Article I

AND the first question is: Whether a spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

And it would seem that it is. 1 For Boethius says in his book De Trinitate [II, Patrologia Latina LXIV, 1250 D]: A simple form cannot be a subject. But a created spiritual substance is a subject of knowledge and of power and of grace; therefore, it is not a simple form. But neither is it simple matter, for in that case it would exist in potency only, and would have no activity. Therefore it is composed of matter and form.

2 Furthermore, any created form is limited and finite. But form is limited through matter. Therefore, any created form is a form in matter. Therefore no created substance is a form without matter.

3 Furthermore, the principle of changeability is matter; hence, according to the Philosopher [Metaphysica II, 2, 994b 26], "it is necessary that matter be conceived in a thing that is moved." But a created spiritual substance is changeable; for only God is by nature unchangeable. Therefore a created spiritual substance has matter.

4 Furthermore, Augustine says in XII Confessiones [17, 25] that God made matter common to things visible and things invisible. Now the things invisible are spiritual substances. Therefore a spiritual substance has matter.

5 Furthermore, the Philosopher says in VIII Metaphysica [6, 1045a 36] that if any substance is without matter, it is at once both being and one (ens et unum), and there is no other cause for it to be both being and one. But everything that has been created has a cause of its being and of its unity. Therefore no created thing is substance without matter. Therefore, every created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

6 Furthermore, Augustine says in his book De Quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti [q. 23, PL XXXV, 2229] that Adam's body was formed before the soul was infused into it, because a dwelling must be made before a dweller is introduced. Now the soul is related to the body as a dweller to a dwelling; but a dweller has a subsistence of its own: the soul accordingly has a subsistence of its own, and, for all the greater reason, an angel. But a substance with a subsistence of its own does not seem to be merely a form. Therefore a created spiritual substance is not merely a form; it is, therefore, composed of matter and form.

7 Furthermore, it is manifest that the soul is able to take on contraries. Now this would seem to be a property of a composite substance. Therefore the soul is a composite substance, and by the same reasoning so is an angel.

8 Furthermore, form is that whereby a thing is (quo aliquid est). Whatever, therefore, is composed of that whereby it is and of that which it is (quo et quod est) is composed of matter and form. Now every created spiritual substance is composed of that whereby it is and of that which it is, as Boethius makes clear in his book De Hebdomadibus [PL LXIV, 1311]. Therefore, every created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

9 Furthermore, there are two kinds of "commonness" (duplex communitas): one, in the divine order, whereby the essence is "common" to the three persons; another, in the created order, whereby the universal is "common" to the things that come under it (suis inferioribus). Now it would seem to be a peculiarity of the first sort of "commonness" that the feature which makes a difference between those beings which share the common element is not really anything else than the common element itself. For the paternity by which the Father is different from the Son is itself the essence which is common to the Father and to the Son. Now in the "commonness" of the universal the feature that makes a difference between the things which are included under the common element must be something else than the common element itself. In every created thing, therefore, which is included in a common genus there necessarily is a composition of the common element and of that whereby the common element itself is restricted. Now a created spiritual substance is in a given genus. Therefore in a created spiritual substance there must be composition of the common nature and of that whereby the common nature is confined. Now this seems to be a composition of form and of matter. Therefore in a created spiritual substance there is composition of form and of matter.

10 Furthermore, the form of a genus cannot exist save in the intellect or in matter. But a created spiritual substance, such as an angel, is in a given genus. Accordingly, the form of that genus exists either in the intellect only, or in matter. But if an angel did not possess matter, it would not exist in matter. Therefore it would exist in the intellect only, and so, supposing that nobody had intellectual knowledge of an angel, it would follow that the angel did not exist. This is an incongruity (inconveniens). Accordingly, it is necessary to say (as it seems) that created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

11 Furthermore, if a created spiritual substance were merely form, it would follow that one spiritual substance would be present to another. For if one angel has intellectual knowledge of another, either this happens through the essence of the understood angel, and in this case it will be necessary for the substance of the understood angel to be present in the intellect of the angel understanding it; or else it happens through a species, and in that case the same conclusion follows, if the species through which the angel is understood by the other angel does not differ from the very substance of the understood angel. Nor does it seem possible to indicate anything wherein it does differ, if the substance of the angel is without matter, as is its intelligible species also. Now this latter is an incongruity, that one angel should be present in another by its own substance, because it is only the Trinity that enters into the rational mind (menti rationali illabitur). Therefore the first point too, from which this follows, is incongruous; namely, that a created spiritual substance is immaterial.

12 Furthermore, the Commentator says in XI Metaphysica [XII, comm. 36] that if there were a box without matter, it would be the same as the box which exists in the intellect. Consequently the conclusion seems the same as before.

13 Augustine says in VII Super Genesi ad Litteram [6, 9] that, just as the flesh had matter (that is, earth) from which it was made, so perhaps it might have been the case that, even before that very nature which is called the soul was made, it had as its own genus a kind of spiritual matter, which was not yet a soul. Therefore the soul seems to be composed of matter and form, and by the same reasoning an angel also.

14 Furthermore, Damascene says [De Fide Orthodoxa II, 3 & 12, Patrologia Graeca XCIV, 867 and 919] that "God alone is essentially immaterial and incorporeal." Therefore a created spiritual substance is not immaterial and incorporeal.

15 Furthermore, every substance circumscribed by the limits of its own nature has a limited and confined existence. But every created substance is circumscribed by the limits of its own nature. Therefore every created substance has a limited and confined existence. But every thing which is confined is confined by something. Therefore in any and every created substance there is a confining element and a confined element; and these seem to be matter and form. Therefore every spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

16 Furthermore, nothing is active and passive on the same basis, but each thing is active through its form, whereas it is passive through its matter. But a created spiritual substance, such as an angel, is active while it is enlightening a lower angel and is passive while it is being enlightened by a higher angel. Similarly, there is in the soul the agent intellect (intellectus agens) and the possible intellect (intellectus possibilis). Therefore an angel as well as the soul is composed of matter and form.

17 Furthermore, every thing that is either is a pure act or a pure potency, or is something composed of act and potency. But a spiritual substance is not a pure act (for this is characteristic of God alone), nor is it a pure potency either. Therefore it is something composed of potency and act, which seems the same as something composed of matter and form.

18 Furthermore, Plato in the Timaeus [13, 41 AB] introduces the highest god as saying, when speaking to the created gods: "My will is greater than your bond." Augustine quotes these words in his book De Civitate Dei [XIII, 16, 1]. Now the created gods seem to be angels. Therefore in angels there is a bond or composition.

19 Furthermore, in those things which are counted, and are different in essence, there is matter; because matter is the principle of numerical distinction. But spiritual substances are counted, and are different in essence. Therefore they have matter.

20 Furthermore, nothing is acted on by a body except a thing that has matter. But created spiritual substances are acted on by bodily fire, as Augustine makes clear in De Civitate Dei [XXI, 10]. Therefore created spiritual substances have matter.

21 Furthermore, Boethius in his book De Unitate et Uno [PL LXIII, 1076-77] expressly says that an angel is composed of matter and form.

22 Furthermore, Boethius says in his book De Hebdomadibus [PL LXIII, 1311] that that which is can have something else mixed with it. But existence itself has absolutely nothing else mixed with it; and we can say the same about all abstract and concrete things. For in man there can be something other than "humanity", such as "whiteness" or something of that sort; but in "humanity" itself there can be nothing other than what pertains to the character of "humanity". If, therefore, spiritual substances are abstract forms, there will not possibly be in them anything that does not pertain to their species. But if something that pertains to the species of a thing be taken away, the thing is corrupted. Since, therefore, every spiritual substance is incorruptible, nothing that is in a created spiritual substance will possibly be lost; and so it will be utterly immobile, which is incongruous.

23 Furthermore, every thing which is in a genus participates in the principles of the genus. Now a created spiritual substance is in the category of substance. Now the principles of this category are matter and form, as Boethius makes clear in his Commentum Praedicamentorum [PL LXIV, 184], where he says that Aristotle, leaving out of consideration the extremes, namely, matter and form, discusses the mean, namely, the composite; and gives us to understand that the substance, which is the category about which he is speaking in that passage, is composed of matter and form. Therefore a created spiritual substance is composed of matter and form.

24 Furthermore, every thing which is in a genus is composed of genus and difference. Now the difference is obtained from the form, whereas the genus is obtained from the matter, as he makes clear in VIII Metaphysica [2, 1043a 19; 3, 1043b 30]. Since, then, a spiritual substance is in a genus, it seems that it is composed of matter and form.

25 Furthermore, that which is first in any genus whatever is the cause of the things which are subsequent; as for instance, the first act is the cause of every being that is in act. Therefore by the same reasoning every thing that is in potency in any way whatever has this character from the first potency which is pure potency, namely, from prime matter. But there is some potency in created spiritual substances, because God alone is pure act. Therefore a created spiritual substance has this character from matter; which could not be so unless matter were a part of it. Therefore it is composed of matter and form.

But on the other hand i there is what Dionysius says in chapter IV of De Divinis Nominibus [lec. 1] about the angels, that they are "incorporeal and immaterial."

But you will say that ii they are called "immaterial" because they do not have matter that is subject to quantity and to change. But this is at variance with what he himself says above, that "they are free from all matter."

iii Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in IV Physica [4, 211a 12], the question of place would not arise were it not for movement; and similarly neither would the question of matter arise were it not for movement. Therefore, according as given things have movement, on this ground matter must be looked for in them; hence those things which are subject to generation and corruption have matter with respect to their being; while those which are changeable according to place have matter with respect to their place. But spiritual substances are not changeable on the basis of their being. Therefore matter for being is not in them, and so they are not composed of matter and form.

iv Furthermore, Hugh of St. Victor says on Dionysius' De Caelesti Hierarchia [V, PL CLXXV, 1010B], that in spiritual substances that which vivifies and that which is vivified is the same. But that which vivifies is form, whereas that which is vivified is matter; for form gives being to matter, and in the case of living things "to live" is "to be". Therefore in angels there is no distinction of matter and form.

v Furthermore, Avicenna [Met. IX, 4] and Algazel [I, tr. IV, 3] say that the separated substances, which are called spiritual substances, are entirely devoid of matter.

vi Furthermore, the Philosopher says in III De Anima [8, 431b 29] that "the stone does not exist in the soul, but the species" of stone does. This seems to be due to the soul's simplicity, namely, the fact that material things cannot exist in it. Therefore the soul is not composed of matter and form.

vii Furthermore, in the Liber de Causis [§6] it is said that an intelligence is a substance which is not divided. But every thing which is composite is divided. Therefore an intelligence is not composite substance.

viii Furthermore, "in those things which are without matter, the understanding being and the understood being are the same" [III De An., 4, 430a 3]. But that which is understood is an entirely immaterial intelligible form. Therefore the understanding substance also is without matter.

ix Furthermore, Augustine says in his book De Trinitate [IX, 4] that the whole soul understands itself. Now it does not understand through matter: therefore matter is not a part of it (aliquid eius).

x Furthermore, Damascene says [De Fide Orth. II, 12] that the soul is simple. Therefore it is not composed of matter and form.

xi Furthermore, a rational soul more closely approaches the absolutely simple First Being (namely, God) than the animal soul (spiritus brutalis) does. But the animal soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore much less is the rational soul.

xii Furthermore, the angelic substance more closely approaches the simple First Being than a material form does. But a material form is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, neither is the angelic substance.

xiii Furthermore, accidental form is below substance in the order of importance. But God makes a given accidental form subsist without matter, as is evident in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore, so much the more does He make a given form in the genus of substance subsist without matter; and this especially seems to be spiritual substance.

xiv Furthermore, Augustine says in XII Confessiones [7]: You have made two things, O Lord, "one next to Yourself", that is, angelic substance, "another next to nothing", namely, matter. So, therefore, there is no matter in an angel, since "matter" is distinguished from "angel" as its contrary.

ANSWER. There are a variety of conflicting opinions concerning this question. For some assert that a created spiritual substance is a composite of matter and form; but some deny this. And hence, in order not to proceed to the investigation of this truth in an ambiguous fashion, we must consider what is meant by the term "matter." For it is obvious that since potency and act are divisions of being (ens), and since any genus whatever is divided into potency and act, the term "prime matter" is generally used to mean something which is in the genus of substance as a kind of potency, which is understood as excluding every species and form, and even as excluding privation, and yet is a potency capable of receiving both forms and privations; as Augustine makes clear in XII Confessiones [vii, viii, xv] and in I Super Genesi ad Litteram [xiv, xv], and the Philosopher in VII Metaphysica [3, 1029a 20].

Now if matter be taken in this sense, which is its proper and generally accepted meaning, it is impossible for matter to be in spiritual substances. For although in one and the same given thing which is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency, potency is prior to act in the order of time, yet in the order of nature act is prior to potency. Now that which is prior does not depend on that which is subsequent, but vice versa. And consequently one comes upon a first act in isolation from all potency; yet one never finds in nature a potency which is not perfected by some act, and on this account there is always some form in prime matter. Now the first absolutely perfect act, which has in itself all the fullness of perfection, causes actual existence in all things; but yet according to a certain order. For no caused act has all the fullness of perfection, but in comparison with the first act every caused act is imperfect. Still, the more perfect an act is, the nearer it is to God. Now of all creatures, the spiritual substances are nearest to God, as Dionysius makes clear in chapter 4 of De Caelesti Hierarchia [§1]. And hence they most nearly approach the perfection of the first act, since they are related to lower creatures as the perfect is to the imperfect and as act is to potency. Therefore the ordered scheme of things does not in any sense imply that spiritual substances, for their own actual being, need prime matter, which is the most incomplete of all beings; but they are on a level that is far above all matter and all material things.

This fact also becomes evident if one takes into consideration the activity that is proper to spiritual substances. For all spiritual substances are intellectual. Now the potency of each individual thing is such as its perfection is found to be; for a proper act requires its own proper potency. Now the perfection of any intellectual substance, insofar as it is intellectual, is intelligible because it is in the intellect. The sort of potency then that we must seek in spiritual substances is one that is proportionate to the reception of an intelligible form. Now the potency of prime matter is not of this sort, for prime matter receives form by contracting it to the individual being. But an intelligible form is in the intellect without any such contraction; for thus the intellect understands each intelligible as its form is in it. Now the intellect understands the intelligible chiefly according to a common and universal nature, and so the intelligible form is in the intellect according to its universality (secundum rationem suae communitatis). Therefore, an intellectual substance is not made receptive of form by reason of prime matter, but rather through a character which is, in a way, the opposite. Hence it becomes obvious that in the case of spiritual substances the kind of prime matter which of itself is void of all species cannot be part of that substance.

Yet on the other hand if we use the terms "matter" and "form" to mean any two things which are related to each other as potency and act, there is no difficulty in saying (so as to avoid a mere dispute about words) that matter and form exist in spiritual substances. For in a created spiritual substance there must be two elements, one of which is related to the other as potency is to act. This is clear from the following. For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were "whiteness" apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body.

Hence in composite objects there are two kinds of act and two kinds of potency to consider. For first of all, matter is as potency with reference to form, and the form is its act. And secondly, if the nature is constituted of matter and form, the matter is as potency with reference to existence itself, insofar as it is able to receive this. Accordingly, when the foundation of matter is removed, if any form of a determinate nature remains which subsists of itself but not in matter, it will still be related to its own existence as potency is to act. But I do not say, as that potency which is separable from its act, but as a potency which is always accompanied by its act. And in this way the nature of a spiritual substance, which is not composed of matter and form, is a potency with reference to its own existence; and thus there is in a spiritual substance a composition of potency and act, and, consequently, of form and matter, provided only that every potency be called matter, and every act be called form; but yet this is not properly said according to the common use of the terms.

As to the first argument, therefore, it must be said that the character of a form is in sharp contrast to the character of a subject: for every form, as such, is an act, whereas every subject is related to that of which it is the subject, as a potency is related to an act. If therefore, there is any form which is exclusively an act, such as the divine essence, it cannot in any sense be a subject; and it is of this form that Boethius is speaking. Now if there happens to be a form, which is in act in one respect and is in potency in another, it will be a subject only in that precise respect in which it is in potency. Now spiritual substances, although they are subsistent forms, are nevertheless in potency inasmuch as they possess a finite and limited existence. And because the intellect, as a consequence of its character, has a capacity for knowing all things, and the will has a capacity for loving all good, there always remains within the intellect and the will of a created substance a potency toward something which is outside of itself. Hence, if one views the matter rightly, spiritual substances are not found to be subjects, except of accidents which pertain to the intellect and to the will.

As to the second, it must be said that there are two kinds of limitation of form. There is one in consequence of which the form of the species is limited to the individual, and this kind of limitation of form comes about through matter. There is a second, however, in consequence of which the form of the genus is limited to the nature of the species; and this kind of limitation of form does not come about through matter, but rather through a more determinate form, from which the difference is derived; for the difference when added to a genus narrows down this latter to the species. And this kind of limitation is the one that is in spiritual substances, in view of the fact that they are forms of determinate species.

As to the third, it must be said that changeability is not to be found in spiritual substances as a consequence of their being, but as a consequence of their intellect and their will. But this kind of changeability is not the result of matter, but of the potentiality of the intellect and the will.

As to the fourth, it must be said that Augustine's meaning is not that the matter of things visible and things invisible is the same numerically; since he himself says that two kinds of formlessness are meant by "heaven" and "earth," which are said to have been created first, so that by "heaven" is meant the spiritual substance that is still formless, whereas by "earth" is meant the matter of corporeal objects, which considered in itself is formless, since it is without any species; hence it is also said to be "void and empty", or "invisible and non-composite" according to another reading, whereas heaven is not described as "void and empty." From this it is plainly manifest that matter, which is without any species, is not a part of the angelic substance. But the formlessness of spiritual substance is a consequence of the fact that the substance has not yet been turned toward the Word whereby it is enlightened, and this is something that pertains to its power of understanding. In this sense, therefore, he calls them both "common matter of things visible and things invisible," according as each is formless in its own way.

As to the fifth, it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking in that passage not of the agent cause but of the formal cause. For those things which are composed of matter and form are not immediately both being and one, but matter is being in potency and becomes actual being through the coming of the form, which serves as the cause of existence in its regard. But a form does not have being through another form. And hence, if there be a subsisting form, it is immediately both being and one, nor does it have a formal cause of its own existence; it does nevertheless have a cause that pours existence into it, but not a moving cause such as would bring it into act out of previously existent potency.

As to the sixth, it must be said that, although the soul has a subsistence of its own, nevertheless it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form, because to have a subsistence of its own can also be an attribute of a form apart from matter. For since matter has existence through form, and not conversely, there is nothing to prevent a given form from subsisting without matter, although matter cannot exist without form.

As to the seventh, it must be said that the capacity of receiving contrary attributes is characteristic of a substance that exists in potency in some way or other, whether it be composed of matter and form or whether it be simple substance. Now the substance of spiritual things is not the subject of contrary attributes, save of those pertaining to the will and to the intellect, since it is in consequence of these that it is in potency, as is clear from what has been said.

As to the eighth, it must be said that to be composed of "that which is" (quod est) and of "that whereby something is" (quo est) is not the same as to be composed of matter and form. For although form can be called "that whereby something is," nevertheless matter cannot properly be called "that which is," since it is not, save in potency. But "that which is" is that which subsists in existence and this, in the case of corporeal substances, is the thing itself that is composed of matter and form, whereas in the case of incorporeal substances it is the simple form itself. Now "that whereby something is" is participated existence itself, because each individual is, insofar as it participates in existence itself. And hence Boethius also uses these words in this sense in the book De Hebdomadibus, saying that in the case of beings other than the First "that which is" and "existence" (esse) are not the same.

As to the ninth, it must be said that a thing is "under" something common in two senses: in one, as an individual is "under" a species; in another, as a species is "under" a genus. Whenever then many individuals are under one common species, the distinction between many individuals is effected through individual matter, which has nothing to do with their specific nature. This is true in the case of created things. But when there are many species under one genus the forms whereby the species are distinguished from one another should in reality be something other than the common form of the genus. For through one and the same form this particular individual is put in the genus "substance", in the genus "body", and so on down to the most specific species. For if this particular individual were to possess its substantiality in consequence of some form, then necessarily it would have to be the case that the other additional forms in consequence of which it is placed in lower genera and species would be accidental forms.

This is clear from the following. For an accidental form differs from a substantial form because a substantial form makes this given thing to be something, whereas an accidental form is added to a thing which already exists as "this something." If then the first form by which the individual is placed in a genus will make the individual to be "this something," all the other forms will be added to an individual that subsists in actuality, and consequently they will be accidental forms. It will also follow that through the addition of the later forms whereby something is given its place in the most specific species or in some subordinate species, generation does not occur, and by the taking away of these forms there is no corruption in an absolute sense but in a qualified sense (secundum aliquid). For since generation is a change oriented to the existence of a thing, something is said to be generated, absolutely speaking, if it absolutely becomes a being (ens) out of that which is non-being in act but being in potency only. If, then, something comes into being out of something that is previously existing in act, what will be generated is not a being in an absolute sense, but "this particular being." Concerning corruption the same reasoning holds good. It must, therefore, be said that the forms of things are ranged in order, and that one form exceeds another in perfection. This is clear both from what the Philosopher says in VIII Metaphysica [3, 1043b 33], namely, that the definitions and species of things are like numbers, in the case of which the species are multiplied by adding one; and also from the fact that through induction the species of things appear to be multiplied hierarchically according to the perfect and the imperfect.

Thus, then, by this line of argument Avicebron's position in the book Fons Vitae is ruled out, to the effect that prime matter, something that is regarded as entirely without form, first receives the form of substance; and once this form is supposed in any part of itself it receives, in addition to the form "substance", another form through which it becomes a body; and so on in succession down to its ultimate species. And in that part in which it does not receive a corporeal form it is incorporeal substance, the matter of which, not being subject to quantity, some call "spiritual matter". Moreover, the matter itself, already perfected through the form of substance which is the subject of quantity and of the other accidents, is "the key", he says, to the understanding of incorporeal substances [II, 6, p. 35]. For the reason why some individual thing happens to be a non-living body and another happens to be a living body is not the fact that a living individual has some form of which the substantial form of a body is a substratum; but the reason is that this particular living individual has a more perfect form, through which it has not only subsistence and bodily existence, but also life; whereas the other has a more imperfect form, through which it does not attain to life, but only to bodily existence.

As to the tenth, it must be said that the form of a genus whereof matter is an essential part cannot exist outside the intellect except in matter, like the form "plant", for instance, or the form "metal". But this genus of substance is not the sort of thing whereof matter is an essential part. Otherwise it would not be a metaphysical genus but a natural one. Hence the form of this genus does not depend on matter as regards its own existence, but can be also found outside matter.

As to the eleventh, it must be said that the intelligible species which is in the intellect of the understanding angel is different from the understood angel, not in the way of "something abstracted from the matter" and "something concreted of matter", but as an intentional being differs from a being which has an established existence in nature, as the species of color in the eye differs from the color which is in a wall.

As to the twelfth, it must be said that if the box were self-subsistent apart from matter, it would be something that understands its own self, because immunity from matter is the essential character of intellectuality. And in view of this, the box apart from matter would not be different from an intelligible box.

As to the thirteenth, it must be said that Augustine brings in that point as a matter to be investigated. This is clear from the fact that he rejects the assertion in question.

As to the fourteenth, it must be said that God alone is said to be immaterial and incorporeal, because all things, when compared to His simplicity, can be reckoned as material bodies, although in themselves they are incorporeal and immaterial.

As to the fifteenth, it must be said that the existence of a spiritual creature's substance is confined and limited, not by matter, but by the fact that it is something that has been received and participated in a nature of a determinate species, as has been said.

As to the sixteenth, it must be said that a created spiritual substance is active and passive, not in consequence of form or matter, but according as it is in act or in potency.

As to the seventeenth, it must be said that a spiritual substance is neither a pure act nor a pure potency, but is something that has potency along with act; yet it is not composed of matter and form, as is clear from what has been said.

As to the eighteenth, it must be said that Plato gives the name of "second gods" not to the angels, but to the heavenly bodies.

As to the nineteenth, it must be said that matter is the principle of numerical distinction within the same species, but not of the distinction between species. Now the angels are not numerically many within the same species, but their manyness (multitudo) is that of many self-subsistent specific natures.

As to the twentieth, it must be said that spiritual substances are not acted on by bodily fire by way of a material alteration but by way of a confinement (alligationis), as Augustine says [De Civitate Dei XXI, 10, 1]. And hence it is not necessary for them to have matter.

As to the twenty-first, it must be said that the book De Unitate et Uno is not a book of Boethius, as its very style indicates.

As to the twenty-second, it must be said that a separated form, inasmuch as it is an act, cannot have anything extraneous mixed with it, but only inasmuch as it is in potency. And in this way the spiritual substances, inasmuch as they are in potency as regards the intellect and the will, receive some accidents.

As to the twenty-third, it must be said that Boethius does not mean to say that it is essential to substance, which is a genus, to be composed of matter and form, since substance comes within the purview of the metaphysician, not of the natural philosopher. But he does mean to say that, since form and matter do not pertain to the genus of substance as a species thereof, only that substance which is something composite is placed within the genus of substance as a species.

As to the twenty-fourth, it must be said that in the case of objects composed of matter and form, the genus is obtained from the matter and the difference from the form: yet in such a way that by "matter" is not understood prime matter, but matter according as it receives through the form a certain being (esse), imperfect and material in comparison with specific being (esse); thus, for instance, the being (esse) of "animal" is imperfect and material in comparison with "man." Still that two-fold being (esse) is not the consequence of two different forms, but of one form, which confers on man not only "animal being" (esse) but "human being" (esse). Now the soul of another animal confers on it only "animal being" (esse). Hence the common element "animal" is not one numerically, but mentally only, because it is not from one and the same form that a man and an ass are "animal". Once matter is taken away, therefore, from spiritual substances, the genus and the difference will remain in them, not in consequence of matter and form, but in consequence of considering in a spiritual substance both that element which is common to itself and to less perfect substances, and also that element which is proper to itself.

As to the twenty-fifth, it must be said that the more a thing is in act, the more perfect it is; whereas the more a thing is in potency, the less perfect it is. Now, imperfect beings derive their origin from perfect beings, and not conversely. And hence it does not have to be the case that every thing which is in potency in any way whatever must get its potentiality from the pure potency which is matter. And on this point Avicebron seems to have been deceived, in his book Fons Vitae, since he believed that every thing which is in potency, or is a subject, has this character somehow from prime matter.