IX, q. 2, a. 1[2]
Utrum in Christo sit una hypostasis tantum. Ad primum sic proceditur.
"Whether there is only one hypostasis in Christ."
Videtur quod in Christo sint plures hypostases.
It seems that there are many hypostases in Christ.
Unio enim animae ad corpus praesupponitur ad assumptionem; quia Christus humanitatem
sive humanam naturam assumpsit, quae, cum sit forma totius, dicit aliquid compositum
ex anima et corpore. Sed anima et corpus unita faciunt hypostasim hominis. Ergo
hypostasis in humana natura praeintelligitur assumptioni. Sed omne quod praeintelligitur
assumptioni, potest dici esse assumptum. Ergo hypostasis Verbi assumpsit hypostasim
hominis...; et sic sunt duae hypostases in Christo.
1. For the assumption presupposes the union of the soul to the body, because
Christ assumed his humanity or a human nature, which, since it is the form of
a whole designates something composed from a soul and a body; but the united
soul and body produce the hypostasis of a man. Therefore, a hypostasis in a
human nature is presupposed in the assumption; but everything that the assumption
presupposes can be called assumed; therefore, the hypostasis of the Word assumed
the hypostasis of a man. ["The thing assuming is not the thing assumed", according
to Boethius. Therefore, the hypostasis of man and the hypostasis of the Word
differ in Christ]; and thus there are two hypostases there.
Praeterea, corpus quod praeintelligitur assumptioni, est assumptibile. Sed corpus
non est assumptibile nisi ut unitum animae rationali: non enim dicitur corpus
inanimatum esse assumptibile. Ergo unio animae et corporis praeintelligitur
ad assumptionem humanae naturae; et sic idem quod prius.
2. Further, the body, which the assumption presupposes, is assumable: but the
body is not assumable except as united to a rational soul; for an inanimate
body is not said to be assumable. Therefore, the union of the soul to the body
is presupposed to the assumption of human nature; and thus the same conclusion
as the first objection follows.
Praeterea, medium unionis praesupponitur ad unionem. Sed gratia est medium unionis
humanae naturae ad divinam personam, unde dicitur gratia unionis. Ergo praesupponitur
ad unionem. Gratia autem non potest intelligi nisi in anima; anima autem non
intelligitur esse antequam corpori uniatur: quia creando infunditur, et infundendo
creatur. Ergo oportet praeintelligi unionem animae cum corpore, ad unionem humanae
naturae cum divina; et sic idem quod prius.
3. The medium of the union is presupposed to the union; but grace is the medium
of the union of the human nature to the divine person, hence it is called the
grace of union; therefore, it is presupposed to the union. But grace cannot
be understood except in a soul, nor is a soul understood to exist before being
united to a body, because "by being created it is infused and by being infused
it is created". Therefore, it is necessary to understand the union of the soul
with the body before the union of the human nature with the divine. Thus, we
get the same objection as before.
Praeterea, humanitas est quaedam forma substantialis. Omnis autem forma substantialis
requirit aliquid quod per ipsam informetur. Non autem potest dici quod hypostasis
vel suppositum aeternum informetur per aliquam formam creatam. Ergo oportet
in Christo ponere aliquod suppositum vel hypostasim creatam, quae humanitate
informetur; et sic in Christo erunt duae hypostases: hypostasis scilicet Verbi,
et hypostasis hominis.
4. Further, Humanity is a certain substantial form; but every substantial form
requires something that is informed through it. Now it cannot be said that the
eternal hypostasis or suppositum is informed through some created form. Therefore
it is necessary to posit some suppositum or created hypostasis in Christ which
may be informed by the humanity; and thus there are two hypostases in Christ,
namely, the hypostasis of the Word and the hypostasis of the man.
Sed contra. Ea quae sunt ad invicem disparata, non praedicantur de se invicem,
nisi per hoc quod conveniunt in uno supposito; sicut dicimus quod album est
dulce, propter unitatem subiecti. Sed divina natura et humana sunt naturae penitus
disparatae; praedicantur autem de se invicem in concreto; dicimus enim, Deus
est homo, et homo est Deus. Ergo est ibi unum suppositum tantum, et una hypostasis.
To the contrary, (1) those things which are disparate from one another are not
predicated of one another, unless they belong to one suppositum, just as we
say that a white thing is sweet on account of the unity of the subject; but
the divine nature and the human nature are utterly disparate natures, but they
are predicated of one another in the concrete (in
concreto). For we say "God is man", and "Man is God"; therefore, there
is only one suppositum and one hypostasis there.
Si dicatur, quod praedicatur de se invicem propter hoc quod conveniunt in una
persona, non per hoc quod conveniunt in uno supposito, vel hypostasi una, sicut
dicimus, album est dulce; contra: persona non addit supra hypostasim vel suppositum
nisi aliquod accidens, scilicet proprietatem ad dignitatem pertinentem. Si ergo
in Christo esset una persona, et non unum suppositum vel hypostasis, divina
natura et humana essent in ipso unitae solum in accidente; quod falsum est.
(2) If it is said that things are predicated of one another on account of the
fact that they share in one person, but not in one suppositum or one hypostasis,
to the contrary: person does not add [anything] beyond a hypostasis or a suppositum
except something accidental, namely, a property pertaining to dignity; therefore,
if there were one person and not one suppositum and hypostasis in Christ, the
divine nature and the human nature would be united in him only accidentally,
which is false.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod secundum opinionem secundam, quam Magister dist. 6
lib. III Sententiarum ponit, quae est communis opinio modernorum, et aliis multo
verior et securior, in Christo est unum suppositum tantum, et una tantum hypostasis,
sicut et persona una.
I answer that, according to the second opinion which Peter Lombard posits in
distinction VI, of book III of the Sentences,
which is the common opinion of recent writers and is truer and safer
than the others [i.e. opinions] by far: there is only one suppositum and only
one hypostasis in Christ, just as there is one person.
Oportet namque nos secundum doctrinam fidei ponere unam rem subsistentem in
duabus naturis, divina scilicet, et humana: alias non posset dici, quod unus
esset Dominus Iesus Christus secundum sententiam Apostoli, I Ad Cor. viii, 6.
Unde et Nestorius fuit damnatus propter hoc quod Christum praesumpsit dividere,
duas introducens personas.
For truly it is necessary that we posit one thing subsisting in two natures,
namely human and divine, according to the teaching of the faith. Otherwise,
it could not be said that the Lord Jesus Christ is one according to the statement
of the Apostle, I Corinthians, VIII. Hence Nestorius was condemned on account
of the fact that he presumed to divide Christ, introducing two persons.
Illud autem quod est subsistens in natura, est aliquod individuum et singulare:
unde unitas Christi, in qua duae naturae uniuntur, attribuenda est alicui nomini
per quod singularitas designetur. Nominum autem quae singularitatem designant,
quaedam significant singulare in quolibet genere entis, sicut hoc nomen singulare
et particulare et individuum, quia haec albedo est quoddam singulare et particulare
et individuum; nam universale et particulare circumeunt omne genus. Quaedam
vero significant singulare solum in genere substantiae; sicut hoc nomen hypostasis,
quod significat individuam substantiam; et hoc nomen persona, quod significat
substantiam individuam rationalis naturae: et similiter hoc nomen suppositum
vel res naturae; quorum nullum de hac albedine potest praedicari, quamvis haec
albedo sit singularis; eo quod unumquodque eorum significat aliquid ut subsistens,
accidentia vero non subsistunt. Partes vero substantiarum quamvis sint de natura
subsistentium, non tamen per se subsistunt, sed in alio sunt; unde etiam praedicta
nomina de partibus substantiarum non di ur: non enim dicimus quod haec manus
sit hypostasis vel persona, vel suppositum, vel res naturae, quamvis possit
dici quod sit quoddam individuum, vel particulare, vel singulare, quae nomina
de accidentibus dicebantur.
Now that which is subsisting in a nature is something individual or singular.
Hence, the unity of Christ, in which the two natures are united, must be attributed
to some name through which singularity is designated. However, of those names
which designate singularity, certain ones signify a singular thing in any genus
of beings, such as the name 'singular', so also both 'particular' and 'individual',
because this whiteness is a certain singular both individual and particular.
For the universal and the particular extend to every genus. But certain names
signify singularity only in the genus of substance, as the name 'hypostasis',
which signifies an individual substance, and the name 'person', which signifies
an individual substance of a rational nature; and similarly the name 'suppositum'
or 'a thing of nature', none of which can be predicated of this whiteness, although
this whiteness is singular, to the extent that each of these names signify something
subsisting per se, but accidents do not subsist [in this way]. In fact, the
parts of substances, although they are of the nature of subsisting things, nevertheless
do not subsist per se, but they are in another; thus, even the aforesaid names
are not said of the parts of substances; for we do not say that this hand is
a hypostasis, a person, a suppositum, or a thing of nature, although it may
be said that it is a certain individual or particular or singular, which names
are also said of accidents.
Non autem potest dici quod humana natura in Christo, vel aliqua pars eius, sit
per se subsistens: hoc enim unioni repugnaret; nisi poneremus unionem secundum
quid et non simpliciter: sicut uniuntur lapides in acervo, vel duo homines per
effectum amoris, vel per aliquam imitationis similitudinem: quae omnia dicimus
esse unum secundum quid, et non simpliciter. Quod enim est simpliciter unum
et per se subsistens, nihil continet actu per subsistens, sed forte in potentia.
Unde servata veritate unionis naturarum in Christo, oportet ponere sicut unam
personam, ita unam hypostasim, et unum suppositum, et unam rem duarum naturarum.
Sed ipsam humanam naturam in Christo nihil prohibet dicere esse quoddam individuum,
aut singulare, aut particulare; et similiter quaslibet partes humanae naturae,
ut manus et pedes et ossa, quorum quodlibet est quoddam individuum: non tamen
quod de toto praedicetur, quia nullum eorum est individuum per se subsistens.
Sed individuum per se subsistens, vel singulare, vel particulare, quod praedicatur
de Christo, est unum tantum.
Now it cannot be said that the human nature in Christ or some part of it is
subsisting per se: for this is contrary to the union, unless we posited a union
in a certain respect and not absolutely [secundum
quid et non simpliciter], as stones are united in a pile or [as] two
men [are united] through the desire of love or through some likeness of imitation,
all of which we call one in a certain respect and not simply. For that which
is one thing, subsisting per se simply, contains
nothing subsisting per se actually, but perhaps it does potentially. Hence,
having preserved the truth of the union of natures in Christ, just as it is
necessary to posit one person, so also one hypostasis, one suppositum and one
thing of two natures [must be posited]. But nothing prevents saying that the
human nature in Christ is a certain individual or singular or particular; and
similarly any part of the human nature, as hands and feet and bones, each of
which is a certain individual, yet it is not what is predicated of the whole,
since none of them is an individual subsisting per se; but the individual subsisting
per se, whether the singular or the particular which is predicated of Christ
is only one.
Unde possumus dicere, in Christo esse plura individua, vel singularia, vel particularia:
non autem possumus dicere, Christum esse plura individua vel singularia vel
particularia. Sed plures hypostases vel supposita non possumus dicere in Christo
esse.
Hence, we can say that there are many individuals or singulars or particulars
in Christ, but we do not say that Christ is many individuals or singulars or
particulars; but neither can we say that there are many hypostases or supposita
in Christ.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex unione animae et corporis constituitur et homo
et humanitas: quae quidem duo hoc modo differunt: quod humanitas significatur
per modum partis, eo quod humanitas dicitur qua homo est homo, et sic praecise
significat essentialia principia speciei, per quae hoc individuum in tali specie
collocatur; unde se habet per modum partis, cum praeter huiusmodi principia
multa alia in rebus naturae inveniantur. Sed homo significatur per modum totius:
homo enim dicitur habens humanitatem, vel subsistens in humanitate, sine praecisione
quorumcumque aliorum supervenientium essentialibus principiis speciei; quia
per hoc quod dico: habens humanitatem; non praeciditur, qui habet colorem, et
quantitatem, et alia huiusmodi.
1. From the union of the soul and the body both a man and humanity are established,
in fact these two differ in this way, that humanity is signified through the
manner of a part, insofar as humanity is called that by which a man is a man,
and thus it signifies precisely the essential principles of the species through
which this individual is placed in such a species, hence it has the status of
a part, since beyond principles of this kind many others are found in things
of nature. But, a man is signified through the manner of a whole: for a man
is spoken of [as] having humanity or subsisting in humanity, without the exclusion
of any other supervening things in the essential principles of the species.
Due to this fact I say that 'having humanity' is not cut off [from] having colour
and quality and other things of this kind.
Secundum ergo secundam opinionem praedictam, unioni humanae naturae ad divinam
praesupponitur unio animae et corporis secundum quod constituit humanitatem,
non secundum quod constituit hominem. Illud enim quod in Christo est constitutum
ex anima et corpore tantum, quod unioni praesupponitur, non est totum quod per
se subsistit, sed aliquid eius; et ideo non potest signari ut homo, sed ut humanitas.
Unde oportet dicere, quod in ipsa unione humanae naturae ad divinam quasi in
termino assumptionis, intelligatur primo in Christo ratio hominis, quia tunc
primo intelligitur ut res per se subsistens completa. et in hoc differt ab aliis
duabus opinionibus.
Therefore, according to the second opinion stated above [i.e. as listed in Peter
Lombard], the union of the soul and the body is presupposed to the union of
the human nature to the divine insofar as it establishes humanity, but not insofar
as it establishes a man. For that which was established in Christ from the soul
and body alone, which is presupposed to the union, is not a whole which subsists
per se, but it is some [part] of him and thus it is not able to be signified
as a man, but as humanity. Hence, it is necessary to say that in the union of
the human nature to the divine the character [ratio]
of a man is understood first in Christ as if in the term of the assumption,
since it is then primarily understood as a completed thing existing per se.
And it differs from the other two opinions in this.
Nam prima opinio ponit, quod unio animae ad carnem praesupponitur secundum intellectum
assumptioni humanae naturae, non secundum solum hoc quod constituit humanitatem,
sed etiam secundum quod constituit hominem; dicit enim hominem esse assumptum.
For the first opinion posits that a union of the soul to the flesh is presupposed
according to the understanding of an assumption of human nature, not only insofar
as it establishes humanity, but also insofar as it establishes a man: for it
says that a man was assumed.
Tertia vero opinio ponit, quod nec etiam in termino assumptionis intelligitur
anima corpori unita, nec ad constituendum hominem, nec ad constituendam humanam
naturam; dicit enim humanam naturam sumi multipliciter, idest pro partibus eius,
scilicet anima et corpore, cum dicamus, humanam naturam assumptam a Verbo: unde
patet quod nec vere dicit Christum esse hominem, nec vere ponit humanam naturam
in Christo: et ideo est tamquam haeretica condemnata.
Now, the third opinion posits that the soul united to the body is not understood
even in the completion , neither for constituting a man nor for consituting
a human nature: for it says that human nature is taken materially, i.e. for
its parts, namely, a soul and a body, when we say that the human nature was
assumed by the Word. Hence it is obvious that this opinion posits that Christ
is neither true man nor does it truly posit a human nature in him, and the same
opinion was condemned as heretical.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpus unitum animae praeintelligitur assumptioni
humanae naturae: unitum autem dico unione constituente humanitatem, non autem
unione constituente hominem.
2. The body united to the soul is presupposed to the assumption of human nature,
but I say that it was united by the union constituting humanity, but not by
the union constituting a man.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod gratia habitualis non intelligitur ut medium unionis,
quod secundum intellectum praecedit unionem: nec est medium quod causet unionem
vel unibilitatem: sed medium quod facit ad congruitatem unionis, sicut decora
vestis facit ad congruitatem coniunctionis matrimonialis. Et similiter scientia
et omnes aliae perfectiones Christi possent dici medium unionis; et pro tanto
gratia habitualis Christi potest dici gratia unionis. Verius tamen puto, quod
gratia unionis dicatur vel ipsa gratuita Dei voluntas, quae gratis, nullis meritis
praecedentibus, unionem fecit; vel potius ipsum donum gratis datum humanae naturae,
quod est esse in divina persona. Si tamen anima unita corpori praeintelligitur
ad assumptionem, solvendum est ut prius.
3. Habitual grace is not understood as the medium of the union which according
to the understanding of it precedes the union: for it is not such a medium that
causes the union or unitability, but a medium which produces suitability of
the union, just as suitable clothing makes for the suitability of matrimonial
joining (and similarly the knowledge and all other perfections of Christ can
be called the medium of the union) and because of all that Christ's habitual
grace can be called the grace of union. Yet I think that it is more truly said
that the grace of union refers either to the gratuitous will of God which freely
produced the union, that is with no preceding merits, or it refers to a gift
freely given (donum gratis datum) to human nature, namely, to be in the divine
person. Yet, if the soul united to the body is presupposed to the assumption,
it must be solved in the same way as before.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod humanitas non est forma partis quae dicatur forma
quia informet aliquam materiam vel subiectum; sed dicitur forma totius, in qua
suppositum naturae subsistit; unde non oportet ponere quod hypostasis increata
informetur humanitate, sed quod subsistit in ea.
4. Humanity is not the form of a part which is called a form because it informs
some matter or subject, but it is called the form of a whole, in which a nature's
suppositum subsists; hence it is not necessary to posit that the uncreated hypostasis
is informed by humanity, but that it subsists in it.
© Mr. Jason Lewis Andrew West (jlawest@watarts.uwaterloo.ca)
The Aquinas Translation Project (http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)