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to be virtuous, just, temperate, prudent. For since virtue is a genus, divided into species, into justice, temperance and the rest, it is necessary that the one partaking of the genus, being virtuous, be as it were a genus of those partaking of the virtues according to species; similarly, since knowledge is a genus, of grammar, music and the rest, we say that the one denominated from the genus, the knowledgeable one, is a genus of those denominated from the species of knowledge. If, then, we speak of species of evil rational beings, we say that all those under these species are such by choice. At any rate, the aforesaid evil names are indicative not of substances, but of things of choice. For the name "devil" indicates not a substance, but a choice. For instance, the Lord called Judas, being a man 39.1100, a devil, not because of his substance, but because of his choice, speaking to all the disciples together, counting Judas among them: Did I not choose you, the twelve, and one of you is a devil? To which the writer adds: Now he said this about Judas, who was about to betray him. For if he is called a devil because of the future betrayal, he was not a devil then, when along with all he received the election. For he was chosen along with all because of the virtue he then possessed; but he was named a devil when he committed the acts of betrayal. If, then, in the case of Judas the name "devil" is indicative of a volitional action, so also if the word were said of anyone else, it signifies something volitional. And common usage knows the use of this name. For we call those who accuse these people to those, and those to these, "devils." Since, therefore, the devil also slanders God to men, and men to God, and men themselves to one another, he has received this name. But if the name "Satan" is also predicated of the devil himself, let them know that this too is indicative of something volitional. For being a Hebrew word, it signifies nothing other in the Greek language than "the adversary." And "the adversary," when applied to a man, is equivalent to "enemy," "harmful." As, therefore, the enemy is such by choice, so also is the adversary; just as also their opposites. For "friend," and "well-wisher," and "one of one accord," and "one of one mind," are names indicative of choices. For this same one is called friend and well-wisher, just as he is called devil, and Satan, and wicked. As in the Gospel the Savior, among other things, teaches the disciples to say this in the prayer: And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one. For the name "the evil one" is also indicative of choice. If, therefore, through all that he signifies, the author of evil and first apostate from virtue is such by choice, he cannot be evil by substance; but if they should say this, that being evil in substance he also happened upon the things of choice for which he is so named; let them know that in things substantial, choice is not admitted. For no one says he is an animal or a stone by choice; for these are substantial. Whence neither is there anything volitional; for volitional things are in those in whom there is also choice. But perhaps they will say: Why did the good God bring into being one who was to be so harmful, or a destroyer? But let them know, in saying this, that they oppose not only us, but also all who posit providence. For many others also who posit providence say that all rational creatures, in whom evil also arises, are from God. If, then, they say these things about the devil, 39.1101 they are also compelled to say this about all rational beings.
Nevertheless, we, not imitating them, say: The one who made that which is able by its own inclination to come to evil is not the cause of evil. For he fashioned a rational creature, which he willed to be good by its own choice, having the capacity to incline to either
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σπουδαίου εἶναι, δίκαιον, σώφρονα, φρόνιμον. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ γένος, εἰς εἴδη μεριζομένη, εἰς δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ, ἀνάγκη τὸν τοῦ γένους μετέχοντα, σπουδαῖον ὄντα, ὡσανεὶ γένος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τῶν κατ' εἶδος ἀρετῶν· ὡσαύτως καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης γένους οὔσης, γραμματικῆς, μουσικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὸν παρονομαζόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπιστήμονα, γένος εἶναι τῶν παρονομαζομένων ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδῶν φαμεν. Κἂν τοίνυν πονηρῶν λογικῶν εἴδη λέγομεν, προαιρετικῶς πάντας τοὺς ὑπὸ τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα λέγομεν εἶναι τοιούτους. Ἀμέλει γοῦν τὰ ὀνόματα τὰ προειρημένα πονηρὰ, οὐκ οὐσιῶν, ἀλλὰ προαιρετικῶν ἐστιν ἐμφανιστικά. Τὸ γὰρ διάβολος ὄνομα, οὐκ οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ προαίρεσιν δηλοῖ. Αὐτίκα γοῦν καὶ τὸν Ἰούδαν, ἄνθρωπον 39.1100 ὄντα, διάβολον ὁ Κύριος, οὐ διὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὠνόμασεν, λέγων πρὸς πάντας ἅμα τοὺς μαθητὰς, συναριθμῶν καὶ τὸν Ἰούδαν ἐν αὐτοῖς· Οὐχὶ τοὺς δώδεκα ὑμᾶς ἐξελεξάμην, καὶ εἷς ἐξ ὑμῶν διάβολός ἐστιν; Ὧ ἐπιφέρει συγγραφεύς· Τοῦτο δὲ εἶπεν περὶ Ἰούδα, τοῦ μέλλοντος προδιδόναι αὐτόν. Εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν προδοσίαν διάβολος εἴρηται οὐ τότε διάβολος ἦν, ὅτε ἅμα πᾶσιν ἐκλογῆς ἔτυχεν. Ἐκλεκτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἅμα πᾶσιν γέγονεν, διὰ τὴν προσοῦσαν αὐτῷ τότε ἀρετήν· διάβολος δὲ τότε ἐχρημάτισεν, ὅτε τὰ τῆς προδοσίας εἰργάσατο. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα τὸ διάβολος ὄνομα πράξεως προαιρετικῆς δηλωτικόν ἐστιν, οὕτως κἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἡ φωνὴ λέγοιτο, προαιρετικόν τι σημαίνει. Οἶδεν δὲ καὶ ἡ συνήθεια τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου. ∆ιαβόλους γοῦν καλοῦμεν τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας τούσδε τοῖσδε, κἀκείνους τούτοις. Ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ διάβολος Θεὸν ἀνθρώποις διαβάλλει, καὶ ἀνθρώπους Θεῷ, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλοις, ταύτης ἔτυχεν τῆς ὀνομασίας. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ σατανᾶς ὄνομα κατηγοροῖτο αὐτοῦ τοῦ διαβόλου, ἴστωσαν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρετικοῦ τινός ἐστι δηλωτικόν. Ἑβραϊκὴ γὰρ οὖσα ἡ φωνὴ, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι σημαίνει καθ' Ἑλλάδα φωνὴν, ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· τὸ δὲ ἀντικείμενον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου λαμβανόμενον, ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ἐχθρὸς, βλαβερός. Ὡς οὖν ὁ ἐχθρὸς προαιρέσει ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀντικείμενος· ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐναντία· τὸ γὰρ φίλος, καὶ εὐνοῶν, καὶ ὁμονοῶν, καὶ ὁμοφρονῶν, ὀνόματα προαιρέσεών ἐστι δηλωτικά. Λέγεται γὰρ αὐτὸς οὗτος φίλος καὶ εὐνοῶν, ὥσπερ διάβολος, καὶ σατανᾶς, καὶ πονηρός. Ὡς ἐν Εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ Σωτὴρ πρὸς ἑτέροις καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν διδάσκει ἐν τῇ εὐχῇ τοὺς μαθητάς· Καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμὸν, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ ὄνομα προαιρέσεώς ἐστι δηλωτικόν. Εἰ τοίνυν διὰ πάντων, ὧν σημαίνει, ὁ ἀρχέκακος καὶ πρῶτος ἀποστάτης τῆς ἀρετῆς προαιρετικῶς ἔστι τοιοῦτος, οὐ δύναται κατ' οὐσίαν εἶναι κακός· εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν τοῦτο, ὅτι τῇ οὐσίᾳ κακὸς ἂν ἔτυχεν καὶ τὰ προαιρετικὰ, δι' ἃ οὕτως ὠνόμασται· ἴστωσαν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς οὐσιώδεσιν οὐ παραλαμβάνεται προαίρεσις. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ λέγει προαιρετικῶς ζῶον εἶναι, ἢ λίθον· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐσιώδη. Ὅθεν οὐδὲ προαιρετικόν τι· ἐν ἐκείνοις γὰρ τὰ προαιρετικὰ, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐροῦσιν· ∆ιὰ τί τὸν οὕτω μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι βλαβερὸν, ἢ λυμεῶνα, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἤγαγεν ὁ ἀγαθὸς Θεός; Ἴστωσαν δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντες, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμῖν μόνοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς τιθεμένοις πρόνοιαν ἀντιπίπτουσιν. Πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοι τιθέμενοι πρόνοιαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ λέγουσιν εἶναι πάντα τὰ λογικὰ ζῶα, ἐν οἷς φύεται καὶ ἡ κακία. Εἰ οὖν περὶ τοῦ διαβόλου ταῦτα 39.1101 λέγουσιν, καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν λογικῶν ἀναγκάζονται εἰπεῖν τοῦτο.
Ὅμως δὲ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐκείνους μιμούμενοι, φαμέν· Οὐ κακίας αἴτιος ὁ ποιήσας τὸ δυνάμενον ἐξ ἰδίας ῥοπῆς εἰς κακίαν ἐλθεῖν. Λογικὸν γὰρ κατεσκεύασεν ζῶον, ὃ ἐβούλετο εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προαιρέσεως ἀγαθὸν, ἔχον εἰς ἑκάτερα ῥέπειν τὸ