Chapter III.—Of Indulgence and Pure Volition.  The Question Illustrated.15    From 1 Cor. vii.

For what things are manifest we all know; and in what sense these very things are manifest must be thoroughly examined.  For, albeit some things seem to savour of “the will of God,” seeing that they are allowed by Him, it does not forthwith follow that everything which is permitted proceeds out of the mere and absolute will of him who permits.  Indulgence is the source of all permission.  And albeit indulgence is not independent of volition, still, inasmuch as it has its cause in him to whom the indulgence is granted, it comes (as it were) from unwilling volition, having experienced a producing cause of itself which constrains volition.  See what is the nature of a volition of which some second party is the cause.  There is, again, a second species of pure volition to be considered.  God wills us to do some acts pleasing to16    Or, “decreed by.” Himself, in which it is not indulgence which patronizes, but discipline which lords it.  If, however, He has given a preference over these to some other acts—(acts), of course, which He more wills—is there a doubt that the acts which we are to pursue are those which He more wills; since those which He less wills (because He wills others more) are to be similarly regarded as if He did not will them?  For, by showing what He more wills, He has effaced the lesser volition by the greater.  And in as far as He has proposed each (volition) to your knowledge, in so far has He defined it to be your duty to pursue that which He has declared that He more wills.  Then, if the object of His declaring has been that you may pursue that which He more wills; doubtless, unless you do so, you savour of contrariety to His volition, by savouring of contrariety to His superior volition; and you rather offend than merit reward, by doing what He wills indeed, and rejecting what He more wills.  Partly, you sin; partly, if you sin not, still you deserve no reward.  Moreover, is not even the unwillingness to deserve reward a sin?

If, therefore, second marriage finds the source of its allowance in that “will of God” which is called indulgence, we shall deny that that which has indulgence for its cause is volition pure; if in that to which some other—that, namely, which regards continence as more desirable—is preferred as superior, we shall have learned (by what has been argued above), that the not-superior is rescinded by the superior.  Suffer me to have touched upon these considerations, in order that I may now follow the course of the apostle’s words.  But, in the first place, I shall not be thought irreligious if I remark on what he himself professes; (namely), that he has introduced all indulgence in regard to marriage from his own (judgment)—that is, from human sense, not from divine prescript.  For, withal, when he has laid down the definitive rule with reference to “the widowed and the unwedded,” that they are to “marry if they cannot contain,” because “better it is to marry than to burn,”17    1 Cor. vii. 8, 9. he turns round to the other class, and says:  “But to the wedded I make official declaration—not indeed I, but the Lord.”  Thus he shows, by the transfer of his own personality to the Lord, that what he had said above he had pronounced not in the Lord’s person, but in his own:  “Better it is to marry than to burn.”  Now, although that expression pertain to such as are “apprehended” by the faith in an unwedded or widowed condition, still, inasmuch as all cling to it with a view to licence in the way of marrying, I should wish to give a thorough treatment to the inquiry what kind of good he is pointing out which is “better than” a penalty; which cannot seem good but by comparison with something very bad; so that the reason why “marrying” is good, is that “burning” is worse.  “Good” is worthy of the name if it continue to keep that name without comparison, I say not with evil, but even with some second good; so that, even if it is compared to some other good, and is by some other cast into the shade, it do nevertheless remain in possession of the name “good.”  If, however, it is the nature of an evil which is the means which compels the predicating “good,” it is not so much “good” as a species of inferior evil, which by being obscured by a superior evil is driven to the name of good.  Take away, in short, the condition of comparison, so as not to say, “Better it is to marry than to burn;” and I question whether you will have the hardihood to say, “Better it is to marry,” not adding what that is which is better.  Therefore what is not better, of course is not good either; inasmuch as you have taken away and removed the condition of comparison, which, while it makes the thing “better,” so compels it to be regarded as “good.”  “Better it is to marry than to burn” is to be understood in the same way as, “Better it is to lack one eye than two:”  if, however, you withdraw from the comparison, it will not be “better” to have one eye, inasmuch as it is not “good” either.  Let none therefore catch at a defence (of marriage) from this paragraph, which properly refers to “the unmarried and widows,” for whom no (matrimonial) conjunction is yet reckoned:  although I hope I have shown that even such must understand the nature of the permission.

CAPUT III.

Alte et impresse recogitandam esse dico Dei voluptatem, 0917A quid etiam in occulto velit. Quae enim in manifesto , scimus omnes; eaque ipsa qualiter in manifesto sint, perspiciendum est. Nam etsi quaedam videntur voluntatem Dei sapere, dum a Deo permittuntur, non statim omne quod permittitur, ex mera et tota voluntate procedit ejus qui permittit. Ex indulgentia est, quodcumque permittitur; quae etsi sine voluntate non est, quia tamen aliquam habet caussam in illo cui indulgetur, quasi de invita venit voluntate, passa caussam sui, quae cogit voluntatem. Vide qualis sit voluntas, cujus alter est caussa. Secunda item species consideranda est non purae voluntatis. Vult nos Deus agere quaedam placita sibi , in quibus non indulgentia patrocinatur, sed disciplina dominatur. Si tamen alia istis praeposuit, utique quae magis 0917B vult, dubiumne est ea nobis sectanda esse, quae mavult; cum quae minus vult, quia alia magis vult, perinde habenda sint atque si nolit ? Nam ostendens quid magis velit, minorem voluntatem majore delevit. Quantoque notitiae tuae utramque proposuit, tanto definiit id te sectari debere, quod declaravit se magis velle. Ergo si ideo declaravit ut id secteris quod magis vult, sine dubio nisi ita facis contra voluntatem ejus sapis, sapiendo contra potiorem ejus voluntatem: magisque offendis quam promereris , quod vult quidem faciendo, et quod mavult respuendo. Ex parte delinquis; ex parte, si non delinquis, non tamen promereris. Porro et promereri nolle, delinquere est. Secundum igitur matrimonium, si est ex illa Dei voluntate, quae indulgentia 0917C vocatur , negabimus meram voluntatem , cui indulgentia est caussa; si ex ea, cui potior alia praeponitur continentiae magis appetendae, didicerimus non potiorem a potiore rescindi . Haec praestrinxerim, ut jam Apostoli voces decurram. In primis autem non videbor irreligiosus, 0918A si, quod ipse profitetur, animadvertam; omnem illum indulgentiam nuptiarum, de suo, id est, de humano sensu, non de divino praescripto induxisse. Nam et cum de viduis et innuptis definiit uti nubant, si continere non possunt, quia melius sit nubere quam uri; conversus ad alteram speciem: Nuptis autem denuntio, inquit, non quidem ego, sed Dominus (I Cor., VII, 10). Ita ostendit, ex tralatione personae suae in Dominum, id quod supra dixerat, non ex Domini persona, sed ex sua pronuntiasse, Melius est nuberequam uri. Quae vox licet ad eos pertineat, qui innupti , vel vidui a fide deprehenduntur; quia tamen omnes eam ad nubendi licentiam amplectuntur, velim pertractare , quale bonum ostendat, quod melius est 0918B poena: quod non potest videri bonum, nisi pessimo comparatum; ut ideo bonum sit nubere, quia deterius est ardere. Bonum ita est , si perseveret nomen obtinens sine comparatione, non dico mali, sed etiam boni alterius; ut et si bono alii comparatur, et alio adumbratur , nihilominus remaneat in boni nomine. Caeterum, si per mali conditionem cogitur bonum dici, non tam bonum est quam genus mali inferioris, quod a superiore malo obscuratum ad nomen boni impellitur . Aufer denique conditionem comparationis, ut non dicas: melius est nubere quam uri; et quaero, an dicere audeas: melius est nubere; non adjiciens quid sit id, quod melius est. Ergo quod non melius, utique nec bonum; quia abstulisti et removisti conditionem comparationis, quae 0918C dum melius illud facit, ita bonum haberi cogit. Melius est nubere quam uri; sic accipiendum est, quomodo melius est uno oculo quam duobus carere: si tamen a comparatione discedas, non erit melius unum oculum habere, quia nec bonum. Nemo igitur captet ex hoc capitulo defensionem, 0919A quod proprie ad innuptos et viduos spectat, quibus nulla adhuc conjunctio numeratur. Quamquam ostenderim etiam illis intelligendam esse permissi conditionem.