by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal; for the eternal does not need the presence or absence of anything in order to exist. If the change of the principles comes about by the presence and absence of the contraries, it is clear that the change comes from their being principles. How then can they remain principles, having cast off their being principles? If a principle having a principle is not a principle, how can matter, which has form as the principle of its being and privation as the principle of its not-being, be a principle? How is it not superfluous to call nature the substrate of privation, which is neither substance nor a 'this something' nor being? If principles are neither from others nor from one another, but privation is from the absence of the form and the form from the absence of the privation, how are form and privation not principles from one another? For by the absence of each other they are productive of each other. If matter has the same relation to substance and the 'this something' and being that bronze has to the statue that is to be made from it, how is it that the bronze, if it is not a substance and a 'this something' and a being, cannot have a relation to the statue, while matter, being neither a substance nor a 'this something' nor a being, can have an analogy to the bronze? If all things observed in the compositions of natural things are knowable by sense, how is matter, from which sensible things come, knowable by analogy and not by sense, or how is it at all possible for sensible things to come from something non-sensible? If both being a 'this something' and being one principle exist, how does matter have the property of being one principle, but does not have the property of being a 'this something'? And if being a 'this something' and not being a 'this something' is substance, how is it that matter is not a 'this something', but is not a substance? How can one exclude matter from being one, who has divided it into two kinds, both into that which underlies what is coming to be and into that which is opposed? If it is not yet clear from what has been said whether the form or the substrate is substance, how has he stated apodictically concerning matter that it is neither substance nor a 'this something' nor being? For he has said that matter is the substrate. At one time that it is neither substance nor a 'this something' nor being, at another that it is unclear if it is substance, how is this not characteristic of those who do not know what they are saying? d. From the same discourse. The first philosophers, in seeking the truth and the nature of things, were turned aside as if onto another path, being pushed off by inexperience, and they say that nothing that exists either comes to be or perishes because it is necessary for what comes to be to come to be either from what is or from what is not, but it is impossible from either of these; for neither can what is come to be (for it already is) and from what is not, nothing could come to be (for something must underlie it). And so, extending the consequence that follows, they say not even that many things exist, but only Being itself. These things too are sufficient to bear witness to the truth of what is by us

παρουσίᾳ αὑτῆς καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ, ἔσονται ἄρα αἱ ἀρχαὶ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων γιγνόμεναί τε καὶ ἀναιρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀΐδιοι· τὸ γὰρ ἀΐδιον παρουσίας τινὸς καὶ ἀπουσίας οὐ χρῄζει πρὸς τὸ εἶναι. Eἰ τῇ παρουσίᾳ καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν ἐναντίων γίνεται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μεταβολή, δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὰς ἀρχάς. Πῶς οὖν δύνανται μένειν ἀρχαί, αἱ ἀποβεβλη κυῖαι τὸ εἶναι ἀρχαί; Eἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή, πῶς ἡ ὕλη, τοῦ μὲν εἶναι ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὴν στέρησιν, δύναται εἶναι ἀρχή; Τὸ φύσιν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ στερήσει, τὸ μήτε οὐσία ὂν μήτε τόδε τι μήτε ὄν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι περιττόν; Eἰ ἀρχαὶ οὔτε ἐξ ἄλλων εἰσὶν οὔτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἔστι δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀπουσίας τοῦ εἴ δους ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀπουσίας τῆς στερήσεως τὸ εἶ δος, πῶς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀρχαί, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις; Τῇ γὰρ ἀπουσίᾳ ἀλλήλων ποιητικαὶ ἀλλήλων. Eἰ ὃν ἔχει λόγον ὁ χαλκὸς πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι ἀνδριάντα, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν, πῶς ὁ μὲν χαλκός, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ οὐσία καὶ τόδε τι καὶ ὄν, λόγον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἀνδριάντα οὐ δύ ναται, ἡ δὲ ὕλη, μήτε οὐσία οὖσα μήτε τόδε τι μήτε ὄν, ἀνα λογίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν χαλκὸν δύναται; Eἰ πάντα τὰ ἐν συ στάσεσι τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρούμενα αἰσθήσει ἐστὶν ἐπιστητά, πῶς ἡ ὕλη, ἐξ ἧς τὰ αἰσθητά, ἀναλογίᾳ ἐστὶν ἐπιστητὴ καὶ οὐκ αἰσθήσει, ἢ πῶς ὅλως ἐκ μὴ αἰσθητοῦ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τὰ αἰσθητά; Eἰ τόδε τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, πῶς ἡ ὕλη τὸ μὲν εἶναι μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτὴν τόδε τι οὐκ ἔχει; Καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶναι τόδε τι καὶ τὸ τόδε τι μὴ εἶναι οὐσία ἐστί, πῶς ἡ ὕλη τὸ μὲν τόδε τι μὴ εἶναί ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι; Πῶς δὲ δύναταί τις ἐκβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἶναι ἕν, ὁ διελὼν αὐτὴν εἰς δύο εἴδη, εἴς τε τὸ ὑποκεί μενον τῷ γιγνομένῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον; Eἰ οὔπω δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, εἰ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, πῶς ἀποφαντικῶς εἴρηκε περὶ τῆς ὕλης τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν οὐσίαν μήτε τόδε τι μήτε ὄν; Τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον εἴρηκεν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην. Ποτὲ μὲν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν οὐσίαν μήτε τόδε τι μήτε ὄν, ποτὲ δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὐσία ἐστί, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τῶν οὐκ εἰδότων ὅ φασιν; δ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ζητήσαντες οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ φασὶν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν γίγνε σθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐθὲν ἂν γενέσθαι (ὑποκεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖ). Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμ βαῖνον αὔξοντες οὐδὲ εἶναι πολλά φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. Ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα μαρτυρῆσαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦ ὑφ' ἡμῶν