On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius.

 Ye that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from t

 In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by th

 The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdit

 What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and speak o

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, a

 Most men think that the word “Godhead” is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the cons

 But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a com

 As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word “Godhead” is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasona

 Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argumen

 If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power

 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the asserti

 But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument

 As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and

 Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove the s

 If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the P

 But in speaking of “cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of “cause” and of “n

 Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another i

The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdity in describing those who are united in nature, if they are more than one, by the plural number of the name derived from their nature. If, then, in the above case, custom admits this, and no one forbids us to speak of those who are two as two, or those who are more than two as three, how is it that in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith, though confessing the Three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of nature between them, we are in some sense at variance with our confession, when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is one, and yet forbid men to say “there are three Gods”? The question is, as I said, very difficult to deal with: yet, if we should be able to find anything that may give support to the uncertainty of our mind, so that it may no longer totter and waver in this monstrous dilemma, it would be well: on the other hand, even if our reasoning be found unequal to the problem, we must keep for ever, firm and unmoved, the tradition which we received by succession from the fathers, and seek from the Lord the reason which is the advocate of our faith: and if this be found by any of those endowed with grace, we must give thanks to Him who bestowed the grace; but if not, we shall none the less, on those points which have been determined, hold our faith unchangeably.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, καθὰ προέφην, πολὺ τὸ δυσμεταχείριστον ἔχει: ἡμεῖς δέ, εἰ μέν τι τοιοῦτον εὕροιμεν, δι' οὗ τὸ ἀμφίβολον τῆς διανοίας ἡμῶν ἐρεισθήσεται, μηκέτι πρὸς τὸ διλήμματον τῆς ἀτοπίας ἐπιδιστάζον καὶ κραδαινόμενον, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀτονώτερος ἐλεγχθείη τοῦ προβλήματος ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος, τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν ἣν παρὰ τῶν πατέρων διεδεξάμεθα φυλάξομεν εἰς ἀεὶ βεβαίαν τε καὶ ἀκίνητον, τὸν δὲ συνήγορον τῆς πίστεως λόγον παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ζητήσομεν: ὃς εἰ μὲν εὑρεθείη παρά τινος τῶν ἐχόντων τὴν χάριν, εὐχαριστήσομεν τῷ δεδωκότι τὴν χάριν: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγνωσμένων τὴν πίστιν ἀμετάθετον ἕξομεν.