OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

power, which is absurd; for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would be envious; which it is impious even to imagine. Therefore it is necessary for the same one, remaining in the same state, to do the same things. A refutation of the response not correctly made. Sufficient indeed for the refutation of the inconsistent argument was the argument itself, when understood. For by saying at the beginning of the argument that there is no greatest evil, but at the end of the argument that it is impious and from imagination alone to think unworthy things concerning God, how is the greatest evil not being introduced with discrimination, which was cast out indiscriminately by the respondent? And if to such impiety from imagination alone the act of speaking is also added, the impiety becomes greater; but if with speaking also writing, the impiety of necessity possesses every excess of evil. And if these things are so, and in all things said and written unworthily concerning God, or even only imagined, there is an impiety destructive of the glory of God, then from ignorance of God comes the greatest evil among men. But since it seemed good to your piety that the inconsistency of the argument be refuted by us also in writing, for this reason I write briefly the things that are subjoined. For to refute a manifest falsehood at greater length is tedious both to the one writing and to the one reading. The respondent posited two kinds of the greatest evil in his response, and three kinds of ignorance of God; the former according to the Manichaeans, the latter according to the respondent himself. And of the two kinds of the greatest evil, he said one was according to substance, the other according to the activity of that which is according to substance; and of the three kinds of ignorance of God, he said one was according to forgetfulness, the other according to an unbelieving nature, and the other according to a good gift. And making a brief refutation, he spoke both of those according to the Manichaeans and of those according to himself, at one time refuting the opinion of the Manichaeans, when he says: "There is no greatest evil; but if one should suppose a greatest evil, another principle will be found opposite to God, which is what the Manichaeans, speaking wrongly, say"; at another time, when he says: "To be ignorant of the truly existing God is not from any other thing but from its own forgetfulness that the soul suffers"; in the former refuting the greatest evil according to substance, and in the latter that according to activity. And refuting also the kinds of ignorance of God which he himself posited, he also says: "Nor is there any ignorance at all concerning God; for all confess that God exists by a common notion." If, then, there is no ignorance at all concerning God, it is clear that it is false that "To be ignorant of God happens to men either according to forgetfulness or according to an unbelieving nature or according to a good gift." But if he speaks of a common notion of all, which is refuted by the specific notion of each of the heterodox heresies, not even so will there be knowledge of God in all. But we posited in the question neither the greatest evil according to the Manichaeans nor the ignorance of God according to the respondent himself, but we spoke of the greatest evil conceptually, the false-

δύναμις, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· τὸ γὰρ ἔγχρονον φθαρτόν. Eἰ δέ, δυ νάμενος καὶ πάλαι κωλῦσαι τὸ μέγιστον οὕτω κακόν, οὐκ ἐκώ λυσε, φθονερὸς ἂν εἴη· ὅπερ ἀσεβὲς καὶ φαντάζεσθαι. ∆εῖ οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένοντα τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. Ἔλεγχος τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐκ ὀρθῶς γεγενημένης. Ἱκανὸς μὲν ἦν εἰς ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἀσυστάτου λόγου αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος νοούμενος. Τῷ γὰρ λέγειν ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τοῦ λόγου μὴ εἶναι μέγιστον κακόν, ἐν τῷ τέλει δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἀσεβὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐκ μόνης φαντασίας τὸ τὰ ἀνάξια περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι κεκριμένως εἰσαγόμενον τὸ μέγιστον κακόν, τὸ ἀκρί τως ἐκβληθὲν παρὰ τοῦ ἀποκριναμένου; Eἰ δὲ προστεθείη τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐκ μόνης φαντασίας ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ τὸ λέγειν, μείζων γίνεται ἡ ἀσέβεια· εἰ δὲ σὺν τῷ λέγειν καὶ τὸ γράφειν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πᾶσαν κακίας ὑπερβολὴν ἡ ἀσέβεια ἔχουσα. Eἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀναξίως περὶ θεοῦ λεγομένοις τε καὶ γραφομένοις ἢ καὶ μόνον φανταζομένοις ἀσέ βεια καθαιρετικὴ τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀγνοίας θεοῦ τὸ μέγιστον κακὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἔδοξε τῇ σῇ θεοσεβείᾳ τὸ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐγγράφως ἐλεγχθῆναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἀσύστατον, διὰ τοῦτο ἐν συντόμῳ γράφω τὰ ὑποτε ταγμένα. Τὸ γὰρ διὰ πλειόνων ἐλέγξαι πρόδηλον ψεῦδος ναρ κῶδες καὶ τῷ γράφοντι καὶ τῷ ἀναγινώσκοντι. ∆ύο εἴδη τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ ἔθηκεν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀποκρίσει, καὶ τρία εἴδη τῆς ἀγνοίας τοῦ θεοῦ· ἐκεῖνα μὲν κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους, ταῦτα δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον. Καὶ τῶν δύο εἰδῶν τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ τὸ μὲν ἔλεγε κατ' οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν· τῶν δὲ τριῶν εἰδῶν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγνοίας τὸ μὲν ἔλεγε κατὰ λήθην, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄπιστον φύσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀγαθὴν δόσιν. Ποιῶν δὲ σύντομον τὴν ἀναίρεσιν καὶ τῶν κατὰ Μανι χαίους καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἔφασκε, ποτὲ μὲν ἀναιρῶν τῶν Μανιχαίων τὴν δόξαν, ὅταν φησί· Μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν· εἰ δέ τις ὑπόθοιτο μέγιστον κακόν, εὑρεθήσεται ἑτέρα ἀρχὴ ἐναντία τῷ θεῷ, ὅπερ οἱ Μανιχαῖοι κακῶς λέγοντες λέ γουσι· ποτὲ δέ, ὅταν φησί· Τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας λήθης ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχει· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀναιρῶν τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν μέγιστον κακόν, ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν. Ἀναιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῆς ἀγνοίας τοῦ θεοῦ, ἃ αὐτὸς ἔθηκε, καί φησιν· Oὐδέ ἐστιν ὅλως ἄγνοια περὶ θεοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς ὁμολογοῦσι κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ. Eἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἄγνοια περὶ θεοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι ψευδὲς τὸ Ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεὸν συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ κατὰ λήθην ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἄπιστον φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀγαθὴν δό σιν. Eἰ δὲ κοινὴν ἔννοιαν πάντων λέγει τὴν κατὰ τὴν εἰδικὴν ἔννοιαν ἑκάστης τῶν κακοδόξων αἱρέσεως ἀναιρουμένην, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται γνῶσις θεοῦ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὔτε τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδὲ τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον ἄγνοιαν θεοῦ ἐθήκαμεν ἐν τῇ ἐρωτήσει, ἀλλὰ μέγιστον κακὸν κατ' ἔννοιαν εἴπομεν, τὸ κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ψεῦ