And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them; but among those who disbelieved the words of the prophets, and defined what seemed right to them by their own conjecture concerning God and creation, there is much disagreement both with one another and with themselves concerning existing things and their principle in respect to substance, number, motion, and limit, as is shown from the first book of Aristotle's *Physics*, besides the fact that he speaks no truth concerning the matters he has undertaken to define. 1. From the first book of Aristotle's *Physics*. For there is always something that is a substrate, from which what comes to be comes to be, for example plants and animals from seed. And things that come to be simply, come to be some by change of shape, like a statue, some by addition, like things that grow, some by subtraction, like the Hermes from the stone, some by combination, like a house, and some by alteration, like things that are changed in respect to their matter. It is clear that all things that come to be in this way come to be from substrates. And this is twofold: for it is either the substrate or the opposite. I mean that the unmusical is the opposite, while the man is the substrate. If that which sows the seed is first and that which comes to be from the seed is later, and both are generated, then while the seed is the substrate for the generation of that which comes to be from the seed, it is not possible for the seed to be the substrate for the generation of that which sows; therefore, animals and plants do not always come to be from seed. Further, if each is a generated animal—that which sows and that which comes from the seed—and each is not from the same substrate, but one is from the seed, and the other is not from the seed, how is it not false that animals always come to be from seed? And the same argument applies to plants. Further, if the principle of that which comes to be from seed is that which sows, and this is unknown and undefined in Aristotle's treatise *Physics*, for what purpose was this treatise written, when the principle of the first animal and plant is unknown? For ignorance of the things from the principle follows from ignorance of the principle. If the animal that comes to be from seed comes to be according to nature, it is clear that the same animal, when it comes to be, but not from seed, does not come to be according to nature. Let the Aristotelians say, then, according to what does the animal that does not come to be according to nature come to be. Further, if a difference is granted in the generation of the animal—that which is from seed and according to nature, and that which is not from seed and not according to nature—it is necessary for generation to be finite, how then do the Greeks say that animals and plants are co-unoriginated with God, things that have come to be according to nature, which cannot be contemporary with the first animal and plant? Further, if everything that comes to be is always composite, how have you distinguished the mode of things that come to be by combination by its own modal difference from the other modes of generation? For if every generated thing is com

Καὶ περὶ τούτων πάντες οἱ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς πάντας ἀν θρώπους ἀποσταλέντες προφῆται ταὐτὰ φρονοῦντες διετέ λουν, καὶ διαφωνία ἐν αὐτοῖς γέγονεν οὐδεμία· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀπιστήσαντας μὲν τοῖς τῶν προφητῶν λόγοις, οἰκείῳ δὲ εἰ κασμῷ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ κτίσεως τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένους, πολλή τίς ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαφωνία ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς τούτων ἀρχῆς κατ' οὐσίαν τε καὶ ἀριθμὸν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πέρας, καθὼς δείκνυται ἐκ τοῦ πρώ του λόγου τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως Ἀριστοτέλους, μετὰ τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτὸν ἀληθεύειν περὶ ὧν διείληφε διορίσασθαι πραγ μάτων. α. Ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου λόγου τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὃ ὑπόκειται, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γινόμε νον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἐκ σπέρματος. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γινόμενα ἁπλῶς τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίσει, οἷον ἀνδριάς, τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, οἷον τὰ αὐξανόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ Ἑρμῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει, οἷον οἰκία, τὰ δὲ ἀλ λοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Πάντα δὲ τὰ οὕτω γινόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὑποκειμένων γίνεται. Καὶ τοῦτο διττόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὸ ἄμουσον, ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Eἰ πρῶτόν ἐστι τὸ σπεῖρον σπέρμα καὶ ὕστερον τὸ ἐκ σπέρματος γιγνόμενον καὶ γενητὰ ἀμφότερα, τῇ μὲν γενέσει τοῦ κειμένου ἐκ σπέρματος γιγνομένου ὑπόκειται τὸ σπέρμα, τῇ δὲ γενέσει τοῦ σπείραντος ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ σπέρμα οὐ δυνα τόν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀεὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἐκ σπέρματος γίνεται. Ἔτι εἰ ζῶον γενητὸν ἑκάτερον, τὸ σπεῖρον καὶ τὸ ἐκ σπέρμα τος γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ θάτερον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος, ἕτερον δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος, πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ ἀεὶ τὰ ζῶα γίνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος; Καὶ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Ἔτι εἰ ἀρχὴ μὲν τοῦ ἐκ σπέρματος γιγνομένου ἐστὶ τὸ σπεῖρον, ἄγνωστον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδιόριστον ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροά σεως Ἀριστοτέλους, τίνος ἕνεκεν ἐγράφη αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀγνοουμένης τοῦ πρώτου ζώου τε καὶ φυτοῦ; Ἀκο λουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ ἀγνωσίᾳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡ ἀγνωσία τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Eἰ τὸ ζῶον, τὸ ἐκ σπέρματος γιγνόμενον, γίνεται δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζώου γιγνομένου μέν, μὴ ἐκ σπέρ ματος δέ, οὐ γίνεται κατὰ φύσιν. Eἰπάτωσαν οὖν οἱ Ἀριστο τελικοί, κατὰ τί γίνεται τὸ ζῶον τὸ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνό μενον. Ἔτι εἰ διαφορᾶς κατὰ γένεσιν τοῦ ζώου δοθείσης, τοῦ τε ἐκ σπέρματος καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐκ σπέρματος μήτε κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένου, ἀνάγκη πεπερασμένην εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν, πῶς οὖν συνάναρχα λέγουσιν Ἕλληνες τά τε ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τῷ θεῷ, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότα, τὰ μήτε τῷ πρώτῳ ζώῳ τε καὶ φυτῷ σύγχρονα εἶναι δυνάμενα; Ἔτι εἰ ἅπαν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ σύνθετόν ἐστι, πῶς τὸν τρόπον τῶν κατὰ σύν θεσιν γινομένων τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοῦ τρόπου διαφορᾷ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῆς γενέσεως τρόπων διέστειλας; Eἰ γὰρ ἅπαν γενητὸν σύν