OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood; which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedience and disbelief of men. Which the respondent, having set out to refute, did refute the two forms of the greatest evil according to the Manichaeans, but our form he did not refute. Wherefore it is necessary for us to say one of two things about the respondent: either that he did not understand our third form of the greatest evil, or that he was not supplied with a just counter-argument to refute it. But that our greatest evil results for men from ignorance of God is shown thus. The greatest evil, that which is not in essence, this men, through ignorance of God, have supposed to exist by their own doctrines. And the respondent himself bears witness to this in what he said: There is no greatest evil; and if anyone should suppose a greatest evil, another principle will be found opposed to God, which is what the Manichaeans, speaking wrongly, say. For it is absurd for God not to comprehend all things, not to shine His own goodness upon all. Therefore, there is no greatest evil. In these words the greatest evil in essence is refuted, but the one by hypothesis in doctrine, which we posed in the question, is left over. But since the respondent, in striving for the refutation of our greatest evil, said, "There is no greatest evil," for this reason it is clear that the respondent either did not understand, as has been said, our greatest evil, or was not supplied with a just counter-argument. But if this is so, it is clear that there is a greatest evil among men by hypothesis in doctrine. For if, he says, God is the greatest of goods, true and pious is the statement that says God is the greatest of goods. But since some men, out of ignorance of God, deprive the truly existing God of his just titles and honors, and attach them to things that are not, does it not seem to the respondent to be a twofold impiety, than which there is none greater, to be ignorant of the truly existing God, and to honor that which is not with His titles and honors? But how is it possible, according to his declaration that says there is no greatest evil among men, when the greatest impiety exists among men, unless perhaps he does not consider the greatest impiety to be the greatest evil? If anyone, he says, should suppose a greatest evil, another principle will be found opposed to God, which is what the Manichaeans, speaking wrongly, say. For it is absurd for God not to comprehend all things, not to shine His own goodness upon all. Therefore, there is no greatest evil. If there is no greatest evil among men, how did you slander the Manichaeans as speaking wrongly what they say? For if the Manichaeans speak wrongly what they say, it is clear that what is said by them is evil; for everyone who speaks wrongly speaks the evil wrongly; and the evil according to the Manichaeans is such that there is none greater. But if this is true, then truly there is a great evil among men, even if not in essence, yet in hypothesis and doctrine.

δος, ἄγνοιαν δὲ θεοῦ τὴν τὸ ψεῦδος εἰρηκυῖαν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ τρί τον εἶδος τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἐκ τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀπειθείας τε καὶ ἀπιστίας ἀνθρώπων συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς. Ὃ προθέμενος ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἀναιρεῖν, ἀνεῖλε μὲν τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους δύο τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ εἴδη, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀνεῖλε. ∆ιὸ δυοῖν θάτερον ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς λέγειν περὶ τοῦ ἀποκριναμένου, ἢ τὸ μὴ νοῆσαι τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς τρίτον εἶδος τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἢ τὸ μὴ εὐπορῆσαι δικαίας ἀντιλογίας τούτου ἀναιρετικῆς. Ὅτι δέ ἐστι τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς μέγιστον κακὸν ἐξ ἀγνοίας θεοῦ συμβαῖ νον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, δείκνυται οὕτως. Τὸ μέγιστον κακόν, τὸ μὴ ὂν κατ' οὐσίαν, τοῦτο διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπέθεντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν δόγμασι. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἐν οἷς ἔλεγε· Μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδέν ἐστι· καὶ εἴ τις ὑπόθοιτο μέγιστον κακόν, εὑρεθήσεται ἑτέρα ἀρχὴ ἐναντία τῷ θεῷ, ὅπερ οἱ Μανιχαῖοι κακῶς λέγοντες λέ γουσι. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸν θεὸν μὴ πάντα καταλαμβάνειν, μὴ πᾶσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθότητα ἐπιλάμπειν. Μέγιστον τοίνυν κακὸν οὐδέν. Ἐν τούτοις ἀνῄρηται μὲν τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν μέγιστον κακόν, ὑπολέλειπται δὲ τὸ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἐν δόγματι, ὃ ἐθή καμεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ ἐρωτήσει. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς μεγίστου κακοῦ ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἀποτεινόμενος ἔλεγε Μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδέν ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἢ μὴ νοήσας, καθὰ εἴρηται, τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς μέ γιστον κακόν, ἢ μὴ εὐπορήσας δικαίας ἀντιλογίας. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι μέγιστον κακὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἐν δόγματι. Eἰ γάρ, φησί, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγα θῶν ὁ θεός ἐστιν, ἀληθὴς μὲν καὶ εὐσεβὴς ἡ φωνὴ ἡ λέγουσα τὸν θεὸν μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδή τινες τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἀγνοίας θεοῦ ἀποστεροῦσι μὲν τὸν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν τῶν δικαίων αὐτοῦ προσηγοριῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν, καὶ προσ άπτουσιν αὐτὰς τοῖς οὐκ οὖσιν, ἆρά γε οὐ δοκεῖ τῷ ἀποκρινα μένῳ ἀσέβειαν εἶναι διπλῆν, ἧς μείζων οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ τὸν μὲν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν ἀγνοεῖν, τὸν δὲ οὐκ ὄντα ταῖς ἐκείνου τιμᾶν προσηγορίαις καὶ τιμαῖς; Πῶς δὲ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀπόφασιν λέγουσαν μὴ εἶναι μέγιστον κακὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, τῆς μεγίστης ἀσεβείας οὔσης ἐν ἀνθρώποις, εἰ μή τι γε ἄρα τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέβειαν οὐχ ἡγεῖται μέγιστον εἶναι κακόν; Eἴ τις, φησίν, ὑπόθοιτο μέγιστον κακόν, εὑρεθήσεται ἑτέρα ἀρχὴ ἐναντία τῷ θεῷ, ὅπερ οἱ Μανιχαῖοι κακῶς λέγοντες λέγουσι. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸν θεὸν μὴ πάντα καταλαμβάνειν, μὴ πᾶσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθότητα ἐπιλάμπειν. Μέγιστον τοίνυν κακὸν οὐδέν. Eἰ μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πῶς διέ βαλες τοὺς Μανιχαίους ὡς κακῶς λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν; Eἰ μὲν γὰρ κακῶς λέγουσιν οἱ Μανιχαῖοι ἃ λέγουσιν, δῆλον ὅτι κακόν ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον παρ' αὐτῶν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ λέγων κακῶς τὸ κακὸν λέγει κακῶς· τὸ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους κακὸν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὗ μεῖζον οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο, ἀληθῶς ἄρα ἐστὶ μέγα κακὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑποθέσει καὶ δόγματι.