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more honorable; for that would no longer hold the conception of divinity, from which the appellation of the inferior is not absent; neither according to the ancient and the recent; for that which does not always exist is outside the conception of the divine; but the account of the Godhead is one and the same, since no particular property is reasonably found in any one, it is altogether necessary that the deluded fantasy about the multitude of gods be compressed into the confession of one Godhead. For if the good and the just, and the wise and the powerful were spoken of in the same way, and incorruptibility and eternity and every pious thought were confessed in the same manner, with every difference according to every account being taken away, the multitude of gods is of necessity also taken away from the dogma, as the sameness through all things leads the faith to the one.

1 But since the account of piety also knows how to see a certain distinction of hypostases within the unity of nature, so that our argument, in its battle against the Greeks, might not be carried over to Judaism, it is fitting again, with some skillful distinction, to correct the error concerning this as well. For not even by those outside our dogma is the divine conceived to be without reason; and this, being confessed by them, will sufficiently articulate our argument. For he who confesses that God is not without reason will surely agree that he who is not without reason has a reason. But indeed, the human reason is also spoken of homonymously. Therefore, if one should say that he conceives of the Word of God by analogy with our own, he will thus be led to the higher conception. For it is altogether necessary to believe that the Word is suitable to the nature, as are all other things. For a certain power and life and wisdom are seen in what is human; but one would not from the homonymy suppose such life or power or wisdom in God, but the significations of such names are also brought low to the measure of our nature. For since our nature is corruptible and weak, for this reason our life is short-lived, our power insubstantial, our word unstable. But in the case of the transcendent nature, everything said about it is elevated along with the majesty of what is contemplated. Therefore, even if the Word of God is spoken of, it will not be thought to have its subsistence in the impulse of the one speaking, passing away into non-existence in a similar manner to our own; but just as our nature, being mortal, has a mortal word, so the incorruptible and ever-abiding nature has an eternal and subsistent Word. If indeed this were to be confessed as a consequence, that the Word of God subsists eternally, it is altogether necessary to confess that the subsistence of the Word is in life. For it is not pious to think that the Word subsists without a soul, in the manner of stones. But if it subsists, being an intelligent and incorporeal reality, it certainly lives; but if it is separated from living, it is certainly not in subsistence either. But indeed, it has been shown to be impious for the Word of God to be non-subsistent. Therefore, it has been demonstrated as a consequence that this Word is to be contemplated in life. And since the nature of the Word is believed to be simple, as is likely, and shows no duplicity or composition in itself, one would no longer contemplate the Word as being in life by participation in life; for such a conception would not be free from composition, to say that one thing is in another; but it is altogether necessary, with its simplicity being confessed, to think that the Word is life-itself, not by participation in life. If therefore the Word lives, being life, it certainly also has the power of choice; for nothing among living things is without choice. And it is pious to reason, as a consequence, that this choice is also powerful. For if one should not confess the powerful, one will certainly establish the powerless. But indeed, the powerless is far from the conception of the divine. For nothing of what is unfitting is contemplated in the divine nature, and it is altogether necessary to confess that the power of the Word is as great as is its purpose, so that no mixture of opposites and concurrence may be contemplated in what is simple, with powerlessness and power being contemplated in the same purpose, if on the one hand something

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προτιμότερον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι θεότητος ὑπόληψιν σχοίη οὗ ἡ τοῦ χείρονος οὐκ ἄπεστι προσηγορία· μήτε κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ πρόσφατον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ὂν ἔξω τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖόν ἐστιν ὑπολήψεως· ἀλλ' εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς θεότητος λόγος, οὐδεμιᾶς ἰδιό τητος ἐν οὐδενὶ κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον εὑρισκομένης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα πρὸς μιᾶς θεότητος ὁμολογίαν συνθλιβῆναι τὴν πεπλανημένην περὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν θεῶν φαντασίαν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, τό τε σοφὸν καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ὡσαύτως λέγοιτο, ἥ τε ἀφθαρσία καὶ ἡ ἀιδιότης καὶ πᾶσα εὐσεβὴς διάνοια κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῖτο τρόπον, πάσης κατὰ πάντα λόγον διαφορᾶς ὑφαιρουμένης συνυφαιρεῖται κατ' ἀνάγκην τὸ τῶν θεῶν πλῆθος ἀπὸ τοῦ δόγματος, τῆς διὰ πάντων ταὐτότητος εἰς τὸ ἓν τὴν πίστιν περιαγούσης.

1 Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ τῆς εὐσεβείας λόγος οἶδέ τινα διάκρισιν ὑποστάσεων ἐν τῇ ἑνότητι τῆς φύσεως βλέπειν, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μάχῃ πρὸς τὸν Ἰουδαισμὸν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὑπενεχθείη, πάλιν προσήκει διαστολῇ τινὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦτο πλάνην ἐπανορθώσασθαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς δόγματος ἄλογον εἶναι τὸ θεῖον ὑπείληπται· τοῦτο δὲ παρ' ἐκείνων ὁμολογούμενον ἱκανῶς διαρθρώσει τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον. ὁ γὰρ ὁμολογῶν μὴ ἄλογον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν πάντως λόγον ἔχειν τὸν μὴ ἄλογον συγκαταθήσεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος ὁμωνύμως λέγεται λόγος. οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ὑπονοεῖν, οὕτω μεταχθήσεται πρὸς τὴν ὑψηλοτέραν ὑπόληψιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα κατάλληλον εἶναι πιστεύειν τῇ φύσει τὸν λόγον, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα. καὶ γὰρ δύναμίς τις καὶ ζωὴ καὶ σοφία περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον βλέπεται· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν τις ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας τοιαύτην καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ζωὴν ἢ τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τὴν σοφίαν ὑπονοήσειεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας μέτρον συνταπεινοῦνται καὶ αἱ τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεις. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ φθαρτὴ καὶ ἀσθενὴς ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις, διὰ τοῦτο ὠκύμορος ἡ ζωή, ἀνυπόστατος ἡ δύναμις, ἀπαγὴς ὁ λόγος. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὑπερκει μένης φύσεως τῷ μεγαλείῳ τοῦ θεωρουμένου πᾶν τὸ περὶ αὐτῆς λεγόμενον συνεπαίρεται. οὐκοῦν κἂν λόγος θεοῦ λέγηται, οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ τοῦ φθεγγομένου καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν νομισθήσεται, καθ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἡμετέρου μετα χωρῶν εἰς ἀνύπαρκτον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις ἐπίκηρος οὖσα καὶ ἐπίκηρον τὸν λόγον ἔχει, οὕτως ἡ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀεὶ ἑστῶσα φύσις ἀίδιον ἔχει καὶ ὑφεστῶτα τὸν λόγον. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ὁμολογηθείη τὸ ὑφεστάναι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ἀιδίως, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἐν ζωῇ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν. οὐ γὰρ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν λίθων ἀψύχως ὑφεστάναι τὸν λόγον εὐαγές ἐστιν οἴεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ ὑφέστηκε νοερόν τι χρῆμα καὶ ἀσώματον ὤν, ζῇ πάντως· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ζῇν κεχώρισται, οὐδὲ ἐν ὑποστάσει πάντως ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀσεβὲς ἀπεδείχθη τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ἀνυπόστατον εἶναι. οὐκοῦν συναπεδείχθη κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τὸ ἐν ζωῇ τοῦτον θεω ρεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον. ἁπλῆς δὲ τῆς τοῦ λόγου φύσεως κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι πεπιστευμένης καὶ οὐδεμίαν διπλόην καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ δεικνυούσης, οὐκέτ' ἄν τις κατὰ μετου σίαν ζωῆς τὸν λόγον ἐν ζωῇ θεωροίη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκτὸς εἴη συνθέσεως ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόληψις, τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέγειν εἶναι· ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, τῆς ἁπλότητος ὁμολογουμένης, αὐτοζωὴν εἶναι τὸν λόγον οἴεσθαι, οὐ ζωῆς μετουσίαν. εἰ οὖν ζῇ ὁ λόγος ὁ ζωὴ ὤν, καὶ προαιρετικὴν πάντως δύναμιν ἔχει· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπροαίρετον τῶν ζώντων ἐστί. τὴν δὲ προαίρεσιν ταύτην καὶ δυνατὴν εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον εὐσεβές ἐστι λογίζεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μή τις τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμολογοίη, τὸ ἀδύνατον πάντως κατασκευάσει. ἀλλὰ μὴν πόρρω τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ὑπολήψεώς ἐστι τὸ ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων περὶ τὴν θείαν θεωρεῖται φύσιν, ἀνάγκῃ δὲ πᾶσα τοσαύτην εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν τοῦ λόγου τὴν δύναμιν, ὅση ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ πρό θεσις, ἵνα μή τις μίξις τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ συνδρομὴ περὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν θεωροῖτο, ἀδυναμίας τε καὶ δυνάμεως ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ προθέσει θεωρουμένων, εἴπερ τὸ μέν τι