, lost, or practically distorted in an English rendition, the Latin has been supplied, in parentheses. It need not be pointed out that many--indeed, most of these terms have more than one connotation. They enjoy an analogical extension to various significations, and are often used in a definitely limited, technical sense in context. Consequently, it will be obvious that the notes appended to the text are not meant to provide exhaustive clarification on each occasion. Above all, and no more than this, the aim has been to furnish readers of English with the complete and exact thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.

As far as is known, this is the first and only translation into English of De Virtutibus in Communi. The Marietti edition of Quaestiones Disputatae, 1949 has been chiefly used for the work of translation while the Parma edition, Opera Omnia, 1852-72, and the Vivès Edition, Opera Omnia, Paris, 1882, have also been consulted. Regrettably, none of the texts found in these editions enjoys a thoroughly critical status, although all are considered sufficiently reliable. The four other Disputed Questions in this series on the virtues are now in the course of translation by members of the Dominican Province of St. Joseph. They will appear successively, it is hoped, at a later date.

The first footnote in each article refers to other works of St. Thomas where the same or a similar question is treated. These parallel passages, and especially those in the Summa, may always be consulted with profit. All footnotes to the text have been provided by the translator. Whenever possible, they give the exact location of references made by St. Thomas to the works of other authors, as well as parallel passages in the other works of Thomas himself. Where it has been impossible for the translator to locate an exact reference, this fact has been noted and the closest available passage has been suggested.

Although the four-fold general division of the present question, mentioned above and outlined below, was not explicitly adverted to by the Angelic Doctor, his intent is unquestionably indicated by the arrangement of the articles. The work should be read in this order, for each succeeding article both assumes its predecessors and adds to them. Above all, the doctrine presented in the present work must be seen and grasped in its proper doctrinal context. A knowledge of what a habit is, is immediately presupposed, for virtue is a species of habit. The scientific interpretation and analysis of virtue depend not only on the main issues of ethics and psychology, but even more upon the co-ordination of these issues. The current trend among those outside the scholastic tradition is to reduce both to a purely physical investigation, an erratic conglomeration of anthropology and experimental psychology.

In St. Thomas' doctrine, on the other hand, there is evolved a penetrating outline of the virtues, entirely adequate and satisfying from a psychological as well as from an ethical point of view. He studies the natural aspects of virtue, for these are the essential basis on which the supernatural perfections are built. These perfections are, it is true, supernatural, but the powers in which they inhere are natural. Consequently, the specific end and need of the natural faculty, salvatis salvandis, are in some way the raison d'être of the supernatural just as they are of the natural virtue. Hence also Thomas proceeds by way of what we know directly, concerning natural virtue, as the surest and most intelligible approach to supernatural virtue, which we know only indirectly and by analogy. To sum it up: "It is possible, therefore, to establish at once a certain broad likeness and distinction between natural and supernatural virtues. Both kinds of virtue perfect the faculties in respect of their proper objects . . . Both imply an habitual orientation in the faculty concerned deriving from the control of a well-disposed will. On the other hand, a notable difference arises from the nature of the ultimate end in each case. In the case of natural virtue the norm or measure of virtue is natural good, natural beatitude. In the case of supernatural virtue the norm of virtue is supernatural good, supernatural beatitude. Whence it follows that, though the proximate objects of the various faculties remain materially the same . . . the formality or 'reason why' of those objects, which derives from the ultimate end, is vastly different. Further, since the ultimate end is supernatural, the virtue commensurate to the attainment of that end is supernatural. In other words, supernatural virtue cannot merely be the result of repeated natural operation. Hence, whereas natural virtue is acquired by repeated acts, supernatural virtue must be a gratuitous gift from above." A brief analysis of Aquinas' mode of procedure in this Question on the virtues, together with a critique of this method may bring out more emphatically for the reader the wise, realistic handling the holy Doctor has achieved of a difficult and important subject. As regards the analysis, each of the articles has been outlined, to facilitate mastery of the form and contents. These outlines will be found in Appendix I, p. 124. Technical notes on a number of points of doctrine or modes of treatment are included in a second Appendix, p. 138. Appendix III, p. 177 contains a complete Bibliography of the authors and their works cited or quoted by St. Thomas; while a last Appendix, p. 180 lists sources referred to or used by the translator.

It would be tragic, as well as ironic, if all these appurtenances, supplied by the translator for the precise purpose of aiding the reader in attaining a more perfect understanding of St. Thomas' doctrine, should prove rather a distraction, not to say positive hindrance, in achieving this aim. Thomas has not wasted a word; he has spoken clearly and with the unchallengable authority of truth. Go to Thomas: read him carefully and thoughtfully. The text of Thomas, here translated, is the essence and whole intrinsic reason for this book. These are golden words and will not fail to enrich the stimulated mind. Let us add, however, that they are meant to do more even than this. With an eye to this further aim, Thomas himself tells us that a moral consideration, since it concerns human actions, is made perfect only when it is realized in practical details. The virtues are operative habits, and of these the greatest is charity. Charity is a promise of the ineffable bliss of vision, for only when we are "rooted and founded in Charity" shall we be "able to comprehend with the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth; to know also the Charity of Christ, and to be filled unto all the goodness of God" (Eph. 3/17).

I owe a debt of profound gratitude to Father Ferrer Smith, O.P., S.T.D. for his immense help in the writing of this Introduction, and to Bro. Ignatius Hanson, O.P. for typing the manuscript.

JOHN PATRICK REID, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies

Feast of Our Lady, Patroness of the Order of Preachers

Dec. 22, 1950

Abbreviations

S. Th. Summa Theologiae

I First Part of the Summa Theologiae

I-II First Part of the Second Part

II-II Second Part of the Second Part

III Third Part

Suppl. Supplement to the Third Part

C.G.I., 2 Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 2

I Sent. d. 4 Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, distinction 4

q., qu., or quest. question

qla. quaestiuncula--a subdivision used in Sent.

a. or art. article

a. 2 c. or in corp. article 2, in the body of the article

Prol. Prologue

obj. objection

S. c. Sed contra (on the contrary)

ad 1 reply to obj. 1

De Verit. Disputed Question De Veritate

Qdlb. Quodlibetal Questions

In ad Rom. Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans

II Ethics c. 6 Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6

Metaphys. Metaphysics

PG Greek Fathers, Migne

PL Latin Fathers, Migne

Vulg. Vulgate

l. or lect. or lesson

Sol. solution

Outline of the Question

Outline of the Entire Question

1. The definition or nature of virtue (formal cause)

a. Genus: Virtues are habits Art. 1

b. Species: St. Augustine's definition Art. 2

2. The subject of virtue (material cause in which)

a. In general: A power of the soul Art. 3

b. In particular

(1) Appetitive powers

(a) Irascible and concupiscible

appetites Art. 4

(b) The will Art. 5

(2) Cognitive powers

(a) The practical intellect Art. 6

(b) The speculative intellect Art. 7

3. The efficient cause of virtue

a. Nature Art. 8

b. Acts of ours Art. 9

c. Infusion by God Art. 10

4. Certain properties and the distinction of the virtues

a. Increase in virtue Art. 11

b. The distinction of the virtues Art. 12

c. Virtue lies in the mean Art. 13