Chapter III.—Justin accuses Crescens of ignorant prejudice against the Christians.

I too, therefore, expect to be plotted against and fixed to the stake, by some of those I have named, or perhaps by Crescens, that lover of bravado and boasting;9    Words resembling “philosopher” in sound, viz. φιλοψόφου καὶ φιλοκόμπου. [This passage is found elsewhere. See note, cap. viii., in the text preferred by Grabe.] for the man is not worthy of the name of philosopher who publicly bears witness against us in matters which he does not understand, saying that the Christians are atheists and impious, and doing so to win favour with the deluded mob, and to please them. For if he assails us without having read the teachings of Christ, he is thoroughly depraved, and far worse than the illiterate, who often refrain from discussing or bearing false witness about matters they do not understand. Or, if he has read them and does not understand the majesty that is in them, or, understanding it, acts thus that he may not be suspected of being such [a Christian], he is far more base and thoroughly depraved, being conquered by illiberal and unreasonable opinion and fear. For I would have you to know that I proposed to him certain questions on this subject, and interrogated him, and found most convincingly that he, in truth, knows nothing. And to prove that I speak the truth, I am ready, if these disputations have not been reported to you, to conduct them again in your presence. And this would be an act worthy of a prince. But if my questions and his answers have been made known to you, you are already aware that he is acquainted with none of our matters; or, if he is acquainted with them, but, through fear of those who might hear him, does not dare to speak out, like Socrates, he proves himself, as I said before, no philosopher, but an opinionative man;10    φιλόδοξος, which may mean a lover of vainglory. at least he does not regard that Socratic and most admirable saying: “But a man must in no wise be honoured before the truth.”11    See Plato, Rep., p. 595. But it is impossible for a Cynic, who makes indifference his end, to know any good but indifference.

[3] Κἀγὼ οὖν προσδοκῶ ὑπό τινος τῶν ὠνομασμένων ἐπιβουλευθῆναι καὶ ξύλῳ ἐμπαγῆναι, ἢ κἂν ὑπὸ Κρίσκεντος τοῦ φιλοψόφου καὶ φιλοκόμπου. οὐ γὰρ φιλόσοφον εἰπεῖν ἄξιον τὸν ἄνδρα, ὅς γε περὶ ἡμῶν ἃ μὴ ἐπίσταται δημοσίᾳ καταμαρτυρεῖ, ὡς ἀθέων καὶ ἀσεβῶν Χριστιανῶν ὄντων, πρὸς χάριν καὶ ἡδονὴν τῶν πολλῶν τῶν πεπλανημένων ταῦτα πράττων. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἐντυχὼν τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδάγμασι κατατρέχει ἡμῶν, παμπόνηρός ἐστι καὶ ἰδιωτῶν πολὺ χείρων, οἳ φυλάττονται πολλάκις περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἐπίστανται διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ψευδομαρτυρεῖν: ἢ εἰ ἐντυχών, μὴ συνῆκε τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς μεγαλεῖον, ἢ συνείς, πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὑποπτευθῆναι τοιοῦτος ταῦτα ποιεῖ, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀγεννὴς καὶ παμπόνηρος, ἰδιωτικῆς καὶ ἀλόγου δόξης καὶ φόβου ἐλάττων ὤν. καὶ γὰρ προθέντα με καὶ ἐρωτήσαντα αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσεις τινὰς τοιαύτας καὶ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐλέγξαι, ὅτι ἀληθῶς μηδὲν ἐπίσταται, εἰδέναι ὑμᾶς βούλομαι. καὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, εἰ μὴ ἀνηνέχθησαν ἡμῖν αἱ κοινωνίαι τῶν λόγων, ἕτοιμος καὶ ἐφ' ὑμῶν κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἐρωτήσεων πάλιν: βασιλικὸν δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον εἴη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐγνώσθησαν ὑμῖν αἱ ἐρωτήσεις μου καὶ αἱ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίσεις, φανερὸν ὑμῖν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐπίσταται: ἢ εἰ καὶ ἐπίσταται, διὰ τοὺς ἀκούοντας δὲ οὐ τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὁμοίως Σωκράτει ὡς προέφην, οὐ φιλόσοφος ἀλλὰ φιλόδοξος ἀνὴρ δείκνυται, ὅς γε μηδὲ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἀξιέραστον ὂν τιμᾷ: Ἀλλ' οὔτι γε πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ. ἀδύνατον δὲ Κυνικῷ, ἀδιάφορον τὸ τέλος προθεμένῳ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι πλὴν ἀδιαφορίας.