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an argument that it is very far away, but the things that partake of matter seem somehow to be separated from it, having departed from the simplicity of form and having been shaped by composition; for they have their subsistence from matter and form. If, then, someone beginning from the first being examines the natures of beings and descends to the things below, he will arrive at another, simpler being, namely matter. But I mean matter not as that which immediately underlies forms-for this, partaking of form, has been called 'formed matter'-but 'matter-itself' as one might say, which also has some faint appearance of being. For since the first being is form-itself and boasts a creative power of forms, 'matter-itself' would properly be named that which underlies it from the opposite, being especially non-being rather than being. But the first being grants even to this, by the overflow of its substance-making power, also a certain small appearance of being. For 'itself' is most fitting for form; for we speak of 'triangle-itself' and 'man-itself', when we contemplate them apart from matter.

9

The natural philosophers, then, posit this matter as substance no less than form, as receptive of all forms, and for this reason called it the 'all-receptive', and again 'maenad', as spitting out forms and taking on others, and certain other such things. Thus, being characterized more in non-being than in being, it has images and faint appearances of the first being, from which is every substance that is in actuality and in potentiality. And this reasonably so; for things that are diametrically opposed to each other project certain phantoms of similarity. The first being has become incomprehensible to the mind, the last is incomprehensible. But something of that one, if anything is comprehensible at all, is comprehended by its own reasoning; for it is being. But this last is bastard, according to the philosopher from Stageira; for the first is defined as non-being by negation, because it is none of the beings; for it is their creative cause and superior to them. The last is also defined by negation, because it is none of the beings, but also inferior to them. The first is most simple, and the last is most simple, even if it is variegated by different forms. For this reason also some of those among the Greeks who theologized imagined matter to be co-eternal with the Creator, knowing badly and unworthily of his proposed hypothesis. For since matter is known more as non-being, the being-making and all-working power makes it also to partake of being and to underlie the things that are and come to be. For having received quantity it constructed magnitude, and having partaken also of quality it completed a physical body.

10

This matter, being a most simple being, they say is in strife with itself because it likes to leap from form to form and is not more friendly disposed toward this one than that one. But it is altogether motionless and inactive, in opposition to the first being; for while that one alone acts, this one alone is acted upon, and while that one alone moves, this one alone is moved. Thus, then, with this underlying and being immediately acted upon by quantities and qualities and receiving existence, the things brought to completion by it are shown to be altogether motionless in this way, but when a portion of the life from there, the first life, descended into it, it received motion, that is, sensation and the activity according to it, and a sentient animal was fashioned. And when mind also came upon it, the rational and intelligent animal came to be, through which also arts were made, certain images of the first substance and creative nature. It is therefore altogether necessary that primarily and properly and not by participation these things exist in the first being. For life is there, and mind, so that by life the being may remain eternally, and by mind it may create and hold together the beings.

11

It is gathered, then, from what has been said, that the first being must be living and intelligent, from which is every substance and life and mind, by participation rather than by form

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λόγον ὡς ὅτι γε πορρω τάτω, τὰ δὲ μετέχοντα ὕλης δοκεῖ πως τούτου διῳκίσθαι, τῆς ἁπλότητος ἐκστάντα τῆς εἰδητικῆς καὶ διαπεπλασμένα συνθέσει· ἐξ ὕλης γὰρ καὶ εἴδους ὑπέστησαν. εἰ γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου ὄντος ἀρξάμενός τις ἐξετάζειν τὰς τῶν ὄντων φύσεις κάτεισι περὶ τὰ κάτω, ὡς εἰς ἕτερον ἁπλούστερον ὂν καταντήσει, τὴν ὕλην. ὕλην δὲ λέγω οὐ τὴν προσεχῶς ὑποκειμένην τοῖς εἴδεσιν-αὕτη γὰρ εἴδους μετέχουσα εἰδοπεποιημένη ὕλη ὠνόμασται-ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτοΰλην ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι, ἣ καὶ ἀμυδράν τινα ἔμφασιν ἔσχεν ὀντότητος. τοῦ γὰρ πρώτου ὄντος αὐτοείδους τυγχάνοντος καὶ δημιουρ γικὴν τῶν εἰδῶν αὐχοῦντος δύναμιν, αὐτοΰλη ἂν κυρίως ὀνομασθείη τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας αὐτῷ ὑποκείμενον, μάλιστα τυψ χάνον μὴ ὂν ἢ ὄν. ἀλλ' ἀποχαρίζεται καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ πρώ τως ὂν τῇ ὑπερβλύσει τῆς οὐσιοποιοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ μικράν τινα ὀντότητος ἔμφασιν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ μάλιστα τῷ εἴδει ἁρμόζει· αὐτοτρίγωνον γάρ φαμεν καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπον, ὅταν ἐκτὸς τῆς ὕλης θεωρῶμεν αὐτά.

9 Ταύτην γοῦν τὴν ὕλην οἱ φυσικοὶ οὐσίαν ὑποτίθενται οὐχ ἥκιστα ἢ τὸ εἶδος, ὡς δεκτικὴν ἁπάντων εἰδῶν, καὶ παν δόχην αὐτὴν ὠνόμασαν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μαινάδα πάλιν, ὡς ἀπο πτυστικὴν εἰδῶν καὶ ἑτέρων προσληπτικήν, καὶ ἕτερ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα. οὕτως δὲ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι μᾶλλον χαρακτηριζομένη ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰκόνας ἔχει καὶ ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τοῦ πρώτου ὄντος, ἐξ οὗ πᾶσα οὐσία κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὖσα καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· τὰ γὰρ ἐκ διαμέτρου πρὸς ἄλληλα κείμενα ἰνδάλματά τινα προβάλλουσιν ὁμοιότητος. ἀκατάληπτον νοῒ τὸ πρῶτον καθέστηκεν ὄν, ἀκατάληπτον τὸ ἔσχατον. ἀλλά τι μὲν τῶν ἐκείνου, εἴ τί που καί ἐστι καταληπτόν, οἰκείῳ καταλαμβά νεται λογισμῷ· ὂν γάρ ἐστι. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἔσχατον νόθον κατὰ τὸν ἐκ Σταγείρας φιλόσοφον· μὴ ὂν γὰρ ἐξ ἀποφά σεως τὸ πρῶτον ὁρίζεται διὰ τὸ μηδέν τι τυγχάνειν τῶν ὄντων· δημιουργικὸν γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ κρεῖττον αὐτῶν. ἐξ ἀποφάσεως ὁρίζεται καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τυγχάνειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χεῖρον αὐτῶν. ἁπλούστατον τὸ πρῶ τον, ἁπλούστατον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, εἰ καὶ τοῖς διαφόροις ποικίλλεται εἴδεσι. διὰ τοῦτο καί τινες τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι θεολογησάντων συνάναρχον τὴν ὕλην τῷ δημιουργῷ ἐφαντάσ θησαν, κακῶς εἰδότες καὶ ἀναξίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῦ ὑποθέσεως. τῆς γὰρ ὕλης καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μᾶλλον γινωσκο μένης ἡ ὀντοποιὸς καὶ παντουργὸς δύναμις καὶ τοῦ εἶναι ταύτην μετέχειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς οὖσι καὶ γινο μένοις. ποσὸν γὰρ προσλαβοῦσα κατεσκεύασε μέγεθος, μετα λαβοῦσα δὲ καὶ ποιοῦ σῶμα φυσικὸν ἀπετέλεσε.

10 Ταύτην τὴν ὕλην ἁπλούστατον τελοῦσαν ὂν στασιάζειν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν λέγουσι διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἀπὸ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος μεταπηδᾶν καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοῦτο ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο φιλίως ἔχουσαν. ἀκίνητος δὲ πάντη ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνενέργητος ἐξ ἐναν τίας τῷ πρώτως ὄντι· ἐκείνου γὰρ μόνως ποιοῦντος αὕτη μόνως πάσχει, κἀκείνου μόνως κινοῦντος αὕτη μόνως κινεῖται. οὕτω γοῦν ταύτης ὑποκειμένης καὶ προσεχῶς τοῖς ποσοῖς καὶ ποιοῖς πασχούσης καὶ λαμβανούσης ὕπαρξιν, ἀκίνητα μὲν πάντη καὶ οὕτω τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης τελεσιουργούμενα ἀναδείκνυται, ζωῆς δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν καὶ πρώτης μοίρας ἐν αὐτῇ καταπτάσης προσεδέξατο κίνησιν εἴτουν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ζῶον ᾠκονόμηται αἰσθανόμενον. προσεπιφοιτήσαντος δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ νοῦ, τὸ λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν γεγένηται ζῶον, δι' οὗ καὶ τέχναι πεποίηνται, εἰκόνες τινὲς τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας καὶ δημιουργικῆς φύσεως. ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα προηγουμένως μὲν καὶ κυρίως καὶ οὐ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ταῦτα τυγχάνειν ὄντι. ζωὴ γοῦν ἐκεῖσε καὶ νοῦς, ἵνα τῇ μὲν ζωῇ διαμένῃ τὸ ὂν ἀιδίως, τῷ δὲ νοῒ δημιουργῇ καὶ συνέχῃ τὰ ὄντα.

11 Συνῆκται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὡς τὸ πρώτως ὂν ἔνζων ὀφείλει εἶναι καὶ ἔννουν, ἐξ οὗ πᾶσα οὐσία καὶ ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς, τῇ μετοχῇ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ εἴδει