is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form of matter is absent, its being a substance and a 'this something' and a being is also absent from it, then matter is nowhere when its form is absent. Further, if matter is numerable, but the contraries that are accidental to it are not numerable, how are there three principles, both matter and the things accidental to it? If nothing of what we observe in the constitution of things that come to be by nature is from matter, neither the qualitative nor the quantitative, how do things that come to be come to be from it in themselves? If it is impossible for something to be and not be a 'this something', how does matter, not being a 'this something' because of privation, have being? If privation and form are accidental to matter, but matter is not a substance, how are the contraries accidental to it? For accidents happen to substance. If just as order is in things ordered, so also is form in matter, how is it that unordered things before order have being as a 'this something', but matter before form, not having being as a 'this something', the analogy of order with respect to form is preserved in matter? If in the composition of things that come to be only two principles are observed, both matter and form, but apart from composition there are three principles, both matter and privation and form, it is clear then that when the thing that comes to be is not, there were three established principles; but when the thing that comes to be is, not three, but two. How then is the thing that comes to be not the principle of the destruction of the one principle, which if it had not been destroyed, the thing that comes to be would not have come to be? If just as man is affected by the musical and the unmusical, and the body by cold and hot, and the voice by harmony and disharmony, so matter is affected by form and privation, let matter be a substance, like man and the body, or an accident, like the voice, so that the consequence of the analogy may be preserved. But if matter is neither a substance nor an accident, then it is not affected by the contraries. 3. From the same, from the same discourse. How many principles there are, then, of natural things concerning generation, and in what way, has been said; and it is clear that something must underlie the contraries and that the contraries must be two. But in another way it is not necessary; for it is sufficient for the one of the contraries to effect the change by its presence and absence. The underlying nature is knowable by analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, or wood to a bed, or as to any of the other things that have form the matter and the formless is before receiving the form, so this is to substance and the 'this something' and the being. This, then, is one principle, not being one or a unity in the way that a 'this something' is, but one in definition, and further its contrary, privation. But whether the form or the substrate is substance is not yet clear. If form by its presence gives form to matter and by its absence makes it formless, and there are two principles, both the form and the formless, but privation also does these very things by its

ἐστιν ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος, ἔχουσα δὲ ταύτην ἡ ὕλη, πῶς οὐκ ἀνῄρηται αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ὕλην; Ἔτι εἰ ἀπόντος τοῦ εἴδους τῆς ὕλης ἄπεστιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδαμοῦ ἄρα ἡ ὕλη ἀπόντος αὐτῆς τοῦ εἴδους. Ἔτι εἰ ἀριθμητὴ ἡ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τὰ ταύτῃ συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἀριθμητά, πῶς τρεῖς ἀρχαί, ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ συμβεβηκότα; Eἰ οὐδὲν ὧν ἐν τῇ συστάσει τῶν φύσεων γιγνομένων θεωροῦμεν ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, οὐδὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ποσόν, πῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται καθ' αὑτά; Eἰ ἀδύνατόν τι εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τόδε τι, πῶς διὰ τὴν στέρησιν τόδε τι μὴ οὖσα ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶναι ἔχει; Eἰ ἡ στέρησις καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῇ ὕλῃ συμβέβηκεν, οὐ σία δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη, πῶς ταύτῃ συμβέβηκε τὰ ἐναντία; Τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ συμβαίνει τὰ συμβεβηκότα. Eἰ ὥσπερ ἡ τάξις ἐν τοῖς τεταγμένοις, οὕτως καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, πῶς τὰ μὲν ἄτακτα πρὸ τῆς τάξεως τὸ εἶναι τόδε τι ἔχει, ἡ δὲ ὕλη πρὸ τοῦ εἴδους τὸ εἶναι τόδε μὴ ἔχουσα, σώζεται ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ ἀνα λογία τῆς τάξεως ὡς πρὸς τὸ εἶδος; Eἰ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει μὲν τῶν γιγνομένων δύο θεωροῦνται μόναι ἀρχαί, ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος, χωρὶς δὲ συνθέσεως τρεῖς εἰσιν ἀρχαί, ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ τὸ εἶδος, δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μὴ ὄντος μὲν τοῦ γιγνο μένου κείμεναι τρεῖς ἦσαν ἀρχαί· ὄντος δὲ τοῦ γιγνομένου οὐ τρεῖς, ἀλλὰ δύο. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῆς μιᾶς ἀρχῆς, ἣ εἰ μὴ ἀπώλετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐγίνετο τὸ γιγνόμενον; Eἰ ὥσπερ πάσχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ μουσι κοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμούσου καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ ἀναρμοστίας, οὕτως πάσχει ἡ ὕλη ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς στερήσεως, ἔστω ἡ ὕλη οὐσία, ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἢ συμβεβηκός, ὡς ἡ φωνή, ἵνα σωθῇ τὸ τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀκόλουθον. Eἰ δὲ οὔτε οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη οὔτε συμβεβηκός, οὐδ' ἄρα πάσχει ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. γ. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Πόσαι μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περὶ γένεσιν φυσικῶν, καὶ πῶς, εἴρηται· καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι δεῖ ὑποκεῖσθαί τι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ τὰ ἐναντία δύο εἶναι. Τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· ἱκανὸν γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιεῖν τῇ παρουσίᾳ καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ τὴν μεταβολήν. Ἡ δὲ ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν. Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν. Μία μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ αὕτη, οὐχ οὕτω μία οὖσα οὐδὲ ἓν ὡς τὸ τόδε τι, μία δὲ ᾗ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἡ στέ ρησις. Πότερον δὲ οὐσία τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὔπω δῆλον. Eἰ τὸ εἶδος τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὑτοῦ εἰδοποιεῖ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ ἀνείδεον, εἰσὶ δὲ ἀρχαὶ δύο, τό τε εἶ δος καὶ τὸ ἀνείδεον, ποιεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ στέρησις τῇ