LESSON I

[i. 1. 1252a1-2. 1253a38]

             9 After these preliminary remarks, then, it should be noted that in this book Aristotle begins with a preamble of some kind in which he manifests the aim of this science; then he proceeds to manifest what he has proposed. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows the dignity of the city, with which politics is concerned, from its end; secondly, he shows the relation of the city to the other societies.

             10 Concerning the first point, he intends to prove two things: first, that the city is ordered to some good as to its end; secondly, that the good to which the city is ordered is the highest human good.

             Concerning the first point, he sets down the following argument. Every society is established for the sake of some good. But every city is a society of some kind. Therefore, every city is established for the sake of some good. Since then the minor premise is evident, he proves the major as follows. All men perform everything they do for the sake of that which is seen as a good, whether it is truly good or not. But every society is established through the work of someone. Therefore, all societies seek some good, that is to say, they aim at some good as an end.

             11 Then he shows that that good to which the city is ordered is the highest among human goods by means of the following argument. If every society is ordered to a good, that society which is the highest necessarily seeks in the highest degree the good that is the highest among all human goods. For the importance of the means to an end is determined according to the importance of the ends.

             Now he makes clear which society is the highest by what he adds. A society is indeed a certain whole. But in all wholes is found an order such that that whole which includes another whole within itself is the higher; a wall, for example, is a whole, and because it is included in that whole which is the house, it is clear that the house is the higher of the two wholes; and likewise, the society that includes other societies is the higher. Now it is clear that the city includes all the other societies, for households and villages are both comprised under the city; and so political society itself is the highest society. Therefore, it seeks the highest among all human goods, for it aims at the common good, which is better and more divine than the good of one individual, as is stated in the beginning of the Ethics.

             12 Then he compares the city to the other societies, and in this connection he does three things. First, he states the false opinion of certain persons. Secondly, he shows how the falsity of the stated opinion can be made known. Thirdly, in accordance with the method indicated, he sets down the true relationship of the city to the other societies. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he states the false opinion. Secondly, he produces their reason.

             13 Concerning the first point, it should be noted that there is a twofold society that is obvious to all, namely, the city and the household. The city is governed by a twofold rule, namely, the political and the kingly. There is kingly rule when he who is set over the city has full power, whereas there is political rule when he who is set over the city exercises a power restricted by certain laws of the city. Similarly, the household has a twofold rule, namely, the domestic and the despotic. Everyone who possesses slaves is called a despot, whereas the procurator or superintendent of a family is called the domestic head. Hence despotic rule is that by which a master commands slaves, [7] while domestic rule is that by which one dispenses the things that pertain to the entire family, in which are contained not only slaves but many free people as well. Some persons have maintained then, but not rightly, that these two rules do not differ but are entirely the same.

             14 Then he sets forth their reason, which is as follows. Things that differ solely by reason of larger and smaller numbers do not differ specifically, because a difference according to more and less does not diversify a species. But the rules just mentioned differ solely by reason of larger or smaller numbers; this they manifested as follows. If the society that is ruled is made up of a small number of people, as in the case of some small household, he who is set over them is called the father of the family and he possesses despotic rule. If the society is made up of a larger number of people, in such a way as to contain not only slaves but a number of free men as well, he who is set over them is called the domestic head. And if the society is made up of a still larger number of people, for example, not only of those who belong to one household but of those who belong to one city, then the rule is said to be political or kingly.

             15 The falsity of what certain persons used to say to the effect that the household and the city differ only by reason of their magnitude and smallness, in such a way that a large household is a small city and vice versa, will become apparent from what follows. Likewise they used to assert also that political rule and kingly rule differed solely by reason of larger and smaller numbers. For, when a man himself rules absolutely and in all ways, the rule is said to be kingly. When, however, he commands in part, in accordance with the principles of a given science, that is, in accordance with the laws set down by political teaching, the rule is said to be political, as though he were in part a ruler, namely, as regards the things that come under his power, and in part a subject, namely, as regards the things in which he is subjected to the law. From all this they inferred that all the previously mentioned rules, some of which pertain to the city and others to the household, do not differ specifically.

             16 Then he shows how the falsity of this opinion can be manifested. He states that what has been said is not true, and that this will become evident to those who examine the matter according to the mode indicated, that is, according to the art of studying such things as will be set down below. Now the mode of this art is the following. Just as, in other things, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the whole, it is necessary to divide the compound into its elements, that is, into the indivisibles, which are the smallest parts of the whole (for instance, to understand a sentence it is necessary to divide it into its letters, and to understand a natural mixed body it is necessary to divide it into its elements), in the same manner if we examine those things out of which the city is compounded, we shall be able to see better what each one of the previously mentioned rules is in itself, and how they differ from one another, and whether in each case something can be studied in an artful way. For in all things we see that if someone examines things as they arise from their principles, he will best be able to contemplate the truth in them. And just as this is true of other things, so also is it true of those things to which we are directing our attention. Now in these words of the Philosopher it should be noted that, in order to arrive at a knowledge of compounds, it is necessary to use the resolutive way, namely, so that we may divide the compound into its elements. Afterwards, however, the compositive way is necessary, so that from the indivisible principles already known we may judge of the things that proceed from these principles.

             17 Then, in accordance with the mode just indicated, he sets down the true relationship of the other societies to the city; and in connection with this, he does two things. First, he treats of the other societies that are ordered to the city. Secondly, he treats of civil society. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he sets forth the society of one person to another person. Secondly, he sets down the domestic society, which comprises different associations of persons. Thirdly, he sets down the village society, which is made up of several groups. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he sets down two personal associations. Secondly, he compares them to each other.

             Now the first of these two personal associations that he sets down is that of male and female; and he says that, since we have to divide the city into its smallest parts, it is necessary to say that the first union is that of persons who cannot be without each other, namely, the male and the female. For this union is for the sake of generation through which are produced both males and females. From this it is clear that they cannot be without each other.

             18 He shows how this union is the first by what he adds. Here it should be noted that in man there is something that is proper to him, namely, reason, according to which it belongs to him to act from counsel and choice. There is also found in man something that is common to him and to others; such is the ability to generate. This then does not belong to him as a result of choice, that is, in so far as he has a reason that chooses; rather it belongs to him in so far as he has a reason that is common to him and to animals and even to plants. For there is in all these a natural [8] appetite to leave after them another being like themselves, so that in this manner, through generation, what cannot be preserved numerically the same is preserved according to its species.

             There is, accordingly, a natural appetite of this kind in all other natural corruptible beings. But because living beings, namely, plants and animals, have a special way of generating in that they generate from themselves, he makes special mention of plants and animals. For even in plants a masculine and a feminine power is found, but they are joined in the same individual, even though there is a greater abundance of one or the other in this or that individual, is such a way that we can imagine a plant to be at all times such as are male and female at the time of intercourse.

             19 Then he sets down the second association of persons, namely, that of ruler and subject. This association too stems from nature for the sake of preservation, for nature aims not only at generation but also at the preservation of the things generated. That among men this indeed comes about through the association of ruler and subject he shows by the fact that he who by his intellect can foresee the things that are conducive to preservation, for instance, by providing what is advantageous and repelling what is harmful, naturally commands and rules, whereas he who by reason of bodily strength is able to carry out in deed what the wise man has foreseen mentally is naturally a subject and a slave. From this it clearly appears that the same thing is profitable to both in view of their preservation, namely, that the former should rule and the latter be ruled. For he who by reason of his wisdom can foresee mentally would not be able to survive at times because of a deficiency of bodily strength if he did not have a slave to carry out his ideas, nor would he who abounds in bodily strength be able to survive if he were not ruled by the prudence of another.

             20 Then he compares the associations just mentioned to each other; first, according to the truth; secondly, he rules out an error.

             He infers then, first of all, from what has been said that there is a natural distinction between woman and slave. For a woman has a natural disposition to beget from another, but she is not robust in body, which is what is required in a slave. And so the two associations just mentioned differ from each other.

             21 Now he establishes the cause for this distinction from the fact that nature does not make things in the same way as those who manufacture Delphic knives out of brass, that is to say, out of metal, for some poor people. For among the Delphians certain knives were made that were designed to serve several purposes, as for example, if a single knife were to be used to cut, to file, and to perform other similar duties. This was done for the benefit of the poor who could not afford several instruments. Nature, however, does not act in such a way as to order one thing to different functions; rather it assigns one thing to one function. For this reason woman is not assigned by nature to serve but to beget. Thus all things will best come about when an instrument is not used for many functions but for one only. This is to be understood, however, of cases in which an obstacle would be encountered in one or both of the two functions to which the same instrument were to be assigned, for instance, if it were often necessary to exercise both functions simultaneously. But if the different functions are exercised one after the other, the adaptation of a single instrument to several functions does not give rise to any obstacle. Hence the tongue is suited for two functions of nature, namely, taste and speech, as is said in Book II of the [treatise] On the Parts of Animals. For these two functions do not coincide with each other in time.

             22 Then he rules out the contrary error. First, he states the error. Secondly, he shows the cause of the error.

             He says then, first of all, that among the barbarians, woman and slave are considered as belonging to the same order; for they use women as slaves. There can be a doubt here, however, as to who are called barbarians. Some people say that everyone is a barbarian to the man who does not understand his tongue. Hence the Apostle says, If I know not the power of the voice, I shall be to him, to whom I speak, a barbarian, and he that speaketh, a barbarian to me [1 Cor. 14:11]. To others it seems that those men are called barbarians who have no written language in their own vernacular. Hence Bede is said to have translated the liberal arts into the English language, lest the English be reputed barbarians. And to others it seems that the barbarians are those who are not ruled by any civil laws.

             23 And in fact all these things come close to the truth in some way; for by the name "barbarian" something foreign is understood. Now a man can be said to be foreign either absolutely or in relation to someone. He who is lacking in reason, according to which one is said to be a man, seems to be foreign to the human race absolutely speaking; and so the men who are called barbarians absolutely are the ones who are lacking in reason, either because they happen to live in an exceedingly intemperate region of the sky, so that by the very disposition of the region they are found to be dull for the most part, or else because of some evil custom prevailing in certain lands from which it comes about that men are rendered irrational and almost brutal. Now it is evident that it is from the power of reason that men are ruled by reasonable laws and that they are practiced in writing. [9] Hence barbarism is appropriately manifested by this sign, that men either do not live under laws or live under irrational ones, and likewise that among certain peoples there is no training in writing. But a man is said to be foreign in relation to someone if he cannot communicate with him. Now men are made to communicate with one another above all by means of speech; and according to this, people who cannot understand one another's speech can be called barbarians with reference to one another. The Philosopher, however, is speaking here of those who are barbarians absolutely.

             24 Then he establishes the cause of the error just mentioned. Its cause, he says, is that among barbarians there is no rule according to nature. For it was stated above that the man who commands according to nature is the one who is able to foresee mentally, whereas the slave is the one who is able to carry things out in deed. Now barbarians for the most part are found to be robust in body and deficient in mind. Hence the natural order of rule and subjection cannot exist among them. But there arises among them a certain association of female and male slave, that is to say, they commonly make use of a female slave, namely, a woman, and of a male slave. And because there is no natural rule among barbarians but only among those who abound in reason, the poets say that it is fitting that the Greeks, who were endowed with wisdom, should rule over the barbarians, as if to say that it is the same thing by nature to be a barbarian and to be a slave. But when the converse takes place, there ensues a perversion and a lack of order in the world, according to the words of Solomon, I have seen servants upon horses and princes walking on the ground as servants [Eccles. 10:7].

             25 Then he treats of the domestic society, which is made up of several personal associations. In this connection he does three things. First, he shows what this society consists of. Secondly, he shows its purpose. Thirdly, he shows how those who live in this society are designated.

             He says then, first of all, that out of the two previously mentioned personal associations, one of which is ordered to generation and the other to preservation, the first household is constituted. For in a household there have to be a man and a woman, and a master and a slave. Now it is called the first household because there is also another personal association that is found in the household, namely, that of father and son, which arises out of the first. Hence the first two associations are primordial. To show this he adduces a saying of the poet Hesiod, who stated that a household has these three things: a master who rules, a woman, and an ox for plowing. For in a poor household the ox takes the place of a servant; man uses an ox, just as he uses a servant, to carry out some work.

             26 Then he shows to what the domestic society is ordered. Here it should be noted that every human association is an association according to certain acts. Now among human acts some are performed every day, such as eating, warming oneself at the fire, and others like these, whereas other things are not performed every day, such as buying, fighting, and others like these. Now it is natural for men to communicate among themselves by helping one another in each of these two kinds of work. Thus he says that a household is nothing other than a certain society set up according to nature for everyday life, that is, for the acts that have to be performed daily. And he goes on to show this by means of names. For a certain Charondas by name calls those who communicate in a household homositios, or men of one fare, because they communicate in food; and a certain other named Epimenides, a Cretan by nationality, calls them homokapnos, or men of one smoke, because they sit at the same fire.

             27 Then he sets down the third society, namely, the village. First, he shows of what this society is made up and what its purpose is. Secondly, he shows that it is natural.

             He says then, first of all, that the first association made up of several households is called a village; and it is called the first as distinguished from the second, which is the city. Now this society is not established for everyday life, as he says of the household; rather it is instituted for the sake of nondaily uses. For those who are fellow-villagers do not communicate with one another in the daily acts in which those who are members of one household communicate, such as eating, sitting at the fire, and things of this sort; rather they communicate with one another in certain external acts that are not performed daily.

             28 Then he shows that the village society is natural. First, he establishes his thesis by means of a reason. Secondly, by means of certain signs.

             He says then, first of all, that the proximity of households, which constitutes the village, seems to be according to nature in the highest degree. For nothing is more natural than the propagation of many from one in animals; and this brings about a proximity of households. Indeed, some people call those who have neighboring households foster brothers and children, that is, sons and children of children, that is, grandsons, so that we may understand that such a proximity of households originally springs from the fact that sons and grandsons, having multiplied, founded different households and lived close to one another. Hence, since the multiplication of offspring is natural, it follows that the village society is natural. [10]

             29 Then he manifests the same thing by means of signs. First, according to what we see among men. Secondly, according to what used to be said about the gods.

             He says then, first of all, that, since the neighborhood was established as a result of the multiplication of offspring, from this it came about that at first any city was ruled by a king; and this because cities and nations are made up of people who are subject to a king. And he shows how this sign corresponds to what has already been said by what he adds, namely, that every household is ruled by some very old member, just as sons are ruled by the father of the family. Hence it comes about that the entire neighborhood too, which was formed of blood relations, was ruled on account of this kinship by someone who was first in the order of kinship, just as a city is ruled by a king. That is why Homer has said that each one lays down laws for his wife and children, like the king in a city. Now this rule passed from households and villages to cities, because different villages are like a city spread out into different parts; and thus in former times men used to dwell dispersed through villages and not gathered in one city. So it is clear then that the rule of the king over a city or a nation derived from the rule of an older member in a household or a village.

             30 Then he sets down another sign from what used to be said about the gods. He states that because of what has just been indicated, all the pagans used to say that their gods were ruled by some king and claimed that Jupiter was the king of the gods, and this because some men are still ruled by kings; but in former times almost all men were ruled by kings. This was the first rule, as will be said later. Now just as men liken the outward appearance of the gods, that is to say, their forms, to themselves, thinking the gods to be in the image of certain men, so also they liken the lives of the gods, that is to say, their behavior, to their own, thinking them to behave the way they see men behave. Aristotle is here referring, after the manner of the Platonists, to the substances separated from matter and created by only one supreme god, to whom the pagans erroneously attributed both human forms and human habits, as the Philosopher says here.

             31 After having treated of the societies ordered to the city, the Philosopher treats here of civil society itself. This treatise is divided into three parts. First, he shows what kind of society the city is. Secondly, he shows that it is natural. Thirdly, he treats of the foundation of the city.

             Concerning the first point, he shows the condition of the city with reference to three things. First, he shows of what things the city is made up. For, just as a village is made up of several households, so a city is made up of several villages. Secondly, he says that the city is a perfect society; and this he proves from the fact that, since every association among all men is ordered to something necessary for life, that society will be perfect which is ordered to this: that man have sufficiently whatever is necessary for life. Such a society is the city. For it is of the nature of the city that in it should be found all the things that are sufficient for human life; and so it is. And for this reason it is made up of several villages, in one of which the art of the smith is practiced, in another the art of the weaver, and so of the others. Hence it is evident that the city is a perfect society. Thirdly, he shows to what the city is ordered. It is originally made for the sake of living, namely, that men might find sufficiently that from which they might be able to live; but from its existence it comes about that men not only live but that they live well, in so far as by the laws of the city the life of men is ordered to the virtues.

             32 Then he shows that civil society is natural. In this connection he does three things. First, he shows that the city is natural. Secondly, that man is by nature a political animal. Thirdly, he shows what is prior according to nature, whether it is one man, the household, or the city.

             Concerning the first point, he sets down two arguments, the first of which is as follows. The end of natural things is their nature. But the city is the end of the previously mentioned societies, which were shown to be natural. Therefore, the city is natural. Now, that nature is the end of natural things he proves by the following argument. We call the nature of each thing that which belongs to it when its generation is perfect; for example, the nature of man is that which he possesses once his generation is perfect, and the same holds for a horse and for a house, in such a way, however, that by the nature of a house is understood its form. But the disposition that a thing has by reason of its perfect generation is the end of all the things that precede its generation. Therefore, that which is the end of the natural principles from which something is generated is the nature of a thing. And thus, since the city is generated from the previously mentioned societies, which are natural, it will itself be natural.

             33 Then he sets down the second argument, which is as follows. That which is best in each thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes about. But to have what is sufficient is best. Therefore, it has the nature of an end. And thus, since the city is a society that has of itself what is sufficient for life, it is itself the end of the previously mentioned societies. Hence it is clear [11] that this second argument is presented as a proof of the minor of the preceding one.

             34 Then he shows that man is by nature a political animal. First, he infers this from the naturalness of the city. Secondly, he proves this from man's proper operation. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he establishes his thesis. Secondly, he rules out a doubt.

             He infers then, first of all, from what has already been said that a city is made up of things that are according to nature. And since a city is nothing other than a congregation of men, it follows that man is a naturally political animal.

             35 However, there could be a doubt in someone's mind concerning this, due to the fact that the things that are according to nature are found in all men. But not all men are found to be city dwellers. And so, in order to eliminate this doubt, he goes on to say that some men are not political on account of fortune, for instance, because they have been expelled from the city, or because poverty compels them to till fields or tend animals. And it is clear that this is not contrary to what has been said to the effect that man is naturally political, because other natural things too are sometimes lacking on account of fortune, for example, when someone loses a hand through amputation or when he is deprived of an eye. But if a man is such that he is not political on account of nature, either he is bad, as when this happens as a result of the corruption of human nature, or he is better than man, namely, in so far as he has a nature more perfect than that generally found in other men, in such a way that by himself he can be self-sufficient without the company of men, as was the case with John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit.

             In support of this he adduces a saying of Homer cursing someone who was not political because of depravity. For he says of him that he was without tribe because he could not be contained by the bond of friendship, and without right because he could not be contained under the yoke of the law, and vicious because he could not be contained under the rule of reason. Now he who is such by nature, being quarrelsome and living without yoke, is at the same time necessarily inclined to be avid for war, just as we see that wild fowls are rapacious.

             36 Then he proves from his proper operation that man is a political animal, more so even than the bee and any gregarious animal, by the following argument. We say that nature does nothing in vain because it always works for a determinate end. Hence, if nature gives to a being something that of itself is ordered to some end, it follows that this end is given to this being by nature. For we see that, whereas certain other animals have a voice, man alone above the other animals has speech. Indeed, although certain animals produce human speech, they do not properly speak, because they do not understand what they are saying but produce such words out of a certain habit.

             Now there is a difference between language and mere voice. Voice is a sign of pain and pleasure and consequently of the other passions, such as anger and fear, which are all ordered to pleasure and pain, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. Thus voice is given to the other animals, whose nature attains the level where they sense their pleasures and pains, and they signify this to one another by means of certain natural sounds of the voice, as a lion by his roar and a dog by his bark, in the place of which we use interjections.

             37 Human speech, on the other hand, signifies what is useful and what is harmful. It follows from this that it signifies the just and the unjust. For justice and injustice consist in this, that some people are treated equally or unequally as regards useful and harmful things. Thus speech is proper to men, because it is proper to them, as compared to the other animals, to have a knowledge of the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, and other such things that can be signified by speech.

             Since language is given to man by nature, therefore, and since language is ordered to this, that men communicate with one another as regards the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust, and other such things, it follows, from the fact that nature does nothing in vain, that men naturally communicate with one another in reference to these things. But communication in reference to these things is what makes a household and a city. Therefore, man is naturally a domestic and political animal.

             38 Then he shows from what has been said that the city is by nature prior to the household and to one individual man by the following argument. The whole is necessarily prior to the part, namely, in the order of nature and perfection. This is to be understood, however, of the part of matter, not of the part of the species, as is shown in Book VII of the Metaphysics. And he proves this as follows: if the whole man is destroyed, neither the foot nor the hand remains, except equivocally, in the manner in which a hand made out of stone can be called a hand. This because such a part is corrupted when the whole is corrupted. Now that which is corrupted does not retain its species, from which it receives its definition. Hence it is clear that the name does not retain the same meaning, and so it is predicated in an equivocal sense. That the part is corrupted when the whole is corrupted he shows by the fact that every part is defined by its operation and by the power by which it operates. For example, the definition of a foot is that it is an organic member having the power to walk. And thus, from the fact that it no longer has this power and this operation, it is not the same according to its species but is equivocally called a foot. The same reasoning holds for other similar parts, which are called parts of matter, in whose definition the whole is included, just as circle is included in the definition of a semicircle, for [12] a semicircle is a half circle. Not so, however, with the parts of the species, which are included in the definition of the whole, as, for example, lines are included in the definition of a triangle.

             39 So it is clear then that the whole is naturally prior to the parts of matter, even though the parts are prior in the order of generation. But individual men are related to the whole city as are the parts of man to man. For, just as a hand or a foot cannot exist without a man, so too one man cannot live self-sufficiently by himself when separated from the city.

             Now if it should happen that someone is unable to participate in civil society because of his depravity, he is worse than a man and is, as it were, a beast. If, on the other hand, he does not need anyone and is, as it were, self-sufficient, he is better than a man, for he is, as it were, a god. It remains true, therefore, from what has been said, that the city is by nature prior to one man.

             40 Then he treats of the foundation of the city and infers from what has been said that there is in all men a certain natural impulse toward the city, as also toward the virtues. But nevertheless, just as the virtues are acquired through human exercise, as is stated in Book II of the Ethics, in the same way cities are founded by human industry. Now the man who first founded a city was the cause of the greatest goods for men.

             41 For man is the best of the animals if virtue, to which he has a natural inclination, is perfected in him. But if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals. This he proves as follows. Injustice is all the more cruel in proportion as it has a greater number of arms, that is, instruments for doing evil. Now prudence and virtue, which of themselves are ordered to the good, belong to man according to his nature. But when a man is evil, he makes use of these as certain arms to do evil; for example, by his shrewdness he thinks up different frauds, and through abstinence he becomes capable of bearing hunger and thirst, so that he might be more persevering in his malice, and so of the other virtues. Hence it is that a man without virtue is most vicious and savage as regards the corruption of his irascible appetite, being as he is cruel and without affection; and as regards the corruption of his concupiscible appetite, he is most evil in relation to sexual matters and greediness for food. But man is reduced to justice by means of the political order. This is clear from the fact that among the Greeks the order of political society and the judgment of justice are called by the same name, to wit, dike. Hence it is evident that the man who founded the city kept men from being most evil and brought them to a state of excellence in accordance with justice and the virtues.