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what is considered to be of equal honor makes the power equal; for the lack of any of these becomes an accusation of imperfection with respect to power. For no one would attest equal power to one who has effected great things and to one who has effected small things. For instance, one man has surpassed a hundred years in a prosperous and happy old age, flourishing with children, attended by descendants, and glorying in the generation after them, without sickness, without harm, held in honor, without grief, having an abundance of wealth, and whatever else in this life is considered precious, being blessed in all things; another was suffocated as soon as he was brought into the light, as indeed many of the newborn are the infants of courtesans or adulteresses, which their mothers, having conceived unlawfully, dispatch with their own hands, stealing the proof of their guilt by death. Where is the power of fate in these cases? How is it that the strength of destiny was not sufficient for the same measure of life? For if your argument thinks it necessary to attribute power to it, its strength will appear equally in all beings. For it will not be strong in one case, and powerless in another, if it is truly understood to be in power; and power is known by its results. Therefore, life will have no anomaly, with all 43 alike displaying in themselves the highest measure of happiness, because according to your argument all are subject to destiny, and you say that it is always able to do all things. If, therefore, this destiny can do all things and always, it will be able to do all things for all people. And yet there are many and various differences in the lives of men, with respect to dignities and possessions and the measures of their years and the temperaments of their bodies and all those things by which one is called blessed or wretched. Therefore, the inequality of the results clearly demonstrates that that fate or destiny, fashioned by your argument, cannot do all things. For if we consider long life a work of power, a swift death is certainly one of weakness. Therefore, it is fitting to dogmatize that one of the destinies is weak, and the other is powerful. For since short-lived is the opposite of long-lived, each of these is certainly brought about by opposites. For no one would attach to the same cause both blessedness and misery, but if the one were achieved through power, the other was certainly not established except through a lack of power. For misery is understood by nothing else than in not being able to become blessed. And yet the wretched are more numerous throughout life. Therefore the weakness of destiny is demonstrated to be greater than its power. Where, then, is that invincible and all-powerful and unalterable necessity, that to it should be assigned the authority over all things ordained in life, which has been proven by the sequence of the argument to be weak in the majority of cases? But you will say that for this man it wills this, but for the other it does not will the same, but it is able for both whatever it wills. 44 Therefore, you will surely add the reason for the difference in these choices. This man and that man, you see no variation in nature between them, neither for this one is his good or evil state from his own choice, nor for the other, but this one, preceding by a short time, leapt from his mother's womb, nature having thus discharged him by chance, and that one after him either immediately or a little later. And because of this, the same life is not allotted to both, but the one is happy or a king, if it so happens, wrapped in gold and purple at his first birth, while the other, the child of some poor or enslaved parents, is not even swaddled in rags by those who bore him. What wrong, then, did he commit by preceding or by being a little later in time, not by his own intention but by the movement of nature, that for this reason the dishonor of this life should be allotted to him? What defense for that mistress of yours will you find in such cases? Where is the justice? Where is the piety? Where is the righteousness? Or do you say that destiny cares for none of these things, nor does it look to virtue, nor has any concern for any good thing? Therefore if not these things with earnestness

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εἶναι νομίζεται τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁμότιμον ἀπεργάζεται· ἡ γὰρ ἔλλειψις τούτων τινὸς τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἀτελοῦς κατηγορία γίνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἴσην προσμαρτυρήσειε δύναμιν τῷ τε μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ ἐνεργήσαντι. οἷον ὁ μὲν ὑπερβέβηκεν ἑκατὸν ἔτη ἐν γήρᾳ λιπαρῷ καὶ εὐδαίμονι, παισὶν εὐθηνούμενος, ἐκγόνοις δορυφορούμενος καὶ τῷ μετὰ τούτους ἐπαγαλλόμενος γένει, ἄνοσος, ἀπήμων, ἐπίτιμος, ἄλυπος, πλούτου δαψιλῶς ἔχων, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον τοῦτον ἐν τιμίοις νενόμισται, διὰ πάντων μακαριζόμενος· ἕτερος ὁμοῦ τῷ παραχθῆναι εἰς φῶς κατεπνίγη, οἷα δὴ πολλὰ τῶν γεννωμένων ἐστὶν ἑταιρικὰ ἢ μοιχίδια βρέφη ἅπερ τῶν μητέρων αἱ παρανόμως κυήσασαι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν χερσὶ διαχειριζόμεναι θανάτῳ τὸν ἔλεγχον κλέ πτουσι. ποῦ ἡ δύναμις ἐπὶ τούτων τῆς μοίρας; πῶς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ζωῆς μέτρον ἡ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἰσχὺς οὐκ ἐξήρκεσεν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτῇ προσμαρτυρεῖν ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος οἴεται δεῖν, ἐπίσης πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἡ ἰσχὺς αὐτῆς φανήσεται. οὐ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἰσχύσει, τὸ δὲ οὐ δυνήσεται, εἴπερ ἀληθῶς ἐν δυνάμει καταλαμβάνεται· ἡ δὲ δύναμις διὰ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων γνωρίζεται. οὐκοῦν οὐδεμίαν ἀνωμαλίαν ὁ βίος ἕξει πάντων 43 ὁμοίως τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μέτρον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δεικνύντων διὰ τὸ πάντας μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὑμῶν ὑπὸ τὴν εἱμαρμένην κεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταύτην ἀεὶ δύνασθαι λέγειν ὑμᾶς. εἰ οὖν καὶ πάντα καὶ ἀεὶ δύναται ἡ εἱμαρμένη αὕτη, πάντα ἐπὶ πάντων δυνήσεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν πολλαὶ καὶ ποικίλαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῦ βίου διαφοραὶ κατά τε τὰς ἀξίας καὶ τὰς περιουσίας καὶ τὰ τῶν χρόνων μέτρα καὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων κράσεις καὶ πάντα ὅσα δι' ὧν ἢ μακαριστός τις ἢ ἄθλιος ὀνομάζεται. ἄρα τὸ μὴ πάντα δύνασθαι τὴν ἀναπλασθεῖσαν ἐκείνην τῷ λόγῳ μοῖραν ἢ εἱμαρμένην ἡ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἀνισότης σαφῶς ἐπιδείκνυσιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μακρόβιον δυνάμεως ἔργον νομίζομεν, ἀσθενείας πάντως ἐστὶ τὸ ὠκύμορον. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεῖν τῶν εἱμαρμένων, τὴν δὲ δύνασθαι δογματίζειν προσήκει. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ πολυχρονίῳ τὸ ὀλιγόβιον, διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ὑφίσταται πάντως τούτων ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας ἐξάψειε μακαρι σμόν τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο κατορθωθείη διὰ τοῦ δύνασθαι, τὸ ἕτερον οὐ συνέστη πάντως παρὰ τὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἔλλειψιν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἡ ἀθλιότης καταλαμβάνεται ἢ ἐν τῷ μὴ δυνηθῆναι γενέσθαι μακάριον. ἀλλὰ μὴν πλείους παρὰ τὸν βίον οἱ ἄθλιοι. οὐκοῦν πλείων ἡ ἀσθένεια τῆς εἱμαρμένης παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιδείκνυται. ποῦ οὖν ἡ ἄμαχος ἐκείνη καὶ παντοδύναμος καὶ ἀπαράβατος ἀνάγκη, ὥστε ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τίθεσθαι πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἰκονομουμένων τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἥτις ἀπηλέγχθη διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ λόγου ἀσθενὴς ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν; Ἀλλ' ἐρεῖς ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τοῦτο βούλεται, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἴσον οὐ βούλεται, δύναται δὲ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν ὅπερ βούλεται. 44 πάντως οὖν καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν προσθήσεις τῆς τῶν προαιρέσεων τούτων διαφορᾶς. ἄνθρωπος οὗτος καὶ οὗτος, οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν παραλλαγὴν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων βλέπεις, οὔτε τούτῳ τὸ καλὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἐκ προαιρέσεως οὔτε τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' οὗτος μικρόν τι τοῦ χρόνου προλαβὼν τῆς μητρῴας νηδύος ἐξέθορεν οὕτω κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν αὐτὸν ἀποσκευασαμένης τῆς φύσεως, ἐκεῖνος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον ἢ εὐθὺς ἢ μετ' ὀλίγον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφοτέροις βίος ἀποκληροῦται, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων ἢ βασιλεύς, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, χρυσῷ καὶ πορφυρίδι παρὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἐνειλούμενος, ὁ δέ τινος τῶν πενιχρῶν ἢ δούλων οὐδὲ ῥακίοις παρὰ τῶν γεννησαμένων αὐτὸν σπαργανούμενος. τί οὖν ἠδίκησεν ἢ προλαβὼν ἢ ἐφυστερίσας τῷ χρόνῳ μικρόν, οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν πρόθεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως κίνησιν, ὡς αὐτῷ τούτου ἕνεκεν ἀποκληρωθῆναι τοῦ βίου τὴν ἀτιμίαν; ποίαν τῆς δεσποίνης ὑμῶν ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπολογίαν εὑρήσετε; ποῦ τὸ δίκαιον; ποῦ τὸ εὐσεβές; ποῦ τὸ ὅσιον; ἢ τούτων οὐδενὸς μέλειν φῂς τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν βλέπειν οὐδέ τινος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν; οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ταῦτα διὰ σπουδῆς