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to hear or to speak this, for to assign causes for things beyond all cause and understanding is audacious; but to marvel at the divine and to consider the thought concerning it to be awesome is safe. 9.13 “Therefore, did God,” he says, “beget willingly or unwillingly?” But we must first state their aim and then answer. 9.14 Their aim, therefore, is that they may make their counter-argument against the simple-minded from either expression. 9.15 For if they should seize upon “he begot unwillingly”—and no one answers them this—they say: “Therefore, what God does not will he endures, having begotten the Son, the necessity of nature compelling him to this against his will.” 9.16 And if “he begot willingly” is granted to them, they add: “Then the generation of the Son is dependent on the paternal will, which provides existence to him creatively”; 9.17 but this answer is most nonsensical. For both God the begetter and Father, and “the radiance of his glory”, the Son, precede will and unwillingness and every thought; and nothing can be conceived between the one and the other, from whom he is. 9.18 And likewise the “image of God”. And again, the Son is not the first existence of will or non-will, having neither beginning nor end. 9.19 He begot, therefore, in a nature beyond counsel and mind. 9.20 But this proposition of theirs is also full of absurdity. For the passion of desire precedes willing, and the force of necessity precedes not willing but doing, along with the pre-conception of the counsel and before that the thought of the Father's hypostasis, which in every way and altogether has the radiance as co-existent. 9.21 In addition to this, if they believe that all things came to be from the counsel of the Father through the Son, the counsel does not pre-exist. For it is impossible and impracticable for the creator not to subsist and for it to be decided afterwards to create through him. 9.22 But this too is full of foolishness. For if he himself says: “I am and I have not changed”, how could the unchangeable nature undergo change according to the hypostases, not standing in the identity of persons, but being moved and shifting? 9.23 And this too. If it is true, as indeed it is true, that “whatever the Father does, these things the Son also does likewise”, the Son will also make another son, so that he may do all things likewise as the Father. 9.24 But if he did not make nor does he make, he is not a creature, nor does the paternal counsel precede him. 9.25 I might say another thing also; if the savior says: “the will of him who sent me, that everyone who sees the Son and believes in him may have eternal life”, the Son is not from the will, but he who sees him is. 9.26 For here too the will is found after the Son. 9.27 And one might quickly reject this argument of theirs altogether, not only from what has been said before, but also from what will be brought forth by us; that is, if one counters them with a similar question: “Does the Father exist by willing or not?”, for the same things they have practiced will meet them in reply: to “not by willing”, that it happened to him to subsist contrary to his purpose, the necessity of nature compelling him to this against his will; and to the second, that before the will he was not; for his existence will be referred back to his counsel, which creatively, according to their babblings, drives him into hypostasis. 9.28 Likewise also another, differing from the one before only in wording: “Is God immortal and good willingly or unwillingly?” For the same things will be brought to bear. 9.29 But one would do better to answer them concisely, that nothing is incidental to the all-perfect God, nor does he lack anything; 9.30 and just as will does not precede the paternal existence and immortality and goodness, so neither does it precede the generation; and that all such things are discordant with the conception of God; 9.31 but concerning created things David sings in the 113th psalm: 9.31 “Our God is in heaven; and on earth, all that he willed, he has done”, and “in wisdom you have made all things”, that is in the Son, and not in will, 9.32 and in the 72nd psalm: “you have held my right hand, in your counsel

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τοῦτο ἀκούειν ἢ λαλεῖν, τὸ γὰρ αἰτίας τῶν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν καὶ νόησιν ἀποδιδόναι τολμηρόν· τὸ δὲ θαυμάζειν τὸ θεῖον καὶ φόβον εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔννοιαν φοβερὰν νομίζειν, ἀσφαλές. 9.13 «Θέλων οὖν, φησίν, ἐγέννησεν ὁ θεὸς ἢ μὴ θέλων;» ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς χρὴ προειπεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν αὐτῶν καὶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. 9.14 ὁ οὖν σκοπός ἐστιν, ἵνα πρὸς ἀκεραίους ἀπὸ ἑκατέρας λέξεως τὴν ἀντίθεσιν ποιῶνται. 9.15 ἤντε γὰρ δράξωνται τοῦ «μὴ θέλων ἐγέννησεν»-οὐδεὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο ἀποκρίνεται-λέγουσιν· «οὐκοῦν ὃ μὴ θέλει ὁ θεὸς ὑπομένει γεννήσας τὸν υἱόν, φύσεως ἀνάγκης εἰς τοῦτο ἄκοντα αὐτὸν περιαγούσης». 9.16 ἤντε δοθῇ αὐτοῖς τὸ «θέλων ἐγέννησεν ἐπάγουσιν· «ἄρα ἡ γέννησις τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐξῆπται τῆς πατρικῆς θελήσεως, δημιουργικῶς ὕπαρξιν αὐτῷ παρεχούσης»· 9.17 ἡ δὲ ἀπόκρισις αὕτη ἀνουστάτη τυγχάνει. τῆς θελήσεως γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἀνεθελησίας καὶ πάσης ἐννοίας προτερεύει ὅ τε γεννήσας θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τό τε «ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ», ὁ υἱός· καὶ οὐδὲν τούτου μέσον καὶ ἐκείνου, ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν, ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται. 9.18 Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ «εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ». ἔστιν δὲ πάλιν ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἀρχομένη οὐδὲ παυομένη πρώτη ὕπαρξις τῆς θελήσεως ἢ μὴ θελήσεως. 9.19 ἐγέννησεν οὖν ἐν τῇ ὑπὲρ βουλὴν καὶ νοῦν φύσει. 9.20 Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδε ἡ πρότασις αὐτῶν ἀτοπίας ἀνάμεστος. ἡγεῖται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν θέλειν πάθος ἐπιθυμίας, τοῦ δὲ μὴ θέλειν μέν, ποιεῖν δέ, ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης βία μετὰ τοῦ προεπινοεῖσθαι τὴν βούλησιν καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνης τὴν νόησιν τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως τῆς πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως ἐχούσης συνυφεστὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα. 9.21 Πρὸς τούτῳ εἰ πιστεύουσι τὰ πάντα ἐκ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ γεγονέναι, οὐ προϋπάρχει ἡ βούλησις. ἀμήχανον γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον μὴ τὸν δημιουργὸν ὑφεστάναι καὶ μετέπειτα δεδόχθαι τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργῆσαι. 9.22 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀσυνεσίας μεστόν. εἰ γὰρ αὐτός φησιν· «ἐγώ εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἠλλοίωμαι», πῶς ἡ ἀναλλοίωτος φύσις ἀλλοίωσιν ὑποσταίη κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις μὴ ἐν ταυτότητι τῶν προσώπων ἑστῶσα, ἀλλὰ κινουμένη καὶ μεταπίπτουσα; 9.23 Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο. εἰ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ οὖν ἀληθές, τό «ἅπερ ἂν ὁ πατὴρ ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ», ποιήσει καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἄλλον υἱόν, ἵνα πάντα ὁμοίως τῷ πατρὶ ποιήσῃ. 9.24 εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν κτίσμα οὐδ' ἡγεῖται αὐτοῦ πατρικὴ βούλησις. 9.25 Εἴποιμι καὶ ἕτερον· εἰ λέγει ὁ σωτήρ· «θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ θεωρῶν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον», οὐκ ἐκ θελήματος ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὁ θεωρῶν αὐτόν. 9.26 τὸ γὰρ θέλημα μετὰ τὸν υἱὸν κἀνταῦθα εὑρίσκεται. 9.27 Ἀπεώσαιτο δ' ἂν καθ' ὅλου τις θᾶττον αὐτῶν καὶ τουτονὶ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐκ μόνων τῶν προλεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπαχθησομένων πρὸς ἡμῶν· τουτέστιν, εἴγε παραπλήσιον ἀντέρηται αὐτούς· «πότερον ποτὲ ὁ πατὴρ θελήσας ὑπάρχει ἢ οὔ;», τὰ ἴσα γὰρ ὧν ἐμελέτησαν ἀπαντήσει αὐτοῖς· πρὸς μὲν τὸ «οὐ θελήσας», ὅτι παρὰ σκοπὸν αὐτῷ συνέβη τὸ ὑφεστάναι, φύσεως ἀνάγκης εἰς τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἄκοντα περιτρεπούσης· πρὸς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, ὅτι πρὸ τῆς θελήσεως οὐκ ἦν· ἀναχθήσεται γὰρ ἡ ὕπαρξις αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν βούλησιν αὐτοῦ· δημιουργικῶς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὰς βαττολογίας αὐτῶν, εἰς ὑπόστασιν περιελαυνούσης. 9.28 Ὁμοίως καὶ ἄλλο, λέξει μόνον διαφέρον τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· «θελητῶς ὁ θεὸς ἀθάνατός ἐστιν καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἢ ἀνεθελήτως;» ἐπενεχθήσεται γὰρ τὰ αὐτά. 9.29 Κάλλιον δέ τις ποιήσει, εἰ συντόμως ἀποκρίνηται αὐτοῖς, μηδὲν ἐπισυμβαίνειν τῷ παντελείῳ θεῷ μηδέ τι ἀπολιμπάνειν αὐτόν· 9.30 καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ προηγεῖται τῆς πατρικῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ ἀθανασίας καὶ ἀγαθότητος θέλημα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῆς γεννήσεως· καὶ ἀπᾴδειν πάντα ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα τῆς περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνθυμήσεως· 9.31 περὶ δὲ τῶν κτιστῶν τὸν ∆αυῒδ ᾄδειν ἐν ριγʹ ψαλμῷ· 9.31 «ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ, πάντα ὅσα ἐθέλησεν ἐποίησεν», καί «πάντα ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐποίησας», τουτέστιν ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, οὐχὶ δὲ ἐν θελήματι, 9.32 καὶ ἐν οβʹ ψαλμῷ· «ἐκράτησας τῆς χειρὸς τῆς δεξιᾶς μου, ἐν τῇ βουλῇ