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if we ask again, from things that are, or from things that are not, he would be in danger either of existing twice, the one pre-existing, the other existing, or of suffering the same thing as the Son, to be from things that are not, on account of your playful questions, and your buildings made of sand, which cannot stand even against breezes. I, therefore, accept neither of these, and say that the question has the absurdity, not that the answer has the difficulty. But if it seems to you necessary for one or the other to be true in every case, according to your dialectical assumptions, accept a little question from me. Is time in time, or not in time? If, then, it is in time, in what time? And what is it besides this time? And how does it contain it? But if it is not in time, what is the superfluous wisdom of introducing a timeless time? Of the statement, 'I am now lying,' give the one alternative, either that it is only true, or that it is false; for we will not grant both. But it is not possible. For either in lying he will speak the truth, or in speaking the truth he will lie; it is an absolute necessity. What is surprising, then, if, just as here the contraries occur, so there both should be false, and thus your wisdom will be revealed as foolishness? Solve one more riddle for me: when you were being born, were you present to yourself? And are you present now? Or neither? For if you were present, and are present, as what, and to whom? And how have you, being one, become both? But if neither of the things mentioned is true, how are you separated from yourself? And what is the cause of the separation? But it is uninstructed to be curious about one person, whether he is present to himself, or not. For these things are said of others, not of oneself. It is more uninstructed, know well, to investigate whether that which has been begotten from the beginning existed before its generation, or did not exist. For this reasoning applies to things divisible by time.

10 But, he says, the unbegotten and the begotten are not the same. But if this is so, neither is the Son the same as the Father. What need is there to say that this argument manifestly casts out either the Son or the Father from the Godhead? For if the unbegotten is the essence of God, the begotten is not the essence; and if this is, that is not. What argument can contradict this? Choose, therefore, which of the impieties you wish, O vain theologian, if you have been zealous to be impious in any case. Then how do you say that the unbegotten and the begotten are not the same? If you mean the uncreated and the created, I also accept it. For the unoriginate and the created are not the same in nature. But if you say that He who has begotten and he who has been begotten are not the same, it is not rightly said. For it is an absolute necessity that they be the same. For this is the nature of an offspring, to be the same as the one who has begotten it according to nature. Or again, thus: how do you speak of the unbegotten and the begotten? For if you mean unbegottenness itself and generation, they are not the same; but if you mean those to whom these belong, how are they not the same? Since also unwisdom and wisdom are not the same as each other, but concern the same thing, man; and it does not divide essence, but is divided concerning the same essence. Or are immortality, and guilelessness, and immutability the essence of God. But if this is so, there are many essences of God, and not one. Or the Divine is composed of these things. For these things are not uncompounded, if they are essences.

11 These things, they say, are not, for they are common to others also. But that which is of God alone and proper to him, this is essence. Those who also introduce matter and form as unbegotten would not concede that the unbegotten is of God alone. For let us cast the darkness of the Manichaeans farther away. Nevertheless, let it be of God alone. But what of Adam? Was he not alone a creature of God? Absolutely, you will say. Was he then also the only man? By no means. Why ever not? Because being formed is not humanity; for he who is begotten is also a man. Thus neither is the unbegotten alone God, even if it belongs to the Father alone, but accept that the begotten is also God. For he is from God, even if you are excessively fond of the unbegotten. Then how do you say essence of God, not the affirmation of what is, but the negation of what is not? For the argument indicates that generation does not belong to him, it does not represent what his nature is, nor what that which has no generation is. What then is the essence of God? It is for your folly to say this, you who are also meddling with the generation. But for us it is a great thing, if ever we might learn this even later, when the darkness and thickness have been dissolved for us, as is the promise of Him who does not lie. Let this therefore be both understood and hoped for by those upon

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πάλιν ἐρωτώντων ἡμῶν, ἐξ ὄντων, ἢ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, κινδυνεύσειεν ἢ δὶς εἶναι, ὃ μὲν προών, ὃ δὲ ὤν, ἢ ταὐτὸν τῷ υἱῷ παθεῖν, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἶναι, διὰ τὰ σὰ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων παίγνια, καὶ τὰς ἐκ ψάμμων οἰκοδομάς, αἳ μηδὲ αὔραις ἵστανται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐδέτερον τούτων δέχομαι, καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησίν φημι τὸ ἄτοπον ἔχειν, οὐχὶ τὸ ἄπορον τὴν ἀπάντησιν. εἰ δέ σοι φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀλη θεύειν ἐπὶ παντός, κατὰ τὰς σὰς διαλεκτικὰς ὑπολήψεις, δέξαι μού τι μικρὸν ἐρώτημα. ὁ χρόνος ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ, τίνι τούτῳ; καὶ τί παρὰ τοῦτον ὄντι; καὶ πῶς περιέχοντι; εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ, τίς ἡ περιττὴ σοφία χρόνον εἰσάγειν ἄχρονον; τοῦ δέ, Νῦν ἐγὼ ψεύδομαι, δὸς τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ἀληθεύεσθαι μόνον, ἢ ψεύδεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀμφότερα δώσομεν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἢ γὰρ ψευδόμενος ἀληθεύσει, ἢ ἀληθεύων ψεύσεται· πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία, οὕτως ἐκεῖσε ἀμφότερα ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω σοι τὸ σοφὸν ἠλίθιον ἀναφανή σεται; ἓν ἔτι μοι λῦσον τῶν αἰνιγμάτων· σεαυτῷ δὲ γεννωμένῳ παρῆς; πάρει δὲ νῦν; ἢ οὐδέτερον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρῆς, καὶ πάρει, ὡς τίς, καὶ τίνι; καὶ πῶς ὁ εἷς ἄμφω γεγόνατε; εἰ δὲ μηδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων, πῶς σεαυτοῦ χωρίζῃ; καὶ τίς ἡ αἰτία τῆς διαζεύ ξεως; ἀλλ' ἀπαίδευτον τὸ περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ ἑαυτῷ πάρεστιν, ἢ μή, πολυπραγμονεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλων, οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ λέγεται. ἀπαι δευτότερον, εὖ ἴσθι, τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γεγεννημένον, εἰ ἦν πρὸ τῆς γεννήσεως, ἢ οὐκ ἦν, διευθύνεσθαι. οὗτος γὰρ περὶ τῶν χρόνῳ διαιρετῶν ὁ λόγος.

10 Ἀλλ' οὐ ταὐτόν, φησι, τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γεννητόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ ταὐτόν. ὅτι μὲν φανερῶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἐκβάλλει τὸν υἱὸν τῆς θεότητος, ἢ τὸν πατέρα, τί χρὴ λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγέννητον οὐσία θεοῦ, τὸ γεννητὸν οὐκ οὐσία· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο. τίς ἀντερεῖ λόγος; ἑλοῦ τοίνυν τῶν ἀσεβειῶν ὁποτέραν βούλει, ὦ κεινὲ θεολόγε, εἴπερ ἀσεβεῖν πάντως ἐσπούδακας. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐ ταὐτὸν λέγεις τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γεννητόν; εἰ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐκτισμένον καὶ ἐκτισμένον, κἀγὼ δέχομαι. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τῇ φύσει τὸ ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ κτιζόμενον. εἰ δὲ τὸ γεγεννηκὸς καὶ τὸ γεγεν νημένον οὐ ταυτὸν λέγεις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. ταὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. αὕτη γὰρ φύσις γεννήματος, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἢ οὕτω πάλιν· πῶς λέγεις τὸ ἀγέν νητον καὶ τὸ γεννητόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν γέννησιν, οὐ ταὐτόν· εἰ δὲ οἷς ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, πῶς οὐ ταὐτόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἄσοφον καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ἀλλήλοις μὲν οὐ ταὐτά, περὶ ταὐτὸν δέ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον· καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας τέμνει, περὶ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τέμνεται. ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τὸ ἄκακον, καὶ τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον οὐσία θεοῦ. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, πολλαὶ οὐσίαι θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ μία. ἢ σύν θετον ἐκ τούτων τὸ θεῖον. οὐ γὰρ ἀσυνθέτως ταῦτα, εἴπερ οὐσίαι.

11 Ταῦτα μὲν οὔ φασι, κοινὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων. ὃ δὲ μόνου θεοῦ καὶ ἴδιον, τοῦτο οὐσία. οὐκ ἂν μὲν συγχωρήσαιεν εἶναι μόνου θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον οἱ καὶ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν συνεισάγοντες ὡς ἀγέν νητα. τὸ γὰρ Μανιχαίων πορρωτέρω ῥίψωμεν σκότος. πλὴν ἔστω μόνου θεοῦ. τί δὲ ὁ Ἀδάμ; οὐ μόνος πλάσμα θεοῦ; καὶ πάνυ, φήσεις. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ μόνος ἄνθρωπος; οὐδαμῶς. τί δή ποτε; ὅτι μὴ ἀνθρωπότης ἡ πλάσις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ γεννηθὲν ἄνθρωπος. οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον μόνον θεός, εἰ καὶ μόνου πατρός, ἀλλὰ δέξαι καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν εἶναι θεόν. ἐκ θεοῦ γάρ, εἰ καὶ λίαν εἶ φιλαγέννητος. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐσίαν θεοῦ λέγεις, οὐ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναίρεσιν; τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ γέννησιν ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ, οὐχ ὃ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ παρίστησιν, οὐδ' ὃ ὑπάρχει τὸ μὴ ἔχον γέννησιν. τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; τῆς σῆς ἀπονοίας τοῦτο λέγειν, ὃς πολυπραγμονεῖς καὶ τὴν γέννησιν. ἡμῖν δὲ μέγα, κἂν εἴποτε καὶ εἰς ὕστερον τοῦτο μάθοιμεν, λυθέντος ἡμῖν τοῦ ζόφου καὶ τῆς παχύτητος, ὡς ἡ τοῦ ἀψευδοῦς ὑπόσχεσις. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ νοείσθω καὶ ἐλπιζέσθω τοῖς ἐπὶ