ARTICLE 2

In this article the question is: Whether Saint Augustine's definition of virtue is a good one.

St. Augustine says: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use; which God works in us, without us."

             It would seem that this is not a good definition.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue is a kind of goodness. If, then, it is good, it is so either by its own goodness, or by the goodness of something else. If the latter, we have an infinite process; if the former, virtue becomes the primary good, because only the first good is good per se.

             2. Further, that which is common to all being should not be placed in the definition of any one thing. But goodness, which is convertible with being, is common to all being. Therefore, it should not be included in the definition of virtue.

             3. Further, as good is in moral beings, so is it in natural beings. But good and bad do not vary the species of natural things. Neither, therefore, should 'good' be placed in the definition of virtue, as though it were the specific difference of virtue.

             4. Further a differentia is not included in the definition of its genus. But good is included in the definition of quality, just as being is. Consequently, it should not be added to the definition of virtue, so as to say that: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, etc."

             5. Further, evil and good are opposites. But evil does not constitute any species, since it is a privation; neither, therefore, does good. Thus goodness must not be placed as an essential differentia in the definition of virtue.

             6. Further, goodness is more universal than quality. Therefore, one quality does not differ from another by its goodness; for which reason goodness should not be placed in the definition of virtue, as though it were the differentia of that quality.

             7. Further, nothing is made up of two acts. But goodness denotes a certain act, and quality likewise. It is improper, then, to say that virtue is a 'good quality.'

             8. Further, what is predicated in the abstract is not predicated in the concrete; thus whiteness is a color, it is not something colored. But goodness is predicated of virtue in the abstract. Therefore, it is not predicated of it in the concrete; and so it is incorrect to say that virtue is a 'good quality.'

             9. Further, no differentia is predicated in the abstract of a species; wherefore, Avicenna says that man is not rationality but a rational being. But virtue is goodness. Therefore, goodness is not the differentia of virtue; hence we cannot truly say that virtue is a 'good quality.'

             10. Further, a moral evil is called a vice. Therefore, moral good is the same as virtue; and therefore, goodness should not be included in the definition of virtue, or else the same thing would define itself.

             11. Further, mind refers to the intellect. But virtue pertains rather to the will (affectum). Therefore, it is wrong to say that virtue is a good quality of the 'mind.'

             12. Further, according to Augustine, mind denotes the higher part of the soul. But there are some virtues in the lower powers. Therefore, it is not suitable to say, in the definition of virtue, 'a good quality of the mind.'

             13. Further, the subject of virtue is a power, and not the essence of the soul. But mind seems to designate the essence of the soul; for Augustine says that in mind there are understanding, memory, and will. Therefore 'mind' is not to be placed in the definition of virtue.

             14. Further, that which is proper to a species should not be included in the definition of its genus. But righteousness (rectitudo) is proper to justice. Hence righteousness should not be placed in the definition of virtue, as it is in Augustine's definition: 'a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously.'

             15. Further, in living things to live is to be (vivere viventibus est esse). But virtue does not perfect one in being but in acting. Therefore, we should not say 'by which we live righteously.'

             16. Further, whoever takes pride in a certain thing makes a bad use of it. But some are proud of their virtues. Therefore, one can make a bad use of virtues.

             17. Further, in his book De Libero Arbitrio Augustine says that it is only of the supreme goods that no one makes bad use. But virtue is not one of the highest goods, because the latter are sought for their own sake, which is not so with virtues, since these are desired for the sake of something else, namely for happiness. Therefore, it is improper to say: 'of which no one can make bad use.'

             18. Further, a thing is generated, nourished, and increased by the same cause. But virtue is nourished and increased by our acts, for the diminution of cupidity is the increase of charity. Therefore, virtue is generated by our acts, so that it is incorrect to place in the definition: 'which God works in us, without us.'

             19. Further, that which removes an impediment is regarded as a mover and cause. But, in a certain sense, free will removes the impediments to virtue. Therefore, free will is, to this extent, the cause of virtue, so that it is not right to say that God works virtue in us without us.

             20. Further, Augustine says "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." Therefore, the conclusion is as above.

             21. Lastly, this definition seems to be proper to grace. But virtue and grace are not one and the same thing. Consequently, virtue is not well-defined by Augustine.

             I reply: We must hold that Augustine's is the true definition of virtue, even if the last phrase be omitted; and that it is suitable for every human virtue.

             For, as we have said (in the preceding article), virtue ultimately disposes a power for perfect act: but this perfect act is the end to which a power or agent is ordered: hence virtue renders good both the power and the agent, as we have already observed (ibid). Therefore, in the definition of virtue, one element is included which pertains to the perfection of the act, and another which pertains to the perfection of the power or agent.

             Now two things are required for the perfection of an act. It is necessary that the act be a good one, and that the habit cannot be the principle of a contrary act. For that which is the principle of both a good and a bad act cannot in itself be the perfect principle of a good act, since a habit is the perfection of a power. Hence it must be the principle of an act which is wholly good and in no way bad. For this reason, the Philosopher says in the Ethics, that opinion, which can be true or false, is not a virtue; but science, which is had only of truth, is a virtue. The first requirement is indicated in the words: 'by which we live righteously;' the second, by the phrase: 'of which no one can make bad use.'

             With regard to the fact that virtue makes its subject good, three things must be considered. The first is the subject itself, and this is determined by the word 'mind;' for a human virtue can reside only in that part of man by which he is truly human. Secondly, the perfection of the intellect, which is designated by the word 'good;' for goodness bespeaks an order to an end. Thirdly, the manner in which the virtue inheres in its subject is shown by the word 'quality;' for virtue does not inhere as a passion, but as a habit, as was said above (preceding art.).

             All of this belongs to both moral and intellectual virtue, to theological, to acquired, and to infused virtue. The phrase which Augustine adds: 'which God works in us, without us,' applies only to infused virtue.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Just as accidents are called beings, not because they subsist, but because there is some being in them; so virtue is said to be good, not as though it were itself (its own) good, but as that by which something is good. Hence it is not necessary that virtue be good thanks to the goodness of another, as though it were informed by the goodness of something else.

             2. The good which is convertible with being is not that which is here placed in the definition of virtue; rather it is that goodness which is ordered to a moral act.

             3. Acts are distinguished according to the diverse forms of their agents, as heating and freezing. Now good and evil are, as it were, the form and object of the will--since an agent always impresses its own form on a patient and a mover does the same on the object being moved. Hence moral acts, the principle of which is the will, are specifically diversified according to good and evil. However, the principle of natural acts is not the end, but some form. Therefore, in natural things, species of acts are not distinguished according to good and evil, as are moral acts.

             4. Moral goodness is not included in the notion of quality; hence the objection proves nothing.

             5. Evil constitutes a species, not insofar as it is a privation, but by reason of the subject of the privation, when that subject is lacking in some good. This is how evil constitutes a species.

             6. This objection relates to natural, not moral good; it is the latter which is placed in the definition of virtue.

             7. Goodness implies no good other than virtue itself, as is clear from what has been said. For virtue is essentially a quality; hence it is manifest that 'good' and 'quality' do not bespeak diverse acts, but one and the same act.

             8. This objection errs with respect to the transcendentals, which embrace all being. For essence is being, and goodness is good, and unity is one; whereas whiteness cannot be called white. The reason is that whatever is grasped by the intellect must fall under the notion of being and, consequently, of goodness and of oneness. Thus essence and goodness and unity cannot be understood save under the aspect of good, one, and being. This is why goodness can be called good, and unity, one.

(The following is an addition made by Fr. Vincent de Castronovo, O.P., venerable professor of Sacred Theology.)

             9. Differentia, like genus, is predicated essentially of a species, and not denominatively. Therefore, if the species is something subsisting and composed, differentia is not predicated of it in the abstract, but in the concrete.

             For in composed substances, concrete terms, which signify a composite, are said properly of a predicable, as species or genus; for example, man or animal. Hence, if a differentia is to be predicated essentially of such a species, it must be expressed in the concrete. Otherwise it would not signify the entire being of the species.

             But if the species is a simple form (as accidents are, in which concrete terms are not placed as in a predicable, as species or genera, e.g. black and white, save reductively; but only as they are expressed in the abstract, e.g. whiteness, music, justice, and virtue in general), both genus and differentia are predicated of it in the abstract. Consequently, just as virtue is essentially a quality, so also is the goodness of reason or moral goodness.

             10. Moral goodness is predicated of a good act, a good habit, and an object that is morally good. Similarly, moral evil is predicated of an evil act, which is sin, and of an evil habit, which is vice. Hence virtue is that which makes its subject good and his acts morally good; whereas vice is that which makes the vicious person evil and his acts morally bad. Thus moral evil is not the same as vice; for vice refers to a habit, while moral evil is attributed to acts and to objects, as well as to habits. For the same reason, moral good is not identical with virtue, since the former is also predicated of acts.

             In virtue itself we may consider three things:

             The first is what the essence of virtue immediately signifies: virtue denotes a certain disposition whereby one is disposed well and properly, according to one's nature. In the Physics, the Philosopher says that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: now by a perfect thing I mean that which is properly disposed, according to its nature." In this regard, vice is opposed to virtue, because it denotes that a thing is disposed contrary to its nature. Hence Augustine says, in De Libero Arbitrio "Whatever you observe lacking in the perfection of a nature you may well call vice; because the vice of anything is evidently the result of its not being properly disposed according to its nature."

             Secondly, we must consider what follows upon the essence of virtue, what virtue itself entails as a consequent. Virtue denotes a certain moral goodness which makes its possessor good. For the goodness of each thing consists in its being aptly disposed in the manner befitting its nature. Now this is what virtue effects, as has been said; and so malice is opposed to virtue.

             Thirdly, we must consider that to which virtue is ordained, namely, a good act. For virtue is ordered to an act which is good and fitting and properly in accord with reason. Hence virtue is the perfection of a power as ordered to its act; not only making one who has it good, but also rendering his action good. In this sense sin is opposed to virtue, for sin properly bespeaks an inordinate act.

             From this it is clear that vicious habits, vice, and sin can be called moral evils, and that virtue is a type of moral good, and not vice-versa.

             11. 'Mind' is taken here as it includes all the rational powers; hence it comprises both the intellect and the will. For the will is by its essence a rational power. However, virtues can reside in the intellect as well as in the will. Intellectual virtues facilitate the operations of this faculty, although they do not insure a good use of the faculty. But the moral virtues, and others which are virtues in an absolute sense, informing the will with the power of acting well, also make for the good use of the will, insofar as by them one uses this faculty rightly and well. Thus justice effects, not only that a man be prompt in doing just things, but also that he actually do them in a just manner. On the other hand, grammar provides one with the ability of speaking correctly and coherently, but it does not make a man always speak in a becoming manner, for the grammarian may sometimes employ barbarisms or solecisms.

             From all of which it is plain that virtue pertains to the appetitive and to the intellective powers, both of which are included in the term 'mind.'

             12. By the word 'mind' is meant the power which elicits acts of which man is master, which are properly called human. The powers of this sort are the reason and the will, which are the first moving principles, commanding acts of which man is master. These powers are said to be rational by their very essence. Moreover, the irascible and concupiscible appetites, inasmuch as they participate in reason, are principles of human acts, as moved movers. For they are moved by the higher appetite when they obey it. In this way, since they participate in reason and have been constituted apt to obey reason, they can be the subject of human virtue.

             Hence it is evident that the intellect and the will are the first principles of human acts, as moving and imperating them; the sense appetite is a secondary principle, a moved mover. Powers of this kind, then, which are included under the term 'mind,' can be the subject of virtue.

             Mind denotes a power which is rational, either essentially or by participation. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites are rational powers by participation; and for this reason they can be the subject of virtue, insofar as they participate in (the powers of the) mind.

             13. Mind signifies the highest power of the soul. Hence, since the divine image is imprinted on what is highest in our being, it must be said that this image is not in the very essence of the soul, but only in the intellectual power, which is the supreme faculty of the soul. Thus, insofar as God's image is in it, mind signifies a power of the soul, and not its essence. Wherefore, mind comprises those powers which are independent in their operations of matter and of the conditions of matter. In mind there are understanding, memory and will--not as accidents in a subject, but as parts of a whole.

             14. Righteousness is two-fold. One is a special type, which regards only exterior objects which fall to man's use; and these things are the proper matter of justice. Hence this kind of righteousness is proper to justice, and is not placed in the definition of virtue. Another type is righteousness in a general sense, which denotes ordination to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will. Such righteousness is common to every virtue and so is included in the definition of virtue itself.

             15. Life may be understood in two ways.

             First, life may signify the being of the living thing; in this sense it pertains to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of being in living things. Thus, in the De Anima, the Philosopher says that in living things, living is being. Taken in this sense, 'living' does not belong in the definition of virtue.

             Secondly, life may denote the operation of the living thing: thus the acts of understanding and of sense knowledge are types of life. Hence the operation which a man finds supremely delightful and in which he chiefly occupies himself is said to be his life. And so, in the Metaphysics, the Philosopher remarks that the race of men live by art and reasoning, i.e. they act thus. In this sense, 'life' is placed in the definition of virtue, because by virtue a man lives rightly, i.e. by it he acts rightly.

             16. The bad use of virtue can be understood in two ways.

             First, of virtue as an object. A man can make a bad use of virtue as an object when, for example, he has an evil regard for it, or hates it, or is proud of it.

             Secondly, of virtue as the principle eliciting some bad use: when the bad use itself is elicited by virtue. In this way no one can make a bad use of virtue, for virtue is a habit which always inclines one to good. This is so because every virtue enables a faculty to act well, and some virtues both do this and insure a good use of the faculty. They insure this good use by making one use the faculty well; of this type are the virtues which pertain to the appetitive power. For example, justice effects not only that a man be of a ready will to perform just deeds, but also that he act justly.

             17. Only the supreme goods are those which no one can use badly as objects, because these goods are desirable for their own sake, and cannot be hated by anyone. But a man can make a bad use of virtue as an object, because virtues are not the highest goods, as has been said above (Art. 1 ad 3); although he cannot use them badly as an elicitive principle.

             Indeed there is no necessity that that, of which one cannot make bad use as the elicitive principle of the bad use, be a supreme good. It may even be said, as Augustine does here, that virtue is numbered among the highest goods, insofar as by it a man is ordered to the supreme good, which is God. On this count, no one uses virtues badly.

             18. Just as acquired virtues are increased and fostered by the (same sort of) acts which caused them, so the infused virtues are increased by the action of God, by Whom they are caused.

             Yet our own acts may dispose us for the increase of charity and the infused virtues. Thus, to receive charity from its source, a man prepares and disposes himself by doing what lies in him, in order to receive this charity from God. Even further than this, our acts can merit an increase of charity, inasmuch as they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. But no one can merit to obtain charity in the first place, for without charity itself there can be no merit.

             Hence it is clear that charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by our acts, but only dispositively and meritoriously (non augentur active . . . sed tantum dispositive et meritorie). They are actively increased by the action of God, Who perfects and conserves the charity which He has previously infused.

             19. Sin is the impediment to virtue. Now free will, without the action of God, is not of itself sufficient to remove sin, because only God can effectively blot out our iniquities and forgive our sins. Moreover, the Holy Spirit, moving the heart of man to a greater or less degree, according to His Divine Will, precedes every disposition, preparation, or effort of free will before the influx of charity. For sin is not forgiven without grace; thus, Rom. 3/24: "Being justified freely by His grace."

             20. Infused virtue is caused in us by God, without any action on our part, not, however, without our consent. And so God does not justify us without our consent, for when we are justified we consent to the justice of God by the movement of our own free will. Nevertheless, this movement is not the cause of the grace which formally justifies, but rather its effect; so that the entire operation belongs to grace and to God, Who, while He justifies, efficaciously infuses grace into our hearts. Indeed, those effects which we accomplish by ourselves, of which we are the cause, God Himself causes in us, but not without any action of ours: for He works in every will and in every nature.

             21. The definition of virtue, once it is correctly understood, does not apply to grace. For, although grace belongs reductively to the first species of quality, it is not an operative habit, as virtue is, because it is not immediately ordered to operation. It is rather like a character (habitudo) which bestows a certain spiritual, Divine being on the soul, and is presupposed by the infused virtues as their root and principle. Grace is to the essence of the soul what health is to the body. Therefore, Chrysostom says that grace is the health of the soul. It is not reckoned among the sciences, nor among the virtues, nor among any of the qualities which the philosophers have enumerated, for they know only those accidents of the soul which are ordered to acts proportionate to human nature.

             Therefore, virtue is essentially an operative habit, whereas grace is not an operative habit, but a kind of supernatural participation in the Divine Nature (quaedam supernaturalis participatio divinae naturae), by the reception of which we are said to be regenerated as sons of God (as we read in 1 Peter 1/4).

             Hence, just as the natural light of reason is the root and principle of acquired virtue; so the light of grace, which is a participation in the Divine Nature, dwelling in the very essence of the soul in the form of a certain character (habilitas), is the root and principle of infused virtue.

             Moreover, virtue is a good quality, which makes its possessor good. Now this goodness, which virtue confers on one who has virtue, is a perfection ordered to operation, of which it is the immediate principle. But the goodness which grace bestows on the soul is a perfection, not ordered immediately to operation, but to a certain spiritual, Divine being, whereby those who enjoy grace are, in a sense, formed to the likeness of God. For this reason they are said to be pleasing to God as sons. Wherefore, the 'good' mentioned in the definition of virtue bespeaks a certain nature already pre-existing--which is the Divine nature, essentially or by participation. Now such good is not attributed to grace, save as to the root and principle of such goodness in man, which grace is.

             'Mind,' also, as it is included in the definition of virtue, signifies the subject of virtue, namely, a power of the soul; whereas in the definition of grace, the subject of grace is the essence of the soul.

             Likewise, 'life,' as found in the definition of virtue, implies an operation, of which virtue itself is the immediate principle; whereas, when it is attributed to grace, life denotes a certain Divine being, of which grace is the immediate principle. In the latter instance it does not refer to any operation, for grace is not ordered to any, save by means of virtue.

             Lastly, virtue is said to be the disposition of a perfect thing to what is best, insofar as it perfects a power with regard to operation, by which a thing attains its end. In this sense, grace is not a disposition of what is perfect to what is best for it: both because it does not primarily perfect a power but the essence of the soul, and also because it has not an operation for its proximate effect, but rather a certain type of Divine being. From this it is evident that the definition of virtue is not to be applied to grace.

 (End of the addition of Vincent de Castronovo)