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148 in himself, so that thus he is always satisfied, having that which cures his thirst. "He who drinks," he says, "of this water will thirst again." If after drinking he thirsts, he is not satisfied. But hear again such words spoken with another meaning: wisdom says: "He who drinks of me will thirst again, and he who eats of me will hunger again." This says that: since he who drinks of wisdom does not drink its perfection suddenly, but little by little receives insights and cures the preceding thirst, he will thirst again not for those same things which he drank, but for the things after those, so that what was said by someone may have force: "What you have learned, preserve by practice, but add to it by knowledge." If he adds to it, having been satisfied he thirsts again, he hungers again. And who has loved produce in its abundance? And this indeed is vanity. There is one who has loved a multitude of produce. The "who" here signifies what is called by some a particular quality, which others call an individual. And it was necessary, according to the produce of governing providence in its abundance, for there to be also of the produce which providence provides to man, a desire. ····· ··· κεν ····αρομεν········ ····· ····· ····

149 not concerning the spirit, but concerning the flesh. "He who sows" therefore "to the flesh" sows many things, that is, beyond what is necessary. We have flesh, and it is necessary to use it as flesh, to discipline it, to bring it into subjection. But when we are attached to the flesh, we acquire both a fleshly choice and disposition. He who sows to this flesh bears fruits of destruction. The apostle enumerated the works of the flesh, such as strife and sorceries and heresies and contentions and the others are. But are we not able to conceive of "a multitude of power" in a praiseworthy manner? because this is pursued in vain. For that produce remains forever—"he has scattered, he has given to the poor; his righteousness endures forever"— unless perhaps we take such a thing also in the case of heretical opinions, that they profess "to sow to righteousness," not the true, but the counterfeit, the seeming righteousness; the produce of this, therefore, is vanity, even if it seems to be much. Take for me someone who possesses much produce according to the saying, but he himself possessing only those things ····· it is possible for him to desire and to be satisfied little by little, it is not ····· ····· ····· ····· ·· it is vain. For he is not able to consume these whole. --

150 darkness, and his zeal has become vain and his desire empty. In the abundance of goodness, those who eat it have multiplied. Suitably we take pleasure as goodness; for goods are indifferent things—some concerning the soul, some concerning the body, and some concerning external things. Things concerning the soul do not arouse so much pleasure as toil and sweat towards noble things. For things concerning the body and external things are filled with and productive of pleasure. If then someone has the things that arouse much pleasure, he has an "abundance of goodness," a reputed goodness, since also the things in which he takes pleasure seem to be good, though they are not truly and properly good. Therefore, nothing is good which does not make the one having it good. No good can exist with sin, but with health and strength and beauty there can be sin. No one sins with a good thing, but with health we sin. Therefore, health is not a good thing. Thus the problem was also shown by a syllogism. But is the spiritual interpretation mixed with the literal? The fact that many are zealous for some instruction and take great pleasure in this very "falsely called knowledge". In the abundance of this pleasure they are multiplied. Those who eat it seem to have some·····η̣ν̣···· the multitude takes hold of ····· ····· ····· ····· ····

151 and what courage is to the one from it -- the good things are more preferable than that which diminishes. because the beginning of seeing is with his eyes. We were saying that courage, properly speaking, is a state prepared for nobly bearing difficult things. For it has virtue with it and also judgment. For it is with prudence. For it has often been said that the virtues are connected to each other. In any case, he who has courage also has theoretical reason; even of what sort

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148 ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ὥστε οὕτω̣ς̣ κ̣ορέννυται ἀεὶ ἔχων τὸ θεραπεῦον τ̣ο`̣ δίψος. "ὁ πί νων", φησίν, "ἐκ τοῦ ὕδ̣ατος τούτου διψήσ̣ει πάλιν". εἰ μετὰ τὸ πιεῖν διψᾷ, ο̣υ᾿̣ κορέννυται. ἀλλὰ ἄκουε πάλιν ἑτέρᾳ διανοίᾳ τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα ῥήμ̣ατα̣· ἡ σοφία φησίν· "ὁ πίνων με πάλιν διψάσει καὶ ὁ τρώγων μ̣ε πάλιν πεινάσει". τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι· ἐπειδὴ ὁ πίνων τῆς σοφίας οὐ τὸ τέλειον αὐτ̣η῀̣ς ἄφνω πίνει, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁλίγον θεωρήματα προσλαμβάν̣ει κ̣αὶ θεραπεύει τὸ προ λαβὸν δίψος, πάλιν διψήσει οὐκ αὐτ̣ῶν ἐκε̣ι´̣νων̣ ὧν ἔπιεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μετ' ἐκεῖνα, ἱ´̣ν̣' ᾖ δύναμιν ἔχον τὸ λεχθὲν παρα´̣ τινι· "ἃ μεμάθηκας, διατή ρει ταῖς μελέταις, προσλάμβανει δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις". εἰ προσλαμβά νει, κορεσθεὶς πάλιν διψᾷ, πάλιν πεινᾷ. καὶ τίς ἠγάπησεν ἐν πλήθ̣ει αὐτοῦ γένημα; καί γε τοῦτο ματαιότης. ἔστιν ὅστις ἠγ̣άπη̣σε̣ν πλῆθ̣ο̣ς γενήματος. τὸ "τὶς" ὧδε τὸν λεγόμενον παρά τισιν ι᾿̣δίως̣ ποιὸν σημαίνει, ὃν ἕτεροι ἄτομον καλοῦ σιν. ἔδει δὲ κα̣τὰ γένη̣μα τ̣ὸ τῆς διοικούσης προνοίας̣ ἐν πλήθει̣ εἶ ναι και`̣ τοῦ γενήματος, ὃ τῷ α᾿̣νθρώπῳ ἡ π̣ρόνοια παρέχει, ἐπιθυμῆσαι. ····· ··· κεν ····αρομεν········ ····· ····· ····

149 οὐ περὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, περὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα. "ὁ σπείρων" οὖν "εἰς τ̣ὴν σάρ κα" πολλὰ σπείρει, τουτέστιν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος. ἔχομεν σάρκα, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῇ οὕτως χρᾶσθαι ὡς σαρκί, ὑπωπιάζειν αὐτήν, δουλαγωγεῖν. ὅταν δὲ προσπα´̣θωμεν τῇ σαρκί, καὶ προαίρεσιν σαρκίνην καὶ διάθεσιν κτώμεθα. ὁ εἰς τὴν σάρκα ταύτην σπείρων καρποὺς φέρειν ἀπωλεία̣ς. κατέιλεξεν τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ ἀπόστολος, ὡς ἔρις καὶ φαρμακίαι καὶ αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐρισχελίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἰσίν. ἐπερ· ο̣υ᾿̣ δὲ ἐννοῆσαι δυνάμεθα "πλῆθος δυνάμεως" ἐπαινετῶς; διὰ τὸ ματαίως τοῦτο σπουδάζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ γένημα ἐκεῖνο μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα-"ἐσκόρπισεν, ἔδωκεν τοῖς πένησιν· ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα"- εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ ἐπὶ αἱρετικῶν γνωμῶν λάβωμεν τὸ τοι οῦτο, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται "σπείρειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην", οὐ τὴν ἀληθινήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπίπλαστον̣, τὴν δοκοῦσαν δικαιοσύνην· τοῦτου τὸ γ̣ένημ̣α οὖν ματαιότης ἐστίν, κἂν πολὺ δοκῇ εἶναι. λαβέ μοι τινὰ κε κτημένον πολλὰ γενήματα κατὰ τὸ ῥητόν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκεῖνα ἔχοντα μόνα ····· ε᾿̣π̣ι̣θ̣υμη῀̣σαι αὐτ̣ὸν καὶ χορτάσαι κ̣ατ' ὀλίγον ἔξεστι̣ν, οὐκ ἔστιν ····· ····· ····· ····· ·· μάταιόν ἐστ̣ιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ´̣λο̣̣ν̣ ἀναλῶσαι ταῦτα δύναται. --

150 σκοτίαν, καὶ μάταια ἐκείνου ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ πόθος κενὸς γέγονεν. ἐν πλήθει ἀγαθοσύνης ἐπληθύνθησαν οἱ ἐσθίον τες αὐτήν. καταλλήλως ἀγαθοσύνην τὴν ἡδονὴν λαμβ̣άν̣ομεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδιάφορά ἐστιν τὰ ἀγαθά-τ̣ὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τ̣α`̣ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν οὐ τοσοῦτον ἡδονὴν ἐγείρει, ὅσον πόνον καὶ ἱδρῶτα πρὸς τὰ κα̣λ̣ά. τὰ γὰρ περὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἡδονῆς εἰσιν πεπληρωμένα καὶ ποιητικά. ἐάν τις ο̣ὐ῀̣ν ἔχῃ τὰ ἐγείροντα πολλὴν ἡδονήν, "πλῆθος ἀγαθο σύνης" ἔχει, νομιζομένην ἀγαθοσύνην, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐφ' οἷς ἡ´̣δεται, δο κεῖ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντα ἀληθῶς καὶ κυρίως ἀγαθά. οὐδὲν οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστι̣ν̣, ὃ μὴ ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν τὸν ἔχοντα. οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν σὺν ἁμαρτίᾳ εἶναι δ̣ύναται, σὺν ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἰσχύι καὶ εὐμορφίᾳ δ̣ύ ναται εἶναι ἁμαρτία. οὐδεὶς σὺν ἀγαθῷ ἁμαρτάνει, σὺν ὑγιείᾳ δὲ ἁμαρ τάνομεν. οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν ἡ ὑγιεία. ὧδε καὶ συλλογισμῷ ἐδείχθη τ̣ὸ πρό βλημ̣α. ἐπερ· μέμεικται ἡ ἀναγωγὴ τῷ ῥητῷ; τό, ὅτι πολλοὶ σπουδα´̣ζουσιν περὶ παίδευσίν τινα καὶ ἡ´̣δ̣ο̣νται πάνυ ἐπ' αὐτὴν τη`̣ν "ψευδώνυμον γνῶσιν". ἐν τῷ π̣λήθε̣ι τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύ της πλη̣θύνονται. οἱ ἐσθίοντες αὐτὴν δοκοῦσιν ἔχε̣ιν τι´̣·····η̣ν̣···· κατα λαμβάνε̣ι̣ τὸ πλῆθος ····· ····· ····· ····· ····

151ν καὶ τί ἀνδρεία τῷ παρ' αὐτῆς -- τὰ ἀγαθὰ αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν τ̣οῦ ἐλαττοῦντος. ὅτι ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ. ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἡ κυρίως̣ ἀνδρεία ἕξις ἐστὶν παρασκευαστι̣κὴ τ̣οῦ γενναίως φέρειν τὰ ἐπίπονα. ἔχει γὰρ ἀρετὴν σὺν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ κρίνει̣ν. σὺν φρο νήσει γὰρ ἔστιν. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐλέχθη, ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἔχονται ἀλ̣λήλων. πάντως ὁ ἔχων ἀν δρείαν ἔχει καὶ λόγον θεωρητικόν· κἂν ποιὰ