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having discerned and rejected the proposed [doctrine] of wills, of those who say that will and wishing, and counsel, and choice and opinion are identical to one another; as well as power and opinion and prudence, differing from each other only in their names; and that the will of both God and of the saints will become one; and because of this, of those who affirm and insist that Christ has one deliberative will; you were not content with yourself for the confirmation of what was well judged, on account of your innate poverty of spirit; but you deigned to take me also, who was brought up in simplicity, as a fellow-voter for the things well known to you. Which I have come to do, even if it is rash, having been conquered by the reward of obedience. And I will make the writing on each of these in sequence, concise, and as it were definitive; not inscribing my own words—for how could I, being poor in these things?—but having collected those labored on by others concerning these things; so that we might know how both of these differ from one another; I mean, in name and in reality.

CONCERNING NATURAL WILL, THAT IS, VOLITION

For a natural will, that is, volition, is an appetitive power of that which exists according to nature; and it is comprehensive of all the properties essentially present in a nature. For the substance, being naturally held together by this, desires to be and to live and to move according to sense and intellect, yearning for its own natural and 15Α_014 full being. For nature is constituted as willing of itself and of all such things as are naturally constituted to establish it; being appetitively attached to the principle of its being, according to which it both is and has come to be. 0013 Therefore others defining this natural will say that it is a rational and vital appetite; and choice, a deliberative appetite for the things that are up to us. Therefore volition is not choice; since volition is a certain simple appetite, both rational and vital; but choice is a coming together of appetite and counsel and judgment. For having an appetite, we first deliberate; and having deliberated, we judge; and having judged, we choose what has been shown by the judgment to be better over what is worse; and the one is related only to natural things; but the other, only to things that are up to us and able to be done by us. Therefore volition is not choice.

CONCERNING WISHING

But neither is wishing choice. For wishing is an appetite of the imagination for things that are up to us and not up to us; that is, formed only by the mind. And the appetite of the imagination is of the intellectual faculty alone without the deliberative reason concerning things up to us; or some kind of natural will. But choice is a deliberative appetite for things up to us that can be done. Therefore, even the reasoning of the definition alone, having shown the difference between these things, would have been sufficient to stop the contentions of those who dispute excessively; and who clearly contradict—I do not know how to say it euphemistically—the things that are well known. But since those who love to inquire somehow desire to understand the things sought through more [arguments], we will speak in another way. Those who have written on these things say: To choose is not suitable in all cases where it is suitable to wish. For we say that we wish to be healthy and to be rich and 15Α_016 to be made immortal; but we do not say that we choose to be rich and to be healthy and to be made immortal; since wishing is for things possible and for things impossible; but choice is only for possible things, and for things able to be done by us. And again, wishing is of the end; but choice is of the things that lead to the end. Therefore, they say the object of wish is the end, for example, health; but the object of deliberation is what leads to the end, for example, the means of health. Therefore, they say that wishing has the same analogy to choice 0016 as the object of wish has to the object of deliberation; since we choose only these things, which we think can be brought about by us.

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θελημάτων προταθέν διαγνούς, καί παρωσάμενος, ταυτόν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι φαμένων θέλημα καί βούλησιν, καί βουλήν, καί προαίρεσιν καί γνώμην· ἐξουσίαν τε καί δόξαν καί φρόνησιν, μόνοις ἀλλήλων, διαφέροντα τοῖς ὀνόμᾳσι· τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καί τῶν ἁγίων ἕν θέλημα γενήσεσθαι· καί διά τοῦτο βεβαιουμένων τόν Χριστόν ἕν θέλημα προαιρετικόν ἔχειν καί διατεινομένων· οὐκ ἠρκέσθης σαυτῷ πρός τήν τοῦ καλῶς κριθέντος βεβαίωσιν, διά τήν σύντροφον πτωχείαν τοῦ πνεύματος· ἀλλά κἀμέ τόν ἰδιωτείᾳ συντεθραμμένον σύμψηφον λαβεῖν τῶν ἐγνωσμένων σοι καλῶς κατηξίωσας. Ὅπερ ποιήσων ἥκω· κἄν προπετές· τῷ τῆς εὐπειθείας μισθῷ νενικημένος. Ἑκάστου δέ τούτων καθ᾿ εἱρμόν τήν γραφήν ποιήσομαι σύντομον, καί οἷον ὁριστικήν· οὐκ ἐμούς ἐγχαράττων λόγους· πῶς γάρ, ὁ τούτων πενόμενος, ἀλλά τούς περί τούτων ἄλλοις πονηθέντας ἐρανισάμενος· ἴνα γνῶμεν ὡς ἀμφοῖν· διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήτων ταῦτα· λέγω δέ κλήσει καί πράγματι.

ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΟΣ, ΗΓΟΥΝ ΘΕΛΗΣΕΩΣ

Θέλημα γάρ εἶναι φυσικόν, ἤγουν θέλησιν, δύναμιν τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτικήν· καί τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικήν πάντων ἰδιωμάτων. Τούτῳ γάρ συνεχομένη φυσικῶς ἡ οὐσία, τοῦ τε εἶναι καί ζῇν καί κινεῖσθαι κατ᾿ αἴσθησίν τε καί νοῦν ὀρέγεται, τῆς οἰκείας ἐφιεμένη φυσικῆς καί 15Α_014 πλήρους ὀντότητος. Θελητική γάρ ἑαυτῆς, καί τῶν ὅσα σύστασιν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι πέφυκε, καθέστηκεν ἡ φύσις· τῷ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῆς λόγῳ, καθ᾿ ὅν ἔστι τε καί γέγονεν ὀρεκτικῶς ἐπηρτημένη. 0013 ∆ιόπερ ἕτεροι τοῦτο τό φυσικόν ὁριζόμενοι· θέλημά φασιν εἶναι, ὄρεξιν λογικήν τε καί ζωτικήν· τήν δέ προαίρεσιν, ὄρεξιν βουλευτικήν τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν προαίρεσις ἡ θέλησις· εἴπερ ἡ μέν θέλησις ἁπλῆ τις ὄρεξίς ἐστι, λογική τε καί ζωτική· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ὀρέξεως καί βουλῆς καί κρίσεως σύνοδος. Ὀρεγόμενοι γάρ πρότερον βουλευόμεθα· καί βουλευσάμενοι, κρίνομεν· καί κρίναντες, προαιρούμεθα τοῦ χείρονος τό δειχθέν ἐκ τῆς κρίσεως κρεῖττον· καί ἡ μέν, μόνον ἤρτηται τῶν φυσικῶν· ἡ δέ, μόνων τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν θέλησις ἡ προαίρεσις.

ΠΕΡΙ ΒΟΥΛΗΣΕΩΣ

Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις. Βούλησις μέν γάρ ἐστιν ὄρεξις φανταστική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν καί οὐκ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· τουτέστι μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ μορφουμένη. Ἡ δέ ὄρεξις φανταστική, μόνης ἐστί τῆς διανοητικῆς δυνάμεως ἄνευ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ λόγου τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· ἤ ποιά φυσική θέλησις. Ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ὄρεξις βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν. Ἤρκει μεν οὖν καί μόνος ὁ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς λόγος, δείξας τήν τούτων διαφοράν, παῦσαι φιλονεικίας τούς περιττῶς φιλολογοῦντας· καί τοῖς καλῶς ἐγνωσμἐνοις, οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως εὐφήμως εἰπεῖν, σαφῶς ἀντιλέγοντας. Ἐπειδή δέ ποθοῦσί πως οἱ φιλοπευστοῦντες διά πλειόνων ἐπιστῆναι τοῖς ζητουμένοις, ἐροῦμεν καί ἄλλως. Φασίν οἱ περί τούτων διειληφότες. Οὐ πᾶσιν οἷς ἁρμόζει τό προαιρεῖσθαι, πάντως ἁρμόζειν καί τό βούλεσθαι. Βούλεσθαι μέν γάρ ὑγιαίνειν καί πλουτεῖν καί 15Α_016 ἀθανατισθῆναι φαμεν· προαιρεῖσθαι δέ πλουτεῖν καί ὑγιαίνειν καί ἀθανατισθῆναι, οὐ λέγομεν· ἐπειδή ἡ μέν βούλησις, καί ἐπί τῶν δυνατῶν καί ἐπί τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ἐπί μόνων δυνατῶν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γενέσθαι δυναμένων. Καί πάλιν, ἡ μέν βούλησις, τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, τῶν πρός τό τέλος. Τέλος οὖν εἶναι φασι τό βουλητόν· οἶον, τήν ὑγίειαν· πρός τό τέλος, δέ, τό βουλευτόν· οἶον, τόν τῆς ὑγιείας τόπον. Τήν αὐτήν οὖν ἀναλογίαν ἥν ἔχει τό βουλητόν πρός τό βουλευτόν, ἔχειν τήν βούλησίν φασι 0016 πρός τήν προαίρεσιν· εἴπερ ταῦτα μόνα προαιρούμεθα, ἅ δι᾿ ἡμῶν οἰόμεθα δύνασθαι γενέσθαι.