Chapter II.—Claim to Be Treated as Others are When Accused.

If, indeed, any one can convict us of a crime, be it small or great, we do not ask to be excused from punishment, but are prepared to undergo the sharpest and most merciless inflictions. But if the accusation relates merely to our name—and it is undeniable, that up to the present time the stories told about us rest on nothing better than the common undiscriminating popular talk, nor has any Christian6    [Kaye, 154.] been convicted of crime—it will devolve on you, illustrious and benevolent and most learned sovereigns, to remove by law this despiteful treatment, so that, as throughout the world both individuals and cities partake of your beneficence, we also may feel grateful to you, exulting that we are no longer the victims of false accusation. For it does not comport with your justice, that others when charged with crimes should not be punished till they are convicted, but that in our case the name we bear should have more force than the evidence adduced on the trial, when the judges, instead of inquiring whether the person arraigned have committed any crime, vent their insults on the name, as if that were itself a crime.7    [Tatian, cap. xxvii., supra, p. 76.] But no name in and by itself is reckoned either good or bad; names appear bad or good according as the actions underlying them are bad or good. You, however, have yourselves a clear knowledge of this, since you are well instructed in philosophy and all learning. For this reason, too, those who are brought before you for trial, though they may be arraigned on the gravest charges, have no fear, because they know that you will inquire respecting their previous life, and not be influenced by names if they mean nothing, nor by the charges contained in the indictments if they should be false: they accept with equal satisfaction, as regards its fairness, the sentence whether of condemnation or acquittal. What, therefore, is conceded as the common right of all, we claim for ourselves, that we shall not be hated and punished because we are called Christians (for what has the name8    [Tatian, cap. xxvii., supra, p. 76.] to do with our being bad men?), but be tried on any charges which may be brought against us, and either be released on our disproving them, or punished if convicted of crime—not for the name (for no Christian is a bad man unless he falsely profess our doctrines), but for the wrong which has been done. It is thus that we see the philosophers judged. None of them before trial is deemed by the judge either good or bad on account of his science or art, but if found guilty of wickedness he is punished, without thereby affixing any stigma on philosophy (for he is a bad man for not cultivating philosophy in a lawful manner, but science is blameless), while if he refutes the false charges he is acquitted. Let this equal justice, then, be done to us. Let the life of the accused persons be investigated, but let the name stand free from all imputation. I must at the outset of my defence entreat you, illustrious emperors, to listen to me impartially: not to be carried away by the common irrational talk and prejudge the case, but to apply your desire of knowledge and love of truth to the examination of our doctrine also. Thus, while you on your part will not err through ignorance, we also, by disproving the charges arising out of the undiscerning rumour of the multitude, shall cease to be assailed.

Καὶ εἰ μέν τις ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχειν ἔχει ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μεῖζον ἀδικοῦντας, κολάζεσθαι οὐ παραιτούμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥτις πικροτάτη καὶ ἀνηλεὴς τιμωρία, ὑπέχειν ἀξιοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ μέχρις ὀνόματος ἡ κατηγορία (εἰς γοῦν τὴν σήμερον ἡμέραν ἃ περὶ ἡμῶν λογοποιοῦσιν ἡ κοινὴ καὶ ἄκριτος τῶν ἀνθρώπων φήμη, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀδικῶν Χριστιανὸς ἐλήλεγκται), ὑμῶν ἤδη ἔργον τῶν μεγίστων καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτων καὶ φιλομαθεστάτων βασιλέων ἀποσκευάσαι ἡμῶν νόμῳ τὴν ἐπήρειαν, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἡ σύμπασα ταῖς παρ' ὑμῶν εὐεργεσίαις καὶ καθ' ἕνα κεκοινώνηκε καὶ κατὰ πόλεις, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔχωμεν ὑμῖν χάριν σεμνυνόμενοι ὅτι πεπαύμεθα συκοφαντούμενοι. καὶ γὰρ οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας δικαιοσύνης τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αἰτίαν λαβόντας ἀδικημάτων μὴ πρότερον ἢ ἐλεγχθῆναι κολάζεσθαι, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ μεῖζον ἰσχύειν τὸ ὄνομα τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ δίκῃ ἐλέγχων, οὐκ εἰ ἠδίκησέν τι ὁ κρινόμενος τῶν δικαζόντων ἐπιζητούντων, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ὄνομα ὡς εἰς ἀδίκημα ἐνυβριζόντων. οὐδὲν δὲ ὄνομα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ δι' αὑτοῦ οὐ πονηρὸν οὐδὲ χρηστὸν νομίζεται, διὰ δὲ τὰς ὑποκειμένας αὐτοῖς ἢ πονηρὰς ἢ ἀγαθὰς ἢ φλαῦρα ἢ ἀγαθὰ δοκεῖ. ὑμεῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἴστε φανερώτερον, ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας καὶ παιδείας πάσης ὁρμώμενοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν κρινόμενοι, κἂν ἐπὶ μεγίστοις φεύγωσι, θαρροῦσιν, [καὶ] εἰδότες ὅτι ἐξετάσετε αὐτῶν τὸν βίον καὶ οὔτε τοῖς ὀνόμασι προσθήσεσθε, ἂν ᾖ κενά, οὔτε ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κατηγόρων αἰτίαις, εἰ ψευδεῖς εἶεν, ἐν ἴσῃ τάξει τὴν καταδικάζουσαν τῆς ἀπολυούσης δέχονται ψῆφον. τὸ τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἴσον καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν, μὴ ὅτι Χριστιανοὶ λεγόμεθα μισεῖσθαι καὶ κολά ζεσθαι (τί γὰρ ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα πρὸς κακίαν τελεῖ;), ἀλλὰ κρίνεσθαι ἐφ' ὅτῳ ἂν καὶ εὐθύνῃ τις, καὶ ἢ ἀφίεσθαι ἀπολυομένους τὰς κατηγορίας ἢ κολάζεσθαι τοὺς ἁλισκομένους πονηρούς, μὴ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι (οὐδεὶς γὰρ Χριστιανὸς πονηρός, εἰ μὴ ὑποκρίνεται τὸν λόγον), ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀδικήματι. οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας κρινομένους ὁρῶμεν· οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν πρὸ κρίσεως διὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην ἀγαθὸς ἢ πονηρὸς τῷ δικαστῇ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ δόξας μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος κολάζεται, οὐδὲν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ προστριψάμενος ἔγκλημα (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ πονηρὸς ὁ μὴ ὡς νόμος φιλοσοφῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀναίτιος), ἀπολυσάμενος δὲ τὰς διαβολὰς ἀφίεται. ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν· ὁ τῶν κρινομένων ἐξεταζέσθω βίος, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα παντὸς ἀφείσθω ἐγκλήματος. ἀναγκαῖον δέ μοι ἀρχομένῳ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου δεηθῆναι ὑμῶν, μέγιστοι αὐτο κράτορες, ἴσους ἡμῖν ἀκροατὰς γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἀλόγῳ φήμῃ συναπενεχθέντας προκατασχεθῆναι, ἐπιτρέψαι δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλάληθες καὶ τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς λόγῳ. ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οὐ πρὸς ἀγνοίας ἐξαμαρτήσετε καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκρίτου τῶν πολλῶν φήμης ἀπολυσάμενοι παυσόμεθα πολεμούμενοι.