OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good; at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised more than things unknown. Besides, the soul suffers ignorance of the truly existing God not from anything else but from its own forgetfulness. But knowledge of God also comes to souls here; just as, then, we also see men here who know God. But if anyone wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance of God at all; for all confess by common notion that God exists. And that men, even while being here, are able to know God, the faith of the orthodox also clearly shows, saying that God himself came down and was made known to men. He said that ignorance is often given to men for their good. But if he means ignorance of God, about which our discourse is, it is manifestly absurd to say that ignorance of God is given for the good of those who are ignorant; for by this reasoning all the religions that are ignorant of God will be ignorant of God for their own good, while the religion that knows God will not be for its own good. But if he means another ignorance, about which it was our purpose to speak, the citation is untimely, having the un-sought ignorance instead of the sought. He said that the soul suffers ignorance of God from its own forgetfulness. He said that knowledge of God also comes to souls here; he said that we also see here those who know God. He said that there is no ignorance of God at all; for all confess by common notion that God exists. He said that men are able to know God even here; and for proof of this he cited the faith of the orthodox, which says that God himself came down and was made known to men. But if it is true that the soul suffers ignorance of God by its own forgetfulness, it is clear that it is false that 'There is no ignorance of God at all; for all confess by common notion that God exists.' What need was there for knowledge of God to come to souls here, when all know God and confess it by common notion? And the statement 'And we also see men here who know God,' about what men does it speak? If it is about those who have known God who came down and was made known to them according to the faith of the orthodox, the statement is true; for we see them. But how can he who used the presence of God to men as proof of the possibility for men to know God even here himself disbelieve the things spoken by him concerning the re-creation of the world? For an untrustworthy proof does not show the thing proposed for proof to be trustworthy. But if he does not mean the men who have known God here from the teaching of the God who came down, the statement that says, 'We see men here who have known God,' is false. For I do not see these. And if there was no ignorance of God at all—for all confess by common notion—what knowledge of God has come to men here, if not the specific knowledge, according to which all existing on

Καὶ γάρ, φησίν, ἡ ἄγνοια πολλάκις ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ δίδοται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ὁρῶμεν γοῦν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὡς πολλάκις συμ βαίνει μᾶλλον καταφρονεῖν τῶν γινωσκομένων ἤπερ τῶν ἀγνο ουμένων. Ἄλλως τε καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν οὐκ ἔκ τινος ἄλλου ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας λήθης ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχει. Πα ραγίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐνταῦθα ψυχαῖς γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ· ὥσπερ οὖν ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀνθρώπους γινώσκοντας τὸν θεόν. Eἰ δέ τις ἐθέλοι τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, οὐδέ ἐστιν ὅλως ἄγνοια περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς ὁμολογοῦσι κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὄντες δύνανται οἱ ἄνθρωποι γινώσκειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀρθοδόξων πίστις σαφῶς δηλοῖ, λέγουσα τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν κατεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐγνῶσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Eἶπεν ὅτι ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ δέδοται πολλάκις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἄγνοια. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λέγει ἄγνοιαν, περὶ ἧς ἐστιν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, προδήλως ἄτοπον τὸ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ λέγειν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ δίδοσθαι τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ ἔσονται πᾶσαι αἱ θρησκεῖαι αἱ ἀγνοοῦσαι τὸν θεὸν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ἑαυτῶν ἀγνοοῦσαι τὸν θεόν, ἡ δὲ τὸν θεὸν γινώσκουσα θρη σκεία οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ἑαυτῆς. Eἰ δὲ ἑτέραν λέγει ἄγνοιαν, περὶ ἧς προέκειτο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἄκαιρος ἡ παράθεσις ἀντὶ τῆς ζητουμένης ἀγνοίας τὴν μὴ ζητουμένην ἔχουσα. Eἶπεν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας λήθης πάσχει ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεόν. Eἶπεν ὅτι καὶ ἐνταῦθα παραγίνεται ταῖς ψυχαῖς γνῶσις θεοῦ· εἶπεν ὅτι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁρῶμεν γινώσκοντας τὸν θεόν. Eἶπεν ὅτι οὐδ' ὅλως ἐστὶν ἄγνοια περὶ θεοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς ὁμολογοῦσι κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ. Eἶπεν ὅτι καὶ ἐνταῦθα δύναν ται οἱ ἄνθρωποι γινώσκειν τὸν θεόν· καὶ τούτου εἰς ἀπόδειξιν παρέθετο τὴν πίστιν τῶν ὀρθοδόξων, λέγουσαν αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν κατεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐγνῶσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὅτι τῇ οἰκείᾳ λήθῃ πάσχει ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεόν, δῆλον ὅτι ψευδὲς τὸ Oὐδέ ἐστιν ὅλως ἄγνοια περὶ θεοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς ὁμολογοῦσι κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ. Τίς δὲ ἦν χρεία τοῦ παραγενέσθαι ταῖς ἐνταῦθα ψυχαῖς γνῶσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, πάν των γινωσκόντων τὸν θεὸν καὶ ὁμολογούντων κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ; Τὸ δὲ Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁρῶμεν ἀνθρώπους γινώσκοντας τὸν θεόν, περὶ τίνων λέγει ἀνθρώπων; Eἰ μὲν περὶ τῶν ἐγνωκότων τὸν θεὸν κατελθόντα καὶ γνωρισθέντα αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν πίστιν τῶν ὀρθοδόξων, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτούς. Πῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους παρουσίᾳ ἀποδείξει χρησάμενος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐνταῦθα γνῶναι θεὸν αὐτὸς ἀπιστεῖ τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ ·ηθεῖσι περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἀνακτίσεως; Ἡ γὰρ ἄπιστος ἀπόδειξις πιστὸν οὐ δείκνυσι τὸ εἰς δεῖξιν προκείμενον. Eἰ δὲ μὴ τοὺς ἐκ διδασκαλίας τοῦ κατελθόντος θεοῦ ἀνθρώπους λέγει ἐνταῦθα ἐγνωκότας τὸν θεόν, ψευδὴς ὁ λόγος ὁ λέγων· Ὁρῶμεν ἀνθρώπους ἐνταῦθα ἐγνωκότας τὸν θεόν. Ἐγὼ γὰρ τούτους οὐχ ὁρῶ. Καὶ εἰ οὐκ ἦν ὅλως ἄγνοια περὶ θεοῦ· πάντες γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσι κοινῇ ἐννοίᾳ· ποία γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνταῦθα παραγέγονε τοῖς ἀν θρώποις, εἰ μὴ ἡ εἰδικὴ γνῶσις, καθ' ἣν πᾶσαι αἱ οὖσαι ἐπὶ