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but the good one the soul, and they completed one living being, man? But if, by way of imitation, as an archetype is the cause of an image, the depicted thing, then your principles are other worlds, in whose likeness the world came to be. For there is not one form nor one or two shapes among existing things, but innumerable ones. And how are the innumerable forms images of your two principles? Thus, your opinion concerning the two principles is impossible and incoherent. For ask the multitude of children, who are innocent of evil: Is the dyad a principle or the monad? And they will say that the monad is the principle of all number. O you who are more childish and more foolish than children. 11 And tell us this, as we ask: Is polyarchy a good, stable, and orderly thing, or monarchy? It is clear to all that polyarchy is anarchy and seditious and a cause of war and battle and evils and dissolution, whereas monarchy is firm and lawful and a cause of peace and order and tranquility and justice and of increase toward the better. If, therefore, according to you, there are two unoriginated principles, then polyarchy is the principle of existing things, and evil is the principle of all things, and thus evil is the one principle. And how can you say that the two principles, which you yourselves have fabricated, have absolutely no fellowship? For if this one exists and that one too, and this substance is an unoriginated and eternal principle and that one likewise, they do not have absolutely no fellowship. For they have fellowship both in being, and in being substance and an unoriginated and eternal principle, and in every way your argument is proven false. 12 And again: If there are two unoriginated principles, each rejoices and delights in its own and considers its own constitution a good thing; for to each thing, that which constitutes its own nature is good. Therefore both your good principle and your evil one, each rejoices in itself and delights in its own things and considers its own things to be good. Who then is the one who judged the one to be good and the other evil? And that one is rather god, being greater than both; for the lesser is judged by the greater and the ruled by the ruler. 13 And tell me this: Do your two principles have fellowship with each other or are they entirely without fellowship? Manichaean: They were entirely without fellowship; for the one was in the fullness of good things, and the other in the fullness of evil things, but after this a mixture occurred. Orthodox: Put aside for now the argument about the mixture. But tell us first: Is that which is, contrary to that which is, with respect to being, or is that which is not, contrary to that which is? Manichaean: That which is evil is contrary to that which is good. Orthodox: I did not ask if they are contrary with respect to evil and good, but with respect to being. For things that are are not entirely contrary; for with respect to being itself they have fellowship with one another, but not-being is contrary to being. Therefore, if evil is entirely contrary to the good, and the good is, then evil is not. So that evil is a privation of being and is called evil; and if the good is substance, evil is non-substantial or they are not in every way contrary. 14 Manichaean: Then: Is not evil seen among existing things? Orthodox: Complete evil is not seen among existing things; for neither is God, who truly is and is the cause of being, evil, nor is any of the things that have come to be, insofar as it has come to be, evil, but the cause of all things is good and all things that have come to be from him are good. And all existing things were brought by him from not-being into being, and all are beautiful and very beautiful. But evil is nothing other than a casting away and a voluntary privation of the things gifted by God to the rational nature, just as poverty is a casting away of wealth; for wealth is the possession of existing things: gold and silver and transparent stones and various clothing, of male and female servants, of irrational animals and of fields and such things, of which each one is a substance. For this reason, one who has acquired these things is also called rich; as if someone with much substance, having much substance around himself. But poverty is in part a partial

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ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἓν ζῷον, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀπετέλεσαν; Εἰ δὲ κατὰ μίμησιν ὡς πρωτότυπον εἰκόνος αἴτιον τὸ εἰκονιζόμενον, ἄλλοι κόσμοι εἰσὶν αἱ καθ' ὑμᾶς ἀρχαί, ὧν καθ' ὁμοίωσιν γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος. Οὐ γὰρ ἓν εἶδος οὐδὲ μία ἢ δύο μορφαὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀναρίθμητοι. Καὶ πῶς τὰ ἀναρίθμητα εἴδη τῶν δύο παρ' ὑμῖν ἀρχῶν εἰκόνες εἰσίν; Οὕτως ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν φρόνημα. Ἐρωτήσατε γὰρ τὴν ἀπειρόκακον τῶν παίδων πληθύν· Ἡ δυὰς ἀρχὴ ἢ ἡ μονάς; Καὶ ἐροῦσιν, ὡς ἡ μονὰς ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. Ὢ νηπίων νηπιωδέστεροί τε καὶ ἀφρονέστεροι. 11 Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἡμῖν ἐρωτῶσιν εἴπατε· Ἡ πολυαρχία ἐστὶ καλὸν καὶ στάσιμον καὶ τακτικὸν ἢ ἡ μοναρχία; Πᾶσι δῆλον, ὡς ἡ πολυαρχία ἀναρχία ἐστὶ καὶ στασιώδης καὶ πολέμου καὶ μάχης καὶ κακῶν αἰτία καὶ λύσεως, ἡ δὲ μοναρχία βεβαία καὶ ἔννομος καὶ εἰρήνης αἰτία καὶ τάξεως καὶ γαλήνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον αὐξήσεως. Εἰ οὖν δύο ἀρχαὶ ἄναρχοι καθ' ὑμᾶς, πολυαρχία ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων κακία, καὶ οὕτω μία ἀρχὴ ἡ κακία. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἀκοινωνήτους παντελῶς λέγετε τὰς δύο ἀρχάς, ἃς αὐτοὶ ἀνεπλάσατε. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτή ἐστι κἀκείνη καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἄναρχος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀίδιος κἀκείνη ὁμοίως, οὔκ εἰσι παντελῶς ἀκοινώνητοι. Κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ κατά τε τὸ εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ οὐσία καὶ ἄναρχος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀίδιος εἶναι, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ψευδὴς ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ἀποδέδεικται. 12 Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἄναρχοι, ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τῷ οἰκείῳ χαίρει καὶ τέρπεται καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σύστασιν ἀγαθὸν λογίζεται· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ συστατικὸν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως. Καὶ ὁ παρ' ὑμῖν οὖν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ παρ' ὑμῖν πονηρός, ἕκαστος ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ χαίρει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐπιτέρπεται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀγαθὰ λογίζεται. Τίς οὖν ὁ κρίνας τὸν ἕνα ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸν ἕτερον πονηρόν; Κἀκεῖνος μᾶλλόν ἐστι θεός, μείζων ἀμφοτέρων· τὸ γὰρ ἔλαττον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος κρίνεται. 13 Εἰπὲ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· Κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις αἱ παρ' ὑμῖν δύο ἀρχαὶ ἢ παντελῶς εἰσιν ἀκοινώνητοι; Μανιχαῖος· Ἀκοινώνητοι ἦσαν παντελῶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ μία ἐν πληρώματι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦν, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ἐν πληρώματι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ' ἐγένετο μετὰ ταῦτα σύγκρασις. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἀναβαλοῦ τέως τὸν τῆς συγκράσεως λόγον. Φράσον δὲ ἡμῖν πρότερον· Τὸ ὂν τῷ ὄντι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι; Μανιχαῖος· Τὸ ὂν κακὸν τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκ ἠρώτησα, εἰ κατὰ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν εἰσιν ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Τὰ γὰρ ὄντα οὐ παντελῶς ἐναντία· κατὰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις, τῷ δὲ ὄντι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐναντίον. Ὥστε, εἰ παντελῶς ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακόν. Ὥστε τὸ κακὸν στέρησίς ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ κακὸν λέγεται· καὶ εἰ οὐσία τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνούσιον τὸ κακὸν ἢ οὐ πάντη ἐναντία. 14 Μανιχαῖος· Εἶτα· Οὐχ ὁρᾶται κακία ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἡ παντελὴς κακία οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὄντως ὢν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιος κακία οὔτε τι τῶν γεγονότων, καθὸ γέγονε, κακόν, ἀλλὰ τό τε τῶν πάντων αἴτιον ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ γενόμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθά. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθη καὶ πάντα καλὰ καὶ λίαν καλά. Τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἀποβολὴ καὶ στέρησις ἑκούσιος τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ τῇ λογικῇ φύσει δεδωρημένων, ὥσπερ πενία πλούτου ἀποβολή· πλοῦτος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὄντων κτῆσις χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ λίθων διαυγῶν καὶ ἐσθῆτος διαφόρου, παίδων καὶ παιδισκῶν, ἀλόγων καὶ ἀρουρῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὧν ἕκαστον οὐσία ἐστί. ∆ιὸ καὶ πλούσιος λέγεται ὁ ταῦτα κτησάμενος· οἷόν τις πολυούσιος πολλὴν ἔχων περὶ ἑαυτὸν οὐσίαν. Ἡ δὲ πενία μερικὴ μὲν μερικὴ