The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro

 And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t

 First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review

 But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G

 Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c

 But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But

 But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,

 But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica

 For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio

 Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals

 Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes

 It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n

 If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi

 How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit

 This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in

 He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o

 Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere

 And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des

 Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun

 But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o

 I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve

 But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere

 And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n

 While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella

 And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un

 I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t

 For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named

 But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but

 But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le

 If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi

 He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w

 But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa

 They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint

 With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w

 But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els

 Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o

 For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to

 For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no

 But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som

 This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence

 Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor

 If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n

 Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain

 But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for

 But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp

 What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that

 But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin

 For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot

 But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r

 And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a

 And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s

 But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac

 For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen

 But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,

 On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage

 But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a

 In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F

 But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger

 To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha

 But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th

 But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human

 “But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an

 This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend

 But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order

 He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e

 But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I

 But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa

 Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera

 And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s

 I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in

 Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the

 But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,

 But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours

 But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,

 Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h

 But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and

 But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should

 All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t

 But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven

 But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr

 But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat

 But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo

 But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w

 Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f

 And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f

 But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a

 I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and

 I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi

 For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it

 But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i

 Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp

 He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne

 But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam

 But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap

 But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k

 What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin

 What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in

 Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e

 Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,

 But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar

 Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in

 But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But

 But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult

 But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our

 But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t

 When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c

 Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th

 Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and

 Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un

 How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo

 Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne

 “But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of

 He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr

 Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,

 Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are

 But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro

 “The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first

 With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who

 Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for

Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were called ungenerate in their heretical sense, merely because He is simple and incomposite, and if the terms simple and ungenerate are the same in meaning, then too must the simplicity of the Son be equivalent with ungeneracy. For they will not deny that God the Only-begotten is by His nature simple, unless they are prepared to deny that He is God. Accordingly the term simplicity will in its meaning have no such connection with being ungenerate as that, by reason of its incomposite character, His nature should be termed ungeneracy; or they draw upon themselves one of two absurd alternatives, either denying the Godhead of the Only-begotten, or attributing ungeneracy to Him also. For if God is simple, and the term simplicity is, according to them, identical with ungenerate, they must either make out the Son to be of composite nature, by which term it is implied that neither is He God, or if they allow His Godhead, and God (as I have said) is simple, then they make Him out at the same time to be ungenerate, if the terms simple and ungenerate are convertible. But to make my meaning clearer I will recapitulate. We affirm that each of these terms has its own peculiar meaning, and that the term indivisible cannot be rendered by ungenerate, nor ungenerate by simple; but by simple we understand uncompounded, and by ungenerate we are taught to understand what is without origin. Furthermore we hold that we are bound to believe that the Son of God, being Himself God, is Himself also simple, because God is free from all compositeness; and in like manner in speaking of Him also by the appellation of Son we neither denote simplicity of substance, nor in simplicity do we include the notion of Son, but the term Son we hold to indicate that He is of the substance of the Father, and the term simple we hold to mean what the word bears upon its face. Since, then, the meaning of the term simple in regard to essence is one and the same whether spoken of the Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there is a wide difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion not contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no necessity that, the Father being ungenerate, His essence should, because that essence is simple, be defined by the term ungenerate. For neither of the Son, Who is simple, and Whom also we believe to be generated, do we say that His essence is simplicity. But as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so also the essence is ungenerate and not ungeneracy. In like manner also the Son being generated, our reason is freed from any necessity that, because His essence is simple, we should define that essence as generateness; but here again each expression has its peculiar force. For the term generated suggests to you a source whence, and the term simple implies freedom from composition. But this does not approve itself to them. For they maintain that since the essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than ungeneracy; on which account also He is said to be ungenerate. In answer to whom we may also observe that, since they call the Father both Creator and Maker, whereas He Who is so called is simple in regard to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the essence of the Father to be creation and making, since the argument about simplicity introduces into His essence any signification of any name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate ungeneracy from the definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject they define His essence by the term ungeneracy, by a parity of reasoning let them likewise see creation and making in the essence of the Father, not as though the power residing in the essence created and made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if they reject this as bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what logically follows to reject the other proposition as well. For as the essence of the builder is not the thing built, no more is ungeneracy the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clearness and conciseness I will restate my arguments. If the Father is called ungenerate, not by reason of His having never been generated, but because His essence is simple and incomposite, by a parity of reasoning the Son also must be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and incomposite essence. But if we are compelled to confess the Son to be generated because He was generated, it is manifest that we must address the Father as ungenerate, because He was not generated. But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions, distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate. But let us discuss this point also in addition to what I have said. If they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the essence8    Essence, substance, οὐσία. Most of this controversy might have been avoided by agreeing to banish the word οὐσία entirely from this sort of connection with the Deity. Even Celsus the Neo-platonist had said, “God does not partake of substance” (οὐσίας). “Exactly,” Origen replies, “God is partaken of, viz., by those who have His spirit, rather than partakes of anything Himself. Indeed, the subject of substance involves questions complicated and difficult to decide; most especially on this point. Supposing, that is, an absolute Substance, motionless, incorporeal, is God beyond this Substance in rank and power, granting a share of it to those to whom according to His Word He chooses to communicate it? Or is He Himself this Substance, though described as invisible in that passage about the Saviour (Coloss. i. 15) ‘Who is the image of the invisible God,’ where invisible means incorporeal? Another point is this: is the Only-Begotten and First-Born of all Creatures to be pronounced the Substance of substances, the Original Idea of all ideas, while the Father God Himself is beyond all these?” (c. Cels. vi. 64). (Such a question as this last, however, could not have been asked a century later, when Athanasius had dispelled all traces of Neo-platonic subordination from the Christian Faith. Uncreated Spirit, not Invisible First Substance, is the mark of all in the Triune-God. But the effort of Neo-platonism to rise above every term that might seem to include the Deity had not been thrown away. Even “God is Spirit” is only a conception, not a definition, of the Deity; while “God is substance” ought to be regarded as an actual contradiction in terms.) (of the Father), and not that He has His substance without origin, what term will they use to denote the Father’s being without origin, when they have set aside the term ungenerate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the distinguishing difference of the Persons by the term ungenerate, but are to regard it as indicating His very nature as flowing in a manner from the subject-matter, and disclosing what we seek in articulate syllables, it must follow that God is not, or is not to be called, ungenerate, there being no word left to express such peculiar significance in regard to Him. For inasmuch as according to them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates the Divine nature, their argument will be found to exclude it altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of their teaching in respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their fallacious argument, something else, and not that He was not generated, their whole argument falls and collapses into Sabellianism. For by this reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the Son, the distinction between generated and ungenerate having been got rid of from their teaching, so that they are driven to one of two alternatives: either they must again adopt the view of the term as denoting a difference in the attributes proper to either Person, and not as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions as to the word, they must side with Sabellius. For it is impossible that the difference of the persons should be without confusion, unless there be a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Accordingly if the term denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by the appellation. For the definitions of difference and essence are by no means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the word so as to signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are called “Son-Fathers9    i.e.who hold the Father and the Son to be one and the same Person, i.e. Sabellians. “He here overthrows the heresy of Sabellius, by marking the persons of the Father and the Son: for the Church does not imagine a Son-Fatherhood (υἰοπατορίαν), such as the figment of that African” (Ammonius caten. ad Joh. I. i. p. 14).,” all accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from their account. But if they say that there is nothing to hinder the distinction between generated and ungenerate from being rendered by the term ungenerate, and that term represents the essence too, let them distinguish for us the kindred meanings of the word, so that the notion of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For the expression of the difference by means of this term involves no ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal opposition. For as an equivalent to saying “The Son has, and the Father has not, been generated,” we too assent to the statement that the latter is ungenerate and the former generated, by a sort of verbal correlation. But from what point of view a clear manifestation of essence can be made by this appellation, this they are unable to say. But keeping silence on this head, our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling subtleties in his former treatise. Because God, saith he, being simple, is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What has the notion of simplicity to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the Only-begotten generated, but, without controversy, He is simple also. But, saith he, He is without parts also, and incomposite. But what is this to the point? For neither is the Son multiform and composite: and yet He is not on that account ungenerate.

εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνοι τὸ ἄνευ αἰτίας εἶναι ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου, ἀλλ' ἡ ἁπλότης ἀντεισέρχοιτο τῇ σημασίᾳ τοῦ τοιούτου ὀνόματος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀγέννητος κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς αἱρέσεως λέγοιτο, διότι ἁπλοῦς ἐστι καὶ ἀσύνθετος, μία δὲ τοῦ ἁπλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγεννήτου ἡ σημασία, καὶ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἁπλότης « ἀγεννησία » πάντως ὀνομασθήσεται. ἁπλοῦν γὰρ εἶναι τῇ φύσει καὶ τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν οὐκ ἀρνήσονται, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ τὸ θεὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀρνήσαιντο. οὐκοῦν οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον κοινωνίαν ἡ ἁπλότης πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἕξει, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἀσύνθετον ἀγεννησίαν τὴν φύσιν λέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ δυοῖν ἀτόποιν τὸ ἕτερον καθ' ἑαυτῶν ἐπισπάσωνται, ἢ ἀρνούμενοι τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν θεότητα ἢ κἀκείνῳ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἐπιφημίζοντες. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἁπλοῦν μὲν τῇ φύσει τὸ θεῖον, ὄνομα δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῆς ἁπλότητός ἐστι τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἢ σύνθετον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν κατασκευάσουσιν, ᾧ τὸ μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι συναποδείκνυται, ἢ εἰ ὁμολογοῖεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν θεότητα, ἁπλοῦν δὲ καθὼς εἴρηται τὸ θεῖόν ἐστι, τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον διὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα πάντως εἶναι κατασκευάσουσιν, εἴπερ ἡ ἁπλότης ταὐτὸν τῇ ἀγεννησίᾳ νομίζεται. ὡς δ' ἂν σαφέστερον τὸ λεγόμενον γένοιτο, πάλιν τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀναλήψομαι.
Ἡμεῖς τοῦτό φαμεν, ὅτι ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἴδιόν τι τὸ σημαινόμενον ὕπεστι καὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ τὸ ἀμερὲς ἑρμηνεύεται οὔτε τῷ ἁπλῷ τὸ ἀγέννητον: ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τῷ ἁπλῷ τὸ ἀσύνθετον ἐνοήσαμεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ τὸ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίας εἶναί τινος ἐδιδάχθημεν. τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐκ θεοῦ θεὸν ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸν ἁπλοῦν πιστεύειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν διὰ τὸ πάσης συνθέσεως καθαρεύειν τὸ θεῖον καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου μήτε διὰ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν ἁπλότητα τῆς οὐσίας σημαίνειν μήτ' αὖ τῇ ἁπλότητι παριστᾶν τὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ σημαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου μὲν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπόστασιν φανεροῦσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἁπλοῦ ὅπερ ἐμφαίνει ἡ τοιαύτη φωνή. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ μὲν τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ἁπλότητος λόγος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς κἂν ἐπὶ πατρὸς λέγηται κἂν ἐπὶ υἱοῦ, οὔτε ὑφέσει τινὶ οὔτε πλεονασμῷ διαλλάσσων, τὸ δὲ γεννητὸν τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ πολλὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων νοῆσαι, ὃ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ οὐκ ἔστι), διὰ τοῦτό φαμεν μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀγεννήτου ὄντος τοῦ πατρός, ἐπειδὴ ἁπλῆ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, « ἀγεννησίαν » λέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ εἶναι πεπιστευμένου, ἁπλότητα λέγομεν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἁπλῆ ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία καὶ οὐχ ἁπλότης, οὕτω καὶ ἀγέννητός ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία καὶ οὐκ « ἀγεννησία ». τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γεννητοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, πάσης ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος κεχώρισται, ἐπειδὴ ἁπλῆ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία, γέννησιν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἰδίαν ἔμφασιν ἑκάτερα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἔχει: ἥ τε γὰρ τοῦ γεννητοῦ προσηγορία τὸ ἔκ τινός σοι παρίστησι καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν τὸ ἀπηλλάχθαι συνθέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα κἀκείνοις δοκεῖ: βούλονται γάρ, ἐπειδὴ ἁπλῆ ἐστιν τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ οὐσία, μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγεννησίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι νομίζεσθαι, διότι καὶ ἀγέννητος λέγεται. πρὸς οὓς καὶ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ κτίστην τὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ὀνομάζουσιν, ἁπλοῦς δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ὁ ταῦτα ὀνομαζόμενος, ὥρα τοῖς σοφοῖς τούτοις „κτίσιν” καὶ ”δημιουργίαν„ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ πᾶσαν σημασίαν τοῦ περὶ αὐτὸν λεγομένου ὀνόματος ὁ τῆς ἁπλότητος λόγος εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀνάγει. ἢ τοίνυν χωρισάτωσαν τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τῆς θείας οὐσίας τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἐπὶ μόνης τῆς ἰδίας ἐμφάσεως μένουσαν ἤ, εἴπερ διὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τῇ ἀγεννησίᾳ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁρίζοιντο, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν κτίσιν καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίᾳ ἐνθεωρείτωσαν, ὡς οὐχὶ κτιζούσης καὶ δημιουργούσης τῆς ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ δυνάμεως, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς τῆς δυνάμεως κτίσμα καὶ δημιούργημα νοουμένης. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀποβάλλουσιν ὡς πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄτοπον, πεισθήτωσαν ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας κἀκεῖνον τούτῳ συναποβάλλειν τὸν λόγον: ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δημιούργημα ἡ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οὐσία, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἀγεννησία ἡ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου οὐσία. συντομίας δὲ χάριν καὶ σαφηνείας πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπαναλήψομαι λόγον: εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ γεγεννῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετος οὐσία ὁ πατὴρ εἶναι ἀγέννητος λέγεται, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην αἰτίαν ἀγέννητος καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὀνομασθήσεται: οὐσία γὰρ καὶ οὗτός ἐστι μονοειδὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος. εἰ δὲ τὸν υἱόν, ἐπειδὴ ἐγεννήθη, γεννητὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσομεν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν πατέρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐγεννήθη, προσεροῦμεν ἀγέννητον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἥ τε ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ τῶν κειμένων ἀκολουθία καταναγκάζει, πρόδηλον ὅτι οὐχὶ οὐσίας ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ διαφορᾶς τινος νοημάτων σημαντικὸν τῆς τὸ γεννηθὲν τοῦ μὴ γεννηθέντος διαστελλούσης. Εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσεξετάσωμεν. εἰ τὸ ἀγέννητον ὄνομά φασι τὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνειν καὶ μὴ τὸ ἄνευ αἰτίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν, ποίῳ ὀνόματι τὸ ἄνευ αἰτίας εἶναι τὸν πατέρα συστήσουσι, τῆς ἀγεννησίας εἰς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἔνδειξιν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀποτεταγμένης; εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὴν διασταλτικὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαφορὰν διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωνῆς διδασκόμεθα, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἐνδεικτικὴν εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν ταύτην ὑποληψόμεθα οἷον ἀπορρέουσάν πως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν συλλαβῶν ἐκφωνήσεως ἐκκαλύπτουσαν τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀγέννητον ἢ μὴ λέγεσθαι, μηδεμιᾶς φωνῆς τὴν τοιαύτην ἔμφασιν ἰδιαζόντως ἐπ' αὐτοῦ παρεχομένης. τῆς γὰρ ἀγεννησίας, καθὼς οὗτοί φασιν, οὐ τὸ ἄνευ αἰτίας εἶναι διασημαινούσης, ἀλλὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐνδεικνυμένης, περιτραπήσεται πάντως αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὐναντίον τὸ σόφισμα καὶ εὑρεθήσεται διαφεῦγον « ἐκ » τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον. μηδενὸς γὰρ ἑτέρου ῥήματος ἢ ὀνόματος τὸ μὴ γεννηθῆναι τὸν πατέρα παριστῶντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι καὶ οὐχὶ τὸ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι διερμηνεύοντος, οἴχεται καὶ συνερρύη πρὸς τὸν Σαβέλλιον αὐτοῖς κατολισθήσας ὁ λόγος. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι νομίζεσθαι τῷ υἱῷ τὸν πατέρα, τῆς κατὰ τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον διαφορᾶς ἐκ τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν ἐκκλαπείσης, ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον ἢ ἀναθήσονται τὴν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος δόξαν ὡς διαφορὰν τῆς ἑκατέρου ἰδιότητος καὶ οὐχὶ φύσιν σημαίνοντος, ἢ παραμένοντες τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις περὶ ταύτης τῆς φωνῆς Σαβελλίῳ συνθήσονται: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡ τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαφορὰ τὸ ἀσύγχυτον ἕξει, μὴ τῷ γεννητῷ διαστελλομένη πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον. ὥστε εἰ μὲν διαφορὰν σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα, ἡ οὐσία ἔσται διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας ταύτης ἀσήμαντος: ἄλλος γὰρ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ ἕτερος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος: εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν σημασίαν τῆς φωνῆς καθέλκουσιν, εἰς τὴν τῶν Υἱοπατόρων λεγομένων ἀπάτην ἀκολούθως ὑποσυρήσονται, τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις τρανώσεως ὑφαιρεθείσης τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ λέγουσι κωλύειν μηδὲν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ γεννητὸν ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀγεννησίας σημαίνεσθαι καὶ αὐτὴν παριστᾶν τὴν οὐσίαν, διαστειλάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὰς προσφυεῖς τοῦ ὀνόματος σημασίας, ὡς δύνασθαι κυρίως ἁρμόζειν πρὸς ἑκατέραν διασχισθεῖσαν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὴν ἔννοιαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου δήλωσις ἀμφιβολίαν οὐκ ἔχει, τῷ τῆς ἀντιδιαστολῆς λόγῳ συνισταμένη: ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ „γεγέννηται ὁ υἱὸς” καὶ ”οὐ γεγέννηται ὁ πατὴρ„ τὸν μὲν ἀγέννητον τὸν δὲ γεννητὸν λέγεσθαι κατά τινα ῥημάτων παρωνυμίαν καὶ ἡμεῖς συντιθέμεθα: ἡ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας δεῖξις ἐκ ποίας διανοίας διὰ τοῦ προσρήματος τούτου σαφηνισθήσεται, εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν.
Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σιωπήσας ὁ καινὸς θεολόγος ἑτέρους ἡμῖν φληνάφους ἐπὶ τῆς προλαβούσης λογογραφίας εἴρων διέξεισιν. « ὅτι ἁπλοῦς », φησίν, « ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀγέννητος λέγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγεννησία ἐστὶν ὁ θεός ». τί κοινὸν ὁ τῆς ἁπλότητος ἔχει λόγος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου διάνοιαν; καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ μονογενὴς καὶ γεννητός ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦς εἶναι οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται.