3

24. MAN. We do not make it like the good God. For we know God to be highest, good, luminous, all-powerful. If, therefore, evil is also without beginning, still it falls far short of God. 25. ORTH. You seem to be ignorant that the goodness and luminosity of God reaches both the holy angels and us human beings by participation, that is, by grace. However, that which is characteristic of the divine nature, being without beginning and uncreated, this is not observed in any of the others. But if you grant to evil the characteristics that are properly and primarily of the divine nature, how will it not be of equal honor with God? And tell me, how can you call God all-powerful, if according to you He has not yet mastered matter and the things from it? 26. MAN. But there will be a time when He will master it too. 27. ORTH. Therefore He is not yet now all-powerful, since He has not yet mastered the matter that is eternally coexistent with Him, and later what He does not now have will be added to Him according to you; for being now all-powerful in potentiality, He will later become so in actuality, proceeding from imperfection to perfection. But answer me, how is it that He is not now all-powerful? Is it as not being able, or as not being willing? If as not being able, how is He all-powerful at all? For the all-powerful must always be also all-capable. But if as not being willing, first He begrudges the salvation of men, and second He is found to be the cause of evil, being able but not willing to destroy it. 28. MAN. From where, then, do evils come? 29. ORTH. Your question has not arisen from any logical sequence. For it is necessary to know if evil exists, and what evil is, and then to inquire from where it arises. 30. MAN. Let us inquire in this way. 31. ORTH. Of existing things, some are substance, some quality, some aptitude, some activity. And substance is I, you; quality is white, black, sweet, bitter, and all such things as are observed in underlying bodies; aptitude is that for which created things are by nature suited, being such in potentiality, for example the hands are suited for performing crafts, the tongue for serving speech, the feet for walking, a child for technical learning; activity is the action of a thing according to its nature, of the irrational as irrational, of the rational as rational. Which of these, then, do you define evil to be? 32. MAN. Activity; but it is clear that every activity is the activity of a substance. 33. ORTH. Every activity is indeed the activity of a substance. But I ask you: can evil, being an activity, also be a substance? 34. MAN. I say so. 35. ORTH. First, you contradict yourself, saying that activity comes from substance and again positing that activity is substance; whence you will not escape the charge of exceeding all ignorance and of being unsound even among those utterly inexperienced in dialectic. But I ask you, is every activity evil? 36. MAN. Not entirely. 37. ORTH. What activity, then, do you call evil? 38. MAN. Murder, adultery, injustice, and all such things. 39. ORTH. If murder is, according to you, evil by nature, do judges do evil when they execute grave-robbers and murderers? And again: why is it that one who has intercourse with his own wife does not sin, but one who does this with another's wife sins, even though the act of intercourse is one and the same? I think that through these examples, you will agree, even unwillingly, that every activity is indifferent, but is varied by the intention of the one pursuing it, becoming either virtue or vice; the

3

24. ΜΑΝ. Οὐχ ὁμοίαν αὐτὴν ποιοῦμεν τῷ ἀγαθῷ θεῷ. Οἴδαμεν γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ὕψιστον, ἀγαθόν, φωτοειδῆ, παντοκράτορα. Εἰ καὶ ἄναρχος οὖν ἡ κακία, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποδέει. 25. ὈΡΘ. Ἔοικας ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ φωτοειδὲς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἁγίους ἀγγέλους, καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατὰ μετουσίαν ἤτοι χάρισμα φθάνει. Ὃ μέντοι τῆς θείας φύσεώς ἐστι χαρακτηριστικόν, τὸ ἄναρχον καὶ ἀγένητον, τοῦτο ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνθεωρεῖται. Εἰ δὲ τῇ κακίᾳ δίδως τὰ κυρίως καὶ πρώτως τῆς θείας φύσεως χαρακτηριστικά, πῶς οὐχ ὁμότιμος ἔσται τῷ θεῷ; Εἰπὲ δέ μοι πῶς παντοκράτορα λέγεις τὸν θεόν, εἴ γε κατὰ σὲ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς οὔπω κεκράτηκεν; 26. ΜΑΝ. Ἀλλ' ἔσται καιρὸς ὅτε καὶ αὐτῆς κρατήσει. 27. ὈΡΘ. Οὐκοῦν οὔπω νῦν παντοκράτωρ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ οὔπω κεκράτηκε τῆς ἀϊδίως αὐτῷ συνούσης ὕλης, ὕστερον δὲ ὃ μὴ νῦν ἔχει προσγενήσεται αὐτῷ κατὰ σέ· δυνάμει γὰρ νῦν παντο- κράτωρ ὑπάρχων, ὕστερον ἐνεργείᾳ γενήσεται ἐξ ἀτελοῦς εἰς τελειότητα ἐρχόμενος. Ἀπόκριναι δέ μοι πῶς νῦν οὐκ ἔστι παντοκράτωρ, ὡς μὴ δυνάμενος ἢ ὡς μὴ βουλόμενος; Εἰ μὲν ὡς μὴ δυνάμενος, πῶς ὅλως παντοκράτωρ; Χρὴ γὰρ εἶναι τὸν παντοκράτορα ἀεὶ καὶ παντοδύναμον. Εἰ δὲ ὡς μὴ βουλόμενος, πρῶτον μὲν βασκαίνει τῇ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ αἴτιος τῆς κακίας εὑρίσκεται, δυνάμενος μέν, μὴ βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτὴν ἀνελεῖν. 28. ΜΑΝ. Πόθεν οὖν τὰ κακά; 29. ὈΡΘ. Οὐκ ἀκολουθίᾳ τινὶ λογικῇ ἡ παρὰ σοῦ πεῦσις γεγένηται. Χρὴ γὰρ εἰδέναι εἰ ἔστι κακόν, καὶ τί ἐστι τὸ κακόν, εἴθ' οὕτω ζητῆσαι πόθεν συνίσταται. 30. ΜΑΝ. Οὕτω ζητήσωμεν. 31. ὈΡΘ. Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν οὐσία, τὰ δὲ ποιότης, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτηδειότης, τὰ δὲ ἐνέργεια. Καὶ οὐσία μέν ἐστιν ἐγώ, σύ· ποιότης δὲ λευκόν, μέλαν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἐν ὑποκειμένοις σώμασι θεωρεῖται· ἐπιτηδειότης δὲ πρὸς ἣν πεφύ- κασι τὰ γεγονότα δυνάμει τοιαῦτα τυγχάνοντα, οἷον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσιν αἱ χεῖρες τέχνας ἐργάζεσθαι, γλῶσσα δὲ λόγῳ διακονεῖν, πόδες δὲ πρὸς βάδισιν, παιδίον δὲ πρὸς μάθησιν τεχνικήν· ἐνέργεια δέ ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν πρᾶξις, ἡ τοῦ ἀλόγου ὡς ἀλόγου, ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ. Τί τοίνυν τῶν εἰρημένων ὁρίζῃ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι; 32. ΜΑΝ. Ἐνέργειαν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι πᾶσα ἐνέργεια οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια. 33. ὈΡΘ. Πᾶσα μὲν ἐνέργεια οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια. Ἐρωτῶ δέ σε· ἡ κακία ἐνέργεια οὖσα καὶ οὐσία εἶναι δύναται; 34. ΜΑΝ. Οὕτω φημί. 35. ὈΡΘ. Πρῶτον μὲν ἐναντίος σεαυτῷ ὑπάρχεις, ἐξ οὐσίας γενέσθαι λέγων τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ πάλιν οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐνέρ- γειαν ὑποτιθέμενος· ὅθεν πάσης ἀμαθίας ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄγαν ἀπείροις διαλεκτικῆς οὐ διαφεύξῃ νοσῶν· ἐρωτῶ δέ σε, ἆρα πᾶσα ἐνέργεια κακή; 36. ΜΑΝ. Οὐ πάντως. 37. ὈΡΘ. Ποίαν οὖν λέγεις κακὴν ἐνέργειαν; 38. ΜΑΝ. Φόνον, μοιχείαν, ἀδικίαν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. 39. ὈΡΘ. Εἰ ὁ φόνος κατὰ σὲ φύσει κακός, οἱ δικασταὶ τυμβωρύχους καὶ ἀνδροφόνους φονεύοντες κακῶς ποιοῦσιν; Καὶ πάλιν· τί δήποτε ὁ μὲν τῇ ἰδίᾳ γαμετῇ μιγνύμενος οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ δὲ τοῦτο ποιῶν ἁμαρτάνει, καὶ ταῦτα μιᾶς ἐνεργείας οὔσης τῆς μίξεως; Οἶμαί σε διὰ τούτων καὶ ἄκοντα προσομολογεῖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἐνέργεια μέσῃ ἐστί, ποικίλλεται δὲ τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ μετιόντος, ἀρετὴ ἢ κακία γινομένη· ὁ