Chapter II.—Hermogenes, After a Perverse Induction from Mere Heretical Assumptions, Concludes that God Created All Things Out of Pre-Existing Matter.

Our very bad painter has coloured this his primary shade absolutely without any light, with such arguments as these: He begins with laying down the premiss,15    Præstruens. that the Lord made all things either out of Himself, or out of nothing, or out of something; in order that, after he has shown that it was impossible for Him to have made them either out of Himself or out of nothing, he might thence affirm the residuary proposition that He made them out of something, and therefore that that something was Matter.  He could not have made all things, he says, of Himself; because whatever things the Lord made of Himself would have been parts of Himself; but16    Porro. He is not dissoluble into parts,17    In partes non devenire. because, being the Lord, He is indivisible, and unchangeable, and always the same. Besides, if He had made anything out of Himself, it would have been something of Himself. Everything, however, both which was made and which He made must be accounted imperfect, because it was made of a part, and He made it of a part; or if, again, it was a whole which He made, who is a whole Himself, He must in that case have been at once both a whole, and yet not a whole; because it behoved Him to be a whole, that He might produce Himself,18    Ut faceret semetipsum. and yet not a whole, that He might be produced out of Himself.19    Ut fieret de semetipso. But this is a most difficult position. For if He were in existence, He could not be made, for He was in existence already; if, however, he were not in existence He could not make, because He was a nonentity.  He maintains, moreover, that He who always exists, does not come into existence,20    Non fieri. but exists for ever and ever. He accordingly concludes that He made nothing out of Himself, since He never passed into such a condition21    Non ejus fieret conditionis. as made it possible for Him to make anything out of Himself. In like manner, he contends that He could not have made all things out of nothing—thus:  He defines the Lord as a being who is good, nay, very good, who must will to make things as good and excellent as He is Himself; indeed it were impossible for Him either to will or to make anything which was not good, nay, very good itself. Therefore all things ought to have been made good and excellent by Him, after His own condition. Experience shows,22    Inveniri. however, that things which are even evil were made by Him: not, of course, of His own will and pleasure; because, if it had been of His own will and pleasure, He would be sure to have made nothing unfitting or unworthy of Himself.  That, therefore, which He made not of His own will must be understood to have been made from the fault of something, and that is from Matter, without a doubt.

CAPUT II.

Hanc primam umbram plane sine lumine pessimus pictor illis argumentationibus coloravit, praestruens aut Dominum de semetipso fecisse cuncta, aut de nihilo aut de aliquo: ut cum ostenderit neque ex semetipso fecisse potuisse, neque ex nihilo , quod superest exinde confirmet, ex aliquo eum fecisse, atque ita aliquid illud materiam fuisse. Negat illum ex semetipso facere potuisse: quia partes ipsius fuissent, quaecumque ex semetipso fecisset Dominus. Porro in partes non devenire, ut indivisibilem et indemutabilem, et eumdem semper qua Dominus. Caeterum, si de semetipso fecisset aliquid, ipsius fuisset aliquid. Omne autem et quod fieret, et quod faceret, 0198C imperfectum habendum; quia ex parte fieret, et ex parte faceret: aut si totus totum fecisset, oportuisset 0199A illum simul et totum esse, et non totum; quia oporteret et totum esse, ut faceret semetipsum; et totum non esse, ut fieret de semetipso. Porro difficillimum. Si enim esset, non fieret, esset enim: si vero non esset, non faceret, quia nihil esset. Eum autem qui semper sit, non fieri, sed esse illum in aevum aevorum. Igitur non de semetipso fecisse illum qui non ejus fuerit conditionis, ut de semetipso facere potuisset. Proinde ex nihilo non potuisse eum facere, sic contendit, bonum et optimum definiens Dominum, qui bona atque optima tam velit facere quam sit; imo nihil non bonum atque optimum et velle eum et facere. Igitur omnia bona, omnia ab eo bona et optima oportuisse fieri secundum conditionem ipsius. Inveniri autem et mala ab eo facta; utique non ex arbitrio, 0199B nec ex voluntate: quia si ex arbitrio et voluntate, nihil incongruens et indignum sibi faceret. Quod ergo non arbitrio suo fecerit, intelligi oportere ex vitio alicujus rei factum, ex materia esse sine dubio.