the human substance taken from Mary the Theotokos? 6. If the Father is impassible and immortal God, and the Son incarnate, who is Christ, is impassible and passible, immortal and mortal, having the impassible and the immortal according to the nature of the Godhead, and having suffering and death according to the nature of humanity, being one and the same, how can I not speak of the two natures in him, the one receptive of suffering and death, and the other not receptive of these? But if you too say that he received death and sufferings in the flesh, you speak rightly; but I ask if the flesh is the nature of his Godhead or another according to substance; and if it is the same as the Godhead, | you dogmatize theopaschism to us; but if it is other in nature, yet hypostatically united to God the Word, why do you not confess the two natures in the one Christ? 7. Every hypostasis is considered in a community, that is, in a substance; and if the hypostasis be simple, the community is also simple; but if the hypostasis be composite, the community will also be composite, or the composite hypostasis will be in different communities. For example, the hypostasis of the Word is simple, simple also is the community which <he and> the Father and the Spirit have; the hypostasis of any man is composite, composite also is the community considered in all men in common. For every man is a rational mortal animal. But if we should not wish to think of the composite community, a certain man will in any case be found in two communities, the soul in community with the other souls, and the body in community with the other bodies. But in the case of Christ, the hypostasis, being composite, is not considered in a composite community. For no other Christ, being in truth God and man, is composite, except the one born of the virgin Theotokos. If therefore he has no composite community, it certainly remains that he is considered in different communities, in the community of the Father and the Holy Spirit, according to which he is God, and in the community with all men, to whom he is similar according to his being man. And in all these we say the community is the substance, that is, the nature; for these exist in common for all those considered | under the same species, not existing more in one and less in another. 8. It is a property of the ultimate union to have identity and unity and otherness, for instance the hypostatic union; for this, as in the case of soul and body, has otherness of substance and identity of hypostasis. For the substance of the soul is other and the substance of the flesh is other, even if man is constituted one animal. And no one would say that by nature the soul is mortal, or the flesh intelligible; and when the flesh is weak, we say the soul is strong. But the man composed of both is one, and in the one, each alike both is and is understood. 9. If substance is that which exists equally in all the particulars that are brought under the same species, and happens to be non-existent apart from the particulars, do those who say "from two substances," [mean] that each exists particularly in certain individuals? Is the union then from non-existents? But if [it exists] particularly in certain individuals, did the two natures, being considered in two persons, come together, which is [the view] of Nestorius and of those who say that Christ was a mere man before the union? But we do not speak of Christ in two natures in this way, but that it is possible for two or more natures to be considered in one and the same person, when their union is hypostatic. For if they were divided, each would certainly be conceived in a person with its own hypostasis. 10. "One" is said not only of simple hypostases, that is, persons, but also of composite ones. What then will be the difference between the simple and the composite, if we do not recognize the one in one substance, and the other in two substances? Therefore, we neither divide from one another the

θεοτόκου Μαρίας ληφθεῖσαν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐσίαν; 6. Εἰ ἔστιν ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαθὴς θεὸς καὶ ἀθάνατος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σαρκωθείς, ὅ ἐστι Χριστός, ἐστὶν ἀπαθὴς καὶ παθητός, ἀθάνατος καὶ θνητός, τὸ μὲν ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀθάνατον ἔχων κατὰ τὴν τῆς θεότητος φύσιν, τὸ δὲ πάθος καὶ τὸν θάνατον ἔχων κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητος φύσιν, εἷς ὢν καὶ ὁ αὐτός, πῶς μὴ εἴπω τὰς δύο φύσεις ἐν αὐτῷ, τὴν μὲν δεκτικὴν πάθους καὶ θανάτου, τὴν δὲ τούτων ἀνεπίδεκτον; Εἰ δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ὑμεῖς σαρκὶ δέξασθαι αὐτόν φατε, ὀρθῶς μὲν λέγετε· ζητῶ δὲ εἰ ἡ σὰρξ φύσις ἐστὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ ἢ ἑτέρα κατ' οὐσίαν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ θεότητι, | θεοπάθειαν ἡμῖν δογματίζετε· εἰ δ' ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει, ἡνωμένη μέντοι τῷ θεῷ λόγῳ ἐνυποστάτως, τί τὰς δύο φύσεις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖτε ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ Χριστῷ; 7. Πᾶσα ὑπόστασις ἐν κοινότητι, ὅ ἐστιν οὐσίᾳ, θεωρεῖται· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ὑπόστασις ἁπλῆ εἴη, καὶ ἡ κοινότης ἁπλῆ· εἰ δὲ σύνθετος ἡ ὑπόστασις εἴη, καὶ ἡ κοινότης σύνθετος ἔσται ἢ ἐν διαφόροις κοινότησιν ἡ σύνθετος ὑπόστασις ἔσται. Οἷον ἁπλῆ ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ λόγου, ἁπλῆ καὶ ἡ κοινότης ἣν ἔχει <αὐτὸς καὶ> ὁ πατὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα· σύνθετος ἡ οὗτινος ἀνθρώπου ὑπόστασις, σύνθετος καὶ ἡ κοινότης ἡ ἐν πᾶσι κοινῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεωρουμένη. Πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τὴν σύνθετον κοινότητα βουληθείημεν νοῆσαι, πάντως ὁ δεῖνα ἄνθρωπος ἐν δύο κοινότησιν εὑρεθήσεται, ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ ἐν κοινότητι τῇ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ψυχάς, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐν κοινότητι τῇ πρὸς τἄλλα σώματα. Ἐπὶ δὲ Χριστοῦ ἡ ὑπόστασις σύνθετος οὖσα οὐ θεωρεῖται ἐν συνθέτῳ κοινότητι. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄλλος Χριστὸς θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὑπάρ- χων ταῖς ἀληθείαις σύνθετός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐκ παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου τεχθείς. Εἰ οὖν οὐδεμίαν σύνθετον ἔχει κοινότητα, πάντως ὑπολείπεται ἐν διαφόροις κοινότησι θεωρεῖσθαι, ἐν τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος κοινότητι, καθ' ἥν ἐστι θεός, καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους κοινότητι, οἷς ὅμοιός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπος. Κοινότητα δὲ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι τούτοις φαμὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅ ἐστι φύσιν· αὗται γὰρ κοινῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος | ἐνθεωρουμένοις ὑπάρχουσιν, οὐ τῷ μὲν πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἔλαττον ἐνυπάρχουσαι. 8. Τῆς ἄκρας ἑνώσεως ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ ἔχειν ταὐτότητα καὶ ἑνότητα καὶ ἑτερότητα, οἷον ἡ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις· αὕτη γάρ, ὡς ἐπὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἑτερότητα οὐσίας καὶ ταὐτότητα ὑποστάσεως ἔχει. Ἑτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία καὶ ἑτέρα ἡ τῆς σαρκός, κἂν ἓν ζῷον ἀποτελεσθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι φύσει τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν θνητήν, τὴν δὲ σάρκα νοητήν· καὶ ἀσθενούσης δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν λέγομεν. Εἷς δὲ ὁ ἑκατέρων συγκείμενος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ὁμοίως ἑκάτερόν ἐστί τε καὶ νοεῖται. 9. Εἰ οὐσία ἐστὶ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀνα-γομένων ἐξ ἴσου πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσα, δίχα δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἀνύπαρκτος οὖσα τυγχάνει, οἱ λέγοντες ἐκ δύο οὐσιῶν, ἆρ' ἔν τισι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἑκάστην ἰδιαζόντως ἐνυπάρχειν; Ἆρ' ἐξ ἀνυπάρκτων ἡ σύνοδος; Εἰ δ' ἔν τισι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδια-ζόντως, ἆρ' αἱ δύο φύσεις ἐν δύο θεωρούμεναι προσώποις συνῆλθον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ Νεστορίου καὶ τῶν ψιλὸν λεγόντων εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν ἄνθρωπον πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως; Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτω φαμὲν ἐν δύο φύσεσι τὸν Χριστόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐνδέχεται δύο καὶ πλείονας φύσεις ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ θεωρεῖσθαι προσώπῳ, ὅτ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ ἕνωσις ἐνυπόστατος. Εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν διῃρημέναι, πάντως ἑκάστη ἐν ἰδιοϋποστάτῳ νοηθήσεται προσώπῳ. 10. Οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ὑποστάσεων ἤγουν προσώπων τὸ ἓν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνθέτων. Ποία οὖν ἔσται διαφορὰ ἁπλοῦ τε καὶ συνθέτου, εἰ μὴ τὸ μὲν ἐν μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν δύο οὐσίαις γνωρίζομεν; Οὔτε τοίνυν διαιροῦμεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰς