comes to be, either when some natural disease occurs or also when an external afflictive accident befalls us. But if these things were properly evils and not rather educational things devised by God's providence for the correction of men, they would not become a cause of any good. But as it is, often even the expectation of these things restrains even those who are too prone to sin | and makes them fear God and ward off the harm from these things, and it stirs us up to beseech God whether the expected thing be a wild beast or a reptile or war or plague or famine or some sickness, or slander and a plot contrived from the evil intention of men, which is properly evil for the one doing it, being a sin, but for the one suffering it, it is not properly evil, though it is afflictive; and afflictive things are not in every case evils, but for those who are courageous according to God, they become the cause of the greatest renown among men, and store up for them eternal benefactions and rewards with God. 16. Therefore, let no one be deceived by calling afflictive things properly evils. For if what is afflictive is evil, and not rather educational and something that calls one to righteousness and every kind of virtue, let no one strike his sinning son, let no one praise one who has been entrusted with some authority for striking down a robber with the sword or for sanctioning by judicial decree that he be handed over to wild beasts for food, let no one praise the physician for cutting away a putrefied wound with the knife; for he afflicts the one being treated. Let no one permit the compounding of antidotes from vipers, if, as the Manichaeans say, reptiles are evil. But those who ignorantly revile these things are ignorant that everything is good which perfectly fulfills the purpose for which it was created by God. But if, as has been shown, these things have been devised for our correction and exist by the providence of God, how are these things not exceedingly good, even if some of them are not substances, but only occur from a natural weakness. 17. Of natural things, some are brought about by the necessity of nature. And I say that these things are brought about by the necessity of nature which happen automatically and against our will by nature, such as dying and a living being growing up to the appointed age. But some things happen in accordance with nature, but it is possible for them not to happen, for example, begetting children through intercourse; for this is among the contingent things; for begetting children does not in every case follow intercourse. All these things, therefore, that happen by the necessity of nature are accomplished without sin even among men who are governed by reason. But as for things that may or may not happen, in the case of irrational nature they are not liable to account, whatever kind of activity they may have; for they do not have reason by nature to scrutinize their actions; but in the case of men, since they are regulated by reason, these things are sometimes properly evils, whenever right reason does not guide the action, having been weakened by our indolence or even completely inflamed by the desires of sensual pleasures. For sin is the irrational choice and use by rational beings of things according to nature that may or may not happen; but the virtue of man is the ability to do something, and to be stimulated by natural impulse, but if it should be improper when done in a certain way or when done at all, to abstain from this action, using reason as a guide and trampling on the bait of sensual pleasure. 18. But they say: "Why | has God not made us incapable of sinning, so that we might not sin even willingly?" But those who propose such things seem to be indignant that God has not made them stones and wood, and to blame the Benefactor because He made men rational and not rather immobile with respect to the choice of good and evil. But if they say: "We ought to have been made rational and to know good and evil, but to stand unchangeably in the doing of good," they seem to me to be seeking nothing other than that we should not have become men, but of the

γίνεται, ἢ φυσικῆς τινος νόσου ἐπιγενο- μένης ἢ καὶ ἔξωθεν συμπτώματος ἡμῖν κακωτικοῦ συμβάντος. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα κακὰ κυρίως ὑπῆρχε καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον παιδευτικὰ ἐκ θεοῦ προνοίας πρὸς σωφρονισμὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐξηυρημένα, οὐκ ἂν αἰτία τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐγίνετο. Νῦν δὲ πολλάκις καὶ ἡ τούτων ἐλπὶς ἄγχει καὶ τοὺς ἄγαν εὐολίσθους πρὸς ἁμαρτίαν | καὶ θεὸν δεδοικέναι ποιεῖ καὶ ἀμύνειν τὴν ἐκ τούτων ἐπήρειαν, ἱκετεύειν <δὲ> ἡμᾶς διανίστησι τὸν θεὸν εἴτε θηρίον ἢ ἑρπετὸν ἢ πόλεμος ἢ λοιμὸς ἢ λιμὸς ἢ ἀσθένειά τις εἴη τὸ ἐλπιζόμενον ἢ συκοφαντία καὶ ἐπιβουλὴ ἐκ φαύλης προαιρέσεως ἀνθρώπων μηχανωμένη, ἥτις κυρίως μὲν κακόν ἐστι τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἁμαρτία τυγχάνουσα, τῷ δὲ πάσχοντι οὐ κυρίως κακόν, κακωτικὸν μέντοι· καὶ τὰ κακωτι- κὰ οὐ πάντως κακά, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ θεὸν ἀνδρείοις πρόξενα μεγίστης εὐδοξίας γίνεται παρ' ἀνθρώποις, εὐεργεσίας τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς αἰωνίους θησαυρίζει τούτοις παρὰ θεῷ. 16. Μὴ οὖν τις ἀπατάσθω τὰ κακωτικὰ ὀνομάζων κυρίως κακά. Εἰ γὰρ κακόν ἐστι τὸ κακωτικὸν καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον παιδευτικὸν καὶ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ παντοίαν ἀρετὴν προκαλούμενον, μηδεὶς τυπτέτω τὸν υἱὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα, μηδεὶς ἐπαινείτω τὸν ἀρχήν τινα πεπιστευμέ- νον λῃστὴν καταβάλλοντα ξίφει ἢ θηρίοις πρὸς βρῶσιν ψήφῳ δικαστικῇ κυροῦντα παραδίδοσθαι, μηδεὶς τὸν ἰατρὸν ἐπαινῇ τῷ σιδήρῳ πάθος σεσηπὸς ἀποτέμνοντα· κακοῖ γὰρ τὸν ἰατρευόμε- νον. Μηδεὶς συγχωρείτω θηριακὰ ἐξ ἐχιδνῶν συντιθέναι, εἴπερ κακά, ὥς φασιν οἱ Μανιχαῖοι, τὰ ἑρπετά. Ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν οἱ ταῦτα ἀπείρως διαλοιδορούμενοι ὅτι καλόν ἐστι πᾶν ὅπερ ἀνελλιπῶς ἔχει πρὸς ὃ δεδημιούργηται παρὰ θεοῦ. Εἰ δέ, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται, πρὸς σωφρονισμὸν ἡμῶν ἐξηύρηται ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι προνοίᾳ θεοῦ, πῶς οὐ καλὰ λίαν ταῦτα, εἰ καί τινα αὐτῶν μὴ οὐσίαι τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκ φυσικῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν. 17. Τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἀνάγκῃ φύσεως ἐπιτελεῖται. Ἀνάγκῃ δὲ φύσεως λέγω ταῦτα τελεῖσθαι ὅσα αὐτομάτως καὶ ἀκόντων ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίνεται, ὡς τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ αὔξειν μέχρι τῆς ὡρισμένης ἡλικίας τὸν ζῶντα. Τινὰ δὲ ἀκολου- θίᾳ μὲν φύσεως γίνεται, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι, οἷον τὸ παιδοποιεῖν διὰ μίξεως· τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖ τῇ μίξει παιδοποιΐα. Ταῦτα οὖν πάντα ὅσα ἀνάγκῃ φύσεως γίνεται ἄνευ ἁμαρτίας ἀποτελεῖται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς τῷ λόγῳ διοικουμένοις. Ὅσα δὲ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ἀλόγου φύσεως ἀνεύθυνα τυγχάνει, οἵαν δ' ἂν ἔχοι τὴν ἐνέργειαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι λόγον κατὰ φύσιν δοκιμάζοντα τὰ πρακτέα· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἅτε δὴ λόγῳ ῥυθμιζομένων, ἐστὶν ἐνίοτε ταῦτα κυρίως κακά, ὅτε δὴ μὴ λόγος ὀρθὸς ἡγεῖται τῆς πράξεως ἐκ ῥαθυμίας ἡμῶν ἀσθενήσας ἢ καὶ παντελῶς πυρωθεὶς ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἡδυπαθειῶν. Ἁμαρτία γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι τε καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν λογικῶν ἀλόγιστος αἵρεσίς τε καὶ χρῆσις· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δύνασθαί τι πράττειν, ὑπό τε τῆς φυσικῆς κινήσεως ἐρεθίζεσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἄτοπον εἴη τοιῶσδε γινόμε- νον ἢ καὶ παντελῶς γινόμενον, ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς πράξεως τούτου κυβερνήτῃ λογισμῷ κεχρημένον καὶ καταπατεῖν τῆς ἡδυπαθείας τὸ δέλεαρ. 18. Ἀλλά φασιν· Τί γὰρ | οὐκ ἀνεπιδέκτους πεποίηκεν ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μηδὲ ἑκόντες ἁμαρτάνοιμεν; Οἱ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα προβαλλόμενοι ἐοίκασιν ἀγανακτεῖν ὅτι μὴ λίθους καὶ ξύλα πεποίηκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς καὶ μέμφεσθαι τὸν εὐεργέτην ὅτι λογικοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργάσατο καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἀκινή- τους πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ πονηροῦ. Εἰ δέ φασιν· Ἔδει ἡμᾶς πεποιῆσθαι λογικοὺς καὶ εἰδέναι ἀγαθόν τε καὶ πονηρόν, ἀτρέπτως δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἵστασθαι πράξει, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔοικασί μοι ζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔδει ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς